Coastwatching Remembered

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Downs, Ian G F
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History - general, Naval Historical Review
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THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY established a coast watching organisation prior to the outbreak of war in 1939. It was a voluntary service under which selected persons undertook to report to the Navy all matters of naval interest in their area.

Immediately after the outbreak of war with Germany the organisation was expanded to cover thousands of miles of Australian coast and the mainland and islands of Papua New Guinea. Volunteer observers manned the arc of islands stretching under the equator from west of Manus to the eastern edge of the British Solomon Islands. This 1200 miles screen of early warning was shattered by the impact of the Japanese invasion in January 1942. Most AWA radio stations which had been relaying Coastwatchers’ reports closed. No effective forces on land, sea or in the air existed to take advantage of Coastwatchers’ reports or to even maintain those now marooned in forward positions. Many brave and able men were killed because they rejected opportunities for their own escape while giving help to others. Regrettably some were executed as civilian spies because naval regulations and a tight budget could not be stretched in time to provide protection of uniforms or even badges. Nor were their dependants eligible for pension when these men were killed.

Many of the original Coastwatchers were government officers with conflicting duties, such as the evacuation of the civilian population. Some were able to discharge these responsibilities and still remain or return as Coastwatchers while others understandably joined the regular fighting services. The gaps were filled to meet the main operational requirements and those in the forefront of the battle who had not come from the armed forces were given rank or rating in the Naval Reserve.

Fortunately there were a few who survived the first onslaught and maintained themselves in situations of extraordinary advantage from which they were able to take a direct and decisive part in the war against Japan. By their efforts, these men justified the whole concept of the organisation and what had begun as an irregular unit was expanded and adopted by both South Pacific and South West Pacific Command Headquarters as a vital and regular intelligence force operating by design behind enemy lines.

Early warning systems of intelligence are wasted unless they can be exploited by offence or defence forces capable of taking advantage of them. On December 7th 1941 the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour crippled the Americans in the Pacific. Japanese sea, air and land power literally swarmed over South East Asia towards the northern and eastern approaches to Australia. In retrospect there is little doubt that if the Japanese had accepted the evidence of the token forces they found at Rabaul as a guide to what they could then expect further south, they would have successfully launched an invasion of Australia long before the United States could have intervened.

In January 1942 Con (Cornelius) Page, the Coastwatcher on Simberi Island in the Tabar group, made the first report of enemy formations heading for Rabaul in New Britain. Over the next two weeks his continued warnings were amplified by reports coming in from Coastwatchers Kyle and Benham in New Ireland. Rabaul’s harbour defence guns were put out of action by Japanese aircraft which a handful of ancient Wirraway fighters were unable to divert. When the invasion came, the defence force of less than a battalion was disrupted by the scale of the attack and did not manage to regroup under its own officers. Remnants making their way south were subsequently gathered together (largely by the efforts of Coastwatchers from South New Britain, organised by J.K. McCarthy) and evacuated with civilians to the mainland. Rabaul became a major base for the Japanese.

A chapter in Commander Eric Feldt’s book “The Coastwatchers” tells the heroic and tragic stories of Page - who survived unarmed, amongst increasingly hostile natives, on a small island in what had become a Japanese sea, for another five months before being betrayed to the enemy - and of Kyle and Benham who also were the victims of informers and executed by the Japanese. These men made their own decisions to remain as Coastwatchers in an organisation that they knew could now do little to help them. They had the frustration of knowing that even their reports could not be exploited by a single allied aircraft. In fact, many months were to go by before Coastwatchers in New Guinea would see even allied reconnaissance flights. They needed great faith as well as fortitude to keep their positions.

Commander Feldt’s efforts to obtain assistance and rescue operations for his men were handicapped by the tense defensive operations in which all allied forces were then engaged, but assistance was generously given when this was at all practicable and in the months ahead US submarines, then aircraft of both the RAAF and the USAAF brought supplies and landed or picked up Coastwatchers, often at great risk to themselves.

Meanwhile, further to the east, events were moving rapidly down the island chain from Rabaul to the Solomons where high island mountains command deep channels between tropical islands of unforgettable beauty. Bougainville, The Shortlands, Choiseul, Vella Levella, Kolombargara, Rendova, were all guardians of sea lanes leading to the passage of blue water between New Georgia and Santa Isobel that fighting men called ‘The Slot.’ Eastwards the passage narrows with the broad island of Guadalcanal on the south and the long dark shape of Malaita to the north. The approach between these islands is divided by Tulagi in the small Florida group facing the northern slopes of Guadalcanal and by the conical peak of Savo lying off the western end of the same island. These are all names that thousands of Americans and those who served with the Australian Squadron will always remember. For Coastwatchers, starting with Bougainville, they are a roll of honour. Coastwatchers were eventually operating from all the main islands and even from the distant atolls of Rennel in the South East and Ontong Java, 300 miles to the north of Guadalcanal. They observed and made their reports of enemy activity despite harassment from Japanese patrols and without any possibility of rescue or retreat. The waters off Guadalcanal and east of Savo became known as ‘Iron Bottom Sound’ and the long savage struggle for the Solomons and the base of Guadalcanal attracted major forces from both sides. This allied victory was the climax of the war for the South West Pacific.

The Japanese occupied Sohano in Buka Passage (between Buka Island and Bougainville) at the end of March 1942, and began to occupy all the important points of the main island. At about the same time, American forces had occupied New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. In May, the Japanese swept eastward to the grassy coastal plains of Guadalcanal’s north coast. In June, the battle of Midway arrested Japan’s unlimited control of the sea and gave back some initiative to the Americans. Their first move was to make a major amphibious assault to capture the Japanese base on Guadalcanal and turn it into an allied airfield. This became known as Henderson Field and was held by American Marines and Army divisions with great tenacity against daily attacks from the enemy, which continued for many months. In November 1942 the Japanese made another supreme effort which was only defeated after very bitter fighting.

Almost all the sea and air attacks and the convoys of Japanese troops were staged or assembled from Rabaul and harbours in Bougainville and New Ireland. Many large sea and air formations were involved and nearly all of them were observed and reported - first by Read from northern Bougainville and then by Mason - operating in the southern sector of the same large island. Their reports were relayed, confirmed or amplified by the expanding screen of observers occupying positions in other islands at different crossroads on the way to Guadalcanal. Recognition and description of types of planes and ships became expert and familiarity with enemy habits made it possible to anticipate major attacks or the assembly of a convoy of troops. Read and Mason were forced off the air on only a few occasions. Allied forces were often able to destroy attacks before they could be developed and defending fighter aircraft were ready at high altitude to repel Japanese raids when they arrived.

A situation was developed in which the Coastwatchers had their own communications centre at Lungoa, close to Henderson Field. Direct listening watches were kept by ships on the Coastwatchers’ frequency and their reports were broadcast to the whole of the Pacific from Pearl Harbour. Codes were improved and simplified, but for a period the urgency of the signals dictated that they should be made in plain language so that ships could rapidly disperse and ground forces react to the warning of air attack.

Allied airmen forced down by the fighting were often rescued by Coastwatchers and kept safely from searching Japanese patrols. As the tide of war turned in our favour Coastwatchers were gradually relieved or replaced in close liaison with the requirements of each operational area. Their final activity, when the Japanese were bypassed or in retreat, was to arm bands of local natives and direct them in guerrilla operations against the remnants of the enemy. The whole pattern for their operations was developed from what had been achieved on Bougainville. Coast-watchers took part in the campaigns that dislodged the Japanese from Buna, Salamaua, Lae, Finschafen, the Rai Coast, Madang, Wewak, Aitape, Vanimo and across the border into Dutch New Guinea.

It is not the purpose of this account to list names or record all the actions in which Coastwatchers and those serving other units related to them took part. The opportunity that Read and Mason created and exploited on Bougainville was an object lesson for the others and a fair example of the common difficulties that had to be overcome.

W.J. Read was the District Officer at Buka Passage when the Japanese invasion became obvious and like other government officers in situations of importance he had been selected as a Coastwatcher. He immediately realised the danger and limitations of remaining on the small island of Sohano and made preparations to move to the big island of Bougainville where he would have room to maneuver and a choice of observation points. He collected and hid stores at vantage points so that they would be ready when needed. By nature a perfectionist, he took tremendous care of his teleradio equipment, realising that he would be unable to obtain spares or get a replacement for a long time. He was a realist, and understood more clearly than most that he could not expect to enjoy forever the loyalty of the local population. The assistants and carriers he employed were mostly from amongst the ‘foreign’ natives from the New Guinea mainland and other islands who had been marooned by the invasion, which had also terminated their employment. He was careful in his selection of police who were to accompany him. Having done his utmost to secure the escape and dispersal of the civilian population and to advise those who would not leave their properties to seek the safety of the interior, Read was careful to detach himself from them as much as possible in order not to compromise his own usefulness and freedom of action as a Coastwatcher. He was not content to let the war pass him by within the relative safety of a limited contribution. He patrolled widely and made visits to Kieta which had been evacuated by his government superior. Kieta, the administrative headquarters for Bougainville was first taken over by a German and then by the very effective Japanese alien, Tashira. Read continually kept on the move in search of information of the enemy. His selection and supply of future observation points was at all times farsighted and aggressive.

Paul Mason of Inus Plantation was a quiet man whose humble bespectacled presence gives no clue to his vigour, initiative and purposeful self-confidence. Like Jack Read, he had decided to see the war out on Bougainville and made plans to keep himself ‘in being’ as a Coastwatcher. One of his many talents was an ability to maintain and repair radio equipment and this proved of great importance to himself and to other Coastwatchers. A truly spartan man, he did not handicap himself with unnecessary comforts and as the war progressed his ability to precisely identify ships and aircraft in order to make accurate and informative reports became remarkable. After some seventeen months he was withdrawn by submarine when Japanese patrols, one hundred strong, combined in a concentration of inland searches to make the positions of both Read and Mason completely untenable. At no stage had either of them operated without extraordinary risk. Mason returned to Bougainville to take charge of guerrilla operations in 1944 which accounted for hundreds of confirmed Japanese ‘kills’ and the rescue of missionaries and others still interned.

Read and Mason suffered injury and sickness, were frequently without food and forced to live in the open when making their escape from ambush or when their camps and observation posts were betrayed by informers under the pressure of Japanese patrolling. As the war continued, Bougainville became isolated from allied success elsewhere. The Japanese defeat in the Solomons was too distant and the Bougainville people were easily convinced that the Japanese occupation would be permanent. They joined in the harassment of the Coastwatchers. Each time Read and Mason moved, they were eventually hunted down. Their teleradio equipment had to be moved, hidden and left in the jungle. Then it had to be recovered again, sometimes at great risk, and carried to a new observation point to get it back into action. Sometimes a handful of men did this with double loads in relays. They had to forage for fuel to feed their battery chargers as well as find food for themselves. As if these hazards were not enough, they were constantly under pressure from missionaries and hiding civilians to arrange evacuations and rescues which these same people had earlier rejected when better opportunities offered. They both retained the deadly effectiveness of their reporting until their work could be covered by observers placed in other islands. Theirs was a fantastic effort of efficiency over a very long period under continuous pressure from the enemy.

In all this, there are some lessons for the future - if coastwatching has any future - which are surely self evident. The politics of nationalism will now always be a factor in the South West Pacific and reliance upon the support of local populations must be discounted even if future coastwatchers are themselves Melanesian. This factor of loyalty has been overstressed and was generally unreliable when the tide of war was against us in the Japanese war. At its best, it was personal loyalty. This is not a criticism but a realistic recognition that inhabitants of places under occupation by an armed force are not only under great pressure and fear of reprisal against their families but often not able to clearly distinguish between a government de facto and a government de jure. Local knowledge will remain important but local contacts are likely to be hostile.

Future Coastwatchers will have to be self sufficient and able to operate and subsist on what they can carry by themselves. Hopefully this would be concentrated rations, communication equipment of longer range and of a size and weight comparable to a fully packed medium sized suitcase. Those who are unfamiliar with the teleradio equipment which Coastwatchers had to use and carry will have difficulty in believing an accurate description. This disbelief was the first impression of those confronted with the actual unit. The following description is quoted from Commander Feldt’s own account - ‘All parts were enclosed in three metal boxes, each about two feet long by one foot deep and one foot wide. Power was supplied by batteries such as a car uses, which were charged by a small petrol engine. This charging engine, weighing about seventy pounds, was the heaviest part of the set. The 3B teleradio was to be our mainstay in the coming operations, and a grand instrument it was, standing up to the heat, wet and amateur handling. It had a range of up to 400 miles on voice and six hundred miles if the key was used to transmit morse. It had one disadvantage - it was difficult to carry and needed twelve to sixteen carriers for its transportation.’ (The bold is mine). I can only add that the three heavy boxes were usually slung on poles from the handles designed for this purpose so that human porterage could be shared by two men and that petrol was an added requirement for carriers. There were always two batteries and the noise the charger made while giving new life to them was just something else. It may be difficult to believe, but these units were frequently carried for more than one hundred miles to bring them into a new position and that ten miles of porterage in a day was commonplace. The reluctance of carriers will be understood.

A voluntary system of coastwatching breaks down under war conditions when a large percentage of what are necessarily part-time observers find that they have conflicts of duty, some thought to be of greater priority. In the event of war, the tendency is for particular areas to require a concentration of reporting. There may be a case for having a dozen trained and properly equipped teams of four or five men standing by for delivery to those places where they will be most useful. Those who planned ahead for the coastwatching operation did so against the background of stringent budgets and were forced to make plans which would avoid cost by co-opting resources of men and equipment which the navy could not provide. There was certainly no money available for experiment and no staff nucleus available until after the outbreak of hostilities.

In the Japanese war, the first Coastwatchers were self located human outposts of early warning at a time when neither reconnaissance aircraft nor radar were available. Modern electronic devices may have made them obsolete, but at the time their contribution was unique and effective.

They were perhaps best understood and are best remembered in the words of Admiral William F. Halsey, USA, who said of them:
‘The Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal. And Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.’

Originally printed in the Naval Historical Review - Summer 1972 Edition

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