Naval Historical Society of Australia

Preserving Australia's Naval History

You are here: Home / Archives for A.N. Other

A.N. Other

Occasional Paper 86: Royal Australian Navy in the Pacific War

By Richard H Pelvin and Jozef H Straczek

This paper was provided courtesy of the Sea Power Centre – Australia. It was first published in 2003 and is available on the Sea Power Centre website Feature Histories page. Both authors worked for the Defence Department in a range of roles over many years. Jozef Straczek was the Senior Naval Historical Officer in the Naval History Directorate, Department of Defence, Canberra. He has written or contributed to many books and articles on naval history. Among his works is the reference book, The Royal Australian Navy: ships, aircraft and shore establishments (Sydney: Navy Public Affairs, 1996). Richard Pelvin worked for ten years in the historical sections of the Army and Navy. He was also Curator of Official Records at the Australian War Memorial and has written and published widely on military, naval and aviation history.

 

In the morning of 8 December 1941 Japanese troops commenced landing in Northern Malaya. This assault was co-ordinated with the Japanese strike against the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor (7 December, local time). As a consequence of these actions the Royal Australian Navy found itself facing a new enemy and fighting a new war. A war that was to last four years and see Australian ships and personnel operate across the vast expanse of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities six corvettes of the RAN had already been based at Singapore. Other vessels, including the cruiser HMAS Hobart, the destroyer HMAS Vampire and the sloop HMAS Yarra, were ordered back to Australian waters to help meet this new threat. Vampire formed part of the escort of HM Ships Prince of Wales and Repulse on their ill-fated sortie to attack Japanese landing forces at Kuantan on Malaysia’s east coast. She rescued 225 survivors after both the capital ships had been sunk by Japanese naval aircraft.

HMAS Vampire was present for the sinking of HM Ships Prince of Wales and Repulse on 10 December 1941. She would later be sunk herself off Ceylon in April 1942

After this disaster the Australian ships were heavily involved in escorting the troopships bringing reinforcements to Singapore, often in the face of severe Japanese air attacks. On one occasion Yarra lifted over 1300 survivors from the troopship Empress of Asia after it had been dive bombed and sunk. A few days prior to this, on 27 January, Vampirecarried out a spirited but unsuccessful attack on a superior Japanese landing force at Endau. An accompanying British destroyer, HMS Thanet, was sunk. Other ships carried out patrol and evacuation duties. After taking part in the evacuation of Singapore the Australian ships formed part of the force allocated for the naval defence of the Netherlands East Indies.

To remove a threat from their flank while attacking eastern Java the Japanese Navy launched a heavy air raid on Darwin, which was being used by the Allies as a staging point for reinforcements. The bombers hit the town, airfield and harbour facilities, sinking five merchant ships and the destroyer USS Peary. Many other vessels, including the hospital ship Manunda, were damaged. This was the first of many such raids.

In Javanese waters, on 27 February a combined Australian, British, American and Dutch striking force composed of five cruisers, including HMAS Perth, as well as a number of destroyers, engaged Japanese forces covering the approach of a landing force. In this action, the Battle of the Java Sea, the Allies lost two Dutch cruisers and three destroyers with damage to a British cruiser. Subsequently the Allied naval forces were ordered to withdraw from the Dutch East Indies. However, whilst attempting to reach Australia through Sunda Straits, Perth, accompanied by the cruiser USS Houston, RAN into a Japanese force landing troops in Bantam Bay. In the ensuing action both cruisers were sunk with heavy loss of life. Many of the survivors were to subsequently die as prisoners of war.

AA Guns loaded

HMAS Perth displayed incredible fight while outnumbered by a superior force. The ship, superbly led by Captain Hector ‘Hec’ Waller was eventually sunk in the early hours of 1 March 1942.

The Australian built corvettes were able to withdraw successfully to Australia while the destroyer Vampire had reached Ceylon. Also fortunate was the destroyer HMAS Vendetta which had been immobilised and under repair in dry dock at Singapore at the time of the attack. She eventually reached Australia after an epic towing operation through enemy controlled waters. Less fortunate, the sloop Yarra which, whilst escorting a convoy south of Java, was surprised by a Japanese heavy cruiser squadron. Despite putting up a gallant fight she was overwhelmed and sunk on 4 March. The following month, on 9 April, Vampire was also sunk by Japanese carrier aircraft off Ceylon.

With the occupation of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies the strategic centre of gravity moved east. The Japanese, having occupied Rabaul and points on the northern New Guinea coast decided to occupy the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby. This would enable them to deny the Allies bases from which to attack Rabaul and also to threaten the RANs Pacific lines of communication. The Combined Operations Intelligence Centre, located in Melbourne, linking information from locally based signals intelligence units, Coastwatchers and aerial reconnaissance, issued an assessment on 25 April that a Japanese assault on Port Moresby was imminent.

On 1 May the cruisers HMA Ships Australia and Hobart and USS Chicago escorted by three American destroyers sailed from Hervey Bay to rendezvous with an American force built around the aircraft carriers Yorktown and Lexington. The Australian force, designated Task Force 44, reinforced with a fourth US destroyer and detached on 7 May to block the movement of any Japanese ships through the Jomard Passage. The force was bombed that day by Japanese aircraft incurring only superficial damage. Although no other enemy were sighted the presence of the Allied ships was influential in the Japanese decision to withdraw the Moresby Invasion force. Meanwhile US carrier aircraft had sunk the Japanese light carrier Shoho the same day.

In the action between the American and Japanese fleet carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku on the 8th, the Lexington was sunk and the Yorktown badly damaged. Neither of the Japanese carriers were sunk though the Shokaku was badly damaged. Although the Japanese had inflicted greater losses in ships on the Allies they had not achieved their strategic objectives. Further, the Shokaku and Zuikaku had suffered such heavy losses in aircraft and personnel that they were not available for the Midway Operation in early June.

The combined effects of the battle of the Coral Sea, Midway and later the Solomons Campaign turned the tide of the Pacific War. Although no Australian vessels were present at the Battle of Midway, Australian naval signals intelligence played an important part in helping to monitor Japanese movements and intentions and passing this information onto the Americans at Pearl Harbor.

Just prior to the Midway Operation the Japanese again brought the war to Australia’ shores with an attack on Sydney Harbour by midget submarines. The accommodation ship HMAS Kuttabul was sunk alongside Garden Island but all three Japanese submarines were lost. This was not the first incursion by Japanese submarines into Australian waters. In January four minelaying boats had operated in northern Australian waters, laying mines off Darwin and in Torres Strait. One, the I-124, had been sunk by the corvette HMAS Deloraine, assisted by other RAN and US vessels. In February and March the submarine I-25 had launched its reconnaissance seaplane on flights over Sydney, Melbourne and Hobart before moving on to New Zealand and Fiji. Simultaneously, submarine operations off the west coast resulted in the sinking of two merchant vessels and attacks on three others.

The tracks of the three midget submarines through Sydney Harbour

The midget attack presaged a submarine campaign against shipping on Australia’s eastern coast which lasted from early June until August. Fourteen ships were attacked of which six were sunk. Convoys were introduced on the Australian east coast on 6 June. The Japanese submarines also shelled Sydney and Newcastle with little resultant damage. Further operations carried out in the first half of 1943 resulted in the loss of another eleven ships including the hospital ship Centaur.

While the first submarine campaign was being waged, plans were in hand to eject the Japanese from the Solomon Islands. On 7 August an Allied force landed on Guadalcanal. Naval support was provided by an Australian/American force of cruisers and destroyers, including HMAS Australia, Canberra and Hobart. Shortly after midnight on 9 August a Japanese cruiser squadron attacked the allied force sinking Canberra and three American cruisers. Although operations in the Solomons were to continue, further RAN involvement was limited, although valuable support was provided by Coastwatchers.

Later in August the Japanese landed at Milne Bay. Units of the RAN had convoyed troopships to the area and latter supported the defence of the area from the sea. On 29 August the new destroyer HMAS Arunta sank the Japanese submarine RO33 off Port Moresby, thereby removing a major threat to the logistic support for Australian troops. With the successful conclusion of the Milne Bay battle the RAN provided naval support for forces operating in northern New Guinea and commenced development of the string of bases that would be opened up along that coast to support the Allied advance. Operations included conducting hydrographic surveys, shore bombardments, t RAN sporting troops and providing logistic support.

December 1942 saw the commencement of Operation Lilliput, which over a six-month period saw the transportation of 60,000 tons of supplies and 3,802 troops from Milne Bay to Oro Bay, escorted by Australian corvettes. In March 1943 the Japanese suffered a major defeat when a reinforcement convoy heading for Lae was destroyed by Allied air attack in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Intelligence on this convoy was provided by the joint RAN /USN codebreaking organisation in Melbourne.

This same period saw a lesser but significant level of RAN activity in the area north and west of Darwin. While supporting commando operations in Timor the destroyer HMAS Voyager was lost in September 1942 as was the corvette HMAS Armidale in December. With the withdrawal of the commandos the RAN continued to support covert operations in the area by the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) which were maintained until the end of the War. In September 1943 SRD operatives in small boats carried out Operation Jaywick, successfully attacking Japanese shipping in Singapore Harbour. They had been t RAN sported there in a small captured fishing vessel, the Krait. In late 1944 another covert attack on Singapore Harbour was mounted by the SRD but was to end in disaster. Throughout the war the RAN units based on Darwin were also to provide support for settlements, missions, airfields and other military installations in the area. On 22 January 1943, while undertaking one of these voyages, the stores carrier HMAS Patricia Cam was bombed and sunk.

As 1943 and 1944 progressed Australian ships were involved in the campaigns to oust the Japanese from West New Guinea and adjacent islands. In the succession of landings carried out the cruisers and destroyers carried out bombardments and provided seaward cover. The corvettes escorted merchant ships through the area. The armed merchant cruisers HMAS Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia were converted to Landing ships Infantry (LSI). As such they were to take part in many of the amphibious operations such as those at Hollandia, Biak, Aitape and Morotai which brought the Allies closer to the Philippines.

In July 1943 the cruisers were detached from the 7th Fleet for operations in the Solomons area. Enroute to Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides Hobart was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine and put out of action for nearly two years. In the previous month the heavy cruiser Shropshire had been transferred from the Royal Navy as a replacement for Canberra.

Captain John A Collins CB RAN assumed command of HMAS Shropshire on 7 April 1943 and she commissioned as HMAS Shropshire at Chatham on 20 April 1943.

Morotai was taken in September 1944 and from there the landings in Leyte were mounted. The LSIs landed American troops at Panaon while the covering forces included Australia, Shropshire, Arunta and her sister ship HMAS Warramunga. Survey work was carried out by the frigate HMAS Gascoyne. On 20 October a Japanese aircraft crashed into Australia causing heavy damage and casualties and forcing her withdrawal with Warramunga as escort.

In the Battle of Surigao Strait on 25 October Shropshire and Arunta formed part of the large American force formed around six battleships which overwhelmed a much smaller Japanese battle squadron attempting to attack the amphibious forces. Shropshire engaged the battleship Yamashiro with gunfire while Arunta carried out a torpedo attack. Surigao Strait was the last action fought using the traditional battle line. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, of which it was part, remains the largest naval battle in history and saw the end of the Imperial Japanese Navy as a fighting force.

In January 1945 the Allies commenced the invasion of Lingayen. Australia, now repaired, Shropshire, Arunta and Warramunga carried out bombardment duties while Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia landed troops. The sloop HMAS Warrego and the frigate HMAS Gascoyne performed escort duties and carried out survey tasks in Lingayen Gulf. The Allied ships came under frequent air attack, especially from kamikaze aircraft. Gascoyne and Westralia were near missed and Arunta damaged. Australia, however, was grievously damaged when, between 5 and 9 January, she was hit five times. She continued to carry out her bombardment duties until ordered to retire with Arunta on 9 January. The other vessels continued operations in the area until March, by which time the repaired cruiser Hobart had rejoined.

At this time the British Pacific Fleet commenced operations in the Pacific. The RAN was initially represented by the destroyers HMA Ships Quickmatch and Quiberon as well as a number of corvettes. Later the destroyers HMA Ships Napier, Norman, Nizam and Nepal joined. All of these vessels had previously served in the Indian Ocean with the British Eastern Fleet. The destroyers had taken part in attacks on Japanese oil installations in Sumatra and the N Class vessels had supported the Army in Burma. The corvette HMAS Launceston had sunk the submarine RO 110 off Vizagapatam. The destroyers saw service in support of the Okinawa operations in April while the corvettes formed two minesweeping flotillas.

The RAN ‘s last operations in the Pacific were those in support of Australian troops in the landings at Tarakan, Brunei and Balikpapan in May, June and July respectively. As before the cruisers and destroyers provided gunfire support, troops were landed from the three LSIs and the sloops, frigates and corvettes carried out patrol, escort and surveying duties. RAN vessels, especially the smaller motor launches, were also active in the final operations in New Guinea waters.

Upon the conclusion of the war the RAN played a significant part in the arrangements for the surrender of various Japanese forces in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. Minesweeping continued for a number of years after the surrender and Australian service personnel and prisoners of war from around the region were repatriated.

The Pacific War saw an expansion of the infrastructure necessary to support wide ranging naval operations. Defensive minefields were laid in Australian, New Zealand and New Guinea waters. Harbour defence systems were established around Australia and forward operating bases provided logistic support to ships close to the combat areas. The manufacture of mines, torpedoes, guns and ammunition was undertaken as was the development and construction of sophisticated electrical equipment.

Shipbuilding, repair and maintenance facilities were greatly expanded, including the construction of the Captain Cook Graving Dock at Garden Island. Three destroyers, twelve frigates and sixty corvettes as well as numerous smaller vessels were built. A large number of merchant ships were converted for naval purposes and many others were defensively armed and given mine countermeasures. Most of this work was carried out by the men and women of the unarmed forces who worked in the factories and dockyard around Australia.

Women were enlisted into the Navy for the first time and helped provide many of the support functions so desperately needed by a navy at war. Some of these women played an invaluable, and largely unrecognised, role in supporting the large intelligence organisation that had been established. One, Ruby Boye, also served as a Coastwatcher at Vanikoro from February 1942 to October 1944. Before the end of the war the peak strength of the RAN had reached 39,650 with approximately 337 vessels ranging from cruisers to motor launches in service.

In proportion to its size the RAN made a significant contribution to the Allied effort in the war against Japan. This was more noticeable in the earlier days of the war when operations were taking place in Australia’s proximity and before the United States was able to fully deploy its manpower and industrial strength. The amphibious operations, survey, minesweeping, convoy and patrol tasks from late 1942 to 1945 tend to be overlooked yet they were all essential components in the exercise of sea power and ultimately the war in the Pacific was a maritime campaign.

Occasional Paper 84: Operation Musketeer – the 1956 Suez Crisis, RAN Members’ Involvement

This paper was written by Society volunteer, Commander Martin Linsley RAN Rtd. Its genesis was a list of the RAN participants in the Suez Crisis compiled by Mike Fogarty a former RAN officer and diplomat. Contributions were also received from participants; Commodore Kelvin Gulliver AM RAN Rtd and Captain Nick Bailey RAN Rtd who were served as junior officers in HMS Newfoundland at the time.

One chronicler called it ‘the shortest and silliest war in history’[i], but Operation Musketeer, better known as the 1956 Suez Crisis, signified the end of an era and the beginning of a new world order. The conflict focused on the Egyptian owned Suez Canal, and involving a conspiracy orchestrated by France, the UK and Israel. At least 13 members of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) were involved.[ii]

Following the end of WWII, the RAN maintained close links with the UK’s Royal Navy (RN), its parent service. It was common for RAN members, particularly officers, to be posted to the RN for ‘service, training and promotion courses’. The posting was welcomed by many. It began and ended with a 4/5 week’s sea passage travelling first class on a passenger liner. The overseas allowances were good and RAN personnel were the envy of their RN contemporaries. More than one young officer found his future wife during his time in the UK.

Four other RAN members serving with the RN in 1956 had been commissioned from the ranks. Two of them, Graham (Spider) Currie and Leonard Peterson had been conscripted for service in WWII, after which they were accepted into permanent service and undertook officer and specialist training. By September 1965 SBLT Special Duties (the SD designation first being used that year) Currie was serving as a Communications Officer in HMS Woodbridge Haven, the command/depot ship of a Coastal Minesweeping Group. SBLT SD Peterson was a Boatswain Officer in the aircraft carrier HMS Albion. Fellow SD officers Charles Goodwin and Norman (Bruce) MacRae also undertook their officer training in the UK. SBLT Goodwin’s first sea-posting as an Ordinance Engineer officer was to HMS Tyne, a depot/headquarters ship; and for Communications Officer SBLT MacRae it was to the destroyer HMS Cavendish.

In August 1956 another six Australian officers were on their second or third postings with the RN. LCDR Ian Burnside, a navigation specialist, undertook long-course training during his first posting, and was sent to a destroyer HMS Duchess for his second. Rory Burnett was the Torpedo and Anti-Submarine officer in HMS Jamaica, a light cruiser. Onboard another light cruiser, HMS Ceylon, LEUT Ian Macgregor was the Assistant Gunnery Officer. Aged just 27, he had already served six years in UK. Subsequently, he lost his life in the Melbourne/Voyager collision.  LEUT Edmund Melzer was a communications specialist in HMS Woodbbridge Haven assisted by Graham Currie. Donald (Weary) Weil joined the RAN in January 1949 and just eight months later was sent to UK for 3½ years of RN training and service. In March 1956 he was back in UK, and by October he was onboard HMS Bulwark, an aircraft carrier.  LEUT Ian Nicholson undertook the RN Long Communications Course in 1954. On completion he was posted to sea and in October 1956 he was serving in the destroyer HMS Daring.

RN service was the first overseas posting for three young Supply Cadet midshipmen; Brian Bigelow, Keith Denton, and Kelvin Gulliver who were 15-year-old classmates when they joined the Naval College in 1953. After initial training they were sent to the UK in 1955 to join their RN contemporaries in the training carrier HMS Triumph for further Cadet training. They were promoted to Midshipman on 1 Jan 1956 and posted to sea for 12 months to complete their sea training. This was followed by Supply specialist training ashore in UK for 16 months before returning to Australia in May 1958. In September 1956, on the outbreak of the Suez crisis, Brian was serving in HMS Eagle an aircraft carrier,Keith in another carrier, HMS Albion, and Kelvin in HMS Newfoundland, a Singapore based light cruiser. In Newfoundland also was Nick Bailey an RN Midshipman who subsequently joined the RAN and became a Captain.

All these British ships were part of the RN’s Mediterranean Fleet for Operation Musketeer. Newfoundlandaccompanied by Diana, Modeste and Crane had been transferred from the Far East Fleet to patrol at the southern end of the Canal. Australia’s then Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, was not supportive of the Australians being onboard RN ships during a conflict in which Australia was not directly involved. While he could do nothing to prevent it, his concerns were evident in the requirement for the 13 Australians to conceal their nationality. This entailed changing the only marks at the time that distinguished their uniforms from the RN by replacing the Australia inscribed brass buttons with RN ones. It is doubtful whether many carried out this direction because of the late notice and that they were in tropical rig or Action Working Dress (AWD).

The Suez Canal, stretching 193.3 km between the Mediterranean and Red Seas, was completed in 1869. It was built by the Suez Canal Company. The enterprise began with mostly French private investors and a significant Egyptian shareholding, but by 1890 it was 44% British owned. The canal slowly became very profitable, but for Britain it had strategic significance because it shortened the time taken for the country to reach India and its eastern colonies.

In response to an anti-European riot in 1882 Britain landed an army, seized the Suez Canal and developed a protectorate over Egypt. After WWII the company’s profits grew rapidly as oil shipments increased. In 1952 developing nationalism in Egypt resulted in a military coup led by Colonel Nasser that overthrew King Farouk. To invigorate Egypt’s economy Nasser undertook to dam the river Nile at Aswan. In 1956 the World Bank denied a loan for the project. To gain the funds necessary for the dam Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in July 1956, promising to fairly compensate its shareholders.

Britain, wishing to retain its influence over the canal and the Middle East, considered Nasser a threat against which it was prepared to use force. So did France, which was fighting an Egyptian-supported rebellion against its rule in Algeria. Israel was also anti-Egypt. Since its formation in 1948 it had consistently and increasingly been harassed by Egypt, including denial of its use of the Suez Canal. Egypt was also sponsoring raids by fedayeen guerillas that resulted in Israeli civilian casualties. While understanding these issues, the USA and other countries opposed the use of force for their resolution.

Five Nations led by Sir Robert Menzies were chosen in September 1956 to negotiate with Nasser. Menzies proposed the “establishment of principles” for the future use of the canal. This was to ensure that it would “continue to be an international waterway operated free of politics or national discrimination and with a secure financial structure and international confidence”. He envisaged that increased confidence would expand Canal use and guarantee a secure future. The proposal also included a convention to recognise Egyptian sovereignty of the Canal, and the establishment of an international body to run it. Nasser rejected these proposals. As Menzies negotiating skills on the international scene were limited, he was unable to reach an understanding with Nasser.

In October 1956 France convened a secret meeting with Britain and Israel. Under the Protocol of Sèvres the parties agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene – supposedly to separate the warring Israeli and Egyptian forces – and set a 24-hour deadline for the forces to withdraw 16 kilometres from either side of the Suez Canal. Assuming Egypt would not accept the ultimatum, Britain and France would then argue that Egypt’s control of the Suez Canal was too fragile and that it needed Anglo-French management. A pretext for invasion was set, so too was the start date for invasion.

Originally planned and prepared as an Anglo-French operation for early September 1956, Operation Musketeer had to be delayed because of the need to coordinate with Israel. The Operation had no clear goal beyond seizing the Suez Canal zone by capturing Port Said at the northern end of the waterway, and then moving south.

Since August 1956 the Anglo-French air-sea-ground force had been concentrating in the Eastern Mediterranean, planning and training. It consisted of approximately 45,000 Britons and 34,000 Frenchmen, 200 British and 30 French warships (including seven aircraft carriers), more than 70 merchant vessels, hundreds of landing craft, and 12,000 British and 9,000 French vehicles. One New Zealand vessel, the cruiser HMNZS Royalist was also present, as a carrier group radar picket, ‘but was ordered not to take part in any operations’[iii]. Of this force, only the cruiser HMS Newfoundland and her 3 escort vessels were located south of the canal.

The Suez Canal invasion – October November 1956

The conflict began on 29 October when Israeli aircraft attacked Egyptian positions throughout the Sinai. Paratroopers were dropped and ground forces headed south and west, routing Egyptian opposition within five days.

On 30 October Britain and France sent the ultimatum to Egypt and Israel. As planned, Israel accepted and, as expected, Egypt rejected it. Egypt’s response was to continue fighting, sink all 40 ships that were then in the Suez Canal and thereby deny the conspirator nations their purpose of keeping the waterway open. Operation Musketeer commenced. On 31 October a land- and carrier-based air strike neutralized much of Egypt’s air forces.

With Egypt having a small and comparatively ineffectual navy, the major roles for the British and French navies were to support and protect an amphibious landing, and to provide aircraft for ground attack. During the night of October 31-November 1 the Anglo-French invasion armada sailed from Malta and Algeria. Shortly after, a smaller force loaded at Cyprus, which was closer.

On the night 31Oct/1 Nov at the southern end of the canal, the cruiser HMS Newfoundland, (a Crown Colony Class light cruiser of 9000 tons, 3 x 6” guns, 14 bofors) encountered and ordered the Egyptian frigate Domiat to “heave to”. Domiat refused and opened fire and caused some damage and casualties with several 4” shells. (1 killed, 5 wounded). Newfoundland and the accompanying destroyer, HMS Diana returned fire and sank the Domiat. (38 killed, 69 Survivors). Domiat was a British built River Class Frigate (1590 tons, 2x QF 4 in /40 Mk.XIX single mounts CP Mk.XXIII) (similar to HMAS Barcoo) and had been sold to the Egyptian Navy in 1948. Midshipman Gulliver’s Action Station in Newfoundland was in the Emergency Crypto team deciphering and transmitting the multitude of highly classified signals. This provided him with a unique insight into the many factors involved in the conduct of the War. Before the commencement of hostilities, he had been working in the Pay Office which suffered a direct hit from the Domiat. Nick Bailey was on the GDP on the Port side of the Bridge and witnessed the whole engagement.

 

Domiat Egyptian Frigate
HMS Newfoundland Pay Office_Shell damage 1956

HMS Newfoundland

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Australian officers in the ships in the East Mediterranean were involved in supporting activities in their respective ships[iv]. They would have witnessed carrier aircraft and helicopters taking off and landing from their operations against Egypt. They would also have been aware that the British and French ships were being shadowed and harassed by ships of the US 6th Fleet.

World reaction to the attacks, led by the USA, was near immediate and almost uniformly negative. President Eisenhauer was distracted by the forth coming election in USA and John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State was completely opposed to it. Lord Mountbatten, the First Sea Lord, had opposed the invasion but reluctantly accepted his Government’s decision. A further distraction was Russia’s brutal invasion of Hungary at that time. On 2 November a United Nations resolution calling for a cease-fire was passed[v]. Only the three conspirators together with Australia and New Zealand voted against it[vi]. Egypt accepted the direction, but the fighting continued regardless.

First RN Ship HMS Theseus_to enter Port Said Harbour (PA Images Getty Images)

Early on November 5 British and French paratroopers landed at strategic points surrounding Port Said. Despite spirited resistance, they soon achieved their objectives.

Musketeer’s amphibious phase began on November 6. Following limited gunfire support and mine-sweeping activities, landing craft and amphibious tracked vehicles left the ships lined-up five miles offshore. Shortly afterwards British commandos left the British carriers Theseus and Ocean for the first helicopter-borne assault landing in history. With Egyptian resistance becoming increasingly disorganized, the attackers won control of Port Said and the area surrounding the northern end of the Suez Canal.

In the afternoon of November 6, the British government succumbed to intense internal, diplomatic and economic pressure and, after advising France, ordered a cease-fire from midnight. By interpreting ‘midnight’ to mean local time. the Anglo/French advance continued for 6 ½ hours, meaning that Musketeer’s ground war came to an end after less than 43 hours. Instead of displacing Nasser and controlling the entire length of the Suez Canal, just a quarter of its length was under Anglo/French control.

Following the cease-fire, British and French forces were to withdraw and Israel was to leave the Sinai. Israel only agreed when the United Nations undertook to employ an Emergency Force to occupy the canal zone as a buffer between itself and Egypt. The evacuation of Anglo-French forces was completed on 22 December when a United Nations Peacekeeping Force, proposed by Lester Pearson (future Prime Minister of Canada), was implemented to patrol the Canal. Under the auspices of the United Nations, a fleet of salvage vessels raised approximately 40 ships sunk by the Egyptians to block navigation in the canal. It was reopened in April 1957.

Although tactically a success, both in the amphibious and airborne assaults, Musketeer proved to the world that Britain and France were no longer superpowers. It left a power vacuum in the Middle East. Only Israel achieved its objectives. It gained access to the Canal when it reopened after five months closure, and a dangerous and hostile neighbor was weakened. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was also diminished; there was animosity and suspicion between Britain and France and both these countries were displeased with the lack of support from USA.

Egypt and the Soviet Union fared best from the conflict. Nasser emerged as a hero of the Muslim world and Egypt’s ownership of the Suez Canal was affirmed. The Soviet Union was now considered to be friendly to Arab interests and the Canal was opened to its use for the first time since WWI.

British military and RAN participants in Operation Musketeer were awarded the Naval General Service Medal (1915-1962) – clasp Near East. As Australia had not allotted any of its personnel for duty in the Suez Operational Area medal recipients were precluded from repatriation benefits.

It was one of the last occasions that Australian servicemen received combat honours for service in the military operations of another country for which they had not been allotted for duty. Current regulations preclude this practice.

 

[i] Suez Crisis: Operation Musketeer. Deac WP Military History, accessed April 2001

 

[ii] The members listed in this article were identified by Mike Fogarty, former RAN officer, diplomat, and historian, through a search of RAN files at the National Archives collection in Melbourne circa 1990. It is unofficial, and more RAN members might have been present.

 

[iii] Operation Musketeer. Wikipedia.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Musketeer_(1956), accessed April 20

 

[iv] Royal Navy aircraft carriers in which Australian officers were embarked included Eagle, Bulwark and Albion.

 

[v] The first ever emergency special session of the United Nation’s General Assembly’s convened on 1 November 1956 after Security Council resolutions involving the belligerent parties failed on 30 October. The General Assembly adopted the proposal of the United States calling for: an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, and the reopening of the Canal. The resolution was adopted by 64 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions.

 

[vi] A detailed analysis can be read in Australia, Menzies and Suez. Australian Policymaking in the Middle East Before, During and After the Suez Crisis. Bowker, Dr R. Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2019. It is not commercially available, but can be bought at the National Library of Australia bookshop

Occasional Paper 80: The Early Years (1970-1971) of HMAS Brisbane (DDG-41)

The following paper was delivered by Captain Ralph T Derbidge MBE RAN (Retired) at a reunion (mostly of commissioning crew members and those who deployed to the Vietnam War in the ship in 1969 and 1971).  His address was made on 9 May 2018 at Maroochydore, Queensland.  It describes a mix of personal experience and memorable anecdotes about his time in the ship.

NUSHIP Brisbane is presently undergoing post-construction trials and is scheduled to be commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy on 27 October 2018.  She will be the third ship to bear the name BRISBANE in the history of the RAN.

NUSHIP Brisbane at sea during builders trials viewed from her sister ship, HMAS Hobart.

Her namesake, HMAS Brisbane II (DDG-41), pictured below was commissioned in Boston, USA on 16 December 1967, de-commissioned in Sydney on 19 October 2001 and sunk as a dive site to seaward of Maroochydore on Queensland’s Sunshine Coast on 31 July 2005.  Her Battle Honours were Vietnam 1969 and 1971 and Kuwait 1991.  One of her 5-inch/54 gun mounts and her bridge are preserved at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra as an interactive display, part of the Conflicts 1945 to Today exhibition.  Her mast forms the centrepiece of an impressive memorial at Alexander Headland overlooking the dive site.

You could always tell a DDG commissioning crew-cum-Vietnam War sailor – but you couldn’t tell him much.  They were good, and they knew it.  There aren’t that many of the breed around anymore – witness tonight.  And that goes for the ships they served in.  All said and done, they were destroyers and neither we nor anybody else are building steam driven destroyers the way they used to.

HMAS BRISBANE (2) CHARLES F. ADAMS CLASS DDG 1967-2001-SPC-0026

Do not be deluded – the RAN’s new DDGs, including NUSHIP Brisbane, can be viewed almost as cruisers, bigger than the light cruisers of WW 2 and, of course, able to deliver much more of a bang for the buck.

And what really defines a destroyer? Let me remind you.  It was not always fair winds and a following sea.  Nothing short of an iron stomach was sufficient for withstanding a destroyer’s motion.  Destroyers could list 45 degrees off keel.  The motion of a destroyer at sea is not just up and down but more like a corkscrew churning through water.  Our Brisbane could do that, usually at meal hours!

 

I have been called upon to deliver formal speeches concerning our beloved DDG-41 on a number of occasions – at the sinking of the ship as a dive-wreck to seaward nearby, at the dedication of the splendid mast memorial also near at hand and more recently at the moving plaque dedication ceremony at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra.  Our ship features also in a lecture I have given frequently on the RAN in the Vietnam War.  Some may view this as a bit odd for I did not command the ship.  I was simply the Gunnery Officer through 1970 and 1971.

I really wasn’t intended to serve in that role at all.  Previously, I had been the Gunnery Officer of four ships, Anzac, Quiberon, HMS Llandaff while on exchange with the RN, and Vampire – all with British systems and 4-inch or 4.5-inch ammunition and none missile armed, but I knew my stuff.  I was serving in Vampire on the screen in the South China Sea in 1969 when Melbourne collided with the USS Evans. Brisbane at this time was on her first Vietnam deployment.   One outcome of the collision was an eventual shuffling around of RAN ship commanding officers.  Vampire’s CO was shifted to Stalwart, the Executive Officer took over command and I found myself as both Gunnery Officer and the First Lieutenant of D-11 that was soon to undergo a major half-life modernisation.

Then came the unexpected – a pierhead jump to Brisbane in early 1970 because of the resignation around the same period of six RAN gunnery officers, the names of which some of you may recall – Atkins*, Bartlett, Brett-Young, Marrable, Mellish and Playford.  This left Officers’ Postings with few options.

I wasn’t too impressed, having been at sea for most of the 1960s, recently married while serving in Vampire and looking forward to some long-overdue shore time.  Moreover, I had had no DDG training or experience but was told I could handle it and to get on with it.  And so, while Brisbane and Vampire were in maintenance periods, it was into the Tartar missile system books and hardware with David Kitchen and Peter Flynn* and out to HMAS Watson for advice from John McDermott on the Mk 68 gunnery system and 5-inch ammunition.

I managed to get in some brief sea-riding in Perth out of Sydney.  On leaving harbour, I sensed things were going to be different when I heard the pipe, “Able Seaman Bloggs report to the wild cat flat!” I turned, puzzled, to the newly joined Chief Boatswains Mate, the legendary Warrant Officer QMG ‘Butch’ Berry*, who explained, “That’s the cable locker.  I’m trying to weed out all of this American stuff but I don’t think I will have much joy with turrets instead of gun mounts!”

Enough of this pre-amble – rather than continue in a ‘boots-and-braces’ mode, I have chosen to recall for you some memorable anecdotes about my time in the ship.  And, dear ladies, be forewarned – the still handsome hunk of a man here tonight on your arm may not have been the saint you always thought him to be.  I will conceal the names of the guilty where relevant in order to protect the innocent.  Sadly, in both cases, and others identified in this narrative, many have crossed the bar.

I moved my goods and chattels from Vampire into Brisbane, joining mid-week in Garden Island Dockyard in that summer of 1970 and taking up residence in Cabin 4 forward with Ian MacDougall, the Operations Officer.  I was told there was not much sleep left in the bunk vacated by John McDermott.  The CO then was the admirable Captain John D Stevens*[i], he having recently relieved Captain Alan A Willis*.

I was the overnight Duty Executive Officer on the Friday night of that first week onboard and aware I was to attend with my wife with other guests a dinner party on the following night in the Wardroom, to be hosted by Captain Stevens and his wife.

On the Saturday morning, well before ‘Call the Hands’, I was abruptly shaken by a very agitated Duty Petty Officer who blurted out, “They’ve broken into the Beer Store!”.

Still half-asleep, I asked “Who, what, where, when?” not having any idea where the Beer Store was at the time.

“The Stokers!” he replied.

I dressed quickly and followed the PO down to the after Stokers’ Mess where I found duty watch bodies and others in all states of undress, asleep in all manner of positions and places and many snoring loudly.  Empty beer cans and plates were strewn everywhere.  On further inspection, it was discovered that, during the night, the bolts of the hinges to the adjacent heavy steel door giving access to the redundant Tartar missile maintenance barbette (used as the Beer Store) had been knocked out and the door swung open on its large padlock.  Nirvana lay ahead for the burglars.

But wait, there’s more to come, and it got worse.  The beer was warm.

“There’s ice in the ice-cream room,” said one of the ring-leaders.  The ice cream room lock was duly forced and, once inside, the perpetrators couldn’t believe their luck.  There, laid out on a bench, was more than a dozen plates with a delectable sweet dish on each.  What a treat, and something to be washed down with the soon to be chilled beer.

The subsequent revelry apparently went on long into the silent hours until most fell into a paralytic slumber.  The revellers did not know it at the time, but the consumed sweet dishes had been carefully prepared by the chefs on the Friday and placed in the locked ice cream room overnight, to be served up as desserts at the impending Captain’s dinner party.

The revellers also did not know that they were in the process of ruining my whole day for the resultant investigation, with Naval Dockyard Police assistance, went on well into the Saturday afternoon.  Moreover, I had to arrange for a local catering firm to provide replacement desserts for the dinner party.  At the subsequent assizes, when the Captain was very lenient overall, the guilty showed little contrition for purloining the beer but were most remorseful over misappropriating the Captain’s desserts.

For a while there onboard, the Stokers were not top of my hit parade but a few G & Ts from the then MEOs, the irrepressible Warwick Robinson* and the laconic Ian Watson, placated me and all was soon forgiven.

And so the ship sailed for a shakedown in the East Australia Exercise Area (EAXA) at the end of the maintenance period, with many new personnel embarked following the return from the 1969 Vietnam deployment.  A busy year lay ahead in Australian waters.  At the end of 1970, Captain Stevens was relieved by Captain R Geoffrey Loosli* during a maintenance period.  At the same time, there was another sizeable change of personnel.  By this time, the ship’s company knew that Brisbane would be returning to Vietnam and the Gunline from March to October of 1971.

Work-up for the deployment began early in the new year.  During the first run of the first AA practice firing under Captain Loosli’s command, the aircraft towed sleeve target was quickly destroyed in spectacular fashion early in the first run by one of the automatically fired salvo of shells.  On the horizon, shortly after, could be seen a number of exploding shells followed by the sound of muffled explosions.  The Captain, quite pleased by the target destruction, nonetheless queried the source of the horizon explosions.  I replied that there must be another ship in the exercise area perhaps firing HE shells at a surface target.

The Captain seemingly bought this at the time.  The aircraft, minus target, was released to return to base and the serial terminated.  There was little left to do but return to the magazines unexpended shells from the gun mounts.  I looked down from the Gun Direction Platform to observe shells being unloaded from Mount 51 and stacked on the forecastle shot mats.  They bore the wrong colour coding for the firing.  Horror of horrors – it was HEVT ammunition and not VT Prac shells.  Despite the Firing Orders for the practice and my preliminary policy broadcast, the magazine crew had fed the wrong ammo to Mount 51.  I looked the other way, said nothing to the Captain as the shells were carried below, and months later wrote off the ammo in a Gunline mission off Vietnam.  This mistake was never repeated, and a good thing too, for the crew of target towing aircraft are not at all keen on the idea!

The Captain might have guessed for there is a cartoon titled Workup 71 – First AA Shoot that appears on page 35 of the HMAS BRISBANE 25th Anniversary commemorative book published in 1992.

The cartoon unmistakably depicts me reporting to the equally recognisable Captain Loosli sitting in his chair on the bridge after the shoot.  The included caption has me stating, “Oh it’s easy to tell they’re not live rounds, Sir.  We’d be wearing steel helmets if they were!”

The workup proceeded smoothly and the last box to be ticked was a successful Overall Readiness Evaluation.  The Navigation Officer, Colin Bartlett, and I felt sure we would get a counter battery call for fire while bombarding Beecroft at night during the Final Battle Problem.  So, beforehand, and by devious means, we had obtained the grid co-ordinates of just about every likely target (old tram cars and vehicles etc) on the peninsular range.  These were printed, given alphabetical designators and a copy provided to Gun Plot for pre-loading into the surface gunnery system.

Sure enough, such a call came through from ashore at which point I requested the Captain to put the wheel hard over, increase to full speed and head due east to seaward while I simultaneously initiated counter battery fire.  As the ship heeled over and gathered speed, I got the nod from the NO and CO, barked into the mike to Gun Plot, “Counter battery – Target Delta – Mount 52, six rounds HEPD, fire for effect – engage”.  This all happened quite quickly, which was the whole point of the exercise.

With the rounds in the air, a startled Fleet Training Group observer burst into the Operations Room and screamed, “Who said anything about firing live rounds?”  Moments later, over the shore bombardment net, the spotter reported loud and clear, “Good shooting.  Target destroyed.  Bravo Zulu!”  Nothing further was said by the FTG observer, at least not to me!

And so, the ship subsequently sailed north from Sydney, acquitted herself well on the seven months Vietnam deployment while firing some 7,000 rounds on the Gunline and returned home in October to be the last RAN ship to be so deployed in that war.  Early in the new year, the ship was awarded the Gloucester Cup for 1971 and I finally had my shore time at the Australian Embassy in Washington DC, USA.  And the rest, they say, is history.

Maybe, but not quite.  For not forgotten by some was Cebu City in the southern Philippines where the ship made a two day port call towards the end of the deployment prior to a final period on the Gunline.  The legacy of that so-called goodwill visit could have been disastrous for the ship and her reputation.  Common sense prevailed and the bad news was kept in-house and out of the official record.

The impending drama began on the first day with the ship berthed portside to at a large godown with no perimeter fence and little local external security.  That afternoon, prior to an official reception onboard, the city Police Chief visited and asked to see the Gunnery Officer.  I offered him tea and sandwiches in the Wardroom during the course of which he asked me if I would like to go flying with him in his private aircraft the next day.  Then came the catch – in return I might provide him with some small arms ammunition, both pistol and rifle.  He explained that the paranoid President Marcos, fearing a coup, had emasculated the nation’s police force by denying them ammunition for their weapons.  As diplomatically adept as could be, I thanked him for his flying invitation, told him I was required onboard for duty the next day and declined firmly his bid for ammunition.  He persisted but eventually accepted my stand and I farewelled him at the gangway.

During both nights in port, better notice might have been taken by more senior duty personnel of small waterborne craft in the vicinity of the ship and sailors casually, and apparently innocently, fishing over the outboard starboard side with rods and handlines.

 

Senior management was no doubt relieved to be free of Cebu City when course was set for Vietnam across the South China Sea.  The aforementioned drama unfolded on that first evening on passage when the Coxswain got an anonymous phone call that suggested there was a number of illegal pistols in the ship.  The caller revealed the concealed location of one of them.  It was duly found – a cheap .38 ‘Saturday-night special’.  The XO, Ted Keane*, was informed who in turn advised the CO.  Captain Loosli was under no illusions about the adverse impact this would have if such a weapon was uncovered by Customs or another authority on return to Australia.  He immediately ordered Clear Lower Deck and a locker search of all junior personnel.  A number of pistols came to light, primarily because an amnesty was declared – hand them in or ditch them over the side and there will be no repercussions.  By the following day, the CO and XO were reasonably confident the menace no longer existed.

Several days later, during a lull in Gunline missions, the Petty Officer in charge of the Gunner’s Party reported to me that a quantity of small arms ammunition was missing from the magazine.  The Cebu City Police Chief apparently had found his man.  I consulted with the XO and we both agreed that the CO should be spared another heart-stopping report.

I had the greatest respect and admiration for the hard-working Gunner’s Party throughout the deployment but I suspected that one of them had to be the culprit.  The team members had ready access to the magazine keys.  All of the party members were stared down and grilled at length in turn by the XO, me and the Coxswain but we were unsuccessful in extracting a confession.  In the absence of any incriminating hard evidence, the matter was put on the back-burner and eventually dropped, the Captain was left in peace and we got on with the business at hand with the main armament.  After detaching from the Gunline for the last time, the Gunnery Log recorded the conduct of several recreational small arms firings during the fortnight’s passage home.

In a moment we will hear a replaying of our RAS song, Proud Mary, after which I will ask you to stand and join me in a toast to our ship and absent and departed shipmates, of whom there are many.

There was always some conjecture about how the ship adopted the song.  I remember quite clearly.  It came about during a Wardroom run ashore with the Captain to one of the naval base clubs following our first arrival at Subic Bay for the turn-over with Perth.  A Filipino band was playing the Credence Clearwater Revival version of the song which many of us at the club that night had not heard before.  Hal Thomsett turned to the Captain and excitedly declared, “That should be our RAS song!”  We all agreed and the Captain said, “Make it so!”

Further Reading

Naval Operations in Vietnam, by Jozef Straczek, Sea Power Centre-Australia, available at https://www.navy.gov.au/history/feature-histories/naval-operations-vietnam

Crew List HMAS Brisbane 1st & 2nd Deployments: 1969 and 1971 available at http://www.gunplot.net/main/content/crew-list-hmas-brisbane-1st-2nd-deployments

Video of Interest

Royal Australian Navy: HMAS BRISBANE RAS and Breakaway featuring Proud Mary, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbLHS7Z6Tic

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[i]  *  All deceased

Occasional Paper 77: HMAS Assault. WWII Combined Operations Directorate Establishment – Port Stephens NSW

By Dennis J Weatherall JP TM AFAITT(L) LSM – Volunteer Researcher

HMAS Assault, also known as the Amphibious Training Centre to American personnel, was a combined operations establishment for training Allied personnel in all aspects of amphibious warfare. It also provided operational and logistics support to amphibious units of the Royal Australian Navy. During its short three-year commission (September 1942 to August 1945) more than 22,000 personnel undertook training which was essential for the successful repulsion of Japanese forces from the Pacific Islands. This paper provides insight into its establishment, roles, challenges confronted and personnel who played a significant role in contributing to victory in the Pacific.

In 1942 Australian Forces were heavily committed to the War against Germany and its Allies in Europe then in its third year.  As in WWI, RAN units were under the command of the Admiralty and employed against Italy in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.  The Japanese had entered the war in Australia’s own area of interest with the invasion of South East Asian countries and the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.  Following the rapid Japanese conquest by the Japanese of Malaya and the “Fall of Fortress Singapore” on 15th February, Australia found itself threatened for the first time since British settlement.  The subsequent Japanese advance through the Dutch East Indies and islands in the South-West Pacific basin brought WWII to the Australian mainland on 19 February 1942 with the bombing of Darwin.

However, by early 1942, the Allies were already planning for the invasion of Europe and had successfully established a “Combined Operations Command”.  Australian planners then urged the Australian Government to seek British assistance with information and expertise to establish a similar Australian Directorate.  This was essential if Japanese forces were to be repelled from the Pacific Islands.  Fortuitously service by many Australians in all three British Services meant there was a pool of experienced Australian available to return home with a small number of British Officers for the task of establishing an indigenous amphibious capability.

The officers seconded to establish an Australian “Combined Operations Base” were;  Commander T. W. Cook RAN (ex CO HMS Tormentor British Combined Operations School) , Lieutenant Colonel M. Hope – Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel T. K. Walker – Royal Marines, Wing Commander A.M. Murdoch – RAAF, Lieutenant Commander H. George – RANVR, and Lieutenant D. Richardson – RANVR.  All had “Combined Operations” experience and understood the importance of an amphibious capability to push the Japanese out of New Guinea, Borneo, Bougainville and occupied islands between Australia and Japan.

In June 1942, the Defence planners made a strong recommendation for the formation of the Australian “Combined Operations Directorate” to be set up in Melbourne.  On 5 June, 1942 the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Captain Frank Getting RAN, Commander Cook and Lieutenant Colonel Hope met with General Macarthur’s Brigadier Chamberlain in General Macarthur’s Headquarters, then located in Melbourne.  They were informed that any such “Combined Operations” in Australia would come under the command of Macarthur.  There was agreement on an immediate start to train three Divisions – one Australian and two American – in amphibious warfare.  The RAN was also to produce one third of the total number of crews required and also provide all naval means (craft and crews) for soldiers undergoing training.

Location of former HMAS Assault at Port Stephens, New South Wales

An immediate task for CMDR Cook and LT COL Hope was to find a suitable location to establish the training base.  They took to the air and eventually decided that Fly Point in Port Stephens, NSW as an ideal location.  A ground inspection confirmed the decision.  Then followed the construction from scratch of a shore base in the scrub country away from prying eyes.  Training for all facets of amphibious operations (sea, land the air) could be conducted in the immediate vicinity.  From a security perspective, Port Stephens being a small fishing village with little other activity in the area, the location was ideal.

No time was lost awaiting the building of the base.  The Auxiliary Merchant Cruiser HMAS Westralia was loaned as an accommodation vessel from 21 August, 1942 and on 1 September, 1942 HMAS Assault was actually commissioned in Westralia with 24 Officers and 280 Seamen Trainees.  HMAS Westralia was then designated as a Landing Ship Infantry when she arrived in Port Stephens on 3 September 1942.

It was hoped at the time that Westralia’s sister ships HMA Ships Manora and Kanimbla would also be made available as LSI’s and fitted out with landing craft.  Provision was made in planning for these ships to be made available and Flinders Naval Depot made aware of the requirement for trained ratings as they finished their basic training.  The Naval Board was supportive and the training pipeline to HMAS Assault commenced.

At the same time, the requirement for landing craft was presented to the Naval Board.  It was recommended that these be built locally as they could not be delivered off-the-shelf.  Until purpose-built craft were available, training was undertaken in nine motor boats requisitioned from civilian sources.  These were referred to by the sailors as the “Hollywood Fleet”.  Folding- boats were provided by the Army.

The base was designed from ground up with layout the was first consideration.  Accommodation for all personnel, moorings, piers, slipways, maintenance facilities all had to be built in a virgin bushland setting 125 miles north of Sydney.

On 1 October 1943, one year after commissioning ashore it was reported that 100 Officers, 100 Coxswains, 453 Boat Crews, 250 Stokers, 40 Landing Craft Signalmen and 120 Naval Beach Party Commandos had been trained.  As it took until 10 December 1942 to complete all buildings the majority many trainees and staff were accommodated in HMAS Westralia for the first three months.  Some 90 officers and men were transferred to a Queensland Army Camp at Toorbul following their training.  They were then used to train soldiers in certain phases of amphibious warfare.  This camp was later taken over by the American Forces and the Australians reposted to Assault.

The roles of HMAS Assault were to train;

  1. Officers and ratings for boat crews,
  2. Naval Commandos for beach parties,
  3. combined operations signal teams, both Naval and Army with spares posted to the LSI vessels,
  4. act as a base for LSI’s arranging transport, victualling, spares and repairs,
  5. designated Commanding Naval Officers to also be Naval Officer in Command of a post.

By 1 October 1943 all three LSIs had been supplied with Assault trained Officers and Boat Crews, along with Beach Commandos, with a factor of 25% spare trained personnel.

On 1 October 1943 HMAS Assault commenced a new phase in its evolution.  With its training role mature and sufficient personnel trained to commence amphibious landings to re-take Japanese occupied territory the new role was logistics support.  This involved;

  1. operating as a stores depot supplying spare parts for the landing craft carried on the LSI’s,
  2. operating as a pool depot for a reserve of trained combined operations personnel, and
  3. assisting with the base’s trained boat crews in training US soldiers passing through the Amphibious Training Centre (ATC).

The ATC was the American organisation responsible for training assault troops and to which HMAS Assault was responsible.  Some 22,000 men from various services received amphibious training including 2,000 Australians.  The remainder were all US Servicemen.

As expected, trainees who had completed their training at Assault had to wait for postings to the LSI’s and in some cases, subject to their wait time, had to be brought back for various refresher courses.  This occurred when such trained personnel had returned to their previous establishments to awaiting a billet on an LSI.  As the Assault expanded and more accommodation became available trained personnel were kept onboard Assault and kept in training until posted to sea.

In the early stages of developing HMAS Assault, there was a shortage of actual landing craft until the locally-built Australian craft were delivered.  This shortage made training in craft handling difficult.  Until December 1942, only two LCA’s (Landing Craft Assault) were actually operational at the base and the requisition civilian craft (nothing like a LCA) were used in conjunction with the two LCA’s.  Although not ideal, training continued with what was available.  Whilst allowing crews to experience handling twin screw boats, these civilian craft couldn’t replicate running ashore and beaching craft in all conditions of weather and sea states.

HMAS ASSAULT – Beach Landing Exercise AWM image

On 14 December 1942 sufficient American landing craft arrived for the USN Advanced Landing Craft Base, the name of the American base at Port Stephens.  Following delivery of these craft training in all conditions could be undertaken.  The Port was an excellent location as within the immediate area and along the coast were steep and shallow, sandy beaches, with or without surf, rock, mud and mangrove areas, all in close proximity to the base.

On 10 January 1943 the Australian-built LCA’s started to arrive.  This allowed Assault to return five requisitioned craft to Sydney for deployment to other urgent tasks.  On 20 March 1943 19 American landing craft were handed over to Assault control by the American Landing Force Equipment Depot (LFED).  Finally there was sufficient craft of various types to provide instruction and gain experience.

In addition to the LSIs, Westralia and Manora, HMAS Assault had on its warrant list several other vessels.  These were;

  • HMAS Ping Wo, a tender for the transportation of water and stores for the LSIs. She was also used as a training ship.  Ping Wo and was an ex Chinese River Steamer of 2,000 tons.
  • HMAS Gumleaf, an ex Seine Trawler, 55 ft OA used for escort, patrol and salvage duties.
  • HMA Ships Flying Cloud and Kweena, both Auxiliary Patrol Vessels’,
  • A variety of landing craft:
  1. LST – Landing ship tank x 1 (US)
  2. LCI – Landing craft infantry x 12 (US)
  • LCT – Landing craft tank x 4 (US)
  1. LCM – Landing craft mechanised x 7 (US), 4 loaned to “Assault”
  2. APC – Auxiliary patrol craft x 2 (US)
  3. LCV – Landing craft vehicle x 67 (US), 14 loaned to “Assault”
  • LCP – Landing craft personnel x 15 (US), 1 loaned to “Assault”
  • LCS – Landing craft support x 7 (US)
  1. LCA – Landing craft assault x 9 (AU)
  2. Motor boats x 4 (AU), of which 38 were under “Assault’s” control
  3. Three boat ramps for slipping, scraping and painting

The buildings ashore in HMAS Assault consisted of 67 structures.  These were classified as “C” series-type unlined, galvanised iron huts.  They were located 800 yards from the landing craft moorings and general pier area.  They were described as hot in summer and freezing in winter, but this was nothing new in time of war!

HMAS ASSAULT – St Nazaire Road Dinning Hall and Galley. AWM image

The base was originally designed for 500 officers and men, but as many as 870 were housed, of which 70 were officers and 800 other ranks.  As in the British counterpart establishments, roads were named after successful operations and buildings named after military personnel who had achieved success in Combined Operations to date in WWII.

A jetty to suit naval requirements was constructed using as its basis, an existing jetty on requisitioned land.  It was altered and extended considerably to reach out 510 feet with a width of 12 feet, and at the end an L-shaped return of 162 feet which formed a boat compound.  The outer perimeter of the jetty was enclosed with planking set 3” apart to act as a breakwater.  The pier had a depth of 7 feet alongside at low water and could handle 5 ton loads with fuelling points located along its length.

Unfortunately, by late 1943 slipping facilities for the repair and painting of boats were found lacking.  This was overcome by the employment of naval divers and by the end of the year the initial work started by civilian contractors was completed.  The result was a working slipway and boat shed.  Prior to completion, boats had to be slipped at Tea Gardens, some 3 miles distance, and only when the facilities there were available.

The Assault boat shed was 112 feet long x 30 feet wide, set up with a winch to haul boats, along with machinery for general maintenance.  The slipway had a capacity of 25 tons but the depth of water limited the size of the vessel that could be slipped.  At high water, it was reported only 4 feet 6 inches at the water end, and only 2 feet 6 inches at the shore side.  It meant that only boats with an average draft of 3 feet 6 inches could be slipped, and only at high water.  The solution would be to extend the slipway another 40 feet at the water end.  However, no record could be found of this ever being done.

The slipway came with three cradles which allowed three boats to be lifted out of the water at any one time for maintenance.

Located nearby was the Engineers’ Work Shop, a building of 114 feet in length and width of 42 feet.  It was well equipped with; lathes, milling machines, drills, shaping machines, a 60-ton hydraulic press, valve grinder, bench drills, punch shears and an electric welding unit.

One of the biggest problems for the base was spare parts for the overhaul of the landing craft engines, as these were mainly of US origin.  Lack of the smallest part could keep a craft alongside for weeks and impact practical craft ship handling exercises.

HMAS Assault was well-located with quite a pleasant temperate climate.  However, summer heat could make it more sub-tropical.  Unlike bases situated in far Northern Queensland, there was little in the way of environmentally induced illness.  The base had a capable hospital which treated mainly casualties from vigorous activities.  On 24 May 1943 casualties from a PBY-Consolidated Catalina which crashed into Port Stephens were treated on base.  Post WWII the base hospital became the Port Stephens civilian hospital.

Men came and trained, then left.  The base had ample sporting facilities available to keep the trainees amused; swimming, surfing, fishing, along with cricket in summer and football in the winter months.  In 1943, the Assault rugby team won the First Grade Newcastle League.

Like all bases in war time, religious observances were conducted by Navy Chaplains and the YMCA and Australian Comforts Fund people ran the recreation, with regular parties and entertainment.

The entire concept of establishing HMAS Assault was to train Australian and American sailors and soldiers in the art of amphibious warfare, and to get the Army conditioned to working with the Navy, and vice-versa.  When the American Training Group was established the two facilities were combined and designated the ATC – Amphibious Training Centre.  This took place in February 1943 under the overall command of the Commander South West Pacific Force, Rear Admiral Daniel E Barbey USN, who answered directly to General Macarthur.

HMAS Ping Wo

This brought all such training in Australia under American command.  From this time until training concluded US Marines, RAN sailors and US Army personnel served together on base.

HMAS ASSAULT: Beach launching in surf conditions work party returning to HMAS Westralia AWM Image

Training at HMAS Assault was, to say the least, intense.  It covered every conceivable aspect of amphibious landing operations to face the enemy on inhospitable landing sites.  RAN sailors took part in all the courses, from assaulting beaches to coxswaining landing craft and other vessels of opportunity, not only to meet the enemy face on, but to learn clandestine skills for infiltrating enemy lines.  The specially selected naval beach commandos were instructed in all makes and models of weapons and explosives, as well as hand-to-hand unarmed combat.

Lieutenant Donald Davidson RANVR was the chief instructor in hand-to-hand combat.  No-one knew from where he originated but at war’s end those he trained knew where he’d been.  He was training officer for those selected to be “Special Service Beach Commandos” and sailed on MV Krait, the Japanese fishing boat captured before Singapore surrendered.  It was known as the “fishing boat that went to war”!  LEUT Davidson was 2IC to Major Ivan Lyons in Krait.  Before this Davidson had established the “Special Reconnaissance Department” based on Fraser Island, Queensland.  He was later a member of the ill-fated ‘Rimau’ raid on Japanese shipping in Singapore.  LEUT Davison was severely wounded in this operation and holed up on Tapai Island.  So he wasn’t taken prisoner and tortured for what he knew he took his ‘last resort’ cyanide tablet carried by operatives.  Major Lyons died in a fire fight on Soren Island, it’s said whilst holding off over one hundred Japanese soldiers.

HMAS ASSAULT: Air Force Ground Support exercise. AWM Image

Many HMAS Assault trainees went to various postings in the three LSIs.  There they operated their landing craft in operations to expel Japanese forces from conquered territory.  Some were employed in the Special Operations with Lyons and Davidson, others were posted to US Military Small Ships and even wore US Army uniform.  They served on these small vessels throughout the South West Pacific theatre as far as Japan until the end of hostilities.

In early March 1944, training at Assault ceased.  It had served its purpose well.  On 4 August 1944 the base was designated to “care and maintenance” and manning was reduced to just one officer and twenty-four other rates.

After the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Monday 6 August 1945 and three days later the second A-Bomb on Nagasaki the Japanese surrendered and so ended WWII when General Macarthur signed the surrender in Tokyo Bay onboard USS Missouri on Sunday 2 September 1945.

On 7 August 1945 HMAS Assault was decommissioned but not abandoned – it was transferred to the Royal Navy and used as the shore depot for the British Pacific Fleet, known also as the “Phantom Fleet”.

References:

  • RAN website HMAS Assault – history
  • Sailor & Commando – A.E. Ted Jones, 1942-46, Hesperian Press ISBN 0 85905253 2
  • Commanding Officers’ Monthly Reports to the Secretary, Naval Office Melbourne
  • Australian War Memorial Canberra – website
  • Photographs from various sites – public accessible
  • National Archives – Canberra
  • Huddart Parker Shipping Company History
HMAS ASSAULT: Bringing the equipment of war ashore in exercise mode, AWM image 304846
HMAS ASSAULT Sailor on Guard Duty Main Gate Entrance to Base. RAN image
HMAS Assault Canteen Hut, AWM image

Occasional Paper 75: The Vietnam War and the Royal Australian Navy

The following address was delivered by Captain Ralph T. Derbidge MBE RAN (Retired) at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance to mark Vietnam Veterans Day on 18 August 2010.  It describes the commitment of RAN fleet and air units to that War and the variety of essential tasks and services they provided in support of both the ground and air war.

Captain Derbidge concluded his 36 years of service in 1990 as the Director of Facilities Planning-Navy.  A specialist Gunnery Officer he served in that capacity in five RAN and RN ships.  He had intervening tours as a Staff Officer to the Australian Naval Attache in Washington, as Deputy Director of Surface and Air Weapons and with the Joint Intelligence Organisation.  He commanded HMA Ships Stuart, Canberra and Success and the RAN Apprentice Training Establishment, HMAS Nirimba.

Vietnam – tropical, alluring, fun-filled, breathtakingly beautiful, gastronomically exciting and friendly – today, a magnetic attraction for numerous tourists, businessmen and capital investors, many of them Australians, including Vietnam War veterans.  Ask my wife about Vietnam.  She welcomed me home from the war 39 years ago, but in recent times she enjoyed greatly with friends a group bicycle tour from Ho Chi Minh City to Hanoi. I didn’t go – I get sunburnt!

But it was not always like that.

Vietnam, some 7,500 kilometres to our north west as the crow flies from Melbourne, and three hours behind Australia’s Eastern Standard Time, lies between the Tropic of Cancer and the Equator.  It is bordered to the west by Cambodia and Laos, and to the north by China.  The northern part of the long eastern shoreline sits within the Gulf of Tonkin while to the south the coastline is washed by the South China Sea.  The shorter western shore faces the Gulf of Thailand.

The scope of my primary interest covers the period from 1956 to 1975 when the country was divided at the 17th parallel of latitude by the Demiltarised Zone (or ‘DMZ’) into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam, albeit South Vietnam.  To understand the Vietnam War, and the Royal Australian Navy’s involvement in that war, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the relatively modern history of Indo-China and Vietnam.

Indo-China had been a sphere of French protectorates and colonisation since the 1850’s but the French influence was interrupted by World War 2 and supplanted by Japanese occupation.  The French returned in 1945 to face much turmoil and unrest as the countries of the region sought self-determination as the sun was setting on British and European empires.  It is not in my brief to dwell at length on the complex issues and proceedings that spawned communist parties and governments in the region and to the north in China and Korea, as Cold War tensions mounted.  It is sufficient for me to note that the Viet Minh forces of northern Vietnam, under the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap, comprehensively defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu some 320 kilometres from Hanoi in May 1954 to end the First Indo-China War.

The armistice and Geneva Conference that followed, and the division of the country at the DMZ, set the scene for future hostilities in the guise of the Vietnam War.  At the time of the French defeat, I was a 14 year old Cadet Midshipman in my first year at the Royal Australian Naval College, then located at Crib Point on Mornington Peninsula.

The Vietnam War officially was a Cold War military conflict that occurred in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 1 November 1955 to 30 April 1975 when Saigon fell.  This war followed upon the First Indo-China War and was fought between the communist North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies, and the government of South Vietnam, supported by the United State and other anti-communist nations, including Australia and New Zealand.

The Viet Cong, a lightly-armed South Vietnamese communist-controlled common front, largely fought a guerilla war against anti-communist forces in the region.  The North Vietnamese Army engaged in a more conventional war, at times committing large units into battle.  US and South Vietnamese forces relied principally on air superiority and overwhelming firepower to conduct search-and-destroy operations involving mainly ground forces, artillery and airstrikes.

The United States entered the war to prevent a communist take-over of South Vietnam as part of their wider strategy of containment.  Military advisers arrived, beginning in 1950.  US involvement increased in the early 1960’s, with US troop levels tripling in 1961 and tripling again in 1962 when Australian military advisers were first sent to the country.  US and Australian combat units were deployed, beginning in 1965.  Operations spanned borders, with Laos and Cambodia being heavily bombed.  Involvement peaked in 1968 at the time of the Tet Offensive.  After this, US and Australian ground forces were progressively withdrawn as part of a policy called Vietnamisation.  Despite the Paris Peace Accords, signed by all parties in January 1973, fighting continued in the South.  The capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese army in April 1975 marked the end of the Vietnam War.  North and South Vietnam were reunified the following year.

It can be argued that the first peripheral involvement by the RAN in the Vietnam War occurred between 1956 and 1963 when six Australian naval vessels in successive pairs visited the Republic of Vietnam, beginning with HMA Ships ANZAC and TOBRUK, followed by VAMPIRE and QUICKMATCH and, lastly, QUEENBOROUGH and QUIBERON.  Former Saigon, now Ho Chi Minh City, was primarily the focal point for this ‘showing of the flag’ as it is colloquially known, but demonstrating at the time, in concert with the United States of America, support for the internally and externally hard-pressed South Vietnam regime of the aloof President Diem and his domineering sister-in-law, Madam Nhu.

Politically and militarily, in and around the Capital, in the Highlands and the Mekong Delta, and in the Central Lowlands, the South was opposed by the increasingly worrying Viet Cong, supported by surrogate North Vietnam, and home grown military and religious dissidents.  Who can forget the images of self-immolating Buddhist monks.

I first visited South Vietnam in 1963 as the Gunnery Officer of HMAS QUIBERON, then exercising this form of ‘gunboat diplomacy’.  It was two years after the Bay of Pigs and Cuba, when the Cold War perhaps was at its most threatening.  Memories of the Malayan Emergency and the Korean War were still vivid, confrontation with Indonesia over newly formed Malaysia was under way and the ‘Domino Effect’ of successively falling democratic governments in Asia and South East Asia was the all pervading fear of the free world lead by the United States of America.  Australian membership of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, or SEATO, and the Australia New Zealand and United States, or ANZUS, Treaty both had implications and obligations for our nation.  A vigorous stand would soon be taken by the United States and some of her allies in South Vietnam.

But back in 1963, I recall a good will port call at Nha Trang, the riviera of Indo-China, and a flurry of official social and ceremonial activity in once Saigon.  All seemed relatively calm and business-like in the South’s capital, but there were disconcerting signs for the keen eyed visitor that not all was well – such as the transit of the scenic Saigon River with overhead escorting aircraft, the requirement to travel in armed convoys up-country and the militarisation of, and midnight curfew in, the city.  I was 23 at the time and unaware that I would return to this troubled land eight years hence in far less pacific circumstances as the Gunnery Officer of HMAS BRISBANE.  Within three years, the Diem regime had been toppled from within and Australia would soon find itself engaged in active hostilities alongside the United States.

As mentioned earlier, Australian Army advisers were sent to South Vietnam as early as 1962 and an RAAF transport flight, No 35 Squadron, was established at Vung Tau in Phuoc Tuy Province in 1964.

But it was not until 1965 that the RAN was in the front line, so to speak, when the former aircraft carrier HMAS SYDNEY, as a fast troop transport, made the first of her 22 trips to South Vietnam to off-load initially an Australian infantry battalion and supporting infrastructure at Vung Tau.  Australian military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam was substantially increased from mid-1966 and it is fitting that I pay tribute to the important logistic role played by the RAN in delivering and returning Australian troops, equipment, ammunition and supplies to and from the war until December 1972.

HMAS Sydney

From June 1966, HMAS SYDNEY was supported in this role by the Australian National Line coastal cargo ship MV JEPARIT, commissioned into the RAN in 1969, and by another ANL vessel, MV BOONAROO, being the first ship commissioned under the new RAN White Ensign in March 1967 for her second voyage to Vietnam.  Escorts for this seaborne logistic lift effort to and from Vietnam over the course of the war were HMA Ships ANZAC, DERWENT, DUCHESS, MELBOURNE, PARRAMATTA, STUART, SWAN, TORRENS, VAMPIRE, VENDETTA and YARRA.

Although the logistic ships and escorts had been ferrying Australian troops and supplies to Vietnam from May 1965, the RAN did not enter the war in a combat role until February 1967 when a six man clearance diving team arrived in country to carry out harbour defence, salvage, explosive ordnance  disposal and a variety of special operations.  This unit, Clearance Diving Team 3, was formed specially for service in Vietnam and eight contingents of the team were to be deployed in-country until May 1971.

In March 1967, the new US built guided missile destroyer or DDG, HMAS HOBART, was deployed for service in Vietnamese waters to join the US Seventh Fleet in operations entailing coastal surveillance and interdiction, shore bombardment of North Vietnamese military targets and similar naval gunfire support of ground operations in the four military regions of South Vietnam.  Sister ships HMAS PERTH and HMAS BRISBANE followed in rotation for a total of eight typical deployments of seven months each until this commitment was withdrawn in October 1971.  The Australian built Daring Class destroyer, HMAS VENDETTA, complemented this effort with one such deployment.

HMAS Hobart

During these operations, HOBART and PERTH came under fire on numerous occasions.  PERTH was hit once during her first deployment and HOBART was struck inadvertently in the dark of one night by missiles fired from a US Air Force aircraft.  BRISBANE, during her first deployment, suffered a gunmount crippling inbore detonation of a faulty high explosive shell in the forward 5-inch gun barrel.

When not on typically month-long Gunline operations, the RAN destroyers were employed on escort duties with United States Navy aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf or receiving ammunition, stores, food, spare parts and mail by underway replenishment from USN fleet train supply ships in the South China Sea.  Periodic detachments were scheduled for routine one-week-long ship maintenance periods and ‘R & R’ in ports such as Subic Bay in the Philippines and Hong Kong and Singapore.  In their five years’ service in the Vietnam War, the four Australian destroyers steamed over 397,000 nautical miles and fired 102,546 rounds of 5-inch and 4.5-inch ammunition amounting to some 2,800 tonnes of high explosive.

HMAS Boonaroo

The RAN Fleet Air Arm, as a separate entity, was also actively and uniquely engaged in the war from late 1967 when the first contingent of the RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam was integrated fully with the US Army’s 135th Aviation Company.  Four contingents of the Flight served in Vietnam until June 1971, flying mainly in the Mekong Delta in support of ground operations, a hazardous business at the best of times.

There were other, smaller, but no less important RAN contributions to the war effort in South Vietnam, such as Fleet Air Arm helicopter pilots serving with 9 Squadron RAAF at Vung Tau, detached medical officers in Australian and US military hospitals and liaison personnel in Saigon.  Several sea transport officers were seconded from the Department of Shipping and Transport and commissioned into the Naval Reserve.  Back home, a number of dedicated staff in Navy Office and Fleet Headquarters, and in the operational and training establishments, looked to the professional, military intelligence, logistic support and welfare needs of those personnel, ships and aircraft deployed to the war.

The return of HMAS BRISBANE to Sydney from her second deployment on 15 October 1971 marked the end of the RAN’s combat role in the Vietnam War.  All told, some 2,800 naval personnel, all male and volunteers, saw active service in Vietnam.  Of these, eight were killed while 15 received serious injuries.  Eighty naval personnel were honoured with decorations and awards, the majority ‘mentioned-in-despatches’.

Today, Vietnam is united and at peace, but there was a time when we were adversaries of those who sought and gained that unification by a spectrum of ideological and military means.  It was a complex and costly war, and the longest to that point fought by the United States and Australia.

To put it into one context, nine million men served in the US military during the Vietnam War, one third of whom went to the Vietnam theatre, and there has been little latter-day recognition of how brutal the war was for those who fought it on the ground.  Those who believe the war was fought incompletely on a tactical level should consider Hanoi’s recent admission that 1.4 million of its soldiers died on the battlefield, compared to 266,000 Army of the Republic of Vietnam deaths and 58,000 total U.S. dead.  Those who believe that it was a ‘dirty little war’, where the bombs did all the work, might contemplate that it was the most costly war the U.S. Marine Corps has ever fought; five times as many dead as in World War I, three times as many dead as in Korea, and more total killed and wounded than in World War 2.

Significantly, those sacrifices were made at a time when the United States, and to a lesser extent Australia, were deeply divided politically and societally at home over our military involvement in Vietnam, particularly after the Tet Offensive in 1968.  Ask any surviving veteran who returned from that war.  He will tell you all about that!

Facebook