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Early History of Somerset and Thursday Island

This paper by Mr C. G. Austin, Honorary Librarian, was read to The Historical Society of Queensland Inc. on Thursday 28 April 1949 and printed in the Journal of The Royal Historical Society of Queensland, Volume 4 Issue 2 (1949). It is now reproduced with the kind permission of the Society.

Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The title of my paper tonight is ‘The Early History of Somerset and Thursday Island’ for it is impossible to cover the whole of the history of Torres Strait in one night, so much history has been made in that area that a series of papers would be necessary to do justice to the subject. The early navigators, the shipwrecks in those dangerous seas, the pearling industry, and the Torres Strait Islanders deserve separate treatment. I have therefore limited this paper to the foundation of Somerset and the beginnings of Thursday Island.

Many famous navigators had passed through this area; Torres in 1606, Cook in 1770, Captain Bligh on his memorable voyage after the mutiny on the Bounty, the voyages of the Fly, Bramble and Rattlesnake. The first resident of Newstead House Captain Wickham, carried out his work as a marine surveyor in this area.

Cape York, Thursday Island and Somerset

In the early part of the nineteenth century ships passing through Torres Strait encountered the double dangers of coral reefs and hostile natives. The massacre of the crew of the Charles Eaton, the stories of white women, such as Barbara Thompson, being captured by the natives of the Prince of Wales Island, drew attention to the need for some protection for shipwrecked mariners and those who passed through the Strait to the nearest port of refuge at Port Essington or Timor.

Depots for provisions for mariners in distress were established on Booby Island, west of Thursday Island. Booby Island was named by Captain Cook in 1770, and Bligh in the launch of the Bounty called there. When Bligh became Governor of New South Wales he petitioned the Home Government to form a depot at Booby Island where shipwrecked mariners could find succour in their distress, but it was not until 1824 that Bligh’s request was granted.

Earlier than this, the surgeon of the Pandora, in company with castaways which included some of the Bounty mutineers, declared that what was wanted in the vicinity of Cape York was a settlement. ‘Were a little colony settled here’, he wrote as he listened to what he called ‘wolves’ howling on Horn Island at night, ‘a concatenation of Christian settlements would enchain the world, and be useful to an unfortunate ship.’

The credit for establishing a settlement in the Cape York Peninsula must be given to Sir George Ferguson Bowen, the first Governor of Queensland. During the eight years of Sir George Bowen’s governorship, a line of new ports was opened all along the eastern coast of Queensland from Rockhampton to Cape York and also to the head of the Gulf of Carpentaria; and the pastoral settlers overspread the entire interior, this virtually adding to the British Empire a territory four times larger than the British Isles.

The opening-up of this territory was described very eloquently by Sir George Bowen when he said, ‘Such are the triumphs of peaceful progress; they are victories without injustice or bloodshed; they are conquests not over man, but over Nature; not for this generation only, but all posterity; not for England only, but for all mankind.’

Those of us who are accustomed to the vastness of Australia are apt to forget the huge area of Australia colonised in a short space of time. Our first Governor once pointed out that in the period 1845 to 1865 the English colonisation in Australia alone spread over a far greater space than the aggregate of all the Greek and Roman colonies put together.

The various considerations which pointed to the necessity of a station in the extreme north of Queensland were summed up in a dispatch from the Governor to the Duke of Newcastle on 9th December 1861 – two years after his arrival in Queensland.

‘In a naval and military point of view a post at or near Cape York would be most valuable, and its importance is daily increasing with the augmentation of the commerce passing by this route, especially since the establishment of a French colony and naval station at New Caledonia.

‘Your Grace will perceive from the enclosed Minute of Council, that the Government of Queensland will be willing to undertake the formation and management of a station at Cape York, and to support the civil establishment there. This cannot be considered as otherwise than liberal and reasonable and as strong proofs of the public spirit and of the attachment to the parent State, with which I have ever found the members of the Queensland Parliament to be animated. For the Colony, as such, has manifestly no direct or immediate interest in the foundation of a settlement at Cape York which is twelve hundred miles from Brisbane, that is further than Gibraltar is from London’.

The Home Government was fully prepared to entertain the proposals of the Queensland Government, and the Admiralty agreed that the Governor and the Commodore in command of the Australian Station should together proceed to Cape York. Accordingly, the Governor left Brisbane on 27 August 1862, in HMS Pioneer under the command of Commodore Burnett, for the purpose of selecting the most eligible site for the proposed settlement.

Pioneer made a remarkably good trip under canvas, reaching Booby Island in Torres Strait, the furthest limit of the north-west of the jurisdiction of Queensland, in thirteen days. There was deposited an iron case for the letters generally left on this rock by the passing ships of all nations, to be conveyed to their respective addressees by succeeding vessels.

The site ultimately chosen was at Port Albany, in the passage between the mainland and Albany Island. The settlement was named Somerset in acknowledgement of the readiness with which the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Duke of Somerset, had lent his aid to the undertaking. Portion of the settlement was to be set aside for the use of the Royal Navy. The site was selected on account of its geographical importance, as harbour of refuge, coaling station, and the channel through which trade of Torres Strait and the North Pacific was to pass.

Mr John Jardine, who was then Police Magistrate at Rockhampton, was appointed Government Resident and sent in 1863 to establish the new settlement. He decided on a site on the mainland opposite Albany Island.

Besides the uses pointed out by Sir George Bowen, Somerset was also to be a sanatorium for the people who were just then rushing to the Gulf country to take up land, and in this respect was to supersede the establishment on Sweer’s Island, east of Bentick Island in the Gulf of Carpentaria, near Burketown. About this time there had been a violent outbreak of yellow fever at Burketown, many perished, and the seat of government had been transferred from Burketown to Sweer’s Island.

The Queensland Government contributed £5,000 and the Imperial Government £7,000, besides sending a detachment of twenty-five marines under command of Lieutenant Pascoe, and accompanied by Dr. T. J. Haran as Medical Officer.

The official foundation of the settlement took place on 21 August 1864, when HMS Salamander visited it on behalf of the Imperial Government.

A report of the establishment of the settlement was published in a newspaper by J. O. Burgess, midshipman in Salamander. The ship was commissioned at Sheerness on 9 December 1863 by Commander the Hon. John Carnegie. She was a paddlewheel sloop of 818 tons, barque-rigged, and fitted with a roof and chart room for surveying purposes. After a long voyage of 147 days the ship reached Sydney, and later anchored at the mouth of the Brisbane River on 26 June 1864.

Accompanied by the barque Golden Eagle, which carried government stores, Salamander sailed on 14 July. The passage of the Inner Barrier before the days of lighthouses and buoys was intricate, and from Rockhampton Bay the navigation was chiefly done from the masthead during daylight, anchoring each evening about 6 o’clock until the arrival in Albany Pass on 29 July 1864.

On 1 August, Golden Eagle arrived, also the barque Woodlark, and the schooner Bluebell owned by Captain Edwards, who had established a beche-de-mer station at Frederick Point, the north-western cape of Albany Island. Its building comprised a stone curing house and a store.

Mr John Jardine, Police Magistrate, and Dr. T. J. Haran, Government Medical Officer, being duly installed it remained for the marines under Lieutenant Pascoe and the accompanying landsmen to set to work, clear the ground and erect buildings constructed in the south for what was to be the nucleus of the first settlement at Cape York.

An early sketch of Somerset, drawn by Mr J. Jardine in 1866, shows a Government Residence, Police Quarters and Customs House on the eastern side of the inlet, and Barracks of Marines and Medical Superintendent’s House on the western side. Salamander also appears in the sketch, which is reproduced in The Jubilee History of Queensland, edited by E. J. T. Barton, and published by H. J. Diddams and Co. in 1909.

This area has always been full of surprises, and it is amusing to read that horses and sheep transported on the Golden Eagle were turned loose on Albany Island under the care of a gentle shepherd in the Royal Marine Light Infantry who within twenty-four hours of encampment was much startled by the curiosity of a seven-foot brown snake desirous of exploring his tent. The provisioning and protection of the new settlement was supplied by Salamander, and later HMS Virago, which ships made three trips per year from Sydney to Somerset for this purpose.

Epic droving trip

In 1864 two sons of John Jardine, Frank and Alick, organized and carried to a successful conclusion one of the finest droving trips in the annals of Queensland. It was realised that the new settlement was dependent on sea transport for supplies, and to provide food, a mob of cattle was driven from Rock-hampton to Somerset, up the peninsula in the face of hostile tribes. The party left Rockhampton on 14 May 1864, and reached Somerset on 2 March 1865, ten months later. It must be remembered that the Kennedy expedition, with its attendant tragedy, was made in 1848. Sixteen years later, the Jardine boys traversed the same ground – with success. An offer by the Government to promote funds to meet the cost of the expedition was not accepted as the Jardine family regarded the trip as a private business venture.

The Old Residency at Somerset

During the continuance of the settlement at Somerset several distinguished officers of Her Majesty’s Navy visited the place and contributed to the survey work in the Strait. The Hon. John Carnegie was succeeded in Salamander by Commander Duke Young. The last-mentioned officer was one of the few survivors of HMS Orpheus wrecked on Manuka Bar, New Zealand. The third Commander on the station was Sir George Nares (later Admiral Nares), noted for his Arctic exploration in command of HMS Alert. He also commanded Challenger on her voyage of deep-sea exploration in 1872-4. Other commanders in the Strait were Captain Bingham of Virago, and Commander (later Admiral) Moresby, whose ship the Basilisk was associated with much of the Commander’s valuable work in Torres Strait and on the coast of New Guinea.

The first land sale was held in March 1865. Sir George Bowen described this sale in a letter to the Right Honourable Edward Cardwell, MP, Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 17 April 1865.

‘In my letter to you by the last mail I mentioned that the first land sale at the new township named Cardwell was about to take place, and that speculators would be present from both Brisbane and Sydney. The upset price was twenty pounds per acre, but the competition was so active that all the lots were sold at an average price of 600 pounds per acre. In the same week took place also the first land sale at the new settlement at Cape York. There again the upset price was twenty pounds per acre, but the price realized averaged only 150 pounds per acre. This result means that the speculators in land consider that Cardwell, from its central position and other advantages, has four times a better chance than Somerset of becoming one day the capital of a new Colony.’ Subsequent events proved that the speculators were astray in their judgement.

When John Jardine took up his residence at Somerset, he occupied one of the loneliest positions in the history of Queensland. Normanton, in the Gulf of Carpentaria, and Cardwell were his nearest neighbours; he was restricted to sea transport, and on the Cape York peninsula were many hostile tribes. Somerset justified its establishment as a port of refuge, for the crews of three wrecked ships were able to receive succour there soon after its foundation.

John Jardine, the first Government Resident and Police Magistrate at Somerset, held office until the end of 1865 when he returned to his magisterial duties at Rockhampton. He was succeeded by Captain Henry G. Simpson, RN, who was still in office at the end of 1866. His appointment was for three years, but before the end of this time he left on sick leave and did not return.

The office was vacant at the end of 1867. The appointment was held by Frank Jardine in 1868 and 1869. In the latter year Frank Jardine was granted leave of absence, and H. M. Chester was appointed to succeed him. Frank Jardine again held office from 1871 to 1873, when he was succeeded by Capt. C. E. Beddome and later George Elphonstone Dalrymple. The next Resident was C. D’Oyley Aplin who had been Government Geologist for Southern Queensland in 1868-9. By a curious twist of fate, he had been on the brig Freak when she searched for members of the Kennedy expedition left at the Pascoe River. The remains of two of the party, Wall and Niblet, having been recovered, were interred at Albany Island, D’Oyley Aplin reading the funeral service. Frank Jardine again temporarily held office until the appointment in 1875 of H. M. Chester, who had held the office previously. H. M. Chester was the last Police Magistrate at Somerset and the first Police Magistrate at Thursday Island for in 1877 he was appointed to that office on Thursday Island.

The part played by the Jardine family in the history of Cape York and Torres Strait is recorded and universally applauded as the work of a family outstanding in the Torres Straits area. The part played by H. M. Chester is not so well known. Spencer Browne in his book A Journalist’s Memories describes Chester as ‘a great administrator, a man of extraordinary courage, and who sturdily and worthily, and without any littleness upheld the dignity of the law in that far-flung outpost’. The unpublished autobiography of H. M. Chester was kindly made available by his son, Mr C. L. Chester, of Toowong, and from this information some idea of this outstanding man can be formed.

Henry Majoribanks Chester was born in 1832, the son of the curate of Cripplegate Parish Church, London, the youngest of twenty children. He was nominated to Christ’s Hospital (The Blue Coat School) in 1840 and then attended the London School in Newgate Street, and later the Royal Mathematical School founded by King Charles II, in which boys were trained in the art of navigation as a preliminary to a career at sea. Boys at this school were presented at Court and H. M. Chester was presented at the time his uncle, Sir Robert Chester, was Master of Ceremonies. This uncle was later killed at the siege of Delhi, and the report of the siege records that ‘…he was killed by a round shot from the city, his body falling into the arms of the late Sir Henry Wylie Norman, then a young officer, afterwards Governor of Queensland’. In 1849 Chester was appointed a midshipman in the Indian Navy in which he served eleven years, and performed distinguished service in the Persian War.

‘It would be murder!’

About 1860 occurred an amusing episode with a crack French duellist. This Frenchman had a reputation for duelling which made him a dangerous opponent. Chester arranged an affront, and was duly challenged, but Chester was entitled to select the weapon. Accordingly, he sent his seconds to the Frenchman bearing an envelope in which was a description of the weapon selected. The Frenchman was horrified on opening the envelope to see a drawing of a butcher’s cleaver. H. M. Chester was a very powerful man and the finesse of the swordsman would not counter the strength of Chester. The Frenchman exclaimed to the Englishman, ‘But it would be murder!’ The Englishman politely informed him that it would likewise be murder if Chester had selected swords. Before long the Frenchman hurriedly left town.

When the Indian Navy was abolished in 1862, Chester eventually came to Australia and in 1865 entered the service of the Union Bank of Australia Ltd. at Brisbane. In December of the same year Chester relinquished his position in the Union Bank to enter government service and take up the position of Commissioner of Crown Lands and Police Magistrate in the Warrego district, and there surveyed a township at Charleville and Cunnamulla. In 1868 he was appointed Land Agent for Gladstone and served there and at Gympie for about nine months.

H.M. Chester police Magistrate Thursday Island

 

Appointment of H. M. Chester

In 1869, Frank L. Jardine, Police Magistrate at Somerset, applied for leave of absence and Chester was appointed to succeed him. In his autobiography we read: ‘On arrival at Somerset I found the garrison to consist of a sergeant and four town police constables, with five native troopers. One of the constables, a married man, looked after the troopers and lived on the southern hill. There were seventeen horses and a mob of about a hundred cattle running in the bush.

‘Jardine remained for a week and showed me over the Settlement. He impressed on me never on any account to leave the house without carrying a revolver even if only going as far as the stockyard and cautioned me, in the event of a night attack by the aborigines, never to stand upright on the verandah where the aborigines could see me but to go on my hands and knees, the better to see them’.

Chester was left to guard the settlement with six Europeans and three aboriginal troopers, while Cardwell on one side and Normanton on the other were the nearest towns from which assistance could be obtained.

One instance of the difficulties of transport is shown in Jardine’s trip back to Brisbane. Jardine left in the schooner that brought Chester to Somerset and Captain Hannah attempted to beat down the coast against the South-East trade winds, but after nearly three weeks had to give it up and run back before the wind to Somerset, whence they sailed round Cape Leeuwin, and it was nearly three months before they reached Brisbane.

Chester never had much regard for town police as sailors, and one of his first acts was to ask the Colonial Secretary to replace the town police with water police. The main menace to the Settlement was an attack by the Yardargan tribe, who occupied the country about twenty-five miles south of the Settlement and who could put 400 young men into the field. Fortunately, a small tribe of 120, who occupied the district round Somerset, feared the Yardargans and always advised the Settlement when the Yardargans were preparing to attack.

There were very few pearl-shelling stations in Torres Strait at that time, and Somerset being a fine port, the shellers who were all from Sydney got their supplies duty free. They employed aboriginals and Kanakas, and although wages, except to divers, were low, pearl shell was worth £200 per ton. Tortoiseshell was plentiful and a few sticks of tobacco would purchase a pound of it.

In October 1869, the Gudang tribe, who inhabited the Cape York district, reported that a cutter had been captured by the natives of Prince of Wales Island, who had killed the captain and his crew of Malays and carried off the wife and son of Captain Gascoigne, who were living with the islanders. A search of the island revealed the wreck with part of the body of a boy pierced by an iron barbed arrow. Chester applied for assistance, and on 1 April 1870, when the frigate Blanche(Captain Montgomerie) arrived bringing stores, five water police to replace the town police and five additional native troopers, Chester was annoyed to discover that these native troopers were released prisoners from St. Helena gaol, who had served half of a sentence of ten years for attempted rape and robbery under arms. Chester was never one to mince his words and he wrote to Mr Gray, the Under Colonial Secretary, to the effect that, if the Government chose to make him keeper of a convict prisoner they need scarcely enquire what became of the convicts for as there were eight native police and only six Europeans (four of whom had their wives and children with them) to guard the Settlement, some of the convicts would not return should they become mutinous. Blanche left on a punitive expedition against the perpetrators of the outrage on the crew of the cutter. The Mt. Ernest natives were thought responsible and this proved correct, for plunder from the ship was found in their gunyahs, such as the ship’s log book, etc. Three of the Mt. Ernest chiefs who were pointed out by the Cape York aborigines as the perpetrators of the massacre were shot.

New Guinea expeditions

Chester made many expeditions to New Guinea in the 1870s. On one trip he travelled up the Fly River and had a skirmish with New Guinea natives, who tried to attack the ship from their canoes. The expedition proceeded upstream and on the return journey Chester halted at the spot where the skirmish had occurred. He went ashore despite hostile natives and entered the chief’s hut and commenced to palaver. Before he left, all signs of hostility had disappeared.

The crowning event in Chester’s life was the annexation of New Guinea. He left Thursday Island on 24 March 1883, taking with him three water police and two men from the pilot cutter. On 4 April 1883, under instructions from Sir Thomas McIlwraith, Premier of Queensland, Chester took formal possession in the name of the Queensland Government, of all that portion of New Guinea and the islands adjacent thereto lying between the 141st and 155th meridians of east longitude. This was that portion not occupied by the Dutch. The formalities were performed at Port Moresby, the honour of hoisting the flag on this memorable occasion falling to Tom Crispin. Immediately the news was released there was much consternation in Germany for the Germans, as well as the Dutch, were interested in New Guinea.

The matter was soon raised in the British House of Commons and the London Times in a leading article deprecated that all Australian Colonies were not sharing in the administration of New Guinea.

Lord Derby, with diplomatic adroitness, later announced that he had decided to relieve Queensland of the responsibility of the annexation of New Guinea, and determined to make it an Imperial act. Eventually, on 06 November 1884, a British Protectorate was established over the South-Eastern portion of New Guinea.

The main reason for the transfer from Somerset to Thursday Island was that the anchorage in Albany Passage was regarded as very troublesome and even dangerous for large mail steamers – with the tide sweeping through as it does they often had to hold on by both anchors – while Port Kennedy was a safe harbor.

There was another reason in that the maritime boundary of Queensland was about to be extended so as to include all the islands between the coast and the Barrier Reef. Up to this time, fugitives from Queensland law were out of the jurisdiction of the State, if they were living on these islands. This extension of the Queensland boundary was provided under The Queensland Coast Islands Bill of 1879.

Mr H. M. Chester was appointed Police Magistrate at Thursday Island, with the subsidiary offices of sub-collector of customs and harbor-master, on 20 July 1877. Mr Allan Wilkie was appointed pilot on 14 September of the same year. The first reference in Pugh’s Almanac to Thursday Island as a settlement is contained in the information for the year 1884. Mr Chester was still Police Magistrate, Mr F. G. Symes sub-collector of customs, and Mr D. Cullen Postmaster.

Pugh’s Almanac

‘The E. and A. Coy. make this their first port of call and have a fine hulk – The Belle of the Esk – as their receiving ship where there is always a plentiful supply of coal. The Tinganini or Gunga take all the Normanton cargo from here. There are two hotels, the Torres Strait (Cockburn) and the Thursday Island (Mr T. McNulty)’.

In the early eighties communication with Brisbane was by the steamer Corea (Captain James Lawrie) of the Q.S.S. Coy. Ltd. She made monthly trips, taking supplies to the various pearling stations and bringing back pearl shell on the return trip. The pearling stations, or shelling stations, were located on the various islands round Thursday Island, and each station had a smart little fore-and-aft schooner yacht of from thirty to fifty tons register to transport the shell from the stations and carry the provisions back.

In 1882 a new very rich patch of shell was discovered west of Torres Strait, on what was locally known as the ‘Old Ground’. The water was comparatively shallow, being from six to ten fathoms in depth.

Progressive shellers made haste to increase their fleet. One, Mr James Clark, purchased in Brisbane the oyster cutter Amy. This vessel left Brisbane for Thursday Island in September 1882, with a crew consisting of Messrs. John Tolman, Wm. Wilson, and P. P. Outridge.

The first marine produce brought from this area was not pearl shell, but beche-de-mer, also known as trepang. It will be remembered that at the time of the foundation of Somerset in 1864, a beche-de-mer station was already established at Albany Island owned by Captain Edwards. Trepang is somewhat like a large sized eel, of many colours, and has always been popular in the Chinese market. Beche-de-mer was found on the reefs from Cape York southwards, and was also prolific on the Warrior Reef.

Beche-de-mer is responsible for changing the character of the inhabitants of the northern coast of Australia. For centuries Malay proas from the Dutch Indies have visited the coast as far east as the Gulf of Carpentaria. In February 1803, Lieut. Matthew Flinders in the Endeavour met six Malay proas beche-de-mer fishing near the western entrance to the Gulf of Carpentaria, part of a fleet of sixty sailing from Celebes. They took the catch to Timor for sale to Chinese traders. This fleet was accustomed to come down annually in the north-west season, returning after the south-east change, and continued to do so up to the 1890s. Then the South Australian Customs intervened to collect export duties and the regular trade ceased.

The Malay visits had a distinct effect on the aboriginal natives for along the Northern Territory coast the natives understand the Malay language and have adopted some of the Malay customs. This influence spread to the Gulf of Carpentaria for the present Bishop of Carpentaria related how on one occasion he landed near Groote Eylandt, and met aboriginals who had not been in touch with missionaries. These natives could not understand the language spoken by his Torres Strait boys but understood quite well the language spoken by his Malay boys.

One body which exercised a great influence in this area was the London Missionary Society. As early as 1871 the first missionaries, Messrs. A. W. Murray and S. McFarlane, arrived at Somerset to commence their work in the area. Murray remained two years and McFarlane returned to the Strait in 1874 and remained sixteen years. The Rev. W. Wyatt Gill arrived in this area in 1872. The well-known James Chalmers joined the Mission in 1877, but his main field of work was New Guinea. In 1877 McFarlane moved to Ma (Murray Island) and in 1879 established a school there. He secured the services of Robert Bruce for the school under whose direction several houses were built. The opening of the telegraph line to Cape York was a step forward in the development of Cape York. The credit must go to John Richard Bradford, who in 1883 led the preliminary exploration party from Cooktown to Cape York to select the route for the telegraph line. The party consisted of Bradford, William Healy as second-in-charge, Messrs. J. Cook, W. MacNamara, J. Wilson, Jimmy Sam Goon (a Chinaman) and Jacky, an aboriginal. The party left on 06 June 1883, and on 29 August Bradford and Healy, leading their horses, walked into Somerset, and were hospitably received by Frank Jardine.

The Society is fortunate in having in its possession a copy of the first issue of The Torres Straits Pilot published on 02 January 1888. This copy is on silk, and was donated by Mr Jack McNulty, well known to anyone who has lived on Thursday Island.

The Society also has in its possession a copy of The Torres Straits Pilot published on 27 January 1942. This edition recorded the immediate evacuation of the civilian population from the area for war purposes.

The Torres Divisional Board is first recorded in Pugh’s Almanac at the beginning of 1886. The members are given as Captain W. T. Boore, Vivian R. Bowden and Henry F. Houghton. The auditors were Thomas Braidwood and Alex. Stewart. The next year records Captain W. T. Boore as chairman, and members Vivian K. Bowden, H. Dubbins, Frank Summers and W. H. Bennett. The auditors were James T. Dewar and Edmunds L. Brown. This Board eventually became the Torres Shire and later the Thursday Island Town Council. At the close of the nineteenth century the chairman was Thomas Fleming, Clerk and assessor David Dietrichson and the members Geo. Hartley, R. Cuherr, W. J. Graham, F. E. Morey, E. E. Slaughter, W. Noelke and C. H. Ashford.

 

The Torres Strait Service

One factor which played an important part in developing the Torres Strait Service which provided direct communication between North Queensland and Great Britain without transshipment, and the streams of immigrants who reached Queensland by that fleet were landed at their intended destinations without, as was often the case when they came via southern ports, being seduced by the lure of the capital cities against finishing their journey. In keeping with the turbulent history of Thursday Island, this service was launched in a political storm. The service dates back to July 1860, when the then Premier (Sir R. G. W. Herbert) carried a motion through the Legislative Assembly: 1. That in consequence of a late arrangement under which English mail steamers no longer proceed beyond Melbourne. 2. That the route via Torres Straits and Singapore is likely to prove more expeditious and economical and to offer greater general advantages to Queensland than any other. 3. That communications ought to be entered into between the Government of Queensland and the Governments of other colonies (New South Wales and New Zealand) with a view to considering adoption of the above route and the subsidy payable… But Herbert got no further than an expression of opinion and it was twenty years before the masterful Sir Thomas McIlwraith forced the necessary measure through Parliament to provide what ultimately became a great boon.

McIlwraith obtained a tentative contract with the British India Company which had to be ratified by Parliament by 6th August. The contract provided a subsidy of £55,000 per annum for five years, and Sir Samuel Griffith led a very strenuous and determined opposition against this measure which he regarded as unconstitutional.

The date of ratification (6th August) passed without the necessary Parliamentary sanction, and Griffith cabled the company that the Opposition, claiming a large majority, repudiated the contract. Not to be beaten, McIlwraith arranged for the ratification date to be extended from 6th to 12th August, and on the latter date cabled the company: The Legislative Assembly not having disagreed to the mail contract it stands ratified.

At the beginning of the twentieth century there were 260 boats ranging from ten to thirty tons, employing about 1600 men, engaged in the pearl shell and beche-de-mer fisheries. The Resident Police Magistrate was the Hon. John Douglas, with Mr W. G. Moran as Clerk of Petty Sessions. The Government Medical Officer was E. Tilston, the hospital doctor being G. B. White. The average attendance at the State School was seventy, the Head Teacher, Mr P. Robinson, being assisted by one pupil teacher.

It is fitting to bring this paper to a close with a brief reference to the part played by the Hon. John Douglas in the history of Thursday Island. It was he who sponsored the Bill for the annexation of the islands, and the transfer of the settlement from Somerset to Thursday Island. The Hon. John Douglas first visited Thursday Island in 1877 to choose the site of the school and post office reserves. As he said, ‘It certainly never occurred to me then that I should be privileged in my latter years to take an active share in the administration of the affairs of the islands in the Strait’. As Government Resident and Police Magistrate from 1885 he left his mark in Torres Strait.

Notes on Green Hill Fort, Thursday Island

Green Hill Fort on Thursday Island was built between 1891 and 1893 as part of Australia’s defence against a possible Russian invasion. It was eventually decommissioned some-time in 1927 and the buildings were demolished and the guns spiked. Green Hill is a small grassy hill about 58 metres above sea level at the western end of Thursday Island.

The guns that formed part of the pre-Federation fort were:

Four rifle muzzle-loading (RML) 7-inch guns

Four sixteen-pounders (King 1983:98)

Two Mark VI 6-inch breech loading guns

Two Mark IV 6-inch breech loading guns

There are five rooms with 600 mm thick concrete walls used for ammunition storage. The initial buildings on site were the general storeroom, shell store, cordite room, lamp room and artillery store. A timber and corrugated iron guardhouse was also built over a 20,000 gallon underground well. A cooling plant, machine room and a powder room were added in 1912. Air conditioning ducts were installed from the cooling plant machine room to the cordite store.

 

 

Radar in the South and Southwest Pacific as at Savo Island in August 1942

By R. W. Madsen

This paper was prepared largely from notes made many years ago when I was at university and living with my grandparents. My grandfather, Sir John Madsen, lived in the Sydney suburb of Roseville.

John Percival Vaissing Madsen (1879-1969) studied both science and engineering in the fields of radioactivity and X-rays. He was awarded a doctorate in 1907 which led to a lectureship in engineering at the University of Sydney, where he became an Assistant Professor in 1912. During WWI he was commissioned into the AMF and commanded the Engineer Officers’ Training School at Moore Park. He returned to university as Foundation Professor of Electrical Engineering and developed a long and fruitful association with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. During WWII he led Australia’s contribution to the Allied development of radio direction finding and air warning systems. In 1941 John Madsen was knighted for his services to science.

Introduction

John Madsen was involved in radar support for the Allies in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) following visits he made to London and Washington in 1940. In 1941 the Radio Physics Laboratory (RPL) in Sydney became a defined sub-centre responsible for research and support to Great Britain.

Prior to leaving for Guadalcanal in July 1942, both HMAS Canberra and USS Chicago required work on their radars. Canberra did acceptance trials on a Type 290 Air Warning Set in conjunction with her Type 271 10 cm microwave surface search radar. Chicago had a CXAM Air and Surface warning set with Sir John assisting in its maintenance. In July 1942, RPL gave a demonstration to the RAN of a Type A271L 10 cm set at South Head which under excellent propagation conditions detected a 6,000-ton ship at 45 miles.

In an action on a dark humid night at Savo Island on 8-9 August 1942, Canberra, leading Chicago on a screening patrol at 12 knots, was attacked with 8‑inch armour piercing shells by several Japanese heavy cruisers. With no warning or ranging from her 271 set and without firing a shot in reply, Canberra was disabled in the space of three minutes. Chicago was hit in the bow by a Long Lance torpedo and taken out of action. It is believed that Chicago’s radars at this time were not in continuous operation. The Japanese cruisers then turned north towards a second US cruiser screening group which was engaged and destroyed, overwhelmed by the surprise and the accuracy of the Long Lance torpedoes and 8-inch AP shells.

In addition to surface warning radars the US cruisers in the Northern Group also had fire control radars which gave accurate ranging. The Japanese cruisers did not go on with an attempted destruction of the 19 transports of the US Amphibious Force which the Allied cruisers were screening.

HMAS Australia, with the light cruiser HMAS Hobart, a veteran of the Japanese night action at Java Sea, were on another screening patrol 11 miles to the east of Savo Island and were not attacked that night. They remained with USS San Juan, with SG 10 cm radar, as the remaining cruiser defence of the Transport Fleet. The radars on Australia and Hobart at this time did not include the Type 271, but Australia later had the updated Type 273.

Outline of HMAS Canberra showing Type 271 Radar

A reconnaissance flight by a B-17 with Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar had been requested for the northern approach to Guadalcanal on the afternoon of 8 August, but this was not carried out and the eight ship Japanese cruiser force remained undetected until only minutes before attacking Canberra. Two US destroyer radar pickets, US Ships Blueand Ralph Talbot, with surface warning radar (Type SC), were on patrols seven miles west of Savo Island steaming at 12 knots. The patrols of these ships had become unsynchronised so that when they reversed course at 0110 the gap between their paths had increased. When the Japanese cruisers passed between them at 0132 the gap was 14 miles and they passed without being detected. Using giant binoculars, the lead Japanese cruiser Chokai first sighted Blue at a distance of about five miles at 0054. The nearest point Ralph Talbot came to the Japanese cruisers was 6.5 miles.

Radar Development – US Navy to April 1942

The Naval Research Laboratory (Radlab) in Washington oversaw USN radar equipment developments. The first production radars delivered to the USN in 1940 were the CXAM and CXAM-1, these were air and surface warning sets. Chicago and CVs Saratoga, Enterprise, Wasp, and Curtiss, a seaplane tender, were fitted with this 1.5 metre equipment. The SC metre wavelength warning radar was developed for smaller ships. Fire Control radars FC and FD at 40 cm were installed from September 1941.

The first 10 cm microwave search radar for the US Navy was the SG developed by Radlab and Raytheon in June 1941 and proved to be one of the most successful radar sets, with the first installation going to sea in April 1942. Saratoga and San Juan had the second and third sets put into operation.

US Navy Guide to the Tactical Use of Radar-March 1942

On 9 March 1942 the C-in-C of the US Fleet issued Radar Bulletin No 1 setting out guidelines on ‘Tactical Use of Radar’. It was acknowledged that radar equipment was continuously undergoing improvements and officers and men associated with it should feel they had some latitude in exploiting its use; the bulletin was a guide for improvement after further experience afloat.

The bulletin covered radar use in aircraft carriers, surface vessels and submarines operating in conditions against Germany and Japan in the Pacific and warned of numerous limitations of navy equipment. The points addressed included:

  • Trouble from hasty installation; above a basic 50 hours training, many more hours were needed for operator proficiency
  • Reduction on operator strain, with two operators to alternate every half hour over two hour watches
  • A scarcity of IFF making ship identification difficult. The enemy could pick up radar transmissions at 250 miles and measures should be taken to reduce this risk
  • Keeping a good lookout was essential, even though radar was being used
  • False contacts may be obtained from ionised layers, most commonly around mid-day, and that at night there would be insufficient time to determine that a signal is false
  • The effectiveness of radar relied on data and orders being passed to the ships concerned in a minimum of time.

The bulletin set out that the Officer in Tactical Control (OTC) was to give orders determining which radar policy was put into effect and that in relation to Radar Guard Ships, the assigned responsibility should be the conduct of a continuous search of a sector using counter RDF measures or such radar control as the OTC may order. It was envisaged that each Radar Guard Ship would search an entire 360 degrees and that when a target enters the sector overlap between adjacent sector Guard Ships, the Guard Ship whose sector the target is leaving notifies the Guard Ship whose sector it is entering. It was recognised that Talk Between Ships (TBS) was the only means then available for rapid communication between ships and was to be put in large ships asap. By using low power at 60 mcs the range was anticipated to be 100 miles.

As a radar policy it was suggested that the following could be considered:

  • Radar transmissions only to be made when air-surface attack is imminent
  • Carry out a sweep every 10 minutes
  • Have no restriction on transmissions when the ship’s location was obvious to the enemy or for transmissions to take place using counter RDF measures.

A Radar Operator’s Log for each set was to be kept including details of the following: the radar policy in effect at all times; other general instructions given to the radar operator; time of commencement of transmission and time ceased; irregularities with the equipment; all unusual observations with the radar; name of the operator and time of start/finish and all initial detections and final observation of each target; time for a CXAM/SC sweep through 360 degrees and not taking counter RDF measures. No specific directions for counter RDF measures should be given, but considerable latitude allowed by following the general rule that the radar transmitter be used for the shortest possible time consistent with an effective search.

Type SG Radar Antenna – circled

Ranges with properly functioning radar equipment generally were more reliable than those obtained by ordinary coincidence or even stereoscopic rangefinders and it was of the utmost importance that all ships’ radars be maintained in perfect operating condition at all times, particularly for ranges greater than 10,000 yards. Optical bearings were always more accurate and reliable than radar bearings and should be used in preference to them.

With CXAM, CXAM-1, FC and FD the reliable range for surface ships was between 5 and 10 miles depending on the size of the ship. SC range was 4 to 10 miles. The antennas were always to be installed at the highest possible points of the ship.

 

Radar Equipment available at this time

CXAM: 1.5 m Air/Surface search, U frame antenna, 14 miles range on a large ship, 50 miles on aircraft.

CXAM-1: 1.5 m Air/Surface search, Mattress array 15 ft x 15 ft 8 inch, 68 miles on aircraft.

SC: 1.36 m, Air/Surface search, Mattress array 8ft 6 in x 7 ft, 4-5 miles on cruiser, A scope.

FC: 40 cm, Fire Control for cruisers, V mesh array, 10 miles range, A scope.

FD: 40 cm, Fire control for destroyers, pair of U mesh for array, 10 miles, A scope.

SG: 10 cm, Air/Surface search, single parabola, 17 miles on destroyer, 9” PPI, 5” A scope.

Type 271: 10 cm, Air/Surface search, Perspex Lantern, parabolas, 17 miles on destroyer.

Type A290: Surface Warning/Gunnery, 1.5 m.

ASV MkII: Airborne Air to Surface Vessel based on UK set adopted by US and Australia, 1.5 m.

 Operations at Savo Island 7-9 August 1942

A Liberator AL 515 fitted with ASV Mk II flew one of the first reconnaissance flights over Guadalcanal in late June 1942 from Garbutt Field at Townsville. Other Liberators, AL 570 and AL 573, probably also fitted with ASV, flew reconnaissance missions to Guadalcanal in July and August. The unit photographer Norman Carlson produced 12,000 prints for preparation of mosaics for the marines and navy before the landings at Guadalcanal on 7 August.

On 31 July 1942 an aircraft from Curtiss (AV-4) at Espritu Santo obtained an aerial photo of the Lunga Point Airfield, Guadalcanal Island. The Japanese had installed a Type II search radar, which when captured was the first example of Japanese radar taken back to the US for examination. It was not until 2 September that the US installed the first Type SCR-270 radar at Henderson Field, followed soon after by two Type SCR-270 AW.

The US Amphibious Force, the first of its type ever assembled, with great speed (but lacking in communication co-ordination), including 20 trans-ports, was able to achieve complete surprise at Guadalcanal on the morning of 7 August having sortied from Fiji over the previous two days without being detected. The Japanese radio traffic analysis had suggested that a major US Naval group had formed in Hawaii but was in fact 3000 miles nearer in Fiji.

At 1325 and 1500 on 7 August the Japanese made two attacks on the transports with bombers and fighters from Rabaul which were broken up by CV fighters located approximately 70 miles to the south west. With warning from Australian Coastwatchers on Bougainville, there was another raid which disrupted the unloading from transports. At 1830 on 7 and 8 August the Fire Support and Screening ships took up their night dispositions along with the transports, and during the 8th marines came ashore to take Henderson Field. At about this time Admiral Fletcher decided he would withdraw the carrier air support one day earlier than was planned on 9 August and that the transports, which were only partly unloaded, would also have to leave but this was delayed by one day after the loss of the air cover. Rear Admiral Crutchley (an RN officer on loan to the RAN) in Australia left his night screening position around 2100 on 8 August to confer on these new arrangements at the poorly equipped command ship McCawley. This left Canberra and Chicago in the Southern Screening Group covering the transports and US Ships Vincennes, Astoria and Quincy remained in the Northern Group with destroyer escorts. The two radar pickets Blue and Ralph Talbot were on the western side of Savo Island with special instructions that if a target was detected warning was to be given and that the target should then be ‘shadowed’.

Reconnaissance by an RAAF Hudson from Milne Bay with no ASV (the Hudson crew was not aware of the operation underway at Guadalcanal because of a secrecy embargo) at 1025 on 8 August indicated that a Japanese force of eight ships located on the eastern side of Bougainville was heading south and appeared to include a seaplane tender. This report was broadcast from Pearl Harbour on Fox and reached Admiral Turner in Guadalcanal at 1845, it was also broadcast on Bells from Canberra at 1817.

Japanese Navy Nikon 120 mm Binoculars

This force had been detected the previous day by a US submarine. A requested reconnaissance flight by a B‑17 for the afternoon of 8 August to cover the area from the northern end of the ‘Slot’ leading south to Guadalcanal was not carried out as an enemy night attack was not envisaged. It was expected that an extensive air search during 8 August would reveal any enemy naval forces heading for Guadalcanal.

At 2345 on 8 August Ralph Talbot detected by radar an unidentified plane flying low over Savo Island heading east towards Tulagi and broadcast on TBS and TBO (portable voice radio) ‘Warning! Warning! Plane over Savo Island heading East’ which was heard by the destroyers Blue and Patterson, the cruisers Vincennes and Quincy and some others. At 2313 the Japanese had despatched two planes to illuminate a course for the cruisers to ‘rush in’ and had previously used scout planes to confirm the Allied Forces disposition. They then developed their tactic of destroying one group first, and then going straight to the second group, and leaving to be clear of Allied planes by sunrise, making no special plans to attack transports.

At 0053 the lead cruiser Chokai sighted Blue with giant binoculars at 10,900 yards and turned to enter from the north passage, but at 0105 reverted back to ‘Enter from South Passage’ realising that she had not been detected by Blue or Ralph Talbot. Blue was lost at Guadalcanal on 22 August 1942.

USS Blue transferring survivors off Guadalcanal 9 August 1942

It would appear that Chokai, leading the column of Japanese cruisers and still undetected, sighted Canberra and Chicago at 12,500 yards around 0132-0136 on 9 August. Japanese 120 mm binoculars used with the larger 150 mm giant Navy Nikon binoculars detected 980 times as much light as the naked eye. Spotters were carefully selected for good night vision and crews were drilled to use flares and searchlights. Some 23 spotters were located on a cruiser.

At 2300 on 8 August, David Medley, Canberra’s young radar officer, visited the 271 radar station and found everything apparently working well. Since sunset all six radar operators had been on four hour watches, two men at a time working half hour tricks. The set was working normally but they were still having trouble with masking from nearby land but with the large number of vessels in working range it was practically impossible to tell friend from foe. Occasionally Canberra saw Blue and Canberra’s escort but if they came in too close they disappeared. Canberra could not see any ships in the Northern Group.

David Medley, a Masters graduate in physics from Melbourne University in 1941, had an interest in ham radio which led him to reply to an RAN advertisement for scientific people to join the navy to work on radar. His first task was to assist at Garden Island while Canberra was having a three-month refit and help to install the Type 271 and Type 290 radars. By the end of May Canberra was back in Sydney after a shakedown cruise to the Melbourne area where two magnetrons were provided to get the 271 working. The essential part of the work for Medley was to try and get the 271 integrated into the ship’s gunnery systems but first he was required to do the calibration work and then later to consider the tactical use of the radar; however at Guadalcanal the Captain and senior officers were not hopeful of the 271 being of any use. There was no telephone communication from the 271 to the bridge, and at the time of the Japanese contact there was no senior officer on the bridge. The scope of the 271 was a 6-inch CRT with range read off the scope and bearings determined from the ship’s head as there was no gyro compass in the radar hut. The aerial was rotated by hand and was located immediately above the transmitter.

In Canberra at about 0100 a plane was heard and this had been reported to the captain. At 0143 an explosion occurred due north, the captain was called and the ship went to Action Stations. Patterson at this time broadcast a TBS ‘Warning! Warning! Three strange ships entering the harbour’ but apparently this was not received in the majority of ships. Within Canberra in the next few minutes, events moved very quickly; while avoiding torpedo tracks across the bow and approaching down the starboard side, a salvo of shells hit the bridge, mortally wounding the captain and other officers, flares dropped by aircraft lighting up the scene. Between 0144 and 0148 Canberra was hit by 24 shells (AP). The ship quickly lost power and listed to starboard. Canberra’s guns were pointing to the port side but she did not fire any rounds. In the confusion it is possible that Canberra was hit by a torpedo on her starboard side fired from USS Bagley.

Canberra was scuttled in the early morning of 9 August. Captain Frank Getting, RAN, later died of wounds, and 84 of his ship’s company were lost. In hindsight, with a better understanding of her damage and what could be done for her in Sydney, she might have been saved.

Chicago was hit in the bow by a torpedo and she veered away to port, but neither Chicago nor Canberra alerted the northern Vincennes group of the Japanese action.

At 0137 Chokai sighted Vincennes in the Northern Group at 18,000 yards (the greatest distance at which visual sighting was reported during the action) and at 0150 Vincennes obtained a radar range on Chokai of 8,250 yards identified by the intermittent use of searchlights by the Japanese to pinpoint the three US cruisers. At 0151 Quincy obtained a range on Aoba using a stereoscopic range finder at 8,400 yards. Repairs to Astoria’s fire control radar had been successfully completed just prior to contact with the Japanese and at 0152, while waiting for orders from the bridge, the gunnery officer made a quick radar check of the report and observed four pips on the forward main battery fire control radar screen. These pips were Chokai, Aoba, Kako and Kinugasa. An initial range of 7,000 yards was obtained on the leading cruiser, which Astoria took as her target. At 0153 the radar range finder range of 6,800 yards on Chokai was correct. At 0155 Astoria was hit and she obtained no more radar ranges and was unable to get visual ranges as the Japanese had turned off their searchlights. By 0159 Astoria had fired off at least seven salvoes on Chokai which received several hits, some also from Quincy.

The three carriers Enterprise, Saratoga and Wasp approaching Guadalcanal on 5 and 6 August had 200-mile reconnaissance flights looking forward and sideways for enemy ships. The range of CXAM-1 on aircraft was 50-100 miles. For the first time the carriers were given the task of providing cover for a major amphibious landing expected to take three days to complete. On the early morning of 7 August Enterprise was positioned 50 miles SE of Guadalcanal near San Cristobal Island and at one hour before sunrise (0535) the carrier planes launched to rendezvous 30 miles west of Guadalcanal in the dark and then at 0615 the bombardment, aerial attack and marine landing commenced. At 1230 a large unidentified plane was detected and the CAP cover was vectored to the north-west by an error of the fighter director on Enterprise reading the wrong side of the azimuth ring on a radar scope, giving the reciprocal bearing. At 1100 Saratogadetected a bogey by radar to the NW at 150 miles which turned out to be a B-17 from Esperitu Santo on a Sector II reconnaissance. Throughout 7 and 8 August air cover was maintained in the face of two concerted Japanese attacks on the afternoon of the 7th by planes from Rabaul and also a further attack on the 8th, warned by the Coastwatchers on Bougainville. Over the two days Enterprise had 372 take-offs and 366 landings where 91 pilots had flown 1,000 hours. At the close of operations on the evening of the 8th, Admiral Fletcher considered his position was well known to the Japanese and it was time to withdraw his three carriers to the southeast. They were 160 miles away when radios began to announce some kind of surface action was taking place at Guadalcanal. The captured airfield at Lunga Point, Henderson Field did not become operational until 19 August.

As Chokai led the Japanese withdrawal around Savo Island north, Ralph Talbot encountered the cruiser Yubary and fired a second salvo using her radar range of 3,300 yards which was accurate. Ralph Talbot received a second hit in the charthouse which destroyed the SC and FD radars and fire control equipment.

At 0225 on 9 August the damaged Chicago had a radar contact at 7,000 yards; at 0232 Bagley was tracking a ship on her port side and at 0341 she was tracking further targets which probably included Patterson proceeding to pass south of Savo Island.

The SG radar on San Juan did not report any radar contacts during the night action and at 0911 on the morning of 9 August her air search radar detected a Japanese reconnaissance plane at 12 miles which remained unmolested for an hour before disappearing at 1004, having reported the presence of 19 transports. At 0700 Saratoga had detected search planes which disappeared at 0743.

Events Subsequent to Savo Island 7-9 August 1942

Following Coral Sea and Midway the third and fourth carrier battles were in the Guadalcanal campaign at the Battle of the Solomon Sea (24-25 August 1942) and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands (25-27 October 1942). Aerial reconnaissance was out to 200 miles with radar plots by Enterprise of raiders out to 88 miles, but on occasions at 50 miles on the CXAM-1. A large four engine flying boat had been detected at 55 miles. The problem with radar plots was to differentiate between friendly scouts and raiders.

The naval Battle of Guadalcanal (12-15 November 1942) was two night actions against the desperate Tokyo Express runs. At 0124 on 13 November, the light cruiser USS Helena detected Japanese ships with her radar and in the ensuing action USS Atlanta was sunk along with four destroyers. Two days later, on the night of 14-15 November the battleship USS Washington, with the effective use of her radar (CXAM-1 and five Fire Control radars), managed to avoid the crippled USS South Dakota and fired 16 inch shells at 8,400 yards, destroying the Japanese battleship Kirishma, which had to be scuttled. The loss of Kirishma was a turning point for Japanese radar when it was realised how significant its use had been in this defeat. (At the Battle of the Bismarck Sea on 2-4 March 1943 the Japanese attempted to reinforce Lae from Rabaul with a convoy of eight destroyers and eight transports but it was decimated after radar and decryption detection preventing further reinforce-ment into New Guinea.).

Two weeks later the US set a trap for an anticipated Tokyo Express run. The US Navy had two cruiser forces and one destroyer force with one SG equipped ship in each force. At 2306 on 29 November the Japanese were detected on radar, and at 2316 the destroyer USS Fletcher had enemy ships at 7,000 yards on SC but not following the plan she was not given permission to fire her torpedoes. Admiral Tanaka quickly counterattacked with Long Lance torpedoes from his destroyers on the four US cruisers, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Pensacola and Northampton. Three of the cruisers were severely damaged and one sunk. The Japanese ships escaped but without landing the desperately needed supplies.

Chicago was lost to an aerial torpedo attack at night on the 30 January 1943 where bright floating flares allowed a twin engine bomber to make an approach in darkness. The Japanese finally cleared their troops from Guadalcanal by 7 February 1943.

Canberra had the first 10 cm magnetron Australian radar to go into service, even though it was only for a very short time. The Type 271 was fitted to Australian destroyers and corvettes along with the Type 290, which came into service during 1942-43. Many of the damaged US cruisers from the Guadalcanal campaign made their way to Garden Island in Sydney for immediate repair before returning to the US.

In addition to the many US ships, as well as Canberra, which were sunk off Guadalcanal, a great many aircraft were lost in air battles defending Henderson Field, and the area now known as ‘Iron Bottom Sound’ has become sacred to the US Navy which each year makes a solemn pilgrimage to remember those lost.

Conclusion

This paper highlights the radar aspect of its implementation into the first major amphibious operation by the US in the Pacific War. This provided many lessons for subsequent operations leading to the eventual defeat of Japan in the SWPA and finally to Japan itself. The isolation of Rabaul and debilitation of the Japanese air force planes and navy due to the twin attacks by the Allies in the Solomons and New Guinea was finally achieved by the US carrier borne attacks on Truk in February 1944.

An Essay on the Royal Australian Navy’s Involvement in Support of the Compromised SRD Operations in Timor 1943-1945

By Sub Lieutenant Nicholas Seton RAN

…I feel so sad. What a waste – what a stuff up. It makes one feel a little bitter about the poor intelligence andcommunications surrounding each operation.  Frank Nolan, 10 May 1998 (Evans 2002 p.197)

With this essay SBLT Nicholas Seton, RAN won the Naval Historical Society History Prize awarded at the recent NEOC graduation ceremony. Nicholas was born and raised in country South Australia in the small town of Morgan. He lived here until commencing academic studies at Flinders University in 2014 and subsequently the Australian Maritime College at Launceston, Tasmania in 2016. From there he graduated with a Bachelor of Engineering, Naval Architecture (Hons).

On joining the RAN Nicholas entered the New Entry Officers Course at HMAS Creswell which he completed in June 2019 and has since been posted to HMAS Cerberus for an Engineering Officers Application Course. Following this he expects to be posted to sea as an Assistant Marine Engineering Officer.

Background

Throughout the Second World War the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) operated a series of little warships, notably theFairmile B type, in operations above Australia’s northern shoreline deep into enemy territory. One of the most noteworthyand contentious of the operations conducted by these ships was the support and continued resupply of the captured Lagarto Party in Japanese occupied Timor, under direction from the Australian Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD).

Aim

This paper will illustrate how the SRD operations repeatedly placed the crews of these vessels in danger unnecessarilydue to their inability to realise the compromised state of the Lagarto Party. We also examine the Australian naval Fairmile B and operations in Timor from February 1943 through to April 1945, encompassing Operation Mosquito, the failure of the Lagarto party, Operation Bulldozer, Operation Adder, and the discovery of the compromised states of the parties.

The Vessels

At only 112 ft the Fairmile B was one of the smallest warships operated by the RAN during the Second World War.Although small, they had significant capabilities with both anti-air and anti-submarine weaponry, and soon became avaluable asset in the RAN’s arsenal. Much of the work conducted by the Australian Fairmiles, in addition to the regular convoy escort and anti-submarine duties, were based out of tropical areas of northern Australia and throughout NewGuinea and Timor.

Fairmile Motor Launches (MLs) 814 and 815 were both operating out of the Port of Darwin at the time of theoperations, conducting rudimentary escort and anti-submarine duties within the harbour. At the time, Darwin was astrategic operational outpost for military forces operating throughout the occupied island nations to the north of Australia(Evans 2002 p.130).

These vessels, however, although the best designed vessel in the RAN’s arsenal, were not particularly well suited to the high humidity and open ocean transits which they were forced to endure during operations throughout Australia’snorthern waters. Originally designed for operations in the Northern Hemisphere, undertaking short transits around the UKand across to occupied France, they were never designed for the work which they were used for by the RAN. High humidity caused these wooden vessels to begin rotting, and with limited airflow through the internal spaces, they werenotoriously hot, damp, and uncomfortable.

The Lagarto Party

Operation Lagarto began on 10 February 1943 with the insertion, via submarine, of a three-man team led by Portuguesepilot, Lieutenant Pires, a civilian radio operator, Patricio Luz, and two Portuguese NCOs. The purpose of the operation was to act as informants on the Japanese operations and report back to SRD headquarters in Melbourne, as well as facilitate the evacuation of approximately 70 refugees caught up in the conflict (Central Intelligence Agency 2008). In order to undertake such a bold evacuation from well within enemy lines the only viable option was by sea, using smallshallow draught vessels that would be capable of getting close to shore and escaping at high speed.

The Evacuation – Operation Mosquito

Operation Mosquito was the code name for the first of two resupply and evacuation missions undertaken by RANFairmiles in support of the Lagarto operation. Australian MLs 814 and 815 were chosen and modified for the trip, which included the construction of a large temporary stern ramp for the purpose of the launch of a canvas and wood landing craft which was to be used to transport personnel and supplies from ship to shore. Along with the operation brief, ML 814 was supplied with a fake Japanese naval ensign for use when operating close to the Timor coast. It was upon the mutualagreement of the officers onboard ML 814 that they would morally refuse to fly such a flag on an Australian ship and thus they stowed the ensign in the potato locker for the remainder of the trip. That ensign is now on display at the AustralianWar Memorial in Canberra (Hordern 1994).

An Australian sergeant of the 2/4 Australian Independent Company, A.J. Ellwood, was to be inserted into the LagartoParty to act as a communications link back to the Melbourne headquarters of SRD. Ellwood joined the ship’s company on1 August 1943 along with two other SRD members and a specialist navigator. All members other than Ellwood would return to Australia with the Fairmiles. Both MLs 814 and 815 departed Darwin bound for Melville Island in order to refuel the vessels prior to the long transit up to Timor. The amphibious operation was a success, with the evacuation of anumber of refugees and the safe insertion of Ellwood and the required rations. As the vessels cruised away at top speed there was a feeling of a job well done (Evans 2002 p.142-149).

This extended transit from Melville Island to the Timor coast, an approximate distance of 1200 km, is well beyond what was originally designed for such a small vessel. In order to achieve the transit distance, and a fast evacuation, all the depth charge armament was removed from the vessels, thus leaving them vulnerable in the event of enemy submarinecontact. This operation can be seen as a success; although the vessels and their crews were pushed beyond normal operational conditions, the outcome was exactly what was asked of them. Operation Mosquito was seen as necessary in order to continue operational effectiveness in occupied Timor, even though it was highlighted in January 1943 that recapture of Timor had been ruled out (Evans 2002 p.195).

In order to escape enemy territory as quickly as possible these vessels were to leave their operation location at their maximum speed. Due to the remote location that they were operating in, however, they were required to conserve fuel on the journey to their rendezvous point. The brief for all supply operations was for a slow, 10 knots transit to the rendezvous point where they were to be shadowed by RAAF Beaufighters (Hordern 1994). This slow transit not only endangered these small boats but also the aircraft protecting them from above. When transiting across the open ocean attack from the air by prowling Japanese patrol aircraft was increasingly likely, thus revealing their position and potentially their mission.

Failure of the Lagarto Party

It was just under two months later, following the successful evacuation and resupply, that the Lagarto party, along with Ellwood, was surrounded and captured by the Japanese. When captured, Ellwood was unable to burn his ciphers and papers and therefore buried them in the sand nearby. This inability to burn classified material, which would have been the protocol in that situation, evidently led to the compromised position held by the SRD. Following the discovery of theburied papers and cipher, the Japanese tortured Ellwood until he unwillingly began to operate his cipher, re-establishingcontact with the SRD. With the SRD unaware that the entire Lagarto Party had fallen into enemy hands, the SRD continued to undertake aerial resupply drops and share intelligence. Consequently, Ellwood was forced to update the SRD with party movements and operations, this time faked by the Japanese (Central Intelligence Agency 2008).

Insertion of Cobra – Operation Bulldozer

This is the point in the operations at which the ignorance of the SRD can be highlighted. Followingon from the re-establishment of communications between the compromised Lagarto Party and the SRD in Melbourne, it was the SRD’sdecision to make a second insertion of intelligence gathering operatives into occupied Timor to assist the Lagarto party in their operation. This new party, named Cobra, was to be put ashore using a similar method to the evacuation of civilians during Operation Mosquito, this time using only ML 814. Details of this operation were passed on to the compromisedLagarto party prior to the amphibious landing. As a result, the party was met on the beach by a group of Japanese sympathizers posing as local villagers. Shortly afterwards, the entire Cobra party had been captured by the Japanese, withmany members of the party ending up in prisoner of war camps on the island where they were beaten and tortured, as wellas the capture and compromised use of their radio communications with Melbourne. This decision by the SRD to not onlyland the Cobra party, but to inform the Lagarto party of their intentions ultimately led to the capture and torture of thesemen (Evans 2002 p.159-162).

The biggest wrongdoing by the SRD in this whole affair that can be highlighted was the use of authenticators, which when included in a signal are words indicating that the sender has not being compromised. The first Lagarto party had not been issued such an authenticator when originally landing in Timor. Worse still, the Cobra party, once captured andforced to establish communication lines with Melbourne in a similar way to the Lagarto party, began to omit theirauthenticator from their transmissions, as per protocol if captured. This should have been an obvious sign to the SRD that something had gone very wrong in Timor. The SRD, however, oblivious to the omission of the authenticator, continued to communicate with the Cobra party, reminding them in one transmission to start use their authenticator. This inexcusableerror ultimately led to the continuation of supply and insertion missions across Timor.

Operation Adder

This negligence in regard to the authenticator ultimately cost the lives of the entire third party to be landed on Timoreseshores, the Adder Party. They too were landed using another RAN Fairmile, ML 429, which took four attempts to successfully land the party, finally landing on 21 August 1943 (Evans 2002 p.169-171). This operation involved placing the Fairmile crews in danger behind enemy lines a total of four times, only to have the embarked SRD captured and killed within hours of landing, indicating a clear waste of personnel and resources.

Discovery of Compromise

It was not until April 1945, 19 months after the capture of the Lagarto party, that intelligence reports began to realise that both the Lagarto and Cobra parties were in fact in enemy hands. This came after the realisation that the documents, air dropped to both teams, had found their way into the hands of the Japanese. The gravity of the situation was immediately realised and all future planned support operations for the Lagarto or Cobra parties was immediately ceased. The war ended only five months later (Central Intelligence Agency 2008).

Conclusion

These resupply operations, although successful in their own right, can be seen as failures considering the lack of impactand cost of human life, in both death and detention. The success of the naval operations can thus clear the RAN of anyinvolvement in the failed operations which occurred ashore, although the operations can be seen as an unnecessary risk to the lives of all the crew aboard the multiple vessels and aircraft involved in the operations. These missions pushed theoperational limits of both the vessels and crews, given that the vessels were not designed to undertake long rangemissions across open ocean. The original design for the Fairmile was for inshore and littoral operations with occasional sprints across the English Channel, and were not designed for open ocean multi-day transits. Although all small boats and aircraft involved in these resupply operations were not compromised, the risk taken by sending these vessels on theseoperations was immense. It can be argued that the potential risk which the crews of these vessels, for all operations following the initial evacuation, were exposed to during their voyage was unnecessary due entirely to the neglect of theSRD to detect the comprised state of the Lagarto Party.

Bibliography

Evans, P. (2002). Fairmile Ships of the Royal Australian Navy, Loftus, Australia: Australian Military History Publications.

Central Intelligence Agency. (2008). A Small South Pole. Retrieved 6 April 2019, from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent- csi/vol4no4/html/v04i4a08p_0001.htm.

Hordern, M. C. (1994). Contact! HMAS Rushcutter and Australia’s Submarine Hunters. Australia, The Anti-Submarine Officers’ Association. Royal Australian Navy. ‘ML 814.’ Retrieved March 2019, from http://www.navy.gov.au/ml-814

 

By Editor

Knowing two senior members of our community who served in ML 814 retain clear memories of their war service, the opportunity was taken to ask if they would care to comment upon the essay. The following response was received from the (former) SBLT John Dowey, RANVR.

RAN Involvement in SRD Operation Timor 1943-1945

Dear Editor,

I am a long-time friend of Marsden Hordern – in war and peace. We served together on ML 814 in Darwin in 1943 – with the passage of time Marsden is almost certainly my oldest colleague. We both have a close link with those dangerous and tragic SRD operations in Timor; Marsden with ‘Mosquito’ and me with the somewhat ludicrously named ‘Bulldozer’.

Marsden has sent me a copy of your email 7 June and SBLT Seton’s essay. I was delighted to see a younger generation’s interest in the history of those traumatic years, which was kept secret for so long. It helps to deepen society’s understanding of those perilous times and appreciation of the brave men, who risked – and, in some cases gave – their lives in compromised and fruitless intelligence operations. Seton is a talented writer.

I still retain strong memories of the time I spent on that enemy beach that night quite oblivious of the situation that would emerge later for the ‘Cobra’ party. I was a raw 20-year-old sub-lieutenant with no training or experience in such an operation. It was only after the landing party returned to the ship, the landing craft hoisted aboard and ML 814 was speeding away from Timor that the reality of that night set in for me. I am sure there was a great collective sigh of relief by all aboard 814.

John Dowey, Jim Ellwood and Marsden Hordern. Dowey Collection c 2010.

In the ensuing years I have become a very good friend of Jim Ellwood. I have a deep appreciation of his bravery in volunteering to return to Timor as the sole signaller to the Portuguese Commandos and how he was let down by his command back in Australia. I know he has made his peace with present Japanese society after his trip there in 2011 (when he accompanied another POW, Sister Johnston of Rabaul Hospital). Whether he could ever forgive his SRD senior officers is arguable. I enclose a copy of my message to him last January on the 75th anniversary of that fateful night. I did not meet up with him.

I am not a great believer in oral history written many years later, unless supported by documentary evidence of about the time of the event. I try to remember Mark Twain’s aphorism – ‘I find that the further back I go, the better I remember things whether they happened or not’. Unfortunately, Fairmile ship logs do not appear to have been lodged in the Australian Archives to any extent – the ML 814 book(s) seem to be an exception. I accessed the log for Jan/Feb 1944 in 1998 and still have some handwritten notes. Of course, some oral history is more compelling than others. The narrative of the tragic ‘Adder’ operation written by my Darwin colleague and peacetime workmate, Trevor Vear, for Contact! The History of HMAS Rushcutter, provides a detailed account (page 433) of how ML 429 was nearly lost on a Timor reef that night. I also discussed ‘Adder’ with Harry Wadds, ML 429’s CO during our meeting.

I enclose copies of –

ML 814’s Sailing Orders for Operation ‘Bulldozer’

Report on Operation ‘Bulldozer’ 27-31 January 1944 (I wrote the Report for the CO LEUT R. Lewis, who added the final para.).

Additionally, in case you may find it of interest, I enclose a copy of an article Jim Ellwood sent me last year. It is an article on the SRD ‘failings’ (1943-45) by a W.A. University Law Lecturer and Military Law Research Fellow, Narelle Morris. It underlines for me the unnecessary risks the Darwin Fairmiles and their crews faced on SRD operations 1943-45.

Finally, may I take the opportunity to congratulate you on the June issue of the Review. Bravo Zulu.

Best regards,

John Dowey

Note: copies of the enclosures mentioned in the above letter are available on request to the Editor.

 

Occasional Paper 62: The Navy in South Australia from Colonial Days to the Present

September 2019

By Dennis J Weatherall JP TM AFAITT(L) LSM, Volunteer Researcher, Naval Historical Society of Australia

It’s reputed that the first sighting of the southern coast of our Great South Land was by a Dutch ship in 1627 the “Gulden Zeepaard” under the command of a Francois Thijssen.  The next record accords Rear Admiral Bruny D’Entrecasteaux in the French war ship “La Recherche”.  He was looking for La Perouse who was on a voyage of discovery in 1788, in company with Boussole and Astralabe, both the latter seemingly disappearing without trace.

Able Tasman probably saw the same coast even earlier in 1644 from his sketch charts.  Another voyager was Lt. John McCluer of the Bombay Marine Company in 1790, followed by Captain Matthew Flinders in 1802-1803.  A Lt. James Grant in January 1800, in command of “HMS Lady Nelson” (a 60 ton Brig), discovered and named parts of the coast such as Cape Banks, Cape Northumberland, Mount Gambier, Mount Schanck.  He was promoted to Commander after a battle with the Dutch in 1805 off today’s Netherlands and he was remembered with a memorial atop Mt Gambier in 1900 for his discoveries.

The Province of South Australia (as opposed to Colony)[1] was established in December 1833 when the British Parliament passed the South Australian Act. South Australia was in fact called a “Province” rather than a Colony to distinguish it from other Colonies that had transportation as their main source of population.

In the early 1850’s the then Governor Henry Young looked at ways of protecting the Province and in due course informed the “Home Authorities” that “it’d accord great satisfaction and increase confidence to his government if the English Pendant was more frequently seen in these waters” and, more importantly, subject to available funds available to the Provinces and Colonies, if a naval force were to be established on the Australian coast.  It appears this submission was considered rather too radical by the “Lords of the Admiralty“.

Recommendations were forthcoming to build forts at The Semaphore, Glenelg, Torrens Island and inland towards Adelaide.  The wish list also had a requirement for six gunboats, each with a 100 pounder gun, with additional guns ashore.  Port Creek would be defended by torpedoes and a boom, along with telegraphic communications, with the lighthouse augmented with both a permanent and volunteer military force.  This was a very ambitious programme on which to embark to defend the Province of South Australia, with a parliamentary grant of 20,000 pounds.  Fort Glanville and Fort Largs, plus a military road, eventually materialised.

[1] While the ‘South Australian Act’ may have referred to the establishment as a “Province” the term was not generally used.  SA was generally referred to as a ‘Colony’ e.g. Her Majesty’s Colonial Ship Protector.

In the mid 1800’s Britain made it quite clear that her contribution to the security of Australia would be the continued policy of the Royal Navy.  It would assume full responsibility on the high seas and no more, therefore the question of adequate local defence measures became paramount during the American Civil War period.

Around the same time an MP, a Mr H.B.T. Strangways, suggested the purchase of a “quick turret ship” capable of carrying two 150 pound shot guns and able to steam at 18-20 knots, which was some speed at that time.  Due to a change in Governor the idea was shelved for more than ten years.

In late 1859 the Province bought to the attention of “the powers” there’d been no HM ships in the waters of South Australia for nine years. This brought a flood of visits by RN ships “HMS Esk” (1,169 tons with 21 guns) along with “HMS Charybdis”, “Curacoa”, “Falcon” and “Galatea” soon after the matter had been raised.

HMS Falcon – a Cruiser class sloop of 17 guns, 1045 tons, commissioned 30th March 1855 and part of the Royal Navy Australian Station based ships

An English Act of Parliament in 1859 established a Reserve volunteer force of seamen to be available for general service in the RN in times of emergency to be known as the RNR.  The Colonial Defence Act was passed into law in 1865 and this “made it lawful for any Colony to provide, maintain and use vessels of war and to raise and maintain seamen for such vessels, also to raise and maintain a volunteer force to serve in the RN in emergencies, appoint officers, obtain from the Admiralty the services of officers and men, enforce order and discipline, making all subject to the R&I’s of the RN”.

Volunteers raised in the Colonies were to form part of the RNR, the Queen may then accept an offer of use of such vessels and men, with such ships then being a ship of war of the RN.  Local ships were granted authority to wear the Blue Ensign with the badge of the Colony in the fly and a Blue Pendant.

It was this Act which made possible the formation of the Naval Brigade, and the building of H.M. Colonial Ship, HMCS Protector in 1884 and her subsequent future service in the RN during the “Boxer Rebellion” in 1900.  During this period as HMS Protector she flew the White Ensign and her officers given temporary commissions in the Royal Navy.

In 1862 Colonel F. Blyth of the Volunteer Military Force recommended additional protection for South Australia by stationing a gunboat “at the outer bar” of the Port River.  In 1865 a Commander Parkin recommended six gunboats each capable of firing off a 100 pound shot.  This recommendation was put forward for consideration after the success of Ironclad Monitors during the American Civil War.

In 1867 the government considered the introduction of a naval training ship for boys who had fallen foul to the courts.  There were many against the idea, but eventually it was decided to go ahead with such a programme.  A suitable vessel was acquired – the hulk “Fitzjames” – which was found in Victoria (where a similar scheme was already operating) and towed to South Australia, anchored off the coast, and used as a training ship for young boys between 1876 and 1891.

Hulk “Fitzjames” Naval Training Ship for boys in South Australia

In 1876 the question of the purchase of a substantial naval vessel once again was raised.  A Defence Commission was established and again it was recommended the Province purchase three gunboats.  Treasurer Mr John Colton suggested a “turret ship” similar to the Victorian vessel “Cerberus” and a request was made to Victoria on how much it would cost.  The SA Agent General in London, a Mr Dutton, at the time made contact with the Chief Constructor of the RN, a Mr E.J. Reed.  He learned such a 1,000 ton ironclad ship carrying 25 ton guns would cost his government 29,500 pounds.  The information was filed away for posterity in the SA government archives and didn’t proceed.

In 1877, following the “Russian Scare” of 1876-77, two British government men visited the Australian Colonies and SA Province to discuss their defence with their respective governments.  One was a Mr W.F.D. Jervois, a future governor of South Australia.  They recommended all Colonies/Provinces acquire gunboats or torpedo boats and man them with locally-recruited men for the protection of their local ports.

Another suggestion by Jervois was to purchase a vessel of 2,500 tons, ironclad with ten inch armour and heavy guns.  Such an outlay – the amount of 150,000 pounds – wasn’t again all that palatable to the tax payers of SA, so the suggestion went nowhere for another five years.

Once Jervois became governor of SA (in October 1877) he suggested to the government they should hire British firm (Sir) William Armstrong & Co of Newcastle-on-Tyne to build its new naval vessel the “Protector”.  The ship was constructed according to the “flat-iron” gunboat design, first introduced during the Crimean War.

HMCS Protector 1884, RAN Image

Originally estimated that such a vessel would cost 40-50,000 pounds, it was to be the largest vessel ordered by any Colony or Province at 188 ft long, 30 ft beam and 12 ft 6 in draft.  Propulsion was via two compound surface condensing engines generating 1,500 hp giving a top speed of 14 knots.  For extra range Protector was fitted with a Schooner rig and flying topsails.

Protector was launched in early 1884 and commissioned the same year on the 19th June – her first CO was a Commander John C.P Walcott RN.  Her delivery passage to Port Adelaide via the Suez Canal arrived on station 30th September 1884.  Protector served SA for fifteen years up until 1900 when she was offered up to the Imperial government as part of the expedition to China and the Boxer Rebellion.  Captain William Rooke Creswell CMG had previously served in the SA Colonial Navy but at the time of his appointment to be CO for the China Rebellion was Commander of the Queensland Maritime Defence Force.

On her return to Australia from China on the 1st January 1901 she was just in time to be transferred to the new Commonwealth of Australia Naval Force and became HMAS Protector.  There’s much more to tell about this gallant ship and we’ll leave its war time service and post service to another paper.

Rewinding back to 1870’s and Colonial times in South Australia.  A site was selected for its strategic importance on the North Arm of the Port River and a Naval Store was established at Largs Bay.  This depot was used for Naval Reserve training and the stowage of emergency items for sea rescue.

In the early 1880’s a temporary Torpedo Station was erected at this site which was later replaced by a more substantial building, some 110 ft in length, and built by the Naval Reservists.  The new building consisted of a store room, lecture room and a residence for a torpedo officer – construction was in galvanised iron.  A jetty was also built into deep water with a railway track system to handle stores and torpedoes.  The “Station” was extended twice in 1890 and 1891 by the crew of HMCS Protector.

This torpedo station was intended to protect Port Adelaide in any hostilities, by a boom of heavy chains across the river and in turn by a gun battery.  The Station could also mine the Port River as required – the government of the day acquired sufficient mines that were never used.  On becoming obsolete and were in due course destroyed.

Eventually, post Federation, a Torpedo Boat was acquired in 1905.  Better late than never as the saying goes!  The Station was closed and equipment dismantled and transferred to the new Naval Depot at Birkenhead which was established in 1915 to replace the Largs Bay site.  Birkenhead was located some 14 kms NW of Adelaide City central business centre on the Lefeure Peninsula, covering an area of 30 square miles.  A Naval Drill Hall was built on the location in 1919 and is significant for its association with the early days of the Naval Reserve in South Australia and eventually with the RAN until its closure in 1990.

Between the wars, the base supported visiting fleet assets and the local Port Division of the RANR.  In WWII it was commissioned as a Naval Shore Establishment as HMAS Cerberus IV on the 13th September 1939 and a year later, 1st August 1940, was recommissioned as HMAS Torrens after the river that flows through Adelaide and the River Class Torpedo Boat Destroyer of the same name.  Torrens was disposed by sinking in 1930.

HMAS Torrens D67 commissioned 1916, decommissioned 1920, RAN Image

Post WWII, HMAS Torrens returned to its peacetime routine of providing a naval presence in South Australia, assisting visiting fleet ships and the base for the RANR training once more.

On the 1st March 1965, Torrens had another name change and recommissioned as HMAS Encounter which perpetuated the name of the former Light Cruiser HMS Encounter built between 1901 and 1905.

Encounter was assigned to the Australian Station and when the RAN was formed it was renamed HMAS Encounter.  The name also commemorates the meeting of two great naval explorers, Captain Matthew Flinders RN and French Captain Nicolas Baudin, off the South Australian coast in 1802.

The establishment, HMAS Encounter was decommissioned on the 21st March 1994 so ending more than one hundred years of permanent naval presence in the Port Adelaide area.  The last Commanding Officer was Commander Brian Gorringe ADC RAN.

Crest of the Shore Establishment HMAS Encounter – Adelaide SA
Naval HQ SA – Keswick Barracks South Australia

A Naval Support Office was subsequently established at Keswick Barracks in June 1994.  It is located on the southern outskirts of the Adelaide parklands and shares its presence with the Army Headquarters for SA.  In 1998 the establishment was renamed “Navy Headquarters South Australia”, its main function being to provide administration support to Naval personnel serving with various Defence projects in South Australia.  These include; RAAF Edinburgh, DSTO Salisbury, ASC Osborne, along with Reserve personnel living in SA and detachments of both the RAN and RANR Bands.

References:

Commonwealth of Australia Archives, Canberra

Department of Defence web site

Records and Register Commonwealth Militia – Reserves

South Australian Heritage data base

South Australian Government Register 10 Jul 1886 + 28 Feb 1891

South Australian State Library data news article Robert Thomas 1891

South Australian Defence of the Colony-Province 26 Mar 1859

Successful Torpedo Practice Register 27 Jul 1885

Naval Defence Act of SA 15 Nov 1887

Information article HMCS Protector 23 Sep 1884

SA History Hub – Protector Warship of SA

Sea Power Centre Australia

Colonial Navies of Australia

National Archives – Coastal Fortifications South Australia 1800’s.

Occasional Paper 63: Malta Revisited: Wartime Memories of HMAS Vendetta’s Malta Sojourn in World War II

September 2019

We are indebted to ex Supply Assistant Gordon Hill for this wonderfully illuminating description of his wartime service in the destroyer HMAS Vendetta when based at Malta.  His story was first published in the June 2010 edition of the Naval Historical Review, available on the Society website.

The George Cross Island Association Reunion in 2004 gave me the opportunity to revisit Malta. I knew that if I put off visiting the Island again after 64 years it was doubtful I would ever do so. Visiting Grand Harbour, the Docks, the infamous ‘Gut’, Valetta, Sliema, the country towns and villages evoked memories of both happy and sad days of Malta at war.

HMAS Vendetta and the four other destroyers of the V and W squadron from Australia were assigned to the 10th destroyer squadron of Admiral Cunningham’s Mediterranean fleet at Malta. We arrived in December 1939 and were soon exercising at sea. The war had not reached the Med’ and with the French fleet as allies we sailed supreme in Mare Nostrum, as the Romans called it. Two battle fleets were a magnificent sight and we five little Australian destroyers were proud to be a part of it; destroyer escort to this mighty armada.

We escorted convoys taking troops to Marseilles, exercised in the Atlantic and visited Gibraltar.

On 5 March 1940 I had my 21stbirthday in Marseilles, visiting the cabarets and dancing the night away. The French and British armies in the north would defeat the Germans, Poland would be liberated and the war would be over in no time. How quickly things changed. We evacuated troops from Marseilles to Palestine, the French fleet became our enemies and we returned to Malta.

Vendetta was feeling her age after months at sea and it was decided to put her in dock at Malta for a refit. Grand Harbour was full of ships, plenty of sailors went ashore enjoying themselves.  One favourite place in Valetta was ‘The Gut’ a street full of bars. I had a memorable evening with two shipmates and two English squaddies (soldiers) in a room over ‘Dirty Harry’s’ Bar. We sang and danced and one girl did the ‘Dance of the Seven Veils’. One soldier who had a magnificent voice and sang ‘My Prayer’ and ‘Indian Summer’, two songs I will never forget.

The ship’s company was divided in two. One half went to live and work with the British army RA 4thCoast Regiment and the other half, which I was unfortunate enough to be in, left to work on the ship during the day and to live in the NAAFI canteen. The canteen had facilities for showers and meals but we had to sleep on mess tables or benches, which at the time we thought nothing could be worse.

In dock Vendetta had one set of torpedo tubes removed and a high angle AA gun fitted, a 0.5 multiple machine gun replaced the small gun between the funnels, the mainmast lowered and sundry other work done by the dockyard workers. We carried out general maintenance and cleaned up the mess the dockyard workers invariably left behind each day. The upper deck soon had a new look. The boilers had been cleaned and the work on the engine refit commenced.

HMAS Vendetta wearing camouflage and new pennant no D69 which was changed in May 1940

On the 10 June I left the ship and was walking to the canteen to shower and spend the evening ashore when two army officers excitedly told me ‘the balloon has gone up’ That expression took a while to sink in but I soon realised that Italy had come into the war. The immediate fear was an Italian invasion by sea and air.

Italy had a menacing naval potential. Her fleet boasted 5 battleships, 25 cruisers, 90 destroyers and nearly 100 submarines. Admiral Cunningham decided to move the units of his fleet in Malta to Alexandria leaving just a few destroyers and other small ships. Vendetta’s refit crew now became dockyard defence and we carried a 0.303 rifle or if lucky a 0.45 revolver with us at all times to guard against a parachute invasion.

Living in the NAAFI canteen was bad enough but we were now to be quartered in a tunnel alongside the ship in the graving dock. Fifty men took their hammocks and laid them on the damp tunnel floor and turned in. Next morning we were covered by bites from fleas that infested the walls of the tunnel. The only relief was to dive into the harbour. That tunnel was our home for four weeks while we worked on the ship.

The bombing started early on 11 June. Valetta, the harbour and surrounding towns were bombed eighty times, sometimes up to eight air raids a day up to the time when we left on 8 July with the engine refit not completed. The siege of Malta had begun. Many people left their homes to live in the catacombs, ancient tunnels and caves and to cut air raid shelters in the soft limestone cliffs.

The only air defence was four Gloster Gladiators left behind by the navy. The Maltese people watched these planes gallantly take off each day to fight the Italian bombers. One of the navy planes was shot down and the people named the remaining three Faith, Hope and Charity. They gave a good account of themselves and shot down or disabled a number of bombers before they too met their fate. The plane christened ‘Faith’ was not badly damaged and after the war was restored and is now in the museum in Valetta.

Frantic efforts to supply the Island with troops, supplies and equipment for the army and air force through Gibraltar in the west and Alexandria in the east meant Malta Grand Harbour was once again full of ships and a target for the bombers. On one occasion one ammunition ship was on fire and another was sunk by navy divers attaching limpet mines to avoid it blowing up. Even though some supply ships were sunk, navy divers recovered stores from some sunken vessels. The harbour became a graveyard for a number of sailors, soldiers and dockyard workers unloading ships.

Italian bombing of Grand Harbour Malta, June 1941

On one occasion I was assigned to a working party to load depth charges on to a truck and take them to Ranella wireless station. This was the main WT station on the Island. We set up the depth charges as demolition charges in a number of the tunnels that made up this vast underground complex. I don’t think I was much help in handling 350 pound depth charges I only weighed 8 ½ stone and was sacked from a 6 inch guns crew at the training depot in Victoria because I could not lift a 112 pound shell off the loading tray

Soon after Italy came into the war an Italian passenger ship the El Nil was close to Sicily and trying to get to its home port when one of our aircraft spotted it and made it heave to. Vendetta was duty boat for the day and even in dry dock had to provide a boat crew if required. We were given the job of providing a boarding party to take over the passenger ship and I with others were roused from our tunnel quarters, armed and dispatched by a fast patrol boat to sea. We boarded El Nil which was two days sailing out of Malta. My job was to guard the engine room crew. Others took over the wheel house, bridge and other positions. The crew and passengers did not appear to resent our presence or resist. In fact, that night when relieved of my watch I slept comfortably in a cabin and next day ate my meals in the dining room with the passengers. A real contrast from our flea infested tunnel and NAFFI meals.

The Italian air force decided to have an air raid just as we were entering harbour. Pandemonium broke out among the passengers and crew. They tried to lower the life boats, and really panicked. Fortunately we had only a short distance to go to secure the ship alongside a wharf. When the air raid was over we managed to get everyone ashore and the army took them away as POW’s

After several attempts to leave Malta with a convoy, including our captured ship El Nil we finally dodged the lurking submarines and newly laid mines and proceeded to Alexandria which we reached on 13 July 1940. Upon our departure from Malta our C.O. LCDR Rhoades received a message from the Vice Admiral Malta praising the work he and his crew had done in improving the Island’s defences. The message spoke of the astonishing results produced by Vendetta’s crew who, in true Australian fashion, turned their hands to everything. The El Nil was turned into a hospital ship some time later. We spent the next two months escorting convoys of troop ships to Malta and screening ships of the covering cruisers and battleships.

We once again entered Grand Harbour Malta on 11 October 1940 and proceeded to our old place in the graving dock and our tunnel accommodation to complete our engine refit. Some German dive bombers had joined the Italians and inflicted heavy damage on ships in the harbour. The AA defence had been strengthened and now 4.5 AA guns, Bofors and multiple pom poms managed to shoot down a number of bombers. The RAF had some Spitfires and other aircraft and it looked less likely that Italy could take the Island.

One of our sailors had a portable gramophone and a few records which he played in our tunnel to entertain us. One record was Gracie Fields singing Gounod’s ‘Ave Maria’. The memory of the constant playing of that record later evoked such strong emotions in me that for many years I would become profoundly upset when I heard it played.

On the 13 September the long expected Italian invasion of Egypt from Libya began and their forces occupied Sidi Barini . On 28 October the Italian army invaded Greece. Vendetta, still in dock in Malta was like a greyhound straining at the leash to get the refit completed . We had missed a naval battle before by being in dock.

With the arrival of the Luftwaffe in Sicily only 60 miles from Malta bombing intensified. Life in the underground shelters, with food and fuel running short people were getting desperate. No pets were allowed to be kept. Babies were born and people died in their air raid shelters. We finally sailed from Grand Harbour on 10 November escorting the monitor HMS Terror to Suda Bay, Crete which was being set up as naval support base for the military reinforcement of Greece.

Our last visit to Malta was when we escorted a convoy from Alexandria arriving on 26 November 1940. This was a particularly hazardous trip. Several troop and supply ships were sunk by submarines and bombers. There was to be no further attempt to get supplies to Malta from both the east and west Mediterranean for some time. The navy even resorted to delivering aviation fuel to the RAF in Malta by submarine, carried in 4 gallon tins. In harbour, our ‘gashman’ was accused of selling our food scraps to people at the dockyard gate for a penny a plate, instead of feeding them to his goats. Goats were the only supply of milk as the Island land was too poor to support grazing cattle. The milkman came to your door or air raid shelter and milked the goats into any container you had.

In April 1942 HM King George Vl awarded the George Cross to the Islanders of Malta and Gozo as a tribute to their gallantry. The siege went on and the people were at the point of giving up the struggle when in August the ‘Pedestal’ convoy, after the loss of many ships (including the aircraft carrier Eagle) got through from Gibraltar. The tanker Ohio made history by delivering vital fuel, though badly damaged and finally sinking at the wharf. While this was considered the end of the siege, it was some time before other convoys got through to supply food to the starving people.

HMAS Vendetta went on in 1942 to make a name for herself in other parts of the Mediterranean, North Africa, Tobruk, Greece and Crete. Malta was in the past. The feather bed in the Emirates Airways hotel in Dubai on my return to Brisbane was a vast contrast to a hammock on the dirt floor of our tunnel dockside in Malta. All just a part of history. 

A little about the author:

Gordon Hill is a current member of NHS.  He joined the RAN as a Supply Assistant in 1938.. After initial training at Flinders Naval Base he was posted to HMAS Vendetta. In December 1939 the RAN destroyer squadron was sent overseas to join the Royal Navy East Mediterranean Fleet in Malta. He served in the Mediterranean in Vendetta until the middle of 1941 when transferred to HMAS Perth. After suffering bomb damage in the evacuation from Crete, Perth returned to Australia for repairs.

Gordon next joined HMAS Colac in 1942 and after a few trips to Milne Bay was posted to HMAS Magnetic at Townsville, to start up and run a supply base. His next posting was to the Combined Operations training base HMAS Assault at Port Stephens. He then returned to Milne Bay becoming Australian Liaison Officer with the American Supply Base. After the end of the war in 1945 he was involved with the disposal of surplus naval assets in North Queensland until discharged from the RAN in 1950.

Gordon later joined the Commonwealth Immigration Department as a Supply Officer and helped run migrant camps for displaced persons from Europe at Brisbane and Townsville, and set up another in Cairns. He became an accountant in Cairns and later Brisbane where he retired in 1980.

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