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You are here: Home / Archives for Article topics / Battles and operations / Colonial navies

Colonial navies

Occasional Paper 28: Cockatoo Island – An Historical Account

October 29, 2018

June 2018

Cockatoo Island has a long association with the RAN. The Island has World Heritage Listing and some additional information can be found on our website at https://www.navyhistory.org.au/naval-heritage-sites/cockatoo-island. This article has been reprinted in the June 2003 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved).

Cockatoo Island is Sydney Harbour’s largest island. It was named after flocks of cockatoos that used to congregate in its large red gum trees. It is a sandstone mound rising to about 18 metres above sea level. The island was originally only 32 acres in size, but due to expansion over the years is now 44 acres. Its isolation, deep waters and proximity to other industrial sites since the first European occupation of the island in 1839 has led to the island having a dynamic and profitable history. It was first used as a penal facility for convicts transferred from Norfolk Island, then as a dockyard for the construction, repair and refitting of ships.

1839

Governor George Gipps ordered the construction of a prison on Cockatoo Island for convicts transferred from Norfolk Island. Their labour was to be used in the construction of roads and other public works of the colony. The convicts excavated the sandstone rock and constructed underground silos, which were used to store the colony’s grain. These silos proved invaluable to the population of Sydney, as until then they had been forced to rely upon the irregular shipment of grain from England. Furthermore, the grain was not threatened by contamination, as the silos were airtight. The sandstone was also used for other construction projects around Sydney, including Circular Quay.

1851

Construction of Fitzroy Dock commenced. Governor Gipps recognised the advantage of building a dry dock to enable the repair of visiting ships of the Royal Navy. The dock was built entirely by convict labour; gangs of convicts in chains chiselling the sandstone by means of a chisel and hammer, and took six years to be completed. However, before construction of the dock commenced, the sandstone cliffs that lay across the chosen site had to be removed. Large charges of gunpowder, electrically charged, were used for this purpose. It was the first time gunpowder was electrically charged in Australia. Accurate calculations were made to ensure that the sandstone did not simply disintegrate. Indeed, the cliffs fell away in large boulders and the rocks were later used in the construction of various buildings.

1864

The administration of the island was split between the NSW Department of Prisons and the Public Works Department.

1870

The Penal Colony was abolished upon the construction of the Darlinghurst Gaol. The administration of the penal establishment at Cockatoo Island had received a great deal of criticism as the gaol was overcrowded – at one point 500 prisoners were held on the island in housing fit for about 300.

1871

An Industrial School for Girls and a reformatory for women took over the prison barracks until 1888. The island’s name was changed to Biloela (Aboriginal for cockatoo) in an attempt to give it a new image. In 1908, a new prison was built at Long Bay and this finally brought about the end of a prison at Cockatoo Island. During the period 1871-1911 two wooden sailing ships administered by the Department of Education as Nautical School Ships were moored off the island. They were used as training ships for delinquent and orphaned boys. The sailing ships proved a great success and many of the boys became talented sailors.

1880

It became evident that a new dry dock would be needed to accommodate not only the increasing number but the increasing size of ships arriving at Cockatoo Island for repairs. Louis Samuel, a 23 year-old engineer, won the contract to build the dry dock, called Sutherland Dock. Upon its completion it was the largest dry dock in the world and over the years would require further extensions to accommodate the larger ships of the time. It was completed in 1892. Over the years, activity at the dockyard increased.

1911

The Royal Australian Navy was created on 10 July.

1913

Cockatoo Island was sold to the Commonwealth and became a defence establishment. From this time many naval ships were built and refitted at Cockatoo Island. The first RAN destroyer to be built at Cockatoo Island was completed in 1916.

World War One

The war years proved to be an arduous time for the dockyard. Repairs and refitting of warships and other vessels such as merchant cruisers and supply ships were in high demand. Around 250 ships were refitted and over 500 vessels were docked at Cockatoo Island during the war years.

The incredible scale of the work undertaken by the dockyard during these years can be judged by the following: the ships converted and refitted were arranged to carry in total 4,459 officers, 5,900 non-commissioned officers, 112,500 men, 1,800 munition workers and navvies and 17,000 horses. ((p 29 Cockatoo Island: A History, by R.G Parker)) Refitting work continued on a large scale after the war to return the ships and other vessels to their previous duties.

1920s

Whilst the war years had proved very lucrative for the dockyard, construction work diminished in the 1920s to such an extent that it was difficult to run the dockyard at a profit. Attempts were made to get commercial engineering projects for the dockyard to keep the employees gainfully employed. However, the High Court intervened for constitutional reasons. It argued that Cockatoo Island, as a government instrumentality, could not compete with private enterprise. These limitations forced the Government of the day to consider leasing out the dockyard and the plant. In 1923, the management and control of Cockatoo Island, in accordance with the provisions of the Commonwealth Shipping Act 1923, was transferred to the Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board. In 1933, Cockatoo Island was leased to a newly formed Australian Company: The Cockatoo Docks and Engineering Company Limited.

1929-33

Wing-Commander L.J. Wackett, the celebrated aeronautical engineer and aircraft designer, was behind this unusual activity on Cockatoo Island. Numerous repairs were undertaken on various aircraft, the largest project being the rebuilding of the Southern Cross in which Sir Charles Kingsford Smith had flown the Pacific. Sixty percent of the plane had to be rebuilt after crashing when landing at Mascot on 19 March 1932.

Albatross in Cockatoo Dock Nov 11 1932

1933

During the 1920s shipbuilding had slowed down but picked up again just before the outbreak of World War II. The Commonwealth ordered the construction of a naval escort vessel HMAS Yarra, followed by HMAS Swan. HMAS Adelaide was modernised, as was HMAS Australia, which was fitted with additional side armour. The liner Moreton Bay was converted into an armed merchant cruiser, whilst another vessel, the Changte, was converted into a victualling supply ship.

World War Two

During the war years dockyard activity at Cockatoo Island was frantic, as the island became the major shipbuilding and dockyard facility for the Pacific region after the fall of Singapore. Hundreds of ships from the RAN and US Navy were docked at Cockatoo for refitting and repairs. Wartime dockings totalled 750 vessels, of which 395 were merchant ships and 350 were naval ships. Work was particularly lengthy because many of the ships were seriously damaged and required long periods in dry dock. Eleven RAN ships required repairs including Australia and Hobart. Hobart had suffered extensive damage, notably to the stern, which was only just hanging on with two propellers and shafting blown off. Australia had suffered considerable damage after being attacked by Kamikaze pilots at the Philippine landings.

Hobart (1) in Sutherland Dock, Cockatoo Island 1944.

1947

This year marked an important change for Cockatoo Island. Vickers Limited, an engineering company based in London took over the majority of the shares in the Cockatoo Docks and Engineering Company Pty Ltd. Vickers had been invaluable to Cockatoo during World War II, providing much needed technical aid and training support.

1948

The Daring class destroyer program began. These were based on a British design. Voyager and Vampire were built at Cockatoo and completed by the late 50s. It was the first time ‘all-welded’ hulls were to be built in Australia. Lack of expertise in this area meant that some of Cockatoo’s technical staff was sent to the United Kingdom to learn the new techniques required. Cockatoo gained a lot of experience in all-welded ship construction and became a leader in the field, advising shipyards throughout Australia. The increased threats from both air and submarine attack meant the destroyer had greater defence responsibilities. The destroyers provided aircraft carrier escort, and gunfire support to the Fleet. Their strong, light construction combined high speed with maximum armament, which included the big guns, lighter anti-aircraft guns, torpedo launchers and anti-submarine mortars. HMAS Voyager sank after a tragic night-time collision with HMAS Melbourne when routine manoeuvres went tragically wrong. Voyager was cut in two, leading to the death of 82 sailors.

1950s

Construction of Type 12 frigates commenced. HMA Ships Parramatta and Stuart were completed by 1961 and 1963 respectively. Their peacetime role involved patrolling and surveillance; escort duties in ocean and coastal water; command and control of maritime forces and navigation and seamanship training. They were considered to be very sophisticated frigates. Stuart was the first ship to be fitted with the IKARA anti-submarine guided missile. IKARA was an innovative Australian development that was later adopted by foreign navies.

1960s

Cockatoo Dockyard received very few orders for naval vessels. Indeed, they were very disappointed when in 1962 the Government ordered two guided-missile destroyers, Hobart and Perth, from the United States. HMAS Brisbane was ordered a year later. Several ships were constructed at Cockatoo after this time, however the dockyard was forced to look for outside work. Cockatoo won the contract to build the merchant ship Empress of Australia.

1970s

The service and refit of the Oberon class submarines took place and operated up to 1991 when the RAN decided to purchase Collins class submarines. Refitting of submarines lasted at least 12 months. In order to free up Sutherland dock, they decided to built a ‘slave dock’ – a type of floating pontoon which was for the exclusive use of the submarines. It proved to be a very useful asset, as once the submarine was loaded onto the slave dock, it could be towed to any berth around the island.

The decline in shipping in Australia, and the size of new container ships, meant that Cockatoo Island dockyard was no longer viable. HMAS Success was the last ship to be built before Cockatoo closed in 1992.

Cockatoo Island 1972

1990s

The Commonwealth regained control of Cockatoo Island in 1992/93. A lot of the plant and machinery was sold and some 40 buildings were demolished. Several wharves were also removed because of their decaying condition.

2000s

Cockatoo Island is now administered by the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust. The Sydney Harbour Federation Trust is a self-funding agency created by the Australian Government responsible for vision planning and management of Sydney Harbour sites including Cockatoo Island and Snapper Island in Sydney Harbour, Woolwich Dock and Parklands in Woolwich, HMAS Platypus in Neutral Bay, Georges Heights, Middle Head and Chowder Bay in Mosman, North Head Sanctuary in Manly, Marine Biological Station in Watsons Bay and Macquarie Light station in Vaucluse. The Harbour Trust’s role is to cultivate a long-term vision plan for these sites to ensure they are integrated into the life of the city and create a lasting legacy for the people of Sydney and Australia.

Tours of the island are now available via their website http://www.harbourtrust.gov.au/visit/cockatoo-island/tours-excursions

Ships Built at Cockatoo Dockyard:

1912-16         HMA Ships Huon, Torrens, Swan – torpedo boat destroyers. These ships were the first warships wholly built in Australia for the Royal Australian Navy.

1913-16         HMAS Brisbane – Town class cruiser

1917-22         HMAS Adelaide – Chatham class cruiser

1918-20         Dundula, Eudunda – cargo ships

1922-24         Fordsdale, Ferndale – refrigerated cargo steamers, the largest merchant ships ever built in Sydney.

1924-25         Cape Leeuwin, Cape York – lighthouse steamers

1926-28         HMAS Albatross – seaplane carrier, Australia’s first aircraft carrier.

1930-31         Cape Otway – lighthouse steamer

1934-36         HMA Ships Yarra, Swan – escort sloops

1938-41         HMAS Kookaburra, Koala, Kangaroo, Karangi – boom defence vessels

1938-40         HMAS Parramatta, Warrego – escort sloops.

1940-42         HMAS Bathurst, Goulburn, Bendigo, Wollongong, Cessnock, Glenelg, HMIS Madras, Bengal – Bathurst class minesweepers

1938-42         HMAS Arunta, Warramunga, Bataan – Tribal class destroyers

1941-43         River Clarence, River Hunter – cargo steamers

1942-46         HMAS Barcoo, Barwon – River class frigates

1944-50         HMAS Tobruk – Battle class destroyer

1946-59         HMAS Voyager, Vampire – Daring class destroyers. These were the first allwelded warships built in Australia (with HMAS Vendetta, built in Victoria). Vampire is on display at the Australian National Maritime Museum in Sydney.

1947-49         Wonga, Yelta – steam tugs

1951-63         HMAS Parramatta, Stuart – Type 12 frigates

1962-65         Empress of Australia – passenger/ vehicle ship, the largest ship of its type built in the world at that time.

1964-68        HMAS Stalwart – escort maintenance ship

1964-71         HMAS Torrens – River class destroyer escort

1974-77         A S Mayne – bucket dredge

1979-86        HMAS Success – Durance class fleet underway replenishment ship (AOR).

Admirable Ancestors

September 21, 2009

This is a copy of a lecture recently delivered to the WA Chapter of the Naval Historical Society of Australia by Mick Graham-Smith

Firstly, I would like to introduce myself. As you probably gather from my accent, I hail from that land-locked country which I prefer to call Rhodesia. I came to Perth with my family 30 years ago to start a new life as I could see what was going to befall that country with the likes of Robert Mugabe gaining power. You are also probably wondering why a blow-in who has come from an African country with no direct access to the sea and therefore no navy would be interested in naval matters. Since retiring three years ago, I decided to research my family history as this had been a bit of a mystery to me. As a family we had always been involved in ‘Serving King and Country’ and through my research I discovered that three members had achieved the exalted rank of Admiral in the Royal Navy. I shall now summarise the results of my research into their careers, some of the noteworthy ships in which they sailed and incidents that changed the course of history. I have called this presentation ‘Admirable Ancestors’ – a play on words.

William Stockes Rees

The first member is William Stokes Rees who was to lead an interesting life during the latter years of Victorian gunboat diplomacy. He joined the Senior Service at the age of 13 and served in the penultimate Royal Oak as a midshipman. Progressing up the commissioned ranks to captain, he was in HMS St George when one of the most remarkable events in naval history took place in Zanzibar, which was a British Protectorate at the time.

The Arab sultans of Zanzibar had been involved for centuries in the trade of ivory, spices and slaves. Despite the abolition of slave trading in East Africa by the British in 1873, slavery was still being practised by Arab merchants on the island, who sent their human cargoes to various Arab states in the Persian Gulf area. It is estimated that over three decades of British gunboat activity off the coast of East Africa, some one thousand dhows were captured and 12,000 Africans saved by the Royal Navy from the horrors of enslavement.

On 23rd August 1896 the Sultan of Zanzibar died and his cousin, Hamoud, was declared by the British as his successor. However this did not meet with the approval of another cousin, Khalid, who considered that he had the rightful claim. Khalid gained access to the Sultan’s palace through a broken window and, along with 2,000 odd supporters, declared himself the new sultan by raising the Zanzibar flag. The British authorities refused to recognise Khalid’s claim and tension rose as a potentially explosive standoff ensued.

Five Royal Navy ships including the cruiser St George, flagship of the Cape of Good Hope Station, arrived at the island. Khalid was given 40 hours to contemplate his fate. He assembled his force and re-commissioned an ancient bronze muzzle-loading cannon which had not been fired in anger for over two hundred years! The night passed without incident, but at dawn Khalid was  issued  with an  ultimatum – either surrender by walking out of the palace by 9.00 am or the Royal Navy would open fire. At 8.00 am Khalid sent a message requesting talks, but his request was curtly turned down. At precisely 9.02 am the ships opened fire on the palace and the Sultan’s yacht moored in the harbour. With the yacht settling in the water and the palace falling around him, he had the Zanzibar flag lowered on the ramparts at 9.40 am and the bombardment ceased. Royal Marines landed onshore and took the citadel at bayonet point with Khalid somehow making his way to the German consulate where he sought sanctuary.

So ended the shortest war in history – 38 minutes! If you don’t believe me, it is in the Guinness Book of Records and would make a good question in a quiz show. As a sequel to this episode, the Germans spirited Khalid away to Dar-es-Salaam in German East Africa (now Tanzania). The British demanded payment from the Zanzibar authorities for the cost of the shells fired!

Pages: Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4

The Naval Defence of the Australian Colonies to Federation

May 24, 2008

By the last decades of the nineteenth century [Australian] colonies had come to appreciate that they had a set of vital interests which were fundamentally different from those of the Mother Country. Disputes between the Australian and British governments over commerce, immigration, the future of the Pacific islands and naval defence ((Author’s italics)) gave expression, sometimes a bitter expression to differences. The conflicts helped transmute instinctive Australian reactions into a self-conscious policy, they paved the way for colonial union and at the same time they strengthened Australian opposition to imperial federation. ((N Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific 1901-1914 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976), p7 Aibinski comments similarly: “[Australia! was reliant on Britain but was frequently displeased with Britain’s policies. She was not averse to talking and moving independently long before achieving the formal status of a sovereign state”, H S Albinski, Australia’s Search for Regional Security in South East Asia. PhD Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1959 p5.))

In his treatise, THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC 1901-1914, the author, Dr Neville Meaney, begs the question with regard to naval defence, what were the differences (if any) and, if there were any, what impact did they have on the federation of the six colonies?

From the beginning of European settlement in Australia in 1788 the colonists were very much aware of the sea. As Captain W R Creswell ((Later, Vice Admiral Sir William R Creswell, who is generally regarded as “The Father” of the Royal Australian Navy. )) declared:

Australia was founded by the navy, its shores explored by the navy, every ounce of produce leaves in vessels guided by charts made by the navy that has surveyed our coast. It has been defended by the navy. Our continuance in it in security during early years of settlement and small population was effected by the navy. ((H M Cooper, A Naval History of South Australia (Adelaide: Hassell Press, 1950) p110.))

The assumption must of course be made that Creswell did not intend his remark with regard to naval defence to be taken literally as none of the Australian colonies was ever attacked. In the first six decades of Australia’s European development, the colonies were not even seriously threatened by external aggression. Prior to `1853 the Australian colonists paid little attention to the state of their naval defences relying instead on the naval supremacy of Great Britain to safeguard them. No doubt they took comfort in the preamble to the Articles of War which stated that “On the British Navy, under the good providence of God, the wealth, safety and strength of the kingdom chiefly depend.”

Australians were, however, pre-occupied with the notion of attack by a foreign power as early as 1792 “…when the presence of Francois Peron’s ship aroused the prospect of a simultaneous French assault and convict rising”. ((H McQueen, A New Britannia (Melbourne: Penguin, 1970), p56.)) Until around the third decade of the nineteenth century, most of the French voyages in and around Australian waters were innocent scientific and trading expeditions ((G S Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean 1810-1850 (London, OUP, 1967) p2.)) but in at least one instance France did have aggressive intentions toward Sydney. ((Albinski, Australia’s Search for Regional Security in South-East Asia, p6. )) By 1815, French naval strength was a shadow; her fleets had been swept from the seas and Britain’s position as a maritime power was unchallenged. ((Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean 1810-1850, p1.)) For the most part, therefore, British movements, enterprises or probings in Australian waters were leisurely and sustained by a minimum of official support ((ibid, p4105. )) although the French voyages sometimes threw the British authorities into defensive preparations such as establishing the settlement at King George Sound in 1826 and three years later, a colony at the Swan River. ((Mc Queen, A New Britannia, p57.))

In the forty years that followed Napoleon’s defeat there existed such a period of absolute peace that it blanketed initiative and encouraged neglect. ((Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean 1810-1850, p444. )) The British Admiralty was primarily a political committee with responsibility for naval affairs and, in general, “. ..the House of Commons showed an almost total ignorance of imperial geography and imperial needs…” ((ibid, p447.)) and looked at the navy chiefly in terms of home defence.

On the surface, however, it appeared that the Admiralty was in sympathy with any call for a more positive naval defence when it issued instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies station in 1837. “The great and increasing importance of Australia, make it indispensable that part of the force under your Command should be employed on the coasts of that Continent”. ((9 October 1837: Admiralty Records 13/2, pp322-3 cited in Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean 1810-1850, p436.)) Captains were `at liberty’ to visit the remote parts of the station, provided their presence was `not likely to be required in India’. This clause made nonsense of the whole, because India, as well as the other parts of the station ranging from Africa to China, made constant and compelling demands on the East India squadron. ((ibid. ))

The laissez-faire attitudes of the British were not always representative of Australians’ feelings toward the security of their colonies. “For a country with twelve thousand miles of coastline and situated twelve thousand miles from its principal market and major defender, it was natural that Australia should become highly sensitive to naval questions”. ((Mc Queen, A New Britannia, p90. )) As early as 1827 the Sydney Gazette demanded the establishment of a safety perimeter which enclosed the entire Pacific Ocean ((Sydney Gazette, 24 August 1827. Cited in W Levi, “Australians and the Near North”, American Perspective, Vol III, No 2 (May 1949), p73. )) in order to achieve the benefit of maximum security for the New South Wales colony. By 1853, however, the Royal Navy had seen fit to station only six small, poorly-armed vessels in Australia; the size and composition of such a fleet could hardly be called an over indulgence in expenditure. Such was the attitude toward naval defence in Australia from settlement until shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century.

Defence as a contentious issue between the Antipodean colonies and the Mother Country did not, however, achieve any prominence until the eighteen fifties. The colonies, aware of their growing pastoral wealth and gold during the decade, developed a high degree of sensitivity to the Crimean War, the fear of the French and the American scares of 1859 and 1861, and the Polish scare of 1864. ((D MacCailum, “Some Aspects of Defence in the Eighteen Fifties in New South Wales”, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol 44, Part 1, 1958, p71. )) Significantly, it was also a period in which New South Wales, Tasmania, Queensland and Victoria acquired self-government or a large measure of control over their internal affairs. ((ibid. ))

The colonials were not impressed with the token Royal Navy force and when the news reached Sydney in 1855 of Russian warships cruising in various parts of the Pacific Ocean the colony of New South Wales built a sixty-two foot gunboat. ((G L Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy (Sydney: Government Printer, 1949), p12. The SPITFIRE (as it was named) was a 65 ton wooden ketch armed with a 32 pounder gun. She was launched on 3 April 1855 and had the distinction of being the first warship to be built in Australia for the defence of an Australian colony. The SPITFIRE was not, however, the first Australian-built armed vessel, Tasmania having produced the armed schooner ELIZA in 1835 and there were probably others. J Bastock, Australia’s Ships of War (Sydney: A & R, 1975) p4. )) As a result of recommendations by a Select Committee of the legislature, Victoria ordered a substantially larger vessel in 1854. ((Bastock, Australia’s Ships of War, pl9. the VICTORIA was 166 feet long and mounted seven 32 pounders. She was the first vessel constructed in England to the order of a British colony.))

The concept of self-governing colonies having their own warships was without precedent and the legal position of armed colonial vessels was discussed by Crown law officers in England, in particular in relation to HMVS VICTORIA.

The VICTORIA is now employed as a vessel of war without the territorial waters of the Colony, but in the event of her being brought into conflict with the vessel of any foreign State…we think it very doubtful whether she could claim to be recognised as a British man-of-war, and to possess the privileges incident to international law…

We think that all vessels of war in the Colonies intended to navigate beyond these territorial limits should be commanded by officers holding commissions from the Crown, and be essentially part of the Royal Navy of England. ((Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, p12. ))

Such was the thinking of the day that it would appear that both New South Wales and Victoria acquiesced with this statement. Even more surprising though is the fact that this legal opinion governed the position of all the naval forces in Australia until 1911. ((ibid.))

In 1847, the First Lord of the Admiralty recommended that a distinct division should be allotted to the joint Australia-New Zealand command. ((Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean, 1810-1850, p436.)) Eleven years were allowed to pass, however, before concern was felt to the point of responsible action. The Governor of Tasmania wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies urging the necessity for making the Australian Colonies an Admiral’s station, and for maintaining in Australian seas a Naval squadron “…equal at least to that maintained therein by any other power”. ((Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, p14.)) In a bid to support his representations, Sir Henry Young invited New South Wales to participate but the Executive Council of that colony disagreed that the commander-in-chief should be an Admiral. ((ibid.)) They did criticise the adequacy of the naval force then in Australia, however, stating that two vessels were not “… in any way adequate to the protection either in peace or war of British and Colonial interests…” ((ibid.))

Despite the fiscal restrictions of the time ((D M Schurman, The Education of a Navy, (London:Cassell, 1965) p2.)) the Admiralty was obviously aware that it could procrastinate no longer and conceded “…the amount of force hitherto maintained in the seas adjacent to those [Australian and New Zealand] Colonies will in future require to be larger than at former periods…” ((Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, p14.))

The immediate and practical outcome of the decision was the despatch of an additional two vessels to Sydney, but more significant was the creation of the Australian Station under the command of a Commodore. ((ibid. Commodore Luring assumed command of the Australian Station in March 1859 and three months later the naval force on the Station comprised five vessels.))

These moves did not have the effect of placating the Colonies with regard to defence, however. In the New South Wales Legislative Assembly in November 1859, the arch republican John Dunmore Lang moved an amendment to a motion of Henry Parkes because he considered that Great Britain would be at war sooner or later with a great European power(s) and Australia should not have to be involved. ((J D Lang, How to Defend the Colony, (Sydney: John L Sherriff, 1860) piii.)) He advocated Great Britain giving “…Her Australian Colonies their entire freedom and independence – and constituting them, under some form of Federal Government, .. .a Sovereign and Independent Australian Empire”. ((ibid, piv.)) His speech showed a less than parochial outlook when he referred to the tempting prize of “…these defenceless colonies of New South Wales and Victoria”. ((ibid, p11.)) The crux (and validity) of his argument was in the statement than in the event of Great Britain being involved in a European war, “I maintain.., it is hopeless for us to rely on imaginary succour…from the Mother Country, as the whole disposable force of England will then be required at home”. ((ibid, p14.))

Victoria should also have had some doubts as to the effectiveness of relying on Britain for its defence needs. In 1859 the Defence Commission appointed Captain F B Seymour RN, to report on the defences of the Colony. ((Defence of the Colony, Report of Captain F B Seymour RN, of HMS PELORUS in regard to the Defences of the Colony; together with a report on the efficiency of HMCSS VICTORIA. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by His Excellency’s Command. (Victoria: 1859-80).)) The validity of Lang’s fears are to be found in a letter which Seymour wrote to the Governor of Victoria. With regard to the Royal Navy ships being available for defence purposes, the Captain wrote that “…it is better not to calculate upon an Imperial ship being in port [in time of war]”. ((Letter from Captain F Beauchamp Seymour RN, to His Excellency, Sir Henry Barkly KCD, Governor of Victoria, 10 November 1859.)) He softened the statement by pointing out that if the enemy had colonies within a reasonable distance of Australian waters it would be “…the duty of Her Majesty’s servants …to seek him in his own ports…” ((ibid.))

The simple fact of the matter was that even in the event of an `incident’ or a minor war such as was common in South-East Asia at the time, six or eight months might elapse before reinforcements arrived from home waters to replace those ships withdrawn from Australian waters. ((Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean 1810-1850, p449.))

The realisation that the naval defence arrangements of the Australian colonies would have to be drastically overhauled was also occurring in Britain. In 1859 a Departmental Committee submitted a report to the imperial government in which the `injurious consequences’ of the old policy of encouraging the colonies to rely solely on the Mother Country for protection was pointed out. ((Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, p17.)) The unfair burden on the British taxpayer and the `retardation of the spirit of self-reliance and self-defence in the colonies’ were given as the reasons for downgrading the Imperial naval defence effort in AustraIia. ((ibid.)) It seems that the point of possible conflict, the Australian colonies being left defenceless in the event of a European conflict, was studiously avoided.

It was believed by the British government that colonies which demanded and acquired increasing powers of self-government should accept the material and financial consequences. A resolution of the House of Commons in March 1862 summarised the policy thus: “That this House …is of the opinion that Colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security and ought to assist in their own external defence. ((Author’s italics. B A Knox, “Colonial Influences on Imperial Policy, 1858-1866. Victoria and the Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865”. Historical Studies, Vol 11, No 41. November 1963, p81. ))

The culmination of the prevailing attitude was the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 which, whatever its failings, did provide for a definite Colonial naval policy. Its chief provisions were:

(1) colonies were able to provide, maintain, and use their own vessels of war under such conditions and for such purposes as Her Majesty in Council …approves, and to place these vessels at Her Majesty’s disposal, when any such vessel would become to all intents a vessel of Her Majesty’s regular navy;

(2) to raise and maintain seamen to serve in such vessels; and,

(3) to raise and maintain volunteers entered on terms of being bound to general service in the Royal Navy, emergency volunteers so raised to form part of the Royal Navy Reserve. ((Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, p21.))

This invitation to establish local naval forces invoked little response from the Colonies (except Victoria ((In 1867, the Victorian Government sent its Treasurer to consult with the Imperial Government on the matter of colonial naval defence. Mr (afterwards Sir George) Verdon pointed out to the Imperial authorities that the colony of Victoria had already spent some 900,000 pounds on naval defence and asked for assistance. In return, the colony received the old steam line-of-battle ship NELSON and 100,000 pounds towards the cost of a turret ship (CERBERUS) for harbour defence. In addition, Victoria was to provide a dry dock for Imperial use in time of war and maintain two ships in an efficient state. F B Eldridge, A History of the Royal Australian Naval College, (Melbourne: Georgian House, 1949, pp3-4. ))), and in 1869 the Admiralty put forward a proposal to establish a permanent Australian naval force, the colonies to pay half the cost of the -ships and their upkeep. Eventually after much discussion, the plan was abandoned. ((Hansard, 3rd Ser, Vol clxxvii, col 1030, 1824 (17 March 1865), cited in Knox, Historical Studies, p62.))

At face value the 1865 Act appeared to be an economic measure as it tended to reduce the liabilities of the Imperial government by permitting the establishment of locally controlled naval forces and giving to colonial armed vessels, the status of ships of war. Nor was it considered to be an inevitability of colonial influence but rather “…the means of enabling [the colonials] to provide for their own local defence in conjunction with the wider responsibility of the Imperial navy”. ((ibid.)) The Secretary of State for the Colonies saw the establishment of a colonial naval force as being “…a most valuable addition to the Imperial defences”. ((ibid, col 483 (30 March 1885).)) Separation of the colonies from the Empire was not, therefore, the aim of the legislators with regard to the Colonial Naval Defence Act. Rather, it was said to be seen as enhancing a continuing association between the colonies and the Mother Country “…on a basis of mutual instead of one-sided benefit”. ((Knox, Historical Studies, p82.))

The platitudes and public reasoning of politicians and statesmen alike were open to the most severe criticism but, curiously, the Australians were silent on the reasons for the enactment of the legislation. The First Lord of the Admiralty stated to Parliament that it was framed “… partly to meet the wish of the colony of Victoria to maintain a ship of war at its own cost”. ((ibid.)) That the colony had taken delivery of its first warship nine years before ((Author’s italics.)) the statement was made, seems to have been overlooked. ((For some unknown reason, Knox did not comment on this apparent anomaly.))

Victoria continued to make requests for additional naval defences until the 1880s but without any notable success. ((See footnote 42.)) Of the various schemes mooted, none of any substance met with the approval of Victoria, the Admiralty or the Treasury.

For half a century the British fleet had enjoyed a long and seemingly irreducible lead in wooden ships, but by the end of the 1850s the simultaneous emergence of steam, screw, iron and armour plate suddenly transformed the situation. ((R Blake, Disraeli, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), p393.)) The technological advancements of the 19th century were responsible for an internal struggle between the innovators and the conservative sailors. The uncertainties about ship design were used by the politicians of both parties after 1865. “In fact naval expenses did not increase between 1865 and 1885”. ((Schurman, The Education of a Navy, p2.)) For nearly two decades, naval defence was also a dormant issue in Australia. Even to the rich Australian colonies, the expense was considered unnecessary. The attention of both France and Russia was directed far from the Pacific, while the risk of war with the United States had passed. ((Knox, Historical Quarterly, p79.)) A great war might have made the difference, but none occurred.

For these and other reasons, the Colonial Naval Defence Act was not of much importance during the period. “It did not take its proper place in Imperial relations until developing national consciousness made it unsatisfactory …to depend entirely upon the Royal Navy …for …external defence”. ((ibid.))

In January 1881 colonial politicians meeting in Sydney passed a resolution defining responsibility for the defence of the Australian colonies. Naval defence, they flatly stated, was exclusively an Imperial responsibility. Since existing defence was inadequate, the Royal Naval squadron on the station should be increased, and at Imperial expense. ((M Hooper, “The Naval Defence Agreement of 1887”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol 14, No 1, 1968, p52. By 1887, most of the Australian colonies were better defended than the rest of the Empire and some were overdefended. ibid, p53.))

Needless to say the British Government declined the responsibility “…but it took six years of negotiation, argument, proposal and counter-proposal before the terms of the Australian naval defence agreement were finalised …” ((ibid.)) closely linked local problems which needed to be resolved were twofold:

…should colonial forces be an alternative to, or an integral part of, the Royal Naval squadron on the station; should additional naval defence for Australasia be provide at imperial or colonial cost [?] ((ibid.))

For the first time the problems were clearly identified, but more importantly, they were not, as in the past, being discussed in a piecemeal fashion over many years. The debate about these problems resulted in a revision of the role of colonial navies and a new defence relationship between the Imperial government and the colonies was worked out. ((ibid.)) Like all compromises, the Naval Defence Agreement of 1887 was not entirely satisfactory but both sides knew that a solution had to be found to what was becoming an increasingly pressing problem.

During the last quarter of the century, Germany, Japan, the United States and Italy made their appearances as great Powers. In the same period, nationalism increased in strength, while international diplomacy became more tense and less scrupulous. Among the great Powers the advance of the industrial revolution combined with a desire for national aggrandisement to produce a dynamic imperialism and highly competitive policies of colonial expansion. Accordingly, the nations lived in a world that had lost much of its former stability and security. ((G N Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Vol 1, (Ottawa: The Minister of National Defence, 1952), p61.))

The eighties witnessed a boom in imperialism. The race between the great Powers for the acquisition of colonies, the growing militarism on the Continent, and the defeat of Free Trade in almost all foreign countries had placed the value of colonies beyond all doubt. ((C A Bodelsen, “Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism”, (Copenhagen.’ 1924), p205 cited in Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Vol 1, p86.)) Public attention was drawn to the problem of the relations between England and her colonies and it was under these types of pressures that the 1887 Naval Defence Agreement was reached. As defence was probably the most important and fundamental of all the interests which the various parts of the Empire held in common, “…it might appear that if the imperialists failed to solve the problem of common defence they would fail all along the line”. ((Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Vol 1, p67.))

In the report of a Royal Commission published in 1882, the Commissioners stated that the time had come for the Australian Colonies to share the burden of their naval defence more equitably.

It was not desirable that these [Australian] Colonies should maintain sea-going ships of their own for action beyond their territorial waters. But we see no reason why the Australian Colonies should not make a moderate contribution in money towards the cost of that Squadron which is maintained by the Mother Country for the protection of the interests common to the Colonies and herself. ((Report of the Royal Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad (1882) cited in Naval Archives Branch, An Outline of Australian Naval History, (Canberra,’ Navy Office, 1962) p13.))

What Britain was worried about became a reality in the following year. Queensland purchased a gunboat with the express purpose of having the ability to move out into the open seas in order to seize Pacific territories and matters came to a head in 1883 when Queensland seized New Guinea.

Britain refused to ratify the annexation. ((A J Koutsoukis, Topics From Australian History, (Sydney: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1968), p8.)) Britain had no objection to coming to Australia’s aid if she were attacked but objected strongly to being dragged into a major European war “…because some upstart colonial Premier attacked a French or German ship in order to indenture a few more labourers”. ((Mc Queen, A New Britannia, p91.))

In Australia at the time, the Colonies were each convinced that they must provide their own local naval forces ((Of all the Australian colonies, only Western Australia did not have a naval force of some description. In 1875, however, the government mail ship, GEORGETTE was commissioned by the governor into the Royal Navy to lay chase to the American whaling barque CATALPA , which had on board six Fenian escapees from Fremantle prison. W J Laubenstein, The Emerald Whaler, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1901), p197. Tasmania put a torpedo boat into service from 1884 until the late 1880s. J Bastock, Australia’s Ships of War, p17.)) in spite of the advice of the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Station that they should take united action for the defence of their territorial waters. ((Naval Archives Branch, An Outline of Australian Naval History, p13.))

A naval organisation already existed in Victoria and New South Wales. In South Australia and Queensland proposals to form local naval forces, based on the recommendations of the Jervois-Scratchley report, ((Colonel Sir William Jervois, Royal Engineers and Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scratchley were appointed to inspect existing defences and discuss the matter with local governments. The naval proposals of the resulting report were based on a policy of leaving offensive action on the high seas to the Australian Squadron of the Royal Navy; but it was recommended that the richer colonies should provide gunboats to protect maritime trade and torpedo boats to co-operate with fixed shore defences in harbours and estuaries. ibid, p12.)) were under discussion. By 1884, five separate naval forces were concerned with Australian naval defence. This unco-operative effort on the part of the Australian Colonies failed to satisfy the British Government, which repeated its view that Australians should contribute towards the cost of defence at sea as distinct from harbour and coastal defence. ((ibid, p13.))

Late in 1884, the First Sea Lord suggested that the formation of a special Australasian Squadron supplementing the Imperial Squadron, would be the best way to overcome the inherent weakness and inefficiency which must mark any further development of independent colonial forces. In many respects, this was a repetition of the proposals advanced in 1869 but rejected by the CoIonies. ((ibid.))

In November 1884 Rear Admiral George Tryon was appointed as the first Flag Officer to command the Australian Squadron. Before leaving England he was instructed to confer with the Colonial Premiers concerning the Admiralty proposal to form an Auxiliary Squadron. Tryon proved an able and patient negotiator and,in 1885, aided perhaps by the seeming imminence of war with Russia, he succeeded in persuading the colonies that the time had come for them to contribute towards to cost of their seaward defence. ((ibid.))

As the States were at last in agreement in their willingness to provide a subsidy, a Colonial Conference was convened in London in April 1887. From these discussions emerged the Australasian Naval Defence Act of 1887 which provided that the existing British Squadron in Australasian waters should be supplemented by an Auxiliary Squadron of five fast cruisers and two torpedo gunboats at a cost to each colony determined on the basis of population. ((Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, p43. The terms of the Agreement not only included the six Australian colonies, but New Zealand as well. )) It was made for a period of ten years at least; and it could only be terminated then or thereafter with two years notice. ((ibid, p72.)) The ships were to be under the sole control and orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Australia Station but, most important of all, they could not be removed from Australasian waters without the consent of the Colonial Governments. ((ibid.)) This overcame the major source of concern for there was no point in paying for a fleet in peace time if it was to be taken away once an attack was imminent. ((McQueen, A New Britannia, p92.)) The Auxiliary Squadron which arrived at Sydney on 5 September 1891 proved a failure. ((Naval Archives Branch, An Outline of Australian Naval History, p14.))

There was now a three-tiered arrangement for naval defence in Australia and six different administrative organisations. ((Hooper, Australian Journal of Politics and History, pp52-74.)) On the one hand, the Admiralty, unused to the responsibility of operating a squadron over which it had only limited control, developed the creed that there must be only one Empire Navy – the Royal Navy.

From the Admiralty …we who had the cause of a self-reliant colonial naval service at heart could not only not look for support but had active opposition to fear… It neither desired nor would tolerate a family of infant navies overseas, and resolutely set its face against providing a nursery for the brats. Colonial control would have spelt dual control, and dual control of the sea forces of the Empire …seemed bound to lead straight to disaster. ((P Thompson (ed) Close to the Mind (London: Heinemann, 1965) pp199-200.))

On the other hand, the Australians came to regard the squadron as poor value for their money. In effect, the ships became part of the Imperial Squadron and at no time became the training ground for Australian seamen as had been expected by the Colonies. ((Naval Archives Branch, An Outline of Australian Naval History, p14.)) Finally, the loan of three of the Auxiliary Squadron ships and the South Australian cruiser PROTECTOR for service in China waters during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 brought matters to a head. On their return, Australians argued that `Australian’ ships and men should not be sent to fight for causes which were of no concern to Australia. ((ibid.)) Before most of the ships had returned, Federation had created the Commonwealth of Australia and the `Agreement’ was about to expire, so the naval situation became a subject for general debate. ((ibid.))

A strong reason for the formation of the Auxiliary Squadron in the first place was the weakness of the Imperial Squadron stationed in Australian waters. Most of the ships had no fighting value against modern armaments and were kept in the Pacific “…as a step towards the scrap-heap”. ((F Fox, Problems of the Pacific, (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), p14.)) HMS NELSON, flagship of the Squadron when Admiral Tryon took command was still fitted with a ram! ((Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, p45.))

Australia, during the last decade of the century, was beset with many internal problems, not the least of which was the financial crisis of 1892-3, which depleted the Treasuries and made governments unwilling to consider any schemes that might necessitate fresh expenditure. ((Jose, W A, The Royal Australian Navy, (Sydney: A & R 1928, 1937) pxxiii.)) In Victoria, for example, all naval progress was brought to a standstill. All ships were placed in reserve and some even sold. In the remaining years before Federation, naval activity did not revive so that when the Commonwealth finally took over her five ships, not only were they in a deplorable condition, but also they did not even have nucleus crews. ((Naval Archives Branch, An Outline of Australian Naval History, pp9-10.))

All through the nineties, too, federation was occupying the attention of politicians; defence, though an essential part of the Federation problem, could be left over till the main issues had been decided. ((Jose, The Royal Australian Navy, pxix.))

In 1901, none of the defence forces transferred to the Commonwealth by the States were of importance in any serious calculation of the security of the continent against attack. ((ibid.)) Feakes described two of the vessels as “…Lilliputian over-gunned hulks …[which] …exhibited the sea-going qualities of half-tide rocks”. ((H J Feakes, White Ensign-Southern Cross: A Story of the King’s Ships of Australia’s Navy, (Sydney: Ure Smith, 1951) p93. Eleven ships were transferred to the newly-formed Commonwealth Naval Forces; their average age was over seventeen years. Macandie, Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, p23.)) Such was the state of naval defence at the birth of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Australians at the end of the century welcomed increased imperial co-operation despite the many differences which had taken place over the years. They also welcomed bilateral co-operation in matters concerning Pacific defence and diplomacy. On the other hand they had turned their face against anything that smacked of an imperial executive. ((Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, pp38-39.))

They had come to recognise that there was a fundamental conflict of view over priorities in defence and diplomacy between the colonies and the Mother Country. Australians in looking to their own were unwilling to be sacrificed for a greater interest with which they could not fully identify and which they did not wholly share. ((ibid, p39.))

As to whether the differences between the Australian colonies and Britain on the subject of naval defence made any impact on the federation of the colonies, there really is no direct evidence. The conflicts which did appear to strain the relationship were cyclical and, generally, arose as a result of a short-lived scare of war. As these were infrequent in the 113 years between European settlement and Federation, the conclusion must be that, on the balance of probabilities, the differences did not have any significant impact on the decision of the six Australian colonies to federate.

Cerberus – First of the modern battleships

June 30, 2003

PRIOR TO FEDERATION, VICTORIA’S DEFENCES were exposed as the British naval presence was located in far away Sydney. As a result a powerful 16 ship fleet evolved. This Victorian Navy was the largest of the Australian colonial navies. Her Majesty’s Victorian Ship Cerberus was for 30 years the main unit of this ‘Great Southern Fleet’.

Completed in 1870, Cerberus was purpose built for Port Phillip Bay to guard against foreign invasion. This revolutionary warship was a radical departure from the wooden warships with sails that had previously dominated the navies of the world. Cerberus was not only the first British warship to be powered purely by steam but was the first ship in the world to mount rotating gun turrets on a central superstructure. This became a key element in modern battleship development. Steam engines were not only used to move Cerberus but were also used throughout the ship. Rotating the gun turrets, raising the anchor, ventilating the ship, hoisting ashes from the stoke hole and pumping water out of the double bottom were all performed by steam power. After its arrival in Victoria, a locally designed and built hydraulic steam steering system was fitted, thereby further reducing the manpower demands on a small colonial navy.

Not only did Victoria have ‘the most powerful ship for harbour defence in the world ((Argus newspaper)), it also had a professional and efficient navy to operate it. The steam powered turrets could rotate in 39 seconds ((Argus newspaper, May 13 1878)) and each gun could fire non targeted shots at a rate of one every 1½ minutes ((Illustrated Australian News, April 23 1872)) . This suggests a targeted shot rate of around 2 minutes, which was considered best practice standard of the day. Cerberus was placed in dry dock every two years. So good was the maintenance program that the ship was described as being in pristine condition thirty years after construction ((Williamstown Chronicle, March 1900)).

Was the threat of invasion real? Just six years after the arrival of Cerberus Britain stood on the brink of a second Crimean war with Russia. Casualties for the Turks and Russians were in the tens of thousands. After Britain moved Indian troops to Malta, called up the reserves and sent a fleet to force the Dardanelles, Russia withdrew and war was narrowly averted. Had war been declared, Russia planned to attack Melbourne with five fast unarmoured cruisers, destroy coastal shipping and obtain gold bullion on threat of bombardment. The Russian ships would then head for neutral ports on the west coast of the USA, thereby avoiding the British fleet ((An Attack on Melbourne, Michael Kitson. Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 35)).

One can only speculate as to how a heavily armoured ship with powerful 10 inch guns and local knowledge would have fared against five fast unarmoured ships. With its recently improved manning levels and proven firing accuracy ((Argus newspaper, August 20 1877)) Cerberus could have caused much damage with her modern exploding shells. Her massive armour should have proved ample protection.

But were the men of the Victorian Navy a match for His Imperial Majesty’s Russian Navy? Just four years after the 1877-8 war scare a Russian squadron made a goodwill visit to Melbourne. Having defeated the New South Wales and Tasmanian forces, the Victorian Navy was likewise challenged to a series of boat races which involved crews rowing against each other for 6 hours. The results say something about the quality of the opposing forces. With a winning time of 5 hours 57 minutes and 28½ seconds Cerberus beat the crew of the other Victorian ship, Nelson, by 8½ seconds. The other two Victorian Navy crews came in 9½ and 53 seconds later. To quote the Argus Newspaper ‘the Russian crews, being as in the other races, left far in the rear.’ ((Argus newspaper, February 13 1882))

Cerberus was continually improved throughout her career. Extra weaponry was added to counter the new torpedo boats, and other innovations such as searchlights and anti-torpedo nets were introduced. However, unlike other Cerberus Class ships and the larger ocean going Breastwork Monitors, her once modern muzzle loading guns were never replaced by breech loading guns. Fortunately for us all four guns are still on board.

A casual observer of the Cerberus in Half Moon Bay today might think that the opportunity to save her has been missed.

Since the major collapse in 1993 she has not only continued to collapse but tilted seaward. However as the conservation management plan ((Conservation Management Plan, Heritage Victoria 2002)) points out, all of its important elements survive intact. It is the lower unarmoured section of the hull that has given way. The upper section of hull (albeit under the water) is still remarkably strong. The 10 inch thick lowmoor iron armoured belt has only lost a matter of millimetres over the years. The important elements of the low freeboard, breastwork deck and two gun turrets can still be saved. The missing funnel and flying deck could, if thought desirable, be reinstated.

Should the current Engineering Study confirm that the suggested plan of approach is viable then the Save the Cerberus Alliance plans to launch a fundraising appeal to raise and stabilise the vessel. Beams would be bolted to the sides of the ship, below the waterline. Piles would be driven into the seabed and jacks on these would attach to the beams and raise Cerberus to her old profile prior to the collapse. Beams would then be placed under the ship to support it. The piles would then be cut off below the waterline and Cerberus would be ready for her next century of service.

The ‘Save the Cerberus Alliance’ is a group of organisations and individuals co-operating in an attempt to ‘Save the Cerberus‘. Represented on the committee are Heritage Victoria, Parks Victoria, The National Trust (Vic), Bayside Council and the Melbourne Convention and Visitors Bureau.

Read more about Cerberus and the campaign at www.cerberus.com.au.

Technical specifications of Cerberus
Name Cerberus
Type Ironclad monitor
Force Victoria
Dates Laid down 1 Sept. 1867
Launched 2 Dec 1868
Completed 5 May 1870
Built by Palmer Shipbuilding & Iron Co., Jarrow, UK
Tonnage 3,340 tons displacement, 2,107 tons measurement
Length 225’oa x 45′ x 16′
Guns Four 10″, 18 ton, 400 pdr MLR
Engine power 1,369 IHP, speed 9.75kts
Complement 82 permanent, including captain, 2 lieutenants, 3 engineers, paymaster, 3 gunners and 73 naval brigade
Armour Turrets – 10″-9″ iron, 9″ – 11″ teak
Breastwork – 9″-8″ iron, 11″-9″ teak
Sides – 8″-6″ iron, 11″-9″ teak
Main deck – 1.5″ iron, 10″ teak
Breastwork deck – 1″ iron, 10″ teak
Notes Endurance at sea – 10 days at economical speed. Refit 1879 with military mast and four Nordenfelt guns. Refit 1888 with shortened flying deck and net defence. Harbour service 1906. Renamed Platypus II as depot ship 1921. Sold 23 April 1924. Scuttled as a breakwater 2 Sept 1926.

American Plans for Invading New Zealand & Australia – Part2

March 14, 2003

The first part of this article, which appeared in the December 2002 edition, reviewed American plans for the invasion of Auckland and Sydney. This part considers plans for Melbourne and Western Australia.

THE SURREPTITIOUS WORK ON PLANNING for attack on Australian ports was conducted in an overwhelming atmosphere of hospitality by the Great White Fleet’s hosts. This validated the advice given to President Teddy Roosevelt by Admiral Sims when the Australian invitation had been received.

He wrote that the men of the Fleet would ‘barely escape with their lives from the hospitality of the people.’ This certainly proved to be the case in Sydney.

Finally dragging itself away from this reception, the Fleet moved on to Melbourne – to receive the same treatment.

Nothing dissuaded the intrepid intelligence planning teams though, and they put the time spent in the Victorian State capital to good account.

The Melbourne Attack Plan

The Melbourne Attack Plan
The Melbourne Attack Plan

The team concluded that, if for some reason the occupation of Sydney was inappropriate, Port Phillip and Melbourne ‘. . . would be for many reasons a logical point of attack.’ As was the case with Sydney though, they stressed that command of the sea was a first requirement. No operations should take place against either port until command of the sea was sufficiently robust to enable a force of 25,000 soldiers to be moved across the Pacific. Also, as has already been mentioned, the Americans would first have to capture a port in New Zealand.

The entrance to Port Phillip presented problems. The entrance, at the Heads, followed a tortuous channel, with excellent sites for coastal defence batteries and good mining potential.

In the circumstances, a landing on the shores of Westernport (Port Western) seemed a good bet. If the entrance was mined (and there was a suspicion [erroneous] that it might be) then: ‘It would be best to land at San Remo and New Haven, and from there capture Phillip Island and thence clear up the road to Port Western, which would leave this road to the attack on the defences of Port Phillip open and also give a base from which to advance upon Melbourne.’

Units of the Great White Fleet, 1908
Units of the Great White Fleet, 1908

The team prepared a comprehensive survey of the various defences of the area, noting that ‘. . . after the attacking force of ships is [once] inside Port Phillip the fire of the forts at the entrance (The Heads) would be of little or no avail against it.’

The greatest weakness to the defence of Melbourne, the assessment concluded, was that ‘the entrance to Port Western is not defended.’

Before moving to the final area to be examined by the intelligence team’s studies it is worth remarking that, when the ships sailed from Melbourne they left nearly 200 sailors behind. Half were recovered.

Western Australia Attack Plans

The depleted and socially exhausted fleet made for the west of the continent before continuing their voyage round the world. As in the eastern States, plans were drawn up for attacking King George Sound, Albany, as well as Fremantle and Perth. Though the problem was relatively simple due to the almost complete absence of fortifications or personnel to man them, these reports were extensive and thorough, comprising 32 and 35 pages respectively.

One of the reasons the planners gave for attacking western ports was to deal with the situation where the United States might approach the eastern part of the continent from either the Indian Ocean or through the Dutch East Indies, in which case they would form a forward base similar to Auckland.

Conclusions

Each of the plans briefly mentioned above was quite extensive. They examined and recorded in detail all aspects of the location covered: rail networks and connections; shipping lines and frequency of sailings; shipyard facilities; coal availability; layout of the cities; the nature of the sewage system; the state of electrification; hospitals, medical care; and details of the military forces available.

The teams’ war plans were, when finalised, first approved by the fleet commander-in-chief and then submitted to the Department of Navy. There they were stowed away, not, it would seem, seeing the light of day for the next nine decades. They were never apparently updated or revised.

So, what should we make of these plans?

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