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You are here: Home / Archives for Article topics / Battles and operations / Post WWII

Post WWII

Occasional Paper 75: The Vietnam War and the Royal Australian Navy

April 14, 2020

The following address was delivered by Captain Ralph T. Derbidge MBE RAN (Retired) at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance to mark Vietnam Veterans Day on 18 August 2010.  It describes the commitment of RAN fleet and air units to that War and the variety of essential tasks and services they provided in support of both the ground and air war.

Captain Derbidge concluded his 36 years of service in 1990 as the Director of Facilities Planning-Navy.  A specialist Gunnery Officer he served in that capacity in five RAN and RN ships.  He had intervening tours as a Staff Officer to the Australian Naval Attache in Washington, as Deputy Director of Surface and Air Weapons and with the Joint Intelligence Organisation.  He commanded HMA Ships Stuart, Canberra and Success and the RAN Apprentice Training Establishment, HMAS Nirimba.

Vietnam – tropical, alluring, fun-filled, breathtakingly beautiful, gastronomically exciting and friendly – today, a magnetic attraction for numerous tourists, businessmen and capital investors, many of them Australians, including Vietnam War veterans.  Ask my wife about Vietnam.  She welcomed me home from the war 39 years ago, but in recent times she enjoyed greatly with friends a group bicycle tour from Ho Chi Minh City to Hanoi. I didn’t go – I get sunburnt!

But it was not always like that.

Vietnam, some 7,500 kilometres to our north west as the crow flies from Melbourne, and three hours behind Australia’s Eastern Standard Time, lies between the Tropic of Cancer and the Equator.  It is bordered to the west by Cambodia and Laos, and to the north by China.  The northern part of the long eastern shoreline sits within the Gulf of Tonkin while to the south the coastline is washed by the South China Sea.  The shorter western shore faces the Gulf of Thailand.

The scope of my primary interest covers the period from 1956 to 1975 when the country was divided at the 17th parallel of latitude by the Demiltarised Zone (or ‘DMZ’) into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam, albeit South Vietnam.  To understand the Vietnam War, and the Royal Australian Navy’s involvement in that war, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the relatively modern history of Indo-China and Vietnam.

Indo-China had been a sphere of French protectorates and colonisation since the 1850’s but the French influence was interrupted by World War 2 and supplanted by Japanese occupation.  The French returned in 1945 to face much turmoil and unrest as the countries of the region sought self-determination as the sun was setting on British and European empires.  It is not in my brief to dwell at length on the complex issues and proceedings that spawned communist parties and governments in the region and to the north in China and Korea, as Cold War tensions mounted.  It is sufficient for me to note that the Viet Minh forces of northern Vietnam, under the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap, comprehensively defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu some 320 kilometres from Hanoi in May 1954 to end the First Indo-China War.

The armistice and Geneva Conference that followed, and the division of the country at the DMZ, set the scene for future hostilities in the guise of the Vietnam War.  At the time of the French defeat, I was a 14 year old Cadet Midshipman in my first year at the Royal Australian Naval College, then located at Crib Point on Mornington Peninsula.

The Vietnam War officially was a Cold War military conflict that occurred in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 1 November 1955 to 30 April 1975 when Saigon fell.  This war followed upon the First Indo-China War and was fought between the communist North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies, and the government of South Vietnam, supported by the United State and other anti-communist nations, including Australia and New Zealand.

The Viet Cong, a lightly-armed South Vietnamese communist-controlled common front, largely fought a guerilla war against anti-communist forces in the region.  The North Vietnamese Army engaged in a more conventional war, at times committing large units into battle.  US and South Vietnamese forces relied principally on air superiority and overwhelming firepower to conduct search-and-destroy operations involving mainly ground forces, artillery and airstrikes.

The United States entered the war to prevent a communist take-over of South Vietnam as part of their wider strategy of containment.  Military advisers arrived, beginning in 1950.  US involvement increased in the early 1960’s, with US troop levels tripling in 1961 and tripling again in 1962 when Australian military advisers were first sent to the country.  US and Australian combat units were deployed, beginning in 1965.  Operations spanned borders, with Laos and Cambodia being heavily bombed.  Involvement peaked in 1968 at the time of the Tet Offensive.  After this, US and Australian ground forces were progressively withdrawn as part of a policy called Vietnamisation.  Despite the Paris Peace Accords, signed by all parties in January 1973, fighting continued in the South.  The capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese army in April 1975 marked the end of the Vietnam War.  North and South Vietnam were reunified the following year.

It can be argued that the first peripheral involvement by the RAN in the Vietnam War occurred between 1956 and 1963 when six Australian naval vessels in successive pairs visited the Republic of Vietnam, beginning with HMA Ships ANZAC and TOBRUK, followed by VAMPIRE and QUICKMATCH and, lastly, QUEENBOROUGH and QUIBERON.  Former Saigon, now Ho Chi Minh City, was primarily the focal point for this ‘showing of the flag’ as it is colloquially known, but demonstrating at the time, in concert with the United States of America, support for the internally and externally hard-pressed South Vietnam regime of the aloof President Diem and his domineering sister-in-law, Madam Nhu.

Politically and militarily, in and around the Capital, in the Highlands and the Mekong Delta, and in the Central Lowlands, the South was opposed by the increasingly worrying Viet Cong, supported by surrogate North Vietnam, and home grown military and religious dissidents.  Who can forget the images of self-immolating Buddhist monks.

I first visited South Vietnam in 1963 as the Gunnery Officer of HMAS QUIBERON, then exercising this form of ‘gunboat diplomacy’.  It was two years after the Bay of Pigs and Cuba, when the Cold War perhaps was at its most threatening.  Memories of the Malayan Emergency and the Korean War were still vivid, confrontation with Indonesia over newly formed Malaysia was under way and the ‘Domino Effect’ of successively falling democratic governments in Asia and South East Asia was the all pervading fear of the free world lead by the United States of America.  Australian membership of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, or SEATO, and the Australia New Zealand and United States, or ANZUS, Treaty both had implications and obligations for our nation.  A vigorous stand would soon be taken by the United States and some of her allies in South Vietnam.

But back in 1963, I recall a good will port call at Nha Trang, the riviera of Indo-China, and a flurry of official social and ceremonial activity in once Saigon.  All seemed relatively calm and business-like in the South’s capital, but there were disconcerting signs for the keen eyed visitor that not all was well – such as the transit of the scenic Saigon River with overhead escorting aircraft, the requirement to travel in armed convoys up-country and the militarisation of, and midnight curfew in, the city.  I was 23 at the time and unaware that I would return to this troubled land eight years hence in far less pacific circumstances as the Gunnery Officer of HMAS BRISBANE.  Within three years, the Diem regime had been toppled from within and Australia would soon find itself engaged in active hostilities alongside the United States.

As mentioned earlier, Australian Army advisers were sent to South Vietnam as early as 1962 and an RAAF transport flight, No 35 Squadron, was established at Vung Tau in Phuoc Tuy Province in 1964.

But it was not until 1965 that the RAN was in the front line, so to speak, when the former aircraft carrier HMAS SYDNEY, as a fast troop transport, made the first of her 22 trips to South Vietnam to off-load initially an Australian infantry battalion and supporting infrastructure at Vung Tau.  Australian military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam was substantially increased from mid-1966 and it is fitting that I pay tribute to the important logistic role played by the RAN in delivering and returning Australian troops, equipment, ammunition and supplies to and from the war until December 1972.

HMAS Sydney

From June 1966, HMAS SYDNEY was supported in this role by the Australian National Line coastal cargo ship MV JEPARIT, commissioned into the RAN in 1969, and by another ANL vessel, MV BOONAROO, being the first ship commissioned under the new RAN White Ensign in March 1967 for her second voyage to Vietnam.  Escorts for this seaborne logistic lift effort to and from Vietnam over the course of the war were HMA Ships ANZAC, DERWENT, DUCHESS, MELBOURNE, PARRAMATTA, STUART, SWAN, TORRENS, VAMPIRE, VENDETTA and YARRA.

Although the logistic ships and escorts had been ferrying Australian troops and supplies to Vietnam from May 1965, the RAN did not enter the war in a combat role until February 1967 when a six man clearance diving team arrived in country to carry out harbour defence, salvage, explosive ordnance  disposal and a variety of special operations.  This unit, Clearance Diving Team 3, was formed specially for service in Vietnam and eight contingents of the team were to be deployed in-country until May 1971.

In March 1967, the new US built guided missile destroyer or DDG, HMAS HOBART, was deployed for service in Vietnamese waters to join the US Seventh Fleet in operations entailing coastal surveillance and interdiction, shore bombardment of North Vietnamese military targets and similar naval gunfire support of ground operations in the four military regions of South Vietnam.  Sister ships HMAS PERTH and HMAS BRISBANE followed in rotation for a total of eight typical deployments of seven months each until this commitment was withdrawn in October 1971.  The Australian built Daring Class destroyer, HMAS VENDETTA, complemented this effort with one such deployment.

HMAS Hobart

During these operations, HOBART and PERTH came under fire on numerous occasions.  PERTH was hit once during her first deployment and HOBART was struck inadvertently in the dark of one night by missiles fired from a US Air Force aircraft.  BRISBANE, during her first deployment, suffered a gunmount crippling inbore detonation of a faulty high explosive shell in the forward 5-inch gun barrel.

When not on typically month-long Gunline operations, the RAN destroyers were employed on escort duties with United States Navy aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf or receiving ammunition, stores, food, spare parts and mail by underway replenishment from USN fleet train supply ships in the South China Sea.  Periodic detachments were scheduled for routine one-week-long ship maintenance periods and ‘R & R’ in ports such as Subic Bay in the Philippines and Hong Kong and Singapore.  In their five years’ service in the Vietnam War, the four Australian destroyers steamed over 397,000 nautical miles and fired 102,546 rounds of 5-inch and 4.5-inch ammunition amounting to some 2,800 tonnes of high explosive.

HMAS Boonaroo

The RAN Fleet Air Arm, as a separate entity, was also actively and uniquely engaged in the war from late 1967 when the first contingent of the RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam was integrated fully with the US Army’s 135th Aviation Company.  Four contingents of the Flight served in Vietnam until June 1971, flying mainly in the Mekong Delta in support of ground operations, a hazardous business at the best of times.

There were other, smaller, but no less important RAN contributions to the war effort in South Vietnam, such as Fleet Air Arm helicopter pilots serving with 9 Squadron RAAF at Vung Tau, detached medical officers in Australian and US military hospitals and liaison personnel in Saigon.  Several sea transport officers were seconded from the Department of Shipping and Transport and commissioned into the Naval Reserve.  Back home, a number of dedicated staff in Navy Office and Fleet Headquarters, and in the operational and training establishments, looked to the professional, military intelligence, logistic support and welfare needs of those personnel, ships and aircraft deployed to the war.

The return of HMAS BRISBANE to Sydney from her second deployment on 15 October 1971 marked the end of the RAN’s combat role in the Vietnam War.  All told, some 2,800 naval personnel, all male and volunteers, saw active service in Vietnam.  Of these, eight were killed while 15 received serious injuries.  Eighty naval personnel were honoured with decorations and awards, the majority ‘mentioned-in-despatches’.

Today, Vietnam is united and at peace, but there was a time when we were adversaries of those who sought and gained that unification by a spectrum of ideological and military means.  It was a complex and costly war, and the longest to that point fought by the United States and Australia.

To put it into one context, nine million men served in the US military during the Vietnam War, one third of whom went to the Vietnam theatre, and there has been little latter-day recognition of how brutal the war was for those who fought it on the ground.  Those who believe the war was fought incompletely on a tactical level should consider Hanoi’s recent admission that 1.4 million of its soldiers died on the battlefield, compared to 266,000 Army of the Republic of Vietnam deaths and 58,000 total U.S. dead.  Those who believe that it was a ‘dirty little war’, where the bombs did all the work, might contemplate that it was the most costly war the U.S. Marine Corps has ever fought; five times as many dead as in World War I, three times as many dead as in Korea, and more total killed and wounded than in World War 2.

Significantly, those sacrifices were made at a time when the United States, and to a lesser extent Australia, were deeply divided politically and societally at home over our military involvement in Vietnam, particularly after the Tet Offensive in 1968.  Ask any surviving veteran who returned from that war.  He will tell you all about that!

Big wave of destruction

December 24, 2018

A voyage from Fremantle to Cocos Islands to farewell the Royal Yacht SS Gothic at the successful end of Queen Elizabeth II’s first visit to Australia ended badly when two of the escort ships collided during a RAS. On 5 April 1954 after HMA Ships Vengeance, Anzac I and Bataan, an Australian-built Tribal-class destroyer, handed over the escort duties to the cruisers HM Ships Colombo and Newfoundland, Bataan was low on fuel and needed to refuel. Consequently orders were received to take on fuel from Vengeance.

Former Chief Radio Electrician Bill Robertson, who was on board Bataan at the time, believes the collision was caused by a rogue wave which lifted Bataan’s bow and turned the ship towards Vengeance, when there was less than 10 tonnes of fuel left to transfer. “The change in heading couldn’t be controlled by the quartermaster in time to avoid a collision,” he said. “The Venturi effect, so dreaded when two moving vessels are so close together, held Bataan’s port side in contact with Vengeance’s starboard side. “There was an imminent danger Bataan would roll over and be sucked under Vengeance.” Mr Robertson said, as Bataan slowly slid aft, each time Vengeance rolled to starboard, her AA platforms came down on Bataan’s port superstructure. “Then the port side of the PO’s Mess, the ‘B’ gun deck and the Bofors platform on the port side of the bridge were all crushed,” he said. “I remember thinking the noise sounded like the damage was going to be expensive.” According to Mr Robertson, only the quick thinking of CO Bataan CMDR Glenn Fowle saved the ship. “He ordered, ‘hard a’ port, full ahead together’,” he said. “This forced our bow into Vengeance while kicking the stern out. “When Bataan had pushed itself out to about 45 degrees, the CO ordered full astern together, which separated the ships but didn’t do the bow
any favours. “At the time of the action I was on the starboard side of the bridge with a lifejacket in one hand and a roll of toilet paper in the other, somewhat unsure which had priority.”

There were no casualties during the collision, which left Bataan’s keel twisted. Bataan paid off at Sydney in October 1954, having steamed 279,395nm after commissioning in May 1945, and was sold for scrap in May 1958, to Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd of Tokyo, Japan

 

Originally published in the Australian Navy News on 14 July 2016

Occasional Paper 30: HMAS Hobart

October 29, 2018

Several events concerning the three HMA Ships Hobart come together with a memorial and commemoration service at the Garden Island Chapel on Sunday 22nd July starting at 10.00am.

HMAS Hobart I

On 20 July 1943, Hobart I was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine whilst enroute to Espiritu Santo, Vanuatu, as part of Task Force 74. The torpedo struck aft on the port side causing considerable damage in the vicinity of the wardroom. Thirteen officers and sailors were killed and another seven injured. She made it to Espiritu Santo under her own power the following day where she underwent temporary repairs.

HMAS Hobart II

Then on 17 June 1968, Hobart II was in the vicinity of Tiger Island off Vietnam when she detected an aircraft approaching her from the vicinity of Cap Lay. Although the aircraft was evaluated as friendly – indeed later identified as a US 7th Air Force jet, it continued to close and fired a missile that struck Hobart amidships on her starboard side. The warhead passed through the main deck, seriously damaging several compartments, while the body of the missile passed through the outer skin of the after funnel before ending up in the forward funnel. In its passage the missile killed one sailor and wounded two others. 

As Hobart’s crew raced to action stations a second and third missile hit the ship. The second missile entered the transom without detonating, destroying the gunner’s store before breaking up in the engineer’s workshop and penetrating the after seaman’s mess. The third missile hit the ship in the same area as the first, passing through one of the ship’s fan spaces, the missile director equipment room and Tartar checkout room. This missile killed a second sailor, wounding several others. At 8000 yards the crew of Hobart’s forward gun engaged the aggressor, firing five rounds in local control, causing it to turn away.

HMAS Hobart III

More recently, on Tuesday 19th June, a group of some 40 members of the NHS visited Hobart III at Garden Island. The ship was undergoing an AMP with parts of the ship not accessible due to dockyard actions, but we were all most impressed by the capabilities and conditions aboard the newest addition to the RAN. A briefing by the Captain in the wardroom was followed by a tour of the foc’sle with gun and missile silos, the bridge, Captain’s quarters and Central Control Centre. Our tour guides were very forthcoming about the ship’s capabilities, results of trials have exceeded expectations, and the enthusiasm, professionalism and pride in their ship was palpable.

HMAS Hobart 5” Gun Trials RAN Image
HMAS Hobart RAN Image

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Spanish build good ships and the excellent sea-keeping qualities have been tested and appreciated in the Bight. The Gas Turbine/Diesel propulsion system provides long range on Diesel as well as an immediate high speed capability on turbine while bow thrusters allow berthing and departures without tugs.  Based on the Navantia designed F100 frigate and fitted with the Aegis Combat System, the Hobart Class will provide air defence for accompanying ships in addition to land forces and infrastructure in coastal areas, and for self-protection against missiles and aircraft. The Aegis Combat System incorporating the state-of-the-art phased array radar, AN/SPY 1D(V), in combination with the SM-2 missile, provides an advanced air defence system capable of engaging enemy aircraft and missiles at ranges in excess of 150km. This capability is enhanced by the ability to engage enemy aircraft based on data transmitted by other Aegis fitted ships, successfully tested recently with Brisbane as she was undergoing builders trials.

The Aegis weapon system has been designed as a total combat management system from detection to engagement. The centralised, automated, command-and-control weapons control enables multi-mission capability, network centric warfare, cooperative engagement capability and growth to SM-6 and future capabilities.

In addition to their air defence capability, the Hobart Class will carry a helicopter for surveillance and response to support key warfare areas – successful trails having already been carried out. The surface warfare function will include long range anti-ship missiles and a naval gun capable of firing extended range munitions in support of land forces. These ships are also equipped with modern sonar systems, decoys, surface-launched torpedoes and an array of effective close-in defensive weapons.

The extensive EW sensors and passive counter-measures enable these ships to continue effective operations in a hostile EW environment, while internally, reliance on computers and other technological advances with built-in redundancies assist the crew both in peacetime and operational activities. These capabilities ensure that the Hobart Class DDGs have the layered defensive and offensive capability required to counter conventional and asymmetric threats.

 

 

Occasional Paper 36: HMAS Sydney (III) Delivery to Australia 1949

September 29, 2018

Our thanks go to Debbie Irwin for the letter by her uncle, Stoker Mechanician James (Jim) Ashwood of HMAS Sydney (3) to his sister Nancy dated 8 May 1949 about his trip home from UK in HMAS Sydney which includes a visit to Aden.

STO/MECH.J.ASHWOOD O/N35168
MESS 12   HMAS SYDNEY
C/- G.P.O
8TH.MAY 1949

Dear Nancy,

Well, we are in the Indian ocean now and only four days out from Fremantle, our first sight of Aussie for almost 12 months. We are all anxiously looking forward to seeing it again especially as we will have been 14 days at sea without sighting land. My luck is out I think, because as things work out at present I’ll be 24 hours on duty the day we arrive there and as we are only staying for the one day it looks as if I won’t be stepping on Aussie soil until we reach Melbourne on the 18th. I’m hoping something happens so that I can get ashore and get my teeth into a decent steak and eggs.

We stayed at Aden for ten hours and we were allowed ashore for three hours. It’s a lousy place ashore, very dry and dusty and dirty, the natives there, Arabs mainly, are dirty devils and talk about rogues, I’ve never met their equal. I’m afraid they gained very little out of me though as I was almost broke when I went ashore. The currency there is Indian rupees and annas, ten rupees to the Aussie pound and 16 annas to a rupee. There are no horses there and the hauling done, apart from trucks, is by camels. We had some photos taken but I don’t know how they’ll turn out, I hope they turn out alright because they should be quite amusing.

The weather for the week before Aden and the week after leaving there was terrific, I was working in the engine room most of the way and believe me Nance, I’d just about had it, I lost about ½  stone in weight and was as weak as a kitten, so were all the rest of the boys working down there, you see the temperature never dropped below 106 degrees for a fortnight and most of the time it was 115 to 120 degrees in the engine room. Still the last four days the weather has cooled down a lot and is now ideal and we have all fully recovered.

There has been quite a bit of entertainment organised on this stage of the trip, pictures twice a night, a concert, a quiz contest, deck hockey and deck tennis tournaments and a crossing the line ceremony.

The crossing the line was very entertaining, there is one chap dressed up as King Neptune and he has his court; a judge and policemen. Chaps are picked out who have never crossed the equator before and charged with some humorous offence and asked how they plead; of course, it makes no difference whether they plead guilty or not they are still judged guilty and have grease and oil rubbed on them and rotten eggs and fruit (if any) smashed on them and then they are thrown into a big canvas tank of water.

When the ceremony is all over the mob take to King Neptune and his hangers on and they get the same treatment, believe me, it’s a great afternoon’s fun.

Were the Aden stamps still intact on the letters I sent you and kitty from there, I sincerely hope so as I thought they were very interesting.

I believe we will only be in Sydney for fifty days when we get there and then we are to go on another months flying trials off the east coast of Australia. Anyhow there’s one thing for sure we’ll be getting 21 days leave first.

I’ve been sleeping on the open deck for the last fortnight and it’s been really good, you wake up lovely and fresh in the mornings. The seas have been very calm all the way, we are wondering if we will get a real rough trip, it’s quite on the cards.

Please give all the family my love.  I’m looking forward to being with you all again.

Well I guess that’s about all for the time being, you’ll probably only get one, maybe two more letters from me before you see me.

Cheerio for now,

Fondest love

Your ever loving brother

Jim

The Unit Citation for Gallantry of the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam Extraordinary and Gallant

September 24, 2018

By CDR Ian (Max) Speedy, DSC, RANR

With the passing of the years, we tend to forget just how defining the Vietnam War was in so many aspects. It was the first air mobility war using helicopters, the first time soldiers were taken into and out of battle by helicopters, obviating the ownership of ground between base and battle front, and the first war that could be watched with the evening TV news.

The key to air mobility is the helicopter. There has been no conflict since Vietnam where the helicopter in one role or another has not played an important and very impressive part: Iraq and Afghanistan for the US and Timor for the Australians are good examples. However in the early 1960s the US Air Force and US Army were in a bureaucratic war: the Air Force demanding ownership of all aircraft and the Army certain the USAF could not provide adequate support for its ground troops. At this time the US Army was experiencing a critical shortage of pilots but strengths would only rise to 12,800 by mid-1968 against a need for nearly 21,500.

At the working level in South Vietnam, Army and Air Force officers hammered out practical methods of solving their day-to-day problems and coordinating their efforts. The Chiefs of the US Army and Air Force eventually signed an agreement to be implemented in January 1967 that transferred the Army’s fixed wing Caribou to the Air Force and Army retained its helicopters. As an aside to this agreement the Caribou 135th became the 135th Aviation Company in April 1967 at Fort Hood, Texas and deployed to Vung Tau on 1 October 1967 with its UH-1 helicopters, becoming the 135th Assault Helicopter Company (AHC), the Experimental Military Unit (EMU) of the US Army and the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV).

The RAN had a long-standing requirement to provide a carrier task group for the SEATO annual combined exercise and this meant HMAS Melbourneand the Carrier Air Group, consisting of the frontline squadrons 816 and 817, were fully committed. The training squadrons 723, 724 and 725 were all actively engaged in meeting the fleet’s support requirements along with the scheduled air and maintenance training programs. In December 1966 a request from the United States Government for pilots and aviation specialists to supplement its own forces in the Republic of South Vietnam was added to these tasks.1

 Enter the Fleet Air Arm

The RAN gave some consideration to commissioning an additional air squadron, 852 Naval Air Squadron with UH-1 helicopters, to operate ashore in support of the Australian Task Force (ATF). This action would result in the RAN holding utility type helicopters well in excess of the required inventory at the conclusion of the conflict and so no further action was taken.2

2nd Contingent at Bear Cat March 69. OIC LCDR GR Rohrsheim RAN standing 3rd from right and the author far right

In a Chief of Naval Staff brief,quite a number of seemingly secondary considerations were raised as major inter-Service issues. Paragraph 10 noted that…the proposed deployment to Vietnam should take place as soon as possible as the Fleet Air Arm needs a raison d’être to maintain morale.

At a later lengthy discussion possible RAAF objections were raised to a helicopter flight: they would not be an identifiable Australian force, would not be engaged in Australian operations, could not be administered, and, very importantly, the RAAF would not see it as a naval job. The brief fortunately noted the FAA’s considerable involvement in Konfrontasi,that they were versatile pilots, and that the RAAF flew with the USAF Liberators in World War II. Lastly, RAN aircrew feel that they are not wanted in the Vietnam theatre and consequently are suffering from an inferiority complex. It is imperative that a worthy role be given to the [FAA] if morale is to be preserved.

The conclusion to the brief was that, amongst other things, the RAAF will raise objections that are not valid.

Initially an RAAF proposal had been formulated to request the United States to provide an additional four helicopters, to be flown and maintained by Australians in support of the ATF. The US had rejected similar requests by Thailand and could not see a way clear to agree to the Australian option.3The RAAF had also identified an immediate need in 9 SQN for additional qualified helicopter pilots for active service operations during 1967-69. To meet this unexpected demand the RAN agreed it could lend Navy helicopter pilots to the RAAF for operations with 9 SQN until its own (RAAF) training pipeline had been expanded. Eight pilots served with 9 SQN from May 1968 – April 1969 with some of them serving for various lengths of time with the 135th AHC.

The US Army logistic train to Vietnam was very long and this made the provision of additional helicopter crews and maintainers for another assault helicopter company for operations in South Vietnam difficult. The Australian Defence Department suggested the shortfall could be met in part by the RAN providing trained helicopter aircrew and maintainers to the US Army. This proposal was accepted by the US and that is how the RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam was born. The scheme of complement for the flight resembled that of a small naval air squadron and seems to be based on the four helicopters the US might have provided had the original RAAF request for assistance succeeded. It had pilots, observers, aircrew men, maintenance sailors, a cook, steward, photographer, writer, and finally a sick-berth attendant – about 46 souls in all.

The first contingent deployed to South Vietnam in two stages during October 1967 under the Officer in Command (OIC) Lieutenant Commander Neil Ralph RAN who left for Vung Tau with the first half and was followed a week later by Lieutenant Commander Pat Vickers with the remainder of the group, the first of a number of homes for the US Army’s 135th AHC. The length of a tour of duty was set at twelve months.

There was no end date established for operations in Vietnam and no indication that the conflict was ever going to draw to a conclusion. So in May and June 1968, replacement personnel joined 723 SQN at Nowra for pre-deployment training. This second contingent went to the Army’s Battle Efficiency Course at the Jungle Training Centre, Canungra, for three weeks of running, jumping, swimming, and muddy misery. Lieutenant Commander Graham Rohrsheim was its OIC. The third contingent served under Lieutenant Commander David Farthing 1969-70 and the fourth and last contingent under Lieutenant Commander Winston James served until June 1971 when the Australian government ended its support for the South Vietnam conflict. In all, 196 Fleet Air Arm personnel served with great distinction in the RANHFV.

A fifth contingent had been planned and its members nominated to replace the fourth group in October 1971. The group was of course stood down when Australia’s withdrawal was announced and the last operational day of the RANHFV was 8 June 1970.

Each contingent OIC had a directive by way of a letter assigning him the powers of punishment equivalent to that of the CO of HMAS Penguin, the administrative base for any navy personnel deployed overseas, and included inter alia:

Responsibilities: Should you be allocated a task, which, in your opinion, is contrary to the provisions of this Directive, endangers the national interests of Australia, or is likely to imperil unduly your Flightyou are to report the situation to COMAFV, having first informed the Commanding Officer of the Aviation Company to which you are attached of your intention. You are to establish safeguards to ensure your aircraft and personnel do not violate the territory, waters or airspace of countries bordering on South Vietnam, nor to take part in operations near the Cambodian border. (Author’s emphasis)

In practice the OIC’s directive was impossible to follow. Some of us would be flying as co-pilot with an American in command of the aircraft; just as often Aussies were in command of an American aircraft with US crew but you were one aircraft in a group of 15. Even though I frequently flew as the leader of the ten ‘Slicks’4or as the air mission commander, there was no way we Aussies could abort a mission just because we were ‘imperilled’. With a US or South Vietnamese battalion commander in the back of the C&C (Command and Control) aircraft directing operations – in fact commanding that his troops be put into a specific place – no pilot had the authority to refuse to obey. There was frequent discussion and generally, relationships were excellent between the US or South Vietnamese back seat commanders and us as air mission commanders in the front responsible for our aircrews. It didn’t stop the hot LZs we got into but we had a common cause.

You rarely knew if an LZ was going to get hot, mostly that happened when you got there. So, in the final analysis, all of us, Aussies and Americans alike, ignored the Chief of Navy directive and the US/RAN agreement.

The US and Australian agreement for the RANHFV with the 135th AHC included a number of novel, if not unique, criteria. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 9 November, 1967. One unique aspect was that the Australian OIC was to be the Executive Officer of the 135th under the US Army Major CO; when the Major went on leave, the Aussie XO took command. The rest of the Australians were integrated rank for rank within the company’s structure and became, in time, air mission commanders, platoon leaders, operations officers, gunship light fire team leaders and maintenance team leaders with the authority each of those positions held in the US Army’s structure. Working within an American culture far from our country and navy, in a very short time we became, to all intents and purposes, soldiers and apart from our beards and accents, frequently could not be identified as other than US Army.

Rules of Engagement

In February 1963 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had authorized an amendment to the rules of engagement for the US Army helicopters in Vietnam to allow them to engage clearly identified Viet Cong forces considered to be a threat to the safety of the aircraft and their passengers. JCS stated that the ROE for armed Army helicopters had been erroneously interpreted to mean that the helicopter must wait to be fired upon before initiating return fire. For the Navy aircrew, CNS’s directive to the OICs was that we conformed to the US rules. Specific Australian ROE, to be forwarded at some later date, never appeared.

The practice came down to this. Depending on the area we were operating in we would use suppressive fire without first taking enemy fire – the Nipa palm edges of most Delta LZs was a case in point, jungle clearings another. These places were pretty well always booby-trapped and the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) and VC (Viet Cong – Charley) could pop out of their bunkers and spider holes in seconds. The expenditure of 7.62 mm M60 rounds was phenomenal. We carried thousands of rounds per gun when 15 to 20 LZs was normal every day – each Slick’s M60 could use 500 rounds per insertion. Fuel and munitions were available at hundreds of places across the country and we refuelled and rearmed at wherever was closest on a ‘take what you need’ basis with no questions and no paper-work ever.

The US forces had quite specific rules on the Cambodian airspace and these were noted in the RANHFV OIC’s directive. Whilst the border areas were explicitly stated as no-go zones, the interdiction by US forces of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that ran the full length of North and South Vietnam went on day and night well inside the Cambodian and Laotian territories. We regularly operated within the buffer zone of the Cambodian border and on a few occasions in 1969, we crossed it. A line on a paper map did not translate to a line on the ground.

However in May 1970 the 3rd Contingent OIC was directed that his personnel were not to be involved if the US were to openly invade Cambodia. The result was that the 135th AHC had to be taken out of the operation because all but one of the Command and Control pilots and all of the Slick Lead Pilots5were Australian personnel. As a consequence, there were not enough qualified US crews to make up the 135th’s fifteen mission aircraft, much to the annoyance of Aussies and US alike. The 135th was assigned to the Mekong Delta instead.

When the 135th AHC became operational in Vung Tau, it operated mostly with the Australian Army – SAS and infantry insertions in Phuoc Tuy Province.6As 1967 wore on, the 135th was increasingly tasked to support South Vietnamese (ARVN) and US troops away from the Australians and frequently so far north that the decision was eventually made to relocate the company from Vung Tau to Blackhorse base some distance north of Nui Dat. The move took place on 1 January 1968. From then on, the 135th became even more engaged in the Mekong Delta, in the far west to the Seven Mountains on the Cambodian border, and south into the sanctuaries of the NVA in the U Minh forest and around Ben Tré. The 135th AHC moved successively to Bear Cat, east of Saigon, in December 1968 and then in September 1969 to Dong Tam in the heart of the Mekong Delta where the RANHFV and the 135th AHC remained until departing for home in June 1971.

Getting the Bloody Job Done

During the four years of the RANHFV, the 135th AHC missions were conducted across the length and breadth of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) and into the jungles and mountains of II CTZ as well as the streets and lanes of Saigon city during the Tet Offensive of February 1968. The 135th AHC was on standby in February 1969 to assist in the evacuation of the US Embassy in Saigon should it have been required.

Each flying day began at 0430 with aircrew at their allocated aircraft for pre-flight inspections. Every day the standard mission for the 135th and all other assault companies was much the same. Every task required ten Slicks, four gunships, and the command and control aircraft fitted out with its extra radios for the battalion staff in the back seat directing their troops on the ground. All we really had to know was where the first pick-up of the day was to be, everything after that was ‘Getting the bloody job done!’ the 135th AHC refrain.7

The aircraft was always flown with a crew of four: two pilots in case one was shot. The crew chief, a Specialist Class 4 of Leading Seaman equivalent rank performed the aircraft’s first line maintenance and then flew everywhere the aircraft went, manning one of its M60s. The gunner maintained the two M60 machine guns and about 3,000 rounds per gun or whatever he could fit into the biggest boxes he could find.

Typical Mekong Delta scenery. Landing Zone one minute, Pickup Zone for another LZ somewhere else the next. Hot or cold receptions were just a 50:50 bet.

All LZ insertions were company sized elements of 100 men, American or ARVN. At one stage the 135th was down to 17 out of its establishment of 31 aircraft but the maintainers worked miracles (under dreadful working conditions) and the 15 mission aircraft were always available. Such was the demand and the response; if the aircraft could be started, we flew it.

If, as happened frequently, the operation was across the country to the Cambodian border area, a transit of some 200 miles from our Blackhorse or Bear Cat base, a spare aircraft had to be included. If lucky, it would have a quiet day waiting at some POL (Petrol, Oil, Lubricants) spot near the day’s operations.

From then on, with up to dozens of company lifts in the day, every pick up and landing zone was always in the lap of the gods. You never knew if the first or any insertion was going to be hot, except perhaps in the notorious Ben Tré area where we always counted on a contested arrival. Once the first troops were on the ground a seemingly quiet LZ could erupt with dozens of the enemy standing up out of small spider holes and launching a blistering attack with AK-47s, RPGs and, if we stumbled into a larger formation as sometimes occurred, 30 or 50 mm machine guns.8We were then committed to a tough day not only reinforcing the troops already on the ground but also to rescue downed aircrew, MEDEVACs and finally to bring them home, late at night out of a hot withdrawal.

A four to five hour flying day was easy and probably only had three companies of a battalion (three lifts) inserted and withdrawn later. Eight to ten hours were not uncommon and could be the one battalion moved a number of times before going home or one company in contact and with others being inserted in blocking positions (easy) or into a hot LZ (hard). The long days were the worst – up to twelve and fourteen hours always meant a day of enemy contact, troops invariably killed and wounded and aircraft hit if not shot down.9 These days always seemed to involve our own casualties.

Combat assault flying days were programmed for five, six or seven days depending on the general tenor of operations and then for a rest, the company would be assigned to Direct Combat Support, known better as Pigs and Riceor Hash and Trash.10All ten Slicksand often four gunships would be tasked to a variety of small units in remote spots needing resupply of ammunition, personnel or equipment for an outpost under attack. The gunships would usually be in reserve against another company needing back-up. All these missions were fraught with danger and could be more dangerous than a standard combat assault day.

Ready Reaction Force (RRF) was another duty. This involved a normal day’s flying operations but instead of returning to our home base (Blackhorse or Bear Cat), we would go to places like Tay Ninh or Cu Chi in the north of III Corps near the border, to be ready for the night insertion of a relief force if a beleaguered out-post had been overrun.

Practice not Theory

Fortunately most flying was by day but our days stretched into night combat assaults making the flying that much more difficult.11As everything the Slicks did was in formation, being led to a touchdown in a dark clearing with no lights and virtually no ground references took some getting used to. It was no easier as the Slickleader with nine other aircraft nervously following your every move. The option of going around for another go was never countenanced – it had to be first time every time and made the flight leader’s role crucial.

In the close and hectic confines of a hot LZ, thumping into the ground was a comparatively minor hazard when the summer dust swirled up and obscured all vision. For all the risks, some amazing work was done at night, such as on 20 December 1967 when a late afternoon hot insertion finally led to the troops being extracted with the flight under constant fire for over four hours from midnight into the early morning. Only two aircraft were hit but there were many troop casualties.12

Combat damage was mainly small arms fire and most pilots made the most professional landings when shot down.13We flew at 1,500 feet when we could so as to stay clear of AK-47 fire but that did not always work.14Heavier calibre weapons were different. The RPGs or 50 mm fire would take you down with one hit, the resultant collision with the ground being largely a question of how much damage had been done to the controls or pilots.15Our aircraft was simple compared to today’s well armoured counterparts but provided the bullets did not mash up in the rotating machinery the Huey could take some incredible punishment and still keep flying.16

It was not always lots of hits and no casualties. The final roll of honour for the 135th AHC was 35 killed and far too many injured for an accurate count (over 100). Five RANHFV members were killed (of eight in all the RAN) and at least 22 wounded (two thirds of our 50 aircrew regularly flying!). In the 135th AHC in 1968/69, 13 were killed and 25 wounded (two RANHFV KIA and five WIA), a casualty every ten days or so more or less.

The case of Leading Aircrewman Noel Shipp and his gunship crew is the best known in the Second Contingent and also nowadays to many of the Australian public following the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal report into unresolved recognition for past acts of gallantry and valour. Shipp and his gunship crew were defending a hot landing zone when they were shot down and all four, three Americans and Shipp were killed. Shipp was proposed to the Tribunal for consideration of a posthumous Victoria Cross which in the event was not agreed. However, his name and gallantry that day, hanging out of his doomed aircraft and firing all the way to the ground, will be remembered at the RAN Recruit School, HMAS Cerberus,with one of the divisions there being named in his honour.

 The Final Tally

With at least 100 American soldiers being killed in a ‘good’ week and up to 600 in a ‘bad’ one, and eventually more than 58,000 deaths the final call for America, it is no wonder the public wanted to stop the war.

The Huey has become the iconic symbol of the Vietnam War. According to the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots’ Association, of the 7,013 Hueys that went to Vietnam, nearly half (3,305) were destroyed and with them 2,177 aircrew killed. Half the aircraft and two thirds of their crews were casualties – not good statistics yet we loved the aircraft and were proud to have flown it in the most intense of environments. We were face to face with our enemy on many an occasion, taking hits, being shot down, having the closest of shaves and regular ‘there but for the grace of God’ moments and still flying the next day to do it all again.

Maintenance Area at Bear Cat, open air day and torch light night, wet or dry according to season. The maintenance personnel did wonders. We had the aircraft from 0430 every day till our return, often as late as midnight, when the maintainers did their repairs for the next day.

On Medals

For reasons that are too tortuous to go into here, the RANHFV started off well behind the rest in terms of access to medal recommendations in Vietnam. Our ‘quotas’ began with having only half of our flying hours tallied and then one third of those hours counted for any medal considerations. The first cut we presumed was to be on the basis that we were only to be co-pilots in American aircraft yet we all became air mission commanders, Slick and Gunship Leaders while the maintenance personnel became the skills’ leaders in every trade. The second cut was on a World War II premise that only one third of our flying was in combat yet every time we went outside the camp perimeter, we were in a combat situation.

While only the aircrew were expected to go into danger, the rest of our personnel did so as well. They flew out into the field to effect repairs to our aircraft if it would allow that aircraft to keep flying on the day’s mission rather than getting a Chinook to lift it home. These same people mounted guard duties on the perimeter each night, they drove stores convoys and on more than a few occasions were ambushed and fought their way out. Photographers who had only ever taken happy snaps were manning the M60s and flying on combat assaults. The Sick Berth Attendants (Medics) performed amazingly in trauma wards for impossibly long periods during the Tet offensives of 1968 and 1969. Our cooks had the best chow halls throughout the Battalion for months on end.

Unit Citation for Gallantry

It has been said in places that the RANHFV was the most awarded unit of the RAN. On one count that might well be. When 18 MIDs were awarded to other people ‘…cheerfully carrying out their duties’ and similar words while not in combat danger, then an MID or other award for the most daring of rescues (under conditions which some equated to gallantry of the highest order) which were recommended and substantively approved and then later dismissed is worse than inequitable.

Against this background, some members of the RANHFV canvassed Navy in 2011 and eventually politicians for a Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal hearing which was finally held in October 2017. Not to seek personal entitlements but for a general recognition that the RANHFV had performed extraordinarily well. The Tribunal recommended and the Governor-General on 1 June 2018 signed his approval of the RAN’s second Unit Citation for Gallantry since World War II.

UNIT CITATION FOR GALLANTRY

For acts of extraordinary gallantry in action in South Vietnam from October 1967 to June 1971.

The Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam, as part of the Experimental Military Unit of the United States Army 135th Assault Helicopter Company, exhibited exceptional and extraordinary gallantry whilst engaged in offensive operations continuously throughout its four-year deployment. This exceptional gallantry was enabled by the efforts of the entire Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam.

The Flight was a unique unit and every member, regardless of mustering or category, either performed their duties with demonstrable gallantry or were used in roles for which they were not trained and still performed bravely. The administrative and maintenance staff were required to assist in the provision of base security in addition to their normal duties and almost all of the support personnel regularly volunteered to act as aircrew employed as door-gunners and Crew Chiefs. This was in addition to the extremely long maintenance hours required to support the tempo of operations conducted by the Flight. Over the course of the operations in Vietnam, the Flight accumulated a formidable record of operational flight hours and citations for individual gallantry. This has set it apart from other operational units.

While exposed to hostile fire and at great personal risk, aircrew flew on average 50 per cent more operational hours per month than other Australian aircrew in comparable roles with other units. Aircrew were constantly engaged by the enemy, faced the danger of booby-trapped landing zones and frequently found themselves fired upon by friendly forces. The personnel who flew with the Flight arguably saw the most intense combat of any Royal Australian Navy personnel in the war. Despite the fact that none of the personnel had previous operational service and none had been under fire, they were courageous in battle, exhibited exceptional and extraordinary gallantry and did so with great skill and heroic dedication in executing a mission far removed from those for which they had been trained. Over the period of the Flight’s operations in South Vietnam, five members of the unit died and 22 were wounded in action.

The extraordinary gallantry, dedication to duty and astonishing record of the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam conducting tasks far removed from the expectations of Naval service, has forever set it apart from other units. The extraordinary acts of gallantry and heroism consistently displayed by the personnel, combined with their loyal devotion to duty were in keeping with the finest traditions of the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Defence Force.

Max Speedy was the 2iC of the 2nd Contingent (1968/69). As a co-pilot for two months under a US Army Warrant Officer getting combat experience he then became 1st Platoon Leader (UH1-H troop lift helicopters) and flight leader of the 10 Slicks, ending his tour as Operations Officer and Air Mission Commander of the Slicksand Gunships. He flew 1,250 combat hours, was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross, two Vietnam Crosses of Gallantry, and a dozen US Air Medals. He flew most of the helicopters types in Vietnam at the time.

 

  1. 1. Information Paper for Cabinet, Request For Helicopter Pilots For Vietnam, Copy 2, May 1967, signed Allen Fairhall, Minister for Defence, National Archives, Canberra.

2    Navy Office File 79/201/3, 6 June, 1967, signed by DNAP, Capt H.E. Bailey DSC RAN.

3       CNS Brief by DNAP 9 May, 1967:

  1. COS Minute 40/1967 recommended that eight RAN pilots and supporting personnel be made available to fly helicopters provided by the US in South Vietnam, and envisages this force would be incorporated in No. 9 SQN, RAAF. The only costs expected would be those arising from daily pay and allowances.
  2. AJSS Washington indicated that the US could not accept the above terms as they had already refused a similar Philippines request and did not want to give the impression that they were forming a White Man’s Club in the operational area…

4    UH-1 helicopters tasked and configured for troop transport were often called ‘Slicks’ due to an absence of weapon pods

5    Jeffrey Gray, Up Top, The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955 – 1972, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1998, p 267

6    Including support of the Coral and Balmoral Fire Support Bases.

7    In the Seven Mountains area on the Cambodian Border on 27 January 1969 and near night-fall, the author in the lead was asked by the Battalion Commander if we could get the remainder of his 1300 troops changed over. It had already been a long day but the (tired) reply was that ‘We would get the bloody job done!’ which we did with nearly 12 hours flying to do so. This became the well-loved motto of the 135th AHC.

8    8 February, 18 May, 23 October, and 23 December in 1968 and 2 February and 31 May in 1969 to name a few.

9    While there were troops to be moved, we kept flying, hot refuelling (not shutting down) as necessary and then back to the fray. My longest day was nearly 14 hours of flying, the first seven hours and last six or so were done without shutting down and this was not an isolated experience; all of us had these days.

10  The only days the war seemed to stop officially were Thanksgiving, Christmas, Easter, and the Apollo Landing on 21 July 1969. There were still lots of aircraft movements on these non-combat days.

11  Of my 1,250 hours flying that year, 85 hours were night combat assaults, more than enough!

12  Ray Jones and Neil Ralph, The First HFV.In: Max Speedy and Bob Ray, Eds, A Bloody Job Well Done: The History of the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam, 1967 – 1971, Canberra, 2008, p 30. ISBN 978-0-646-50060-7

13  Almost every one of the 32 RANHFV pilots was shot down at least once, along with all of our US Army crew members. One of the US Warrant Officers was downed three times before his 21st birthday.

14  Lieutenant Commander P.J. Vickers was killed on 22 February 1968 when a round deflected off his rudder pedal while flying at this ‘safe’ height.

15  On 8 August 1968, Lieutenant Tony Casadio, Petty Officer O.C. Phillips and their American co-pilot and crew chief were all killed when an RPG hit their gunship while flying low. With no options, they landed in a bomb crater with a force too great to survive.

16  As Lieutenant Bruce Crawford DSC can attest (one amongst many): on 8 February 1968, his aircraft took 25 hits and kept flying. On 8 May, 1968, six aircraft were shot down in the one LZ and 125 troops were killed or injured. The EMU Shootof 23 October 1968 near Ben Tré, saw three Slicks and two gunships downed and reinforcements called in.

 

 

 

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