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Post WWII

Post-War Naval Losses 1945-88

Most of us have books on our shelves listing losses in various navies during the 1939-45 war. Sometimes we tend to forget that since that war, roughly, countries and groups have taken up arms 140 times. Relatively few of these wars have involved naval actions with large combatants, but a surprising number of ships have been lost. Examine the list below.

Cruisers

USS PHOENIX, later transferred to Argentina and renamed GENERAL BELGRANO
USS PHOENIX, later transferred to Argentina and renamed GENERAL BELGRANO

Ex-Chungking ex-Aurora (Chinese)

Defected from Nationalists to Communist Chinese forces and sunk in Taku Harbour 2/3/49. General Belgrano (Argentine)

Torpedoed by British Submarine Conqueror, 2/5/82.

Submarines Ghazi (Pakistan)

Sunk by Indian Naval Forces? Mined? 4/10/71? Sante Fe (Argentine)

Damaged and Captured by British forces 25/4/82.

Destroyers, Frigates and Sloops El Amir Farouk (Egyptian)

An old sloop-royal yacht 17 knots, 1,440 tons built in 1926. Sunk by Israeli Naval forces using ex-Italian explosive boats. 21/10/48. Nan Chang ex Chang Chi, ex. Jap. Uji (PLA Navy)

Sunk by nationalist aircraft in the Yangtse 24/9/49. Tai Ping (Taiwan)

Sunk by PLA MTBs 14/11/54. Abikir (Egyptian)

Scuttled at Port Said 1/11/56. Damietta (Egyptian)

Sunk by gunfire H.M.S. Newfoundland 31/10/56. Ibrahim-el-Awal (Egyptian)

Captured following action against sea and air forces. Efforts to scuttle the ship failed when sea cocks could not be found. Alphonso de Alberquerque (Portugese)

Sunk by gunfire. INS Mysore and destroyers 12/61. Elath (Israeli)

Sunk by Egyptian Styx SSM 21/10/67. El Qaher (Egyptian)

Sunk Israeli aircraft at Ras Banas 16/5/70. Khaibar (Pakistan)

Sunk by Indian Styx S SMs 4/10/71. Khukri (Indian)

Torpedoed by Pakistani Submarine Hangor 9/10/71. Kocatepe (Turkish)

Sunk by their own aircraft during Cyprus invasion 22/7/74. Sheffield (British)

Foundered followed damage from Exocet ASM 10/5/82. Ardent (British)

Sunk after multiple bomb and rocket hits from Argentine Aircraft. Antelope (British)

Sunk by detonation of an unexploded bomb 24/5/82. Coventry (British)

Sunk by Argentine aircraft bombs 25/5/82. Milanian (Iranian)

Loss admitted 1982, cause as yet unknown. Kahnamuie (Iranian)

Loss admitted 1982, cause as yet unknown. Reports of a third unit of this PF class being sunk are widely believed. Tariq Ibn Ziyad (Libyan)

Sunk US naval and air forces 24/3/84. Sahand (Iranian)

Sunk by 3 Harpoon ASM and Laser guide bomb US Forces 19/4/87. The above list maybe incomplete or incorrect in places, and I would welcome any criticism. It makes no attempt to list the large number of FAC, patrol vessels, mine warfare vessels, landing craft or auxiliaries that have been lost in the numerous conflicts.

Some Observations

Firstly, ships have been sunk by almost every type of weapon in the naval inventory, from conventional iron bombs and shells, to the most sophisticated guided weapons. The notable absence from the list is the mine. However, mines have crippled ships in post war years, beginning with the celebrated Albanian mining of British destroyers in 1946, to more recent incidents in the Persian Gulf.

Secondly, it does seem that larger units have a better chance of survival than the smaller ones, although ARDENT received enough hits to sink a far larger ship. Generally ships with air cover, and/or medium range SAMs and CIWS have a better chance of survival than the small units without these systems. In addition larger units usually have a more advanced electronic warfare suit.

Thirdly, efficient damage control seems a necessity. USS STARK was saved by the excellence of her crew and systems. It seems likely that SHEFFIELD would have been saved if more attention had been paid to this matter in the initial design.

Warships are built to go in ‘harm’s way’ and as a result we could expect a number to be sunk from time to time. But the lessons from those losses should definitely be learnt so that crews are not needlessly sacrificed. I know that naval officers and maritime experts have gone over the post war conflicts ceaselessly, and come to important conclusions and learnt needed lessons. However, we always have to ask if the lesson is being implemented. A 4.5″ gun mount for destroyers and frigates was a lesson of the Falkland War. The newest batch of the Type 23 design is apparently dispensing with it for economy reasons. SHEFFIELD was sunk in a storm of economy reasons. One wonders how many other ‘lessons learnt’ are being forgotten.

Lessons from the Falkland Islands War

IN HINDSIGHT all naval powers learnt lessons from the Argentine-British conflict in the Falkland Islands in 1982. Dr. Juan Carlos Murguizur had this to say in an article published in the International Defence Review earlier this year.

While it is true that in terms of NATO strategy the Royal Navy has been confined to a secondary role, it is equally clear that in all areas it was vastly superior in strength to the Argentinian fleet. In all the naval encounters of Argentina’s short history as an independent nation, the fleet had always been inferior to the enemy in terms of equipment, and yet, through improvisation and ingenuity, it had managed each time to overcome this disadvantage and emerge successful.

In the Falklands conflict of 1982 the location of the theatre of operations created such logistic difficulties for the British task force that, initially, Argentinian hopes were raised by the prospect of being able to repeat the successes of the past. These hopes were, however, dashed with the arrival in the area of British submarines – conventionally powered vessels to operate in the shallow waters of the continental shelf and nuclear vessels for the deeper waters beyond. It became patently obvious that it would not be possible to defend surface vessels against submarine attack and the decision was taken, wisely, to call all surface ships back into port; the decision came too late, however, to save the General Belgrano.

From the various contacts outside the exclusion zone, it became clear that the range of the Argentinian destroyer’s sonar equipment was much inferior to that of the British submarines torpedoes and it was possible only to try to escape detection in the hope of avoiding the torpedoes. The Argentine destroyer Segui was, in fact, located close to the mainland by a British submarine which refrained from using its torpedoes doubtless for political reasons.

On board British surface ships similar situation were experienced. When the small Argentinian submarine San Luis made one of its abortive torpedo attacks, three British vessels, two of them frigates or destroyers, made off in different directions at top speed.

Helicopters, the most effective ASW weapons, were severely hampered by the excessively heavy seas so common at these latitudes. Take-off, recovery and remaining in the hover when deploying the dunking sonar became very hazardous.

It seems clear therefore that, at present, in the oceans adjacent to South America, surface vessels are no real match for submarines. And one is bound, with this in mind, to question the wisdom of continuing the past policy of the Argentinian Navy, namely placing emphasis on surface ships. Pursuing this line of thinking, one could speculate that, even if Argentina had possessed four times the number of Type 42 destroyers and missile-armed corvettes (that is eight and 12 respectively and thus a sizeable fleet), the situation would not have been very different. In an encounter with enemy forces, many such vessels would have been sunk by British submarines, in all probability even before being able to engage the RN’s surface ships. On the other hand, with half a dozen submarines, it would have been possible to inflict grave losses on the enemy and even frustrate his invasion plans.

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