Naval Engagements, Operations and Capabilities

Book Review: Albany’s ANZAC Convoys

September 24, 2014

Albany’s ANZAC Convoys by Roger Cunnington. Published by Digger Press, Albany, WA, 2014. Paperback of 176 pages with b&w illustrations, maps and diagrams. $46.95, from sales@diggerpress.com or albanyconvoys@westnet.com.au.

The release of this publication is well timed with the centenary of the commencement of WW I and reminds us of the immense organisation involved in assembling armed assistance by the dominions in response to the call of the mother country. Roger Cunnington, who is a maritime researcher with the Albany Historical Society, has assembled an impressive amount of material concisely into one volume which is easily referenced. The acronym ‘ANZAC’ in the title of the book was not used until shortly before the second convoy gathered in King George Sound but the author has used it because of its association with both the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF).

This book tells the story of the first two convoys that took soldiers of the AIF and the NZEF to the battlefields during WW I, departing from the Port of Albany in Western Australia in the latter part of 1914, within a couple of months of one another. All of the Australian troops who departed from Albany were embarked in the eastern states. Those home grown soldiers from Western Australia left from Fremantle a day later to meet up with their counterparts off the Western Australian coast.

While much has been published about the actual battlefield experiences of soldiers of WW I, very little has been produced about the day-to-day life of the men between boarding their ships in Australia and New Zealand and leaving them many weeks and sometimes months later in Egypt. The author has researched soldiers’ personal letters, diaries, official diaries from the Australian War Memorial, national and state archives, unit histories, the Port of Albany Register of Inwards Shipping Movements and of course relevant volumes of Bean’s and Jose’s official war histories.

The enormous amount of logistical support required to provide provisions for such a large fleet in readiness for war is explained. These were the two largest transport contingents to depart from Australasia and both assembled and departed from King George Sound. The First Convoy which departed on 1 November 1914 comprised 28 Australian and 10 New Zealand transports with nearly 30,000 men and over 11,700 horses. Before these ships could return to Australia a second contingent of troops was ready to be sent overseas. It was therefore necessary to requisition another convoy of sixteen Australian and three New Zealand transport ships which again assembled at King George Sound and mostly departed on 31 December 1914 with in excess of 12,000 men and over 5,000 horses. Because of the unknown presence of the German East Asiatic Squadron the First Convoy was heavily protected by HMS Minotaur and HMA Ships Melbourne and Sydney, later joined by the Japanese cruiser HIJMS Ibuki. With the enemy presence largely dissipated with the demise of SMS Emden by Sydney, the Second Convoy was only protected by several of the larger transport ships which had been modified to be Defensively Armed Merchant Ships. HMAT Berrima towed the Submarine AE2 for most of the voyage.

We are offered detailed descriptions of life on board the vessels for both the soldiers and their horses, as well as the more formal descriptions of the planning and preparations for the convoys, including the ships’ acquisitions and fitting out. Scattered throughout the text are several black and white photographs which reveal quite vividly the conditions that would have been accepted as normal in wartime conditions of the day but which today’s soldiers would no doubt, consider primitive. Further description is provided of Albany’s wartime troop and hospital ship replenishment role which would have been of particular importance for the two convoys which were the two largest transport contingents to depart from Australasia and the only ones to depart from Albany.

The volume comes complete with a detailed bibliography and index. There is a plentiful supply of appendices which includes a brief history of each of the Australian and New Zealand ships in the first and second convoys.

This book is highly recommended to those readers who, having read other works detailing life in the trenches for the soldiers of WW I, would like to learn how they arrived and more about their lives from a slightly different perspective.

Reviewed by Liz Colthorpe

Book Review: Rising Sun, Falling Skies – The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II

June 24, 2014

Rising Sun, Falling Skies – The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II. By Jeffrey R. Cox. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2014. Hardback of 487 pages with b&w photographs and plans, rrp £20.

This well researched volume by an American lawyer and historian endeavours to consider, even-handedly, the overall Allied effort in this campaign. It starts with Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 but does not dwell long there as this was only one part of a Japanese strategic plan to control the ‘Southern Resources Area’. To achieve this it was necessary to drive Americans and Europeans out of East Asia, which could be offered independence under Japanese suzerainty.

The scene is set with Commodore Matthew Perry sailing into Tokyo Bay in 1853, awakening Japan from isolation, sowing the seeds for modernisation, resulting in competition with America and European colonial powers. Japan was not only copying industrially but politically, extending its territories by annexing lands from a disintegrating Chinese empire. This led to a collision with Russia and an alliance with Great Britain, propelling Japan to a position of armed superiority by the early 1930s. With continuous armed conflict throughout China and Korea for the next decade, the Japanese were battle hardened and developed superior weapon systems. They also became strategically astute in managing East Asian affairs.

On paper, American, British and Dutch forces in the Far East should have withstood initial enemy attacks until reinforcements were found, but Pearl Harbor badly damaged and immobilized the US Pacific Fleet. Within hours Japanese aircraft also struck the Philippines, leaving regional American air power in ruins. This brought further misfortunes to the US Asiatic Fleet based there. The British fortress of Singapore was next tested and within days the pride of its fleet lay at the bottom of the South China Sea. The early capitulation of both Singapore and the Philippines, with many thousands taken prisoner, resulted in withdrawal to the East Indies and the establishment of a new coordinated American, British, Dutch & Australian (ABDA) command.

The main focus of the work however remains in the Dutch East Indies. Here the composition of ABDA is examined, with problems of disparate commands hastily brought together to form a multinational defence force. While the Dutch were committed to preventing an overall invasion of what many regarded as their homeland, they lacked the resources to counter aggressive Japanese attacks. Most importantly there was little or no air cover afforded to Allied forces. Compounding problems arose in joint communications and an indigenous population which was not always sympathetic and reliable. In February 1942 the Japanese launched a twin-pronged amphibious invasion force, with Eastern and Western Invasion Fleets, aimed at the capture of Java. The ABDA command placed most of its ships under Rear Admiral Karl Doorman with a fleet intended to halt or at least stall the invader. The ensuing Battle of the Java Sea ended in disaster, with this battle and subsequent engagements seeing the loss of numerous ships including HNLM Ships De Ruyter and Java, HMS Exeter, HMAS Perth and USS Houston. With virtually no major warships and few aircraft ABDA collapsed. A final withdrawal of limited assets was made to Australia before a counter offensive could be organised to fight another day.

This book has wide appeal not only to historians and scholars but to those wishing to explore this fascinating period of naval and military history. As a reference it is well indexed. An extensive bibliography demonstrates the depth of research and copious endnotes are illuminating.

Reviewed by Liz Colthorpe.

Book Review: They Sang Like Kangaroos: Australia’s Tinpot Navy in the Great War

March 24, 2014

They Sang Like Kangaroos: Australia’s Tinpot Navy in the Great War. By Anthony Delano: Australian Scholarly Press, Melbourne, Dec 2012. rrp $34.95

As his title may suggest, Doctor Delano has written an entertaining book covering the major features of the Australian Navy’s participation in World War I. In fact, it comes from a ballad created by the self-appointed ‘Poet Laureate’ of the Royal Navy, Sir Henry Newbolt, to celebrate the destruction of the German cruiser Emden by HMAS Sydney in November 1914. Delano’s use of part of this doggerel for the book’s title is for theatrical effect, because the series of linked episodes he discusses demonstrates that, despite ignorance in all quarters on the capability of the new Australian Navy at both ends of the Melbourne-London axis, its performance in the war was far from ‘tinpot’, and that it deserves a more balanced consideration.

Working from thorough research, but applying the degree of journalistic licence his experience permits, Delano’s accounts are delivered in ebullient tones. Whether or not Commander Claude Cumberlege, leading three black-painted destroyers through a tropical night into Rabaul Harbour towards a potential confrontation with the German Far East Asiatic Squadron on 11 August 1914, though exactly as the author describes is beside the point. They serve to set the scene which might have turned out to be the first fleet confrontation of World War I, and they are reasonable hypotheses. It isn’t a historian’s history but makes the same points in more colourful terms.

This approach is used by Delano in his accounts of the travails of Admiral Sir George Patey, trying desperately to get to grips with the Germans but being frustrated at every turn by ignorance and wishful thinking in London, but Melbourne doesn’t escape his critical scrutiny either. He carries on this design in outlining the origins of the RAN, the RAN’s involvement in the occupation of German New Guinea, the destruction of Emden, the eventual destruction of her sister ship Königsberg in East Africa, the tedious hunt for German agents and bases throughout Southeast Asia 1915 to 1917, the Australian destroyer flotilla on the Otranto Barrage patrol 1917-1918 and wearisome sojourn of the light cruisers and the battle cruiser HMAS Australia with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea.

Delano also examines the role played by Australian Guy Gaunt, serving in the RN, in the manipulation of American opinion towards war with Germany, and the contribution of sailors from Australia in the famous assault on Zeebrugge in Belgium in 1918. The poor treatment handed out to Acting Commander Thomas Biddlecombe by the Australian Naval Board at the behest of the Admiralty is used to illustrate the power which Whitehall exercised over Australian government agencies. Delano describes the Naval Board as ‘supine’: ’inexperienced and out of its depth’ might be a more apt description, especially of the First Naval Member, Admiral Creswell.

And for those who are unaware that the Royal Australian Navy operated briefly in the Sea of Azov, described by Delano as ‘the world’s biggest puddle‘, at the end of 1918, the author provides a lively account of the expedition to find evidence to support more Allied military assistance to the Don Cossacks fighting Bolshevik forces. Rather curiously, there is also an account of problems of command in the Queensland colonial navy, involving the arrest of the commanding officer of HMQS Gayundah. This incident might have suggested the adjective ‘tinpot’.

There are, however, two points in Delano’s account with which one could take issue. It seems de rigueur for commentators to take one swipe or many at Winston Churchill’s perceived conspiracies to get his way. This makes for good press, but are these charges supported by fact? He made many mistakes, and his failure to unleash Patey and the Australian fleet to chase after the Germans in the Pacific was one of them: for that, after the Battle of Coronel, he had 1,600 British lives on his conscience. But his obsession with making sure the Royal Navy had sufficient strength in the North Sea to defeat any attempt by the German High Seas Fleet to break out of its bases was surely sound policy. And once the German cruisers had been accounted for, was there any point in having an RAN battle cruiser swanning around the Pacific?

Second, it is true that the Admiralty directed the deployment of RAN ships during World War I and senior positions on the upper and lower decks were occupied, predominantly, by British personnel. They clearly believed that the system that had produced the finest navy in the world provided the most appropriate model for the new Australian fleet to follow. The Naval Board might have advised the Australian government to take a more independent stance on these issues, but it simply wasn’t in a position to do so and, in the final analysis, what alternatives did it have to acceding to Admiralty requests and practices? To perform to RN standards was their most devout wish.

Finally, there are some editorial errors and omissions: the book lacks a proper bibliography, there are few maps, and the quality of some of the photographs is less than one would expect. There are some mistakes and typos as well. And I am a great believer in notes – end or foot: either will do – to show what sources an author is citing. It keeps we scribblers honest.

In summary, They Sang like Kangaroos will interest and inform some readers and provoke others to rage. My view is that it is a timely and appropriate addition to the history of a period of Australia’s naval history not well covered in other texts, and which has the potential for exciting interest in and the study of more conventional presentations.

Reviewed by Dr Ian Pfennigwerth

Book Review: Carrier Attack Darwin 1942: The Complete Guide to Australia’s own Pearl Harbor

March 24, 2014

Carrier Attack Darwin 1942: The Complete Guide to Australia’s own Pearl Harbor. By Dr Tom Lewis & Peter Ingram. Published by Avonmore Books, Kent Town, South Australia, 2013. Hardback, 368 pages with numerous illustrations and photographs many in colour, rrp $49.95.

Darwin on 19 February 1942 is a day that should be long remembered by Australians when one of the largest attacks by Japanese aircraft was delivered on a poorly defended relatively small outpost at the northern end of our nation. What is extraordinary about the scale and ferocity of this attack, mainly conducted by carrier borne aircraft, is explained in great detail in this fine volume. Why was the attack necessary, what was the strategic purpose, was this the prelude to an invasion of our shores? These and many more important questions are addressed. In the context of our national defence the lessons learned both then and extrapolated to the present should not be overlooked.

In setting the scene it should be remembered that this was one of our darkest hours. Within a period of a few months Pearl Harbor had been attacked with devastating effect, the Americans were forced to withdraw from the Philippines, the impregnable fortress of Singapore had been lost in a humiliating surrender with many thousands of Australian troops in captivity, the Dutch East Indies was set to fall and, Australian territories in New Guinea were about to be invested. The authors place all this into perspective and shows where Darwin fits into this vast and dynamic landscape.

The similarities and differences with Pearl Harbor are explained with the attack on the former mainly conducted using about 350 aircraft from six carriers whereas that at Darwin was from about 250 aircraft from four carriers supported by some land based naval aircraft. As four of the same carriers were used in both attacks those in the latter attack had prior experience and given the much smaller value targets at Darwin the attacks were of similar determined ferocity. A detailed analysis is undertaken using the latest information, some of which has only recently become available from Japanese sources. This provides details of the composition of the forces available to the Japanese and the tactics used by the carriers and their bombing and strafing aircraft. There are also details of the available defence forces both Australian and American together with a comhrenhsive list of the many ships in harbour at this time.

The results of the raids, one major wave from the carriers followed by a smaller wave from land based aircraft, are explained as are the actions taken by those on the ground, in the air and, by the various ships. As the number of witnesses to these historic events is now in serious decline it is timely that many myths and misconceptions as to actions taken, damage caused and the number of causalities are fully explored. The experienced authors seek to reach sound evidence based conclusions which provide many answers. These days it is a pleasant surprise to find an Australian published hardback of fine quality. In this case the publisher has done well; the generous text is adequately supported by copious illustrations and photographs, many in colour. For those seeking further detail there is a plentiful supply of appendices and the volume is well referenced and indexed. It is a book that should have wide appeal to anyone interested in Australian history as well as those with a taste for military history. It is also a fine book of reference with a vast amount of material cleverly pulled together into a single readable volume which should find its way to many bookshelves and libraries and will retain its value for many years to come.

Reviewed by Walter Burroughs

Book Review: Carriers at War 1939 -1945

December 24, 2013

Carriers at War 1939 -1945 by Adrian Stewart. Published by: Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2013. Paperback of 224 pages with numerous photographs. rrp about $30 but reductions now available.

Barely ten days into WW II, the converted 1916 cruiser HMS Courageous was torpedoed and sunk while stationary in the North Sea to retrieve its aircraft spotting for German submarines. Thus begins the author’s examination of ten principal areas of carrier warfare in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific theatres of war, and the developments in the design of carriers and aircraft by which this war was fought.

The first significant application of carrier strategy occurred in the Mediterranean under Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham on 11/12 November 1940 against the formidable Italian fleet at Taranto. The 23,000 ton HMS Illustrious, one of the new fleet of carriers with armour-plated flight and hangar decks and flying 21 Swordfish fighters, made crippling torpedo attacks on the Italian fleet at Taranto, while the destruction of the 42,000 ton German battleship Bismarck in the Atlantic in May 1941 by relentless Spitfire torpedo and bomb attacks from HMS Ark Royal confirmed that the carrier had come of age.

The survival of Malta was central to Allied strategy in the Mediterranean and North Africa, and the relief of the embattled island, its inhabitants on the verge of starvation, was achieved with the help of convoys which included HMS Ark Royal delivering vitally needed land-based Hurricane fighter aircraft. Coinciding with the victory at El Alamein in November 1942 and the neutralisation of the Axis airfield at Martuba in North Africa, the siege of Malta was raised and the threat to the Suez Canal negated.

In the meantime Japan had invested in a large fleet of carriers equipped with aircraft of superior quality (Aichi Val dive bombers and Kajima Kate torpedo bombers) which devastated the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, fortuitously in the absence of two carriers, Lexington and Enterprise, which the Japanese would willingly have exchanged for the six disabled battleships.

By March 1942 the Japanese had overrun South East Asia and had seized the north coast of Papua New Guinea, where completion of an airfield under construction could have neutralised Australia as the base for an eventual reconquest of the Japanese-occupied territories. The author covers in detail the Battles of the Coral Sea (7-8 May), Midway (4-7 June) and the bitter six-month campaign from August 1942 to February 1943 centred on Guadalcanal in the Solomons, where Japan’s attempts to isolate Australia as the base for future offensive action were frustrated. The struggle for Guadalcanal had cost the US and its allies 24 major warships, including HMAS Canberra, far more than Japan’s losses, but the author observes that the industrial power of the US would soon make good the losses, which was beyond the power of Japan to match.

The introduction of various types of auxiliary carrier is examined at length, e.g. Fighter Catapult Ships employed against German long-range Condor aircraft and Escort Carriers, originally converted freighters and tankers, acting as convoy protectors in the Atlantic. They proved instrumental in safeguarding vital war shipments to the ports of Murmansk and Archangel delivering tanks, aircraft, ammunition, fuel, raw materials and medical supplies to Russia. They performed a similar role in protecting the vast quantity of US troops and war supplies required for the invasion of Europe in 1944. The purpose-built auxiliary or escort carrier was later mass-produced by the United States and its fleet eventually numbered 77, while 38 were supplied to the Royal Navy. No fewer than 14 escort carriers participated in the Leyte Gulf operations in October 1944 and they played a key role in the Allies’ island-hopping strategy in preparation for the final assault of the Japanese homeland.

Admiral Nimitz later described Leyte Gulf as the Trafalgar of WW II – it had ‘wiped out the Japanese fleet as an effective fighting force’. The author argues that the Battle ensured the eventual defeat of Japan, with its Navy crippled and denied access to the raw materials underpinning its ability to continue the conflict. Japan’s early acceptance of defeat, however, was ruled out by the Allied Declaration of Potsdam in July 1945 on Unconditional Surrender and Japan was left no alternative but to continue the war by redoubled Kamikaze attacks on the advancing Allied forces. The invasion of Japan would nevertheless have been a costly exercise and risked the slaughter of Allied prisoners of war. The issue was resolved by the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima on 6 August and Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. On 15 August Japan surrendered unconditionally.

At Winston Churchill’s insistence the British Pacific Fleet had joined the US Battle Fleet for the final assault on Japan, but its carriers were allotted only a minor role, due in the author’s opinion to Admiral Halsey’s unwillingness to share the glory of victory – a sad reflection on the ally which had pioneered carrier warfare. Nevertheless, the last word belonged to the Royal Navy – on 9 August Lt. R.H. Gray, a Canadian Corsair pilot from HMS Formidable, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for a successful bomb attack on a Japanese warship in Onagawa Harbour – ‘the only time the supreme decoration was earned by an airman operating from a British carrier’.

The author packs a vast amount of detail into 224 pages. The RAN’s contribution is acknowledged by references to HMA Ships Perth and Vampire in the Mediterranean and HMA Ships Australia, Canberra (sunk at the Battle of Savo Island), Shropshire and Arunta at Surigao Strait. Stewart has authored a book of similar length on the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He cites no fewer than ninety-nine secondary, but no primary, sources to back his narrative, plus an exhaustive index on ships, types of aircraft and naval engagements. With the addition of HMAS Shropshire by Stan Nicholls (NHSA 1989) he would have earned a well-researched century.

Reviewed by Richard Gardner

Naval Engagements, Operations and Capabilities

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