Ship histories and stories

Occasional Paper 58: Postcards Home

July 6, 2019

July 2019

An interest in philately has led to a collection of post cards from a century past showing the Pacific colonies of the German Empire. These help bring to life the story of the transit of the German Asiatic Squadron from its base at Tsingtao across the Indian and Pacific Oceans until its eventual demise off the cold and dark waters of the Falkland Islands. This article summarises an award-winning exhibit at the Canberra Stampshow 2014 held in March.

The Colonies

Germany was a latecomer to overseas colonies but made up for lost time in the latter part of the 19th century. To help penetrate world markets a series of colonies was acquired between 1884 and 1899 extending from southern China through chains of oceanic islands to New Guinea. These comprised Chinese concessions at Kiautshou and Chefoo, and colonies/ protectorates at Bougainville Island, Caroline Islands, Marshall Islands, Mariana Islands, German New Guinea, Solomon Islands and German Samoa. A naval base and small garrison was established at the Chinese concession with an administrative centre at Tsingtao. A further administrative centre was at Rabaul in New Pomerania, Kaiser-Wilhelmsland (German New Guinea).

SMY Hohenzollern

Kaiser Wilhelm II had a great attachment for his navy, epitomised by his royal yacht Seiner Majestät Yacht Hohenzollern. With a length of 390 ft (116 m), 46 ft (14 m) beam, 19 ft (5.7 m) draught, displacing over 4,300 tons and capable of 22 knots with a complement of 600 officers and men this was indeed a stately floating palace. She was used extensively taking the royal party on summer cruises and fleet reviews. In twenty years of active service the Kaiser is said to have spent over four years onboard. In June 1914 at the Kiel Regatta officers of the British fleet were entertained on board only two months before the outbreak of WW I. Importantly in philatelic circles the Hohenzollern image was used as the definitive design for nearly all German colonial postage stamps issued between 1900 and 1919.

The Homeward Journey

The first post card which shows the cruiser SMS Gneisnau was posted from Tsingtao on 13 March 1913. In translation this reads: Dear Parents, One day after I sent my last letter to you, this was 13th March, received your parcel by the steamer York containing the bag for a telescope and other nice things. Naturally I was very glad about it and thank you very much and I send my best wishes. Your warm hearted son, Ernst.

On 23 August 1914 Japan declared war on Germany and promptly blockaded Tsingtao but by this time Vice Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee and his German Asiatic Squadron had departed. Following a bitter struggle supported by British troops the Japanese claimed the German concession. There is a post card from this period showing the Japanese cruiser Soya. She had an interesting history, being built in the United States as Variag for the Russian Navy. Being badly damaged in the Russo-Japanese war she was scuttled but salvaged and repaired by the victors. Soya then served as a cadet ship until 1916 when sold back to the Russians. After refitting in Britain she served as a depot ship until wrecked on her way to the breakers in 1920.

Next is a post card from the New Zealand Expeditionary Force of 1,383 men who effected an unopposed occupation of Samoa on 29 August 1914. Life in this quiet backwater was interrupted on 14 September by the arrival of the German cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. An intended dawn raid to destroy Allied shipping and cut communications did not eventuate when it was discovered the only vessel in harbour was an American sailing ship. The cruisers withdrew seeking better game.

A postcard dated 21 September which in part reads: ‘Things are pretty deadly in Samoa and the heat is awful and the bugs, ants and mosquitoes make night hideous and none of the boys are feeling too well and next month when the rainy season commences many no doubt will be down with fever. Two big German warships entered the harbour last week and alarmed the Corps but they cleared out without a fight. They are still off the coast, however, so we may yet have a scrap. Everyone is sick of Samoa and we all want to go to Europe, but suppose we will have to stick it out here for months yet.’

By 22 September the German cruisers had reached Tahiti where they conducted a half-hearted bombardment. This was answered by a shore battery of 4-inch guns taken from the gunboat Zelee. The gunboat had been scuttled to block the harbour and the stockpile of coal set alight. The Germans again withdrew but by this time their intentions were becoming clearer in making for South America.

Following the decisive Battle of Coronel where the German squadron defeated a Royal Naval squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, the victors called at Valparaiso primarily to coal ship. From here a post card was sent from the Captain of SMS Nurnberg to the Mayor of Nurnberg dated 3 November 1914. Translated, this reads: ‘A quick note to say the SMS Numberg sank the English heavy cruiser Monmouth on the night of 1st November off the coast of Coronel (Conception Bay, Chile). The weather was stormy. The conditions of the whole engagement was excellent.’ This card most likely went in diplomatic mail via the German Consulate.

The revenge by a superior Royal Naval force over von Spee’s squadron off the Falklands on 8 December 1914 is well known. Only one warship, SMS Dresden (a sister ship of Emden), escaped to hide in the expansive Chilean fiords, until she too was cornered by HM Ships Glasgow and Kent at Juan Fernandez Island (famed home of Alexander Selkirk, the inspiration for Robinson Crusoe).

Finally there are two postcards of British manufacture showing Dresden at Juan Fernandez, taken before her magazine detonated. One card shows a ship’s boat approaching Dresden and the other a close-up of shell splinter damage. On 14 March 1915 after a few shots were fired by both sides Dresden’s Kapitan zur See Ludecke, knowing his situation was hopeless, raised the white flag and sent Leutnant Wilhelm Canaris (later Admiral) to negotiate with the British. However, this was merely a ruse to buy time so that the crew could abandon ship and scuttle her by detonating the forward magazine. Dresden then sank with her battle ensign flying and most of her crew were saved to be interned in Chile.

Publication December 2014 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
By Peter Brigden

HMAS Reserve in the Liberation of the Philippines and the Not-so-Little Tug that Could

June 6, 2019

By Paul Baker

On Christmas Day 1944, just as the 34 members of the crew of HMAS Reserve celebrated the occasion aboard their ship in San Pedro Bay in the Philippines, Australian mainland newspapers were preparing to report on the role they played as the only RAN ship involved in the Allied landing on Mindoro just over a week earlier by delivering a barge full of ‘power spirit’ or high octane petrol for use by PT boats to protect the landing forces. Perhaps it was the fault of the relatively new Bass Strait telephone cable that the Tasmanian newspapers, meanwhile, were preparing to proudly report that Reserve’s cargo was ‘a fuel barge laden with paratroops’.¹

The Mindoro landing, however, was only the beginning of Reserve’s five month deployment to the Philippines during which she was involved in two major amphibious landings, became the only Royal Australian Navy tug that can claim an enemy aircraft downed in combat, survived a near-miss kamikaze attack, and helped to construct the largest drydock in the country.²

The Seventh Fleet Needs a Tug

Less than three years earlier, in the shadow of the fall of the British Commonwealth’s fortress of Singapore and the looming loss of the US fortress in the Philippines in 1942, MacArthur was selected to lead the combined Australian, British, Dutch and US forces of South West Pacific Area (SWPA) Command. As he and his staff set about shaping an effective fighting force to shift from defence to offence that year, the geography of the area of responsibility dictated that an amphibious landing force was going to be an essential requirement. As a result, what would eventually be named the 7th Amphibious Force was established in January 1943 as the amphibious landing task force of SWPA Command’s naval fleet, which itself was later renamed the 7th Fleet.³

The first landing ship to be made available for the 7th Amphibious Force in March 1943 was the recently refitted infantry landing ship HMAS Manoora, followed soon after by the USS Henry T. Allen. Further ships including tank landing ships were allocated to the force throughout 1943.⁴Prior to the Force’s first unopposed landing operations in June 1943, it was determined that an ocean-going tug was also required as part of the amphibious force, to drag ships off banks and reefs and to do general towage work.⁵

A solution was found in the guise of a tug operated by the Commonwealth Salvage Board. Originally named BAT 11 and constructed in Texas in 1942, she was the first of three ocean going tugs built for Australia to a British design, capable of maintaining a speed of 10 knots towing a 10,000-ton vessel in fair weather. At just over 43 metres in length and displacing 800 tons at full load, she had a crew of 34 and was armed with a 3-inch gun, two 20-mm Oerlikons and one 0.50 cal. machine gun. Despite her impressive towing capability, she was renowned among her crews for her tendency to roll excessively at sea.⁶

New Guinea Landings

It was not until 27 August, however, that she was taken over from the Commonwealth Salvage Board in a ‘bad state’ and commissioned into the RAN as HMAS Reserve. With 7th Amphibious Force’s first opposed assault landing planned for Lae in September, Reserve was urgently required in New Guinea but was unable to depart Brisbane until ten days later. Even then it was only with a crew which, according to the captain, were, with two exceptions, entirely inexperienced. Off Brisbane, she immediately encountered rough seas from which all hands were prostrated except two sailors, two officers and the captain. The captain reported that, at that stage, they were not in a position to repel any enemy or to salvage a peanut.⁷

However, an intensive training program coupled with practical recovery experience on the journey to New Guinea brought the crew up to standard. Their subsequent performance under fire at the Cape Gloucester and Saidor landings over the Christmas and New Year period, in which they recovered a number of beached tank landing ships, soon earned the ship’s company the praise of the Naval Board for their excellent work. In January 1944, after the landing at Saidor, Reserveand the much older US tug that had been drafted into the 7th Amphibious Force to participate in the Lae landing, USS Sonoma,commissioned in 1912, were placed under operational control of the Commander Service Force Seventh Fleet.⁸

A Warm Welcome to the Philippines

In November 1944, Reserve was tasked with towing two dry docks and two barges to Leyte via the Kossol Passage near Palau. Leaving one of the dry docks at Kossol Passage because it was sinking, Reserve eventually rendezvoused with her escort, USS Orange, some 260 km southeast of Leyte just before midnight on 5 December. With dawn came a Japanese welcoming party in the form of a torpedo bomber. Despite fire from both ships, the aircraft was able to drop a torpedo before turning away unharmed. Fortunately, the torpedo reversed its course shortly after striking the water and it was last seen moving away from the convoy. Though other ships were attacked as they continued into the Leyte Gulf, Reserveand Orangewere left unmolested and arrived in San Pedro Bay on the morning of 7 December.⁹

A ‘Motley Assembly’: a Slow Tow to Mindoro

While at Leyte, Reserve received orders to join a convoy of tugs supporting the landing on Mindoro on 15 December. Reserve’s tow was a large barge of high octane petrol for the immediate consumption of US PT boats operating from a base to be established there.

A second Seventh Fleet ocean going tug, the USS Whippoorwill, was also assigned to the convoy to tow a pontoon crane barge and a pontoon drydock for the new PT boat base. Escorted by five destroyers, the remainder of the convoy consisted of a US Army aviation fuel tanker, four US Army tugs and two tank landing craft in what the convoy commander described as ‘a motley assembly of 4-knot tows’. Officially referred to as the ‘Slow Tow Convoy’, its organisation appeared to be haphazard fromthestartwiththeconvoycommanderlater describing the whole voyage as a comical but serious Saga of the Sea.¹⁰

Aboard HMAS Reserve in San Pedro Bay in December 1944, Leading Stoker Len Thurley of Burnie fattens up his Christmas dinner, obtained from a Filipino in exchange for a shirt.

Although the convoy was due to sail early on the morning of 12 December, the convoy commander only received his orders to assemble it on the afternoon before without any information from Army Headquarters on how to establish contact with the participating US Army vessels. When the convoy was eventually assembled, the commander discovered that the Army contingent had only the vaguest sort of verbal orders in regard to delivery of their cargoes once at Mindoro and the only way control could be maintained over the convoy was by course and speed flag hoists, and plain language flashing light as some vessels did not have radios.¹¹

Organised into three columns with Reserveleading the left and Whippoorwillthe centre columns respectively, the Slow Tow Convoy commenced its long journey to Mindoro down the Surigao Strait some three hours late. Keeping a speed of 4 to 5 knots, head winds and adverse currents at times reduced the speed being made good to about one-half knot and on at least one occasion they were actually stationary or losing a little ground. During daylight hours, the protective screen of five destroyers continually circled the convoy at a speed of 12 to 15 knots although, with the Slow Tow Convoy being the first of the landing force convoys to set out, the first day was relatively uneventful. By 0500 hours on the following morning, 13 December, they were south of Bohol when the faster convoys of landing ships and fire support vessels which had set out a few hours after the Slow Tow were forced to manoeuvre around them.¹²

‘Bogey-bait’

As the day progressed, the men aboard the tugs and their escorts felt like they stood out like ‘bogey-bait’, sentiments not helped by numerous remarks and chuckles directed at them prior to their departure. By contrast, a sense of security had built up among the other convoys over the day in the absence of enemy air activity after they overtook the Slow Tow. That was shattered with a shock in the afternoon when the landing force’s flagship USS Nashvillewas hit by a kamikaze Zero carrying two bombs, resulting in a large number of deaths and serious damage to the ship. Just as further Japanese aircraft were reported in the area, enemy aircraft which had not been detected on radar were sighted overhead of the Slow Tow Convoy and, despite the presence of US fighters, two twin-engined bombers soon attacked, releasing three bombs, all of which missed. One of the bombers was hit by fire from two of the destroyers and crashed into the sea well behind the convoy and, although there were further aircraft sightings, the Slow Tow was then left unmolested for the rest of the afternoon and evening.¹³

The morning of 14 December saw US Navy fighters take station early over the Slow Tow, less than an hour before the convoy was attacked by three aircraft. A Zero was followed in and ‘splashed’ by one of the US Navy Hellcats in close proximity to theconvoy, despitethedanger of the Hellcat being hit by anti-aircraft fire from the ships, exemplifying the aggressiveness the pilots were later commended for. Hellcats also shot down a second aircraft as it approached the convoy, while the third was beaten off by fire from the ships. The rest of day passed quietly and it was not until just before noon on 15 December, as the landing forces were going ashore on Mindoro, that the Slow Tow Convoy was again attacked. This time a twin-engined bomber was picked up about 50 kilometres from the convoy, giving the destroyers time to get into good defensive positions. The destroyers opened fire when the aircraft got within range with one using its searchlight in an attempt to distract the pilot. The pilot then dived at the destroyer while being repeatedly hit, dropping a bomb which fell short, and crashing in flames just off the other side of the ship. There were no further attacks that day and the only other highlight was the landing ships and their escorts again passing the Slow Tow Convoy, this time in the opposite direction, having completed their part in the landing operation.¹⁴

Claiming a Kill

By the morning of 16 December, the Slow Tow Convoy was only 75 kilometres south of the landing site on Mindoro and began to attract more attention from Japanese aircraft with the combat air patrol starting their day by shooting down a twin-engined bomber. About an hour later, an aircraft passing in front of the convoy at high altitude was fired upon by the ships but it did not approach the convoy while US fighters chased off a further three aircraft. Soon after, a fast moving single-engined aircraft was picked up on radar approaching the convoy at high speed from the left and managed to pass under the US fighters manoeuvring to intercept it. All ships on the left side of the convoy opened fire, including Reserveleading the left column of tows and the nearest destroyer which was turning to cross in front of Reserveto bring more guns to bear on the aircraft. The aircraft which most witnesses described as a Zero subsequently crashed and exploded extremely close to the small US Army aviation fuel tanker YO‑14in the column behind Reserve. Not surprisingly, most ships that had engaged the aircraft claimed at least a partial kill from the downing of the aircraft, with the captain of Reserve giving credit to the port Oerlikon gunner (and former Port Adelaide footballer) DougDangerfield.¹⁵

Meanwhile, aboard the 50 metre-long YO-14, …the terrific explosion threw all hands violently to the deck amid flying glass, plane fragments and shrapnel. Fires broke out on the bridge, the awning covering the deck, in the lower passage ways and in three of the living quarters on the port side. They were extinguished before getting out of control. After a general muster, five members of the crew were missing. Despite the damage, YO-14 was able to continue with her task and three of the missing men were picked up by other ships in the convoy. The two men still missing, Erwin L. Peterson and Jack H. Hogue of the US Coast Guard, are listed on the Walls of the Missing at the Manila American Cemetery.¹⁶

The day still had one more scare in store for the convoy. When they were just off Mindoro, one of the escorting destroyers picked up a good sound contact astern of the convoy which was initially believed to have been a submarine. During the destroyer’s attack run on the target, however, further evidence suggested the initial identification was doubtful. Despite this, depth charges were dropped as a precaution.¹⁷

By 1730 hours that afternoon, Reserve and Whippoorwill had detached from the convoy to proceed independently to Mangarin Bay to deliver their tows for the new PT base. They rejoined the convoy of vessels returning to Leyte just prior to its departure the next morning for a journey during which enemy aircraft were sighted daily but no attacks were made. After the convoy arrived back in San Pedro Bay on 19 December, the Commander of Amphibious Group 9 recorded that the Slow Tow had …successfully completed a hazardous and difficult mission with supplies necessary for the early establishment of motor torpedo boat and air operations at Mindoro, PI. That it was successful under adverse conditions, is a tribute to the officers and men of the task unit.¹⁸

Close Calls at Lingayen

Employed on harbour duties over the Christmas and New Year period, Reserve was again tasked with a long tow in convoy from 6 January 1945, this time in support of the Lingayen Gulf landings. Their tow this time consisted of a pontoon drydock and a fuel oil barge. Aside from Reserve, the convoy, designated the G-4 Echelon, consisted of Whippoorwill, eleven US Army tugs with tows, two small US Army tankers and two US Army tugs without tows to act as ‘trouble shooters’. In total, the convoy comprised 57 hulls in three columns stretching just over ten kilometres in length, escorted by two destroyers. Once again, the first attack on the convoy occurred when the convoy was south of Bohol early on the morning of 7 January. The aircraft, apparently not observed by most ships in the heavy haze prior to dawn, passed over the convoy before dropping two bombs which missed the escorting destroyer sailing ahead of the convoy. Although the aircraft was briefly sighted, the crew were unable to engage it.¹⁹

Contrary to the concerns of the crews, however, no further attack was launched on the convoy until early in the afternoon of 12 January when the convoy was approximately 95 kilometres west-southwest of Subic Bay. Three Japanese Vals were observed flying towards the convoy from behind it, off to the right side. One of the aircraft, flying at a low altitude, passed over the two right hand columns of the convoy before turning to fly between the centre and left hand columns. Coming out of the sun, it then attempted to dive into Reserve,missing the bridge by a metre or two and crashing into the ocean just off Reserve’s port bow. The captain recorded that …the gun’s crew on the forecastle was smothered in oil and water and hundreds of pieces of plane landed on board – eagerly caught up by all members of the ship’s company as souvenirsbut that he…was pleased to be able to report to the anxious enquiries of the escort that we had no casualties.²⁰

The remaining two aircraft then commenced to dive on the convoy out of the sun, strafing and bombing while under fire by a number of ships in the convoy. The aircraft subsequently broke off their attack with none of the ships and apparently neither of the aircraft damaged in the incident. The convoy was again attacked on the following morning, 13 January, as it sailed north about 50 kilometres west of Agno in Zambales. A single-engined fighter approached the convoy from behind before diving under fire at an Army tanker at the rear of the centre column. Overshooting its target, the aircraft crashed into the ocean between the centre and left columns, leaving the tanker undamaged.²¹

After the convoy arrived at Lingayen on 14 January, the convoy commander recorded that: …the fact that all units were delivered at the objective area without damage is difficult to explain.Reservedelivered her tow, probably at Port Sual, and was then employed on various duties in the harbour. On 22 January, Reserveand Whippoorwilljoined a convoy bound for Leyte, but Reservewas soon forced to turn back with engine trouble. While repairs were being effected, Reservehad a further two close calls with a bomb landing about 45 metres in front of the ship on 27 January and two more bombs falling about 350 metres away on 29 January. Thankfully, the ship was finally able to leave the Lingayen Gulf for Leyte again in another convoy on 31 January.²²

Return to general towing and harbour duties

On the morning of 5 February, the convoy from the Lingayen Gulf sailed into San Pedro Bay on what the captain described as ‘a red letter day’ in that the crew received their first mail from home in three and a half months. And with her arrival, Reserveagain returned to harbour duties. By this stage, Allied forces were moving forward at a rapid rate leaving the Seventh Fleet’s Service Force suffering from a critical shortage of tugs required to move the floating equipment and personnel forward into the newly recaptured areas and an acute shortage of floating drydocks, particularly those capable of providing for repair of vessels up to that of destroyer or submarine size, which left ships suffering from battle damage waiting over a month to be docked for repairs. The preceding months had also been a very strenuous operating period for the vessels of the Seventh Fleet during which little or no routine maintenance had been possible, and it was obvious that there were going to be increasing demands on the Service Force for both maintenance and battle damage.²³

Although extensive repair facilities were being constructed on Manicani Island in Guiuan on Samar and a large floating drydock and the first three sections of an even larger one capable of accommodating battleships (ABSD-5) had arrived at Leyte, they were not expected to be operational until at least April. Subic Bay had also been liberated by this time and, despite damage to the facilities there, it was obvious that a repair unit could be more quickly brought into service there than on Manicani Island. Accordingly, when two floating drydocks capable of accommodating destroyers arrived at Leyte in mid-February, Reserve was tasked with towing one to Subic, departing San Pedro Bay under escort on 20 February.²⁴

Arriving without mishap on 27 February,Reserve’s crew enjoyed a well-earned quiet spell at Subic before departing again for Leyte on 4 March. From her subsequent arrival back at Leyte on 7 March, the shipwas engaged ongeneral harbour towage and assisting in the assembly of the Advanced Base Sectional Dock Five (ABSD-5). Finally, on 6 May, ABSD-5 was finished, except for welding and testing, and Reserve was ordered south to resume salvage and towage operations in New Guinea waters, making her final departure from the Philippines two days later. Notably, two months after her departure, ABSD-5 accepted the first battleship to be drydocked in Philippine waters in the history of the US Navy.²⁵

Due Recognition

With such a varied and distinguished war record,Reserve has definitely earned the right to be among the RAN ships listed on the Australian Philippines Liberation Memorial at Palo on Leyte, ensuring that the ship and the service of her crew is not forgotten.

Notes

1 AWM78/301/1, Reports of Proceedings, HMAS Reserve: August 1943 – December 1948; Wonders Of Bass Strait Cable: Telephone, Telegraph, and Wireless, Argus, Melbourne, 11 Mar 1936, p. 8; Australian Naval Tug in Mindoro Landing: Victorians in Crew, Argus, Melbourne, 26 December 1944, p. 12; SA Naval Men At Mindoro: Tug’s Long Service in South Pacific, Advertiser, Adelaide, 26 December 1944, p. 2; RAN Tug Was at Mindoro, Newcastle Morning Heraldand Miners’ Advocate, Newcastle, 26 December 1944, p. 2; Ace Australian Tug Visits Port Adelaide, Mail, Adelaide, 11 May 1946, p. 2; Only One Ran Ship At Mindoro, Mercury, Hobart, 26 December 1944, p. 2;Aus. Tug Took Part in Mindoro Landing, Examiner, Launceston, 26 December 1944, p. 4.

2 Mail, 11 May 1946, p. 2.

3 Seventh Amphibious Force Command History: 10 January 1943 – 23 December 1945, p. I-1; Edward J. Marolda (2012), Ready Seapower: A History of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, Department of the Navy, Washington, p. 1; Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby– Editor in Chief (1966), Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific Volume I, US government Printing Office, Washington, p. 105.

4 Seventh Amphibious Force Command History, pp. I-2 – I-3; Ross Gillett (1983), Australian & New Zealand Warships 1914-1945, Doubleday Australia, Sydney, pp. 148 and 171; Ship’s History of USS Henry T. Allen (APA-15).

5 A Tug’s Trials – Storm-Bound in Bight: The Reserve’s Proud Record, West Australian, Perth, 22 May 1946, p. 11; Seventh Amphibious Force Command History, p. II-64 and Annex C Sheet 1.

6 Gillett (1983), p. 227; Mail, 11 May 1946, p. 2; West Australian, 22 May 1946, p. 11; AWM78/301/1.

7 AWM78/301/1;Seventh Amphibious Force Command History, pp. I-1 and I-4.

8 AWM78/301/1;Seventh Amphibious Force Command History, pp. C-1 – C-6; Commander Seventh Amphibious Force, War Diary 1-31 January 1944; USS Sonoma, War Diary 30 August 1943; USS SONOMA War Diary 1 September 1943; Naval History Division (1976),Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships Volume VI: Historical Sketches – Letters R Through S, Department of The Navy, Washington, p. 555.

9 AWM78/301/1; Commanding Officer USS Orange(PF-43), Action – Operation Report, Leyte Gulf and Entrance, 5-7 December 1944.

10 AWM78/301/1; Commander Task Unit 78.3.12 (CDD-48), Action Report of Slow Tow Convoy, Love Three Phase of Mike One Operation; T. Garth Connelly (1994), PT Boats in Action, Squadron/Signal Publications, Carrollton, p. 40; Mail, Adelaide, 11 May 1946, p. 2; Commanding Officer USS Whippoorwill, Action Reports of the Mindoro Island, Philippine Islands Operation.

11 Commander Task Unit 78.3.12 (CDD-48).

12 Commander Task Unit 78.3.12 (CDD-48); USS Bush(DD-529),Action Report 12-19 December 1944 Escorting Slow Tow with Supplies to Mindoro, PI; Commander Task Group Seventy-eight point Three (Commander Amphibious Group Nine), Mindoro Action Report – 15 December 1944; Commander Task Group Seventy-seven point Three (Commander Cruiser Division 15),Action Report of Mindoro Operations, 12-17 December 1944.

13 USSBush(DD-529); Commander Task Group Seventy-seven point Three (Commander Cruiser Division 15); USS Nashville(CL-43), War Diary for Month of December 1944; USS Holt(DE-706), Action Report, 12 to 19 December 1944.

14 USS BUSH (DD-529); USS Holt(DE-706).

15 USS BUSH (DD-529); USS Holt(DE-706); USSHalford (DD-480), Action Report for Period 11-19 December 1944, While Escorting Slow Tow Convoy to Mindoro Island; AWM78/301/1; Mail, 11 May 1946, p. 2.

16 CDR Edgar T. Bassford USCGR (Ret), Tanker Y-14 In 230 Air Raids, published in Coast Guard Combat Veterans Association Newsletter 2-91, June 1991; USS Bush(DD-529); https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jun/25/2001768433/-1/-1/0/USCGCUTTERMEMORIALLIST.PDF accessed 30 December 2018; United States Coast Guard Enlisted Memorial Foundation, Fallen Roster, http://www.cgemf.org/fallen-rosteraccessed 30 December 2018; https://www.abmc.gov/node/514114and https://www.abmc.gov/node/514099accessed 30 December 2018.

17 USSHolt(DE-706).

18 USSBush(DD-529); AWM78/301/1; Commander Task Unit 78.3.12 (CDD-48).

19 AWM78/301/1; USS Whippoorwill(ATO-169), War Diary for the Month of January 1945; USS DAY (DE-225),Action Report – Luzon Operation.

20 AWM78/301/1; USS Whippoorwill (ATO-169); USS DAY (DE-225).

21 AWM78/301/1; USS Whippoorwill(ATO-169); USS DAY (DE-225).

22 AWM78/301/1; USS Whippoorwill(ATO-169); USS DAY (DE-225); Task Group 78.1, War Diary January 1945; USS Wilson(DD-408), War Diary for the Month of January, 1945.

23 AWM78/301/1; USS Wilson(DD-408); Service Force, Seventh Fleet, War Diary for February 1945.

24 AWM78/301/1; Service Force, Seventh Fleet.

25 AWM78/301/1; US Naval Operating Base Leyte Gulf and US Naval Station Guiuan, Samar, War Diary – 20 October 1944 to 31 May 1945

Occasional Paper 51: The Attack Class Patrol Boat

April 12, 2019

April 2019

By Dennis J Weatherall JP TM AFAITT(L) LSM

Volunteer Researcher, Naval Historical Society of Australia

Patrol boats have proven to be the most flexible and versatile elements of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) since World War 2. Every day they are at sea patrolling Australian waters and protecting our national interests. They play an active role in the enforcement of Australian legislation pertaining to; illegal immigration, fishing, quarantine and smuggling.

Between World War 2 and 2019 the Royal Australian Navy has operated five classes of patrol boats commencing with the Bathurst class built between 1940 and 1942. Then followed the Ton class, Attack class, Fremantle class and in current service, the Armidale class.

Experience during the period of Indonesian Confrontation (1963-6) with the Ton class demonstrated the value of small vessels for patrol and interdiction tasks. However, the Ton class propulsion system was not suited to loitering and they were expensive to maintain. This experience led the RAN to introduce the Attack class to conduct patrol work in Australian territorial waters.

This paper examines the design, construction and operations of the Attack class and provides some insight into their habitability.

HMAS ADVANCE launched 16th August 1967,
commissioned 6 February 1968. ANMM image

User Requirement

The requirement for a new Royal Australian Navy Patrol Boat design commenced in May 1963 with an official request from Navy for a preliminary feasibility study for a boat of simple characteristics, around 70-80 feet in length with a speed of approximately 12 knots, and accommodation for a minimum of 2 Officers, 2 Petty Officers and 10 Junior Sailors.

From these initial and additional requirements, the final design developed by Department of Navy naval architects resulted in a vessel that could carry out; general duties, harbour defence, pursuit and interception tasks.

The final design required the following;

Capabilities:

• Search & rescue

• Seaward defence

• Coast Watching

• Target towing

• Boarding operations

Navigation:

· Radar, transistorised light weight commercial unit

· Gyro compass, similar to Arma Brown commercial units

· Magnetic compass,

· Echo sounder of a type similar to Ferrograph, a Trident Log with a bridge repeater

· Training: for Junior Officers and sailors (PNF and Reserve) in ship handling

Training

for Junior Officers and sailors (PNF and Reserve) in ship handling

Communications

A package for both external and internal use for control and navigation.

Speed

Maximum, 23 knots

Cruising, 15 knots

Weapons

A power-operated single Bofor gun on forecastle immediately forward of superstructure with similar mount aft. Provision for small arms and ammunition

Endurance

At maximum continuous speed: 500 miles

At cruising speed: at least 1500 miles

Water & victuals: 14 days

Accommodation

to approved standards, fitted with air-conditioning for tropical area operation

Dimensions

length 100-120 ft and

draught of 5-8 ft

Life-saving equipment

RAN standard

Propulsion

Twin screw, simple and reliable in operation

Ships Boat

14 ft dingy (approximately)

Delivered Capabilities and Specifications

The boat ‘as delivered’ generally met the required specifications, e.g. length 107.5 feet (32.76M), draught 6.2 feet (1.9M) and a speed of 24 knots. Full details of the boat as delivered are at Annex A.

Service Life and Disposal

The original plan was to build twenty boats, although the class type was designated the Attack, the boat bearing the class name was the tenth pennant number allocated, fifth launched and second commissioned four days after Aitape # P84. Pennant numbers ran from 81-95 and 97-101, (20 numbers) but Pennant number 96 was never allocated, nor could I find a reason for skipping this specific number.

HMAS *Archer* in Jervis bay showing her original thin style pennant number

The Attack class (A) Boats were built at two Queensland engineering works; Evans Deakin (Brisbane) built 13 and Walkers Ltd (Maryborough) built 7.

Five Patrol Boats were purpose built for New Guinea service and named accordingly. They were used for patrol and general duties in Australian and surrounding waters before transfer to the PNG Defence Force. The boats destined for New Guinea service were HMAS Aitape, Samarai, Ladua, Lae and Madang. These vessels, after Independence, were retitled HMPNG Ships. The table provided in Annex B lists all twenty vessels built; by whom, pennant numbers, dates laid down and dates launched and commissioned.

The Attack class gave good service over more than two decades. HMAS Bayonet, built by Walkers Ltd was the last boat launched (6 November 68) and commissioned on 22 February 69. The last boat to decommission was HMAS Aware on 17 July 1993.

Five boats were gifted to the PNG Government; Aitape, Samarai, Ladava, Lae and Madang. Nine were either gifted or purchased by Indonesia. These were:

RAN Name	TNI Name
Acute P81	KRI Sikuda # 863
Archer P86	KRI Siliman # 848
Ardent P87 sold privately, then bought by Indonesia.	KRI Tenggin # 865
Assail P89	KRI Sigurot # 864
Attack P90	KRI Sikuda # 863
Bandolier P95	KRI Sibarau # 847
Barbette P97	KRI Siada # 862
Barricade P98	KRI Sigalu # 857
Bombard P99	KRI Siribura # 859

Two boats were sunk as targets, Adroit on 8 August 1994 and Buccaneer on 8 October 1988.

Loss of HMAS Arrow

HMAS Arrow floundered alongside Stokes Hill Wharf during Cyclone Tracy on 25 December 1974 with the loss of two lives, Petty Officer Leslie Catton and Able Seaman Ian Rennie. Arrow and Attack had attempted to sail Port Darwin and ride out the cyclone at sea, but neither vessel made it out of the port. Arrow was unlucky and was blown under Stokes Hill Wharf and wrecked. Attack was driven ashore at Doctor’s Gully without sustaining any casualties. Arrow was re-floated by DT1 on 13 January 1975 by attaching pontoons to her hull and, with the assistance of tugs, the wreck was towed underwater to the shallows of Frances Bay, where she was surveyed, written off as a wreck and put up for sale.

HMAS Arrow, lost in Darwin during Cyclone Tracy, 1974 RAN images

A local businessman purchased what was once a proud patrol boat, his idea was to restore her, but it proved far too expensive, therefore a decision was made to break her up where she lay.

HMAS Advance was the third boat in Darwin at the time. She escaped damage at sea. One of HMAS Arrow’s name boards is proudly displayed in the Mess at HMAS Waterhen, once her home base.

HMAS Advance is the last remaining Attack class patrol boat maintained as an operating exhibit by the Australian National Maritime Museum in Darling Harbour, Sydney. Advance is a proud reminder of the twenty boats built between 6 July 1967 and 6 November 1968 to protect Australia’s 200nm economic zone, fishing rights and just about any other task directed. They welcomed fleeing South Vietnamese after the Fall of Saigon in April 1975, and towed many a craft safely to our shores. They were work-horses with more sea time than many major fleet units. Once a “boat-man”, you always wished to stay in what was often referred to as “McHale’s Navy”. There wasn’t much of our extensive coastline that we didn’t pass or “drop the pick” in some secluded bay or river entrance, from Cooktown into the Gulf and down the West Australian coast.

Life in an ‘A’ Boat

The combination of a small, relatively junior crew, remote area operations and cycle of 6 weeks on patrol and 2 weeks in home port resulted in close-knit self-reliant ships companies very proud of their boat. Dress standards in the tropics were relaxed with the ships ‘T’ shirt, shorts and sandals frequently dress of the day. Multi-tasking was essential for the conduct of evolutions such as boarding operations and during leave periods. Young and inexperienced hands quickly learnt under guidance from the CO and senior sailors. Training in an ‘A’ boat occurred naturally.

Habitability was adequate but some design shortcomings created frustrations. ‘A’ boats were not designed for crew comfort in heavy sea states! Operations in conditions above sea states 4 and 5 (moderate to rough seas) curtailed many activities particularly boarding operations. They rolled uncomfortably in moderate conditions often creating havoc due to design issues. As an example, the galley range door which was oriented longitudinally would fly open in heavy seas. Local modifications such as attaching a gate bolt to keep what was cooking in the oven were necessary. As an aside, one day before the modification was carried out, I found our LSCK chasing half-baked chickens across the deck after we hit some rather heavy seas! You can imagine the mess of oil (from the chickens), the baking tray and one rather irate cook chasing scran across the deck!

The senior sailor’s bathroom located in the peak of the bow presented another challenge. It was some real fun sitting on the heads when underway heading into a forceful sea state, and an impossibility to shower without a very wet deck when the shower curtain swung to starboard at 40-plus degrees. Laundry facilities were ‘Heath Robinson’ with a washing machine lashed to the mast for use alongside when adequate fresh water was available. The engine room doubled as a drying room.

Throughout their service Attack class boats developed a proud and respected reputation so much so that the Australian Broadcasting Commission produced a television series based on actual events with which they dealt. They certainly lived up to their short sharp mottos which are listed in Annex C.

Attack Class Successor: The Fremantle Class

Planning for the new Fremantle class patrol boats commenced in 1970. Experience gained from operating twenty Attack class boats identified numerous areas for improvement in the new design. By September 1970 the Navy proposed construction of ten additional new patrol boats to commence entering service between 1976 and 1980. These additional vessels would augment the Attack class and also replace the two General Purpose Vessels HMAS Bass and Banks.

The acquisition of replacement patrol craft was announced in April 1975 with eleven shipbuilders invited to tender. On 22 September 1977 the Minister of Defence (James Killen) announced the PCF450 design had been selected and fifteen boats would be built at a cost of AUD 115 million.

The lead vessel HMAS Fremantle was built in the UK by Brooke Marine of Lowestoft. The remainder were built in Australia by North Queensland Engineers and Agents. Fremantle was allocated pennant number 203 and following commissioning, 17 March 1980 made one of the longest duration delivery voyages in RAN history taking 82 days. Fremantle arrived at her home base, HMAS Waterhen on 27 August 1980. She had sailed 14,509 nautical miles, probably the longest voyage undertaken by a single RAN patrol boat.

With HMAS Fremantle came the new class of patrol boats and additional duties as they were integrated into the Fleet. Attack class boats progressively handed over the reins to the Fremantles until they were all decommissioned. In turn, the Fremantles were superseded by the Armidale Class, but that is another story!

Annexes

Attack Class Patrol Boat: Delivered Capabilities and Specifications
Attack Class Patrol Boat: Key Dates
Attack Class Patrol Boat: Mottos

References:

Personal experience from boats on which I served (Dennis Weatherall)
Design of Patrol Boats for RAN – J.J. Follan M.R.I.N.A. (Royal Institution of Naval Architects Australia)
Australian Ships of War – John Bastock Published 1975 Pages 372-382
Welcome to the Armidale Class, Semaphore February 2006, Issue 4
Australian Patrol Combatants, April 2010, Semaphore 2010 Issue 3,
HMAS Arrow, Sea Power Centre Australia Website, accessed 30 March 2019

Annex A

Attack Class Patrol Boat: Delivered Capabilities and Specifications

The following describes the Attack class as delivered to the RAN

Displacement: 100 tons standard, 146 tons fully loaded, length 107.5 ft (32.8m), beam 20 ft (6.1m), draught 7.3 ft (2.2m) at full load, propulsion 2×16 cylinder Paxman YJCM diesel engines 2 shafts, speed 24 knots (44 km or 28 mph), complement 3 Officers/4 Senior Sailors/12 Junior Sailors, armament 1×40 mm Mk 7 Bofor gun, 2 x .50 calibre machine guns, sufficient SLR and AR mix of rifles and hand guns.

Hull: The Attack class main hull was constructed of steel frame, bulkheads, deck beams were designed in mild steel of all-welded construction. The superstructure, funnel and masts were constructed of aluminium alloy of all-welded construction and “huck-bolted[1]” to the main hull structure.

Accommodation was located forward in the bow for 4 Senior Sailors. Senior Sailors’ bunks were two up port and starboard. Officers were accommodated in 2 cabins; Executive officer and Navigator, in a 2-off cabin forward opposite the radio office before entering the Senior Sailors’ Mess, starboard-side. The CO had a single cabin aft of the forward ladder to the lower deck and adjacent the magazine. All three officers shared a bathroom and heads directly opposite the forward ladder, accessible from the wardroom flat. These spaces were lined, with a white laminate and insulated, joins were neatly covered with natural timber trim. The Junior Sailors’ Mess was located aft immediately behind the engine room and forward of the tiller flat. Bunks were steel constructed, 3 up on the port side and 3 on the starboard side, split 6 forward and 6 aft, with a coat locker dividing sleeping area from the general mess.

Fuel Tank Capacity: Diesel, 6 main tanks of 20 tons capacity; 2 ferrying tanks of 2.5 tons;

Fresh Water Tank Capacity: normal capacity 4 tanks of 6.5 tons. Fresh water maximum capacity was 7.5 tons. These fresh water tanks were built into the hull. In order to conserve fresh water, an alternative salt water supply (if needed) could be operated in all three bathroom shower heads. When fresh water was scarce and top-up was impossible due to location, passing rain squalls were a welcome shower alternative on the quarter deck.

Steering Gear was fitted as a “Mathway” light weight power-assisted unit. It could be operated from either the Bridge, Wheelhouse or the emergency steering position in the Tiller flat, also known as the Bosun’s Store aft, directly over the ship’s rudder area. In the event of any hydraulic failure, this equipment could function without any power assistance but extremely hard on the arms.

Deck Machinery on the forecastle consisted of an anchor windlass of one cable lifter and two warpends driven by a 4.5 hp electric motor through an enclosed worm reduction gearbox. The windlass was also arranged for emergency hand operations.

Anchor was a 180 pound (81.8 kg) “Danforth” type fitted with 11/16 inch chain cable.

Galley was located immediately aft of the Wheelhouse on the main deck before exiting the forward superstructure. All equipment was electric and consisted of one single oven range with four hot plates and a grill plate. A 15 cubic feet upright refrigerator, one 7.5 gallon hot water urn for brews (always ready for use 24 hrs/day) and one use-all mixer/mincer.

Provisions Room – located at the bottom of the aft ladder into the Junior Sailors’ Mess directly opposite their bathroom, it took up the entire compartment, 21 cubic ft capacity in which we stored all meats, frozen milk, bread and the beautiful, pre-packed “guinea pig” vegetables such as broccoli, sweet corn and peas. Each Mess (x 3) also had a 5 cubic ft ready-use refrigerator – they also suffered from the same fore & aft placement onboard ship as our galley stove/range and often the fridge lock would spring open and whatever was inside quickly deposited itself on the deck!

Annex B

Attack Class Patrol Boat: Key Dates

The following table provides key dates (builder, pennant number, date laid down, launch and commission) for all twenty boats.

Name	Pennant Number	Builder	Launch Date	Commissioning Date	Decommissioning Date	History Post RAN Service
Acute	P81	Evans Deakin	26/8/67	26/4/68	6/5/83	Indo KRI Sikuda # 863
Adroit	P82	Evans Deakin	3/2/68	17/8/68	28/3/92	Sunk as target, August 1994
Advance	P83	Walkers Ltd	16/8/67	24/1/68	6/2/88	Museum, ANMM Sydney
Aitape	P84	Walkers Ltd	6/7/67	13/11/67	14/11/74	Transferred to HMPNGS, scuttled 1995
Samarai	P85	Evans Deakin	14/7/67	1/3/68	14/11/74	Transferred to HMPNGS
Archer	P86	Walkers Ltd	2/12/67	15/5/68	21/5/74	Indo KRI Siliman # 848
Ardent	P87	Evans Deakin	27/4/68	26/10/68	6/1/94 and Reclassified as TRNG NAV # A243. Paid off Dec. 1998	Sold to Pvte Indo 2002 KRI Tenngeri #865
Arrow	P88	Walkers Ltd	17/2/68	3/7/68	Lost in Darwin, 25/12/74 Cyclone Tracy
Assail	P89	Evans Deakin	18/11/67	21/7/68	18/10/85	Indo KRI Sigurot # 864
Attack	P90	Evans Deakin	8/4/67	17/11/67	21/2/85	Indo KRI Sikuda # 863
Aware	P91	Evans Deakin	7/10/67	21/6/68	17/7/93	Sold Pvte, scrapped 2011
Ladava	P92	Walkers Ltd	11/5/68	13/11/67	14/11/74	T/fs to HMPNGS
Lae	P93	Walkers Ltd	5/10/67	3/4/68	14/11/74	Transferred to HMPNGS
Madang	P94	Evans Deakin	10/10/68	28/11/68	14/11/74	Transferred to HMPNGS
Bandolier	P95	Walkers Ltd	2/10/68	14/12/68	16/11/73	Indo KRI Sibarau # 847
Barbette	P97	Walkers Ltd	10/4/68	16/8/68	15/6/84	Indo KRI Siada # 862
Barricade	P98	Evans Deakin	29/6/68	26/10/68	20/5/82	Indo KRI Sigalu #857
Bombard	P99	Walkers Ltd	6/7/68	5/11/68	12/9/83	Indo KRI Siribura # 859
Buccaneer	P100	Evans Deakin	14/9/68	11/11/69	27/7/84	Sunk as target 8/10/88
Bayonet	P101	Walkers Ltd	6/11/68	22/2/69	26/6/88	Scuttled 21/9/99 in Victoria

Annex C

Attack Class Patrol Boat Mottos

The following is a list of mottos allocated to each boat.

P81 Acute “Swift to the Point”

P82 Adroit “Quick and Secure”

P83 Advance “Never Look Back”

P84 Aitape “Tread Warily”

P85 Samarai “United We Stand”

P86 Archer “Swiftly Sure”

P87 Ardent “Flame and Fury”

P88 Arrow “Straight as an Arrow”

P89 Assail “Cut Deep”

P90 Attack “Never Waver”

P91 Aware “Forever Alert”

P92 Ladava “Fight the Good Fight”

P93 Lae “Dare All”

P94 Madang “Our Ship Your Shield”

P95 Bandolier “Dressed to Kill”

# 96 not allocated. Reason unknown

P97 Barbette “Taut and Trim”

P98 Barricade “They Shall Not Pass”

P99 Bombard “Hit Hard”

P100 Buccaneer “Seek and Find”

P101 Bayonet “We Fix”

[1] Huck-bolting is a patterned fastening, similar to a rivet, used frequently to fasten unlike metals together such as mild steel and aluminium. It’s a screwed thread with a clamp nut.

The German Raider HSK Stier and the American Freighter SS Stephen Hopkins

March 26, 2019

Many volumes have been committed to the deadly encounter between the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney and the German raider HSK Kormoran. Depending on which side of the fence you sit, this can be seen as the greatest single tragedy to befall the Royal Australian Navy, or a magnificent victory by the Kriegsmarine. An Australian naval audience could be expected to have considerable knowledge of the Sydney/Kormoran encounter, but know little of the similar and equally intriguing Stier/Stephen Hopkins engagement. The primary role of German auxiliary cruisers in the war at sea was to delay and paralyse Allied shipping by destroying enemy commerce. They were therefore offensive vessels whereas Allied armed merchant cruisers were defensive, with their main role the protection of merchant shipping. An auxiliary cruiser often masqueraded as a peaceful vessel well suited to a particular area, then at the last moment removing her disguise to surprise and overpower an opponent.

During WWII the Kriegsmarine commissioned ten¹merchantmen as auxiliary cruisers, colloquially they were also known as commerce raiders. There were two classes: heavy cruisers and light cruisers. Kormoranwas the largest of the heavy cruisers at 8,736 grt, with a length of 164 m and maximum speed of 18 knots, manned by 401 men. She carried an armament of 6 x 150 mm, 2 x 37 mm and 5 x 30 mm guns, plus 6 x 21-inch torpedo tubes and 2 x Arado196 seaplanes.

HSK Stier was a light cruiser and the last of her type to escape the blockaded Axis coastlines and gain access to the open seas and lucrative Atlantic shipping lanes. Stier was 4,778 grt, 134 m long with a maximum speed to 14 knots, with a complement of 324 men. Her armament however was similar to the much larger Kormoran and she carried 2 x Arado231 seaplanes. Stier’s major drawback was her low maximum speed and the ineffectiveness of her two small aircraft which had been designed for U-boats and could only manage a few feeble flutters in calm water.

Horst Gerlach joined the navy during WWI but had limited operational service when in early 1941 he was appointed to command the requisitioned merchant ship Schiff 23 undertaking picket duty in the Baltic. New orders were received to convert the ship into an auxiliary cruiser and she was commissioned as HSK Stieron 11 November 1941. She was named after the captain’s wife’s star sign Taurus (in German ‘bull’ is Stier). The crew was young and inexperienced and there was little time for work-up.

On 9 May 1942 Stier left the Dutch port of Rotterdam in convoy with an escort of four large torpedo boats and 16 motor gunboats. The darkened ships crept along the French coast but two hours after midnight they were discovered by patrolling Royal Navy Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) who called for reinforcements and gave their position to the heavy gun batteries above Dover which covered the gap to the coast of France. The convoy had to contend with heavy fire from the 13.5-inch batteries and MTBs attacking from both sides with machine guns and torpedoes. Two of the escorts were sunk with considerable loss of life and one MTB was also sunk, but Stier escaped and made the fortified French port of Royan at the mouth of the River Gironde to the north of Bordeaux. She sailed from here into the Atlantic on 19 May, the last commerce raider to make this perilous voyage.

Because of her relatively slow speed Stierneeded to clear areas where convoys and escorts might be encountered so she entered the South Atlantic where single Allied ships might still be found. The poor performance of her scouting seaplanes also limited her operational range and to improve the chances of success, for a time she joined with another commerce raider HSK Michel. However, sightings were limited but after four months she could claim credit for having sunk three Allied ships including a large American tanker, Stanvac Calcutta.

Stier was now prowling the infrequently travelled waters between Cape Town and South America and had rendezvoused with the supply ship Tannenfels for provisions and to offload prisoners. On Sunday 27 September 1942, in calm seas covered by early morning fog, the two ships had stopped and were drifting with the opportunity taken to employ most of the ship’s company of Stierin cleaning marine growth from her waterline.

SS Stephen Hopkinswas a first generation Liberty ship with an all welded hull, built by Kaiser’s Richmond, California yard, and like many of her sisters was constructed on mass production lines at incredible speed. These relatively bulky general purpose freighters, of a simple British design with reciprocating engines from a past era, could be manufactured quickly and cheaply by largely unskilled labour. With German submarines sinking Allied merchant ships at an alarming rate it was necessary to supply new hulls fast or Britain would be starved of provisions. It is perhaps coincidental that 2,710 Liberty ships were eventually built by United States shipyards, almost exactly the same number (2,780) of Allied and neutral merchant ships sunk by U-boats.

Stephen Hopkins of 8,000 grt was 135 m long and her low powered reciprocating steam engines gave a top speed of 11.5 knots. She had an armament of one 4-inch (102 mm) gun of WWI vintage at the stern, two 37 mm guns forward and two 30 caliber machine guns on either side of the bridge. Under command of her master Paul Buck she had a crew of 41 men and a surprisingly large number of 15 Naval Armed Guards³commanded by Lieutenant Junior Grade Kenneth Willett, USNR. Her youngest crew member was 18-year-old Engineering Cadet Edwin O’Hara who enjoyed volunteering to help with gun drills.

Her maiden voyage had taken her from San Francisco on the US West Coast with wartime supplies and troops for the US supply base at Bora Bora in French Polynesia, then Wellington, New Zealand and Melbourne, Australia. She next proceededtoPortLincolnwheresheloaded grain for Durban, South Africa. Here she took on sugar for Cape Town and was now sailing in ballast to Dutch Guiana (now Suriname) in northeastern South America to load bauxite for New Orleans. After this her crew could expect some well-deserved leave.

The Battle

At 0852 on Sunday 27 September 1942 the fog lifted and the two German ships and the American sighted one another at about 4,000 metres. The Stephen Hopkins had been ordered to stop but thoughts of surrender were far from her Captain’s mind. Stier and Stephen Hopkins simultaneously cleared for action, the former was handicapped in recovering her crew, and wishing to escape, the latter put her stern towards the enemy, presenting a smaller target and bringing her main armament to bear upon the enemy. The first shots were from Stier’s secondary armament which raked Hopkins’s upper deck and critically wounded the First Mate, Richard Moczkowski. With the third salvo from Stier’s main armament she found the range and started to cause havoc. But Stier also received several well directed hits from Stephen Hopkins, one to her steering gear and another in her engine room.

The forward gun crews in Stephen Hopkins also paid attention to Tannenfels, keeping her out of the action and causing slight damage. The main thrust of the action was from the 4-inch gun under the command of Cadet O’Hara which managed to get away 35 rounds with an amazing success rate of 15 hitting their target. Later this brought praise from the unfortunate Kaptain zur See Gerlach who thought he was dealing with another armed merchant cruiser. Towards the end of the action with the remainder of his gun’s crew lying dead or wounded Cadet O’Hara fired the last shots alone. A fewmoments later he was killed by a shell which exploded nearby.

The action continued for about an hour until Stephen Hopkins slid below the waves, by which time all but 19 of her crew and naval gunners were dead. Lieutenant Willett, while severely wounded, remained on the bridge with the captain coordinating the overall return of fire. Kenneth Willet was last seen trying to cut away life rafts just before the ship sank.

Copy from USN Intelligence Report into sinking of HSK Stier (Raider “J’)

Those who fell during the action included Captain Buck, First Mate Moczkowski, Lieutenant Willett and Cadet O’Hara. The survivors managed to get away in the one remaining serviceable boat. Knowing that the prevailing current would take them towards South America, with great perseverance they proceeded on an 1,800 nautical mile ordeal on a diet of mostly malted milk tablets. After 31 days the survivors, now down to 15 men, waded ashore near Barro de Itabapoana north of the then Brazilian capital of Rio de Janeiro on 28 October 1942, to be eventually given a heroes’ welcome in New York before reuniting with their families.

The damage to Stierwas severe with fire taking hold and, with the loss of all power, firefighting equipment was useless. Accordingly, the decision was made to scuttle the ship and transfer all survivors (two men had died in the battle) to Tannenfels.On 02 November 1942 they arrived at Le Verdon-sur-Mer, which is on the opposite side of the River Gironde from where they had set out less than six months before. Their reception was less than enthusiastic with a noticeable lack of medals.

Conclusion

There are many similarities between the Sydney/Kormoran encounter and those of Stier/StephenHopkins. In both cases surprise and a lack of preparedness caused the loss of the superior naval ship. Stieris the only German surface warship destroyed by an American ship in WWII, and the only cruiser ever sunk in combat by a merchantman.

The Australian arrival of this rather ugly duckling seems to have been unheralded, but she was possibly the first of the famous Liberty ships that helped changed the course of the war to sail into Australian waters. In American naval annals Stephen Hopkins is remembered with her master Captain Paul Buck, First Officer Richard Moczkowski and Cadet Edwin O’Hara posthumously awarded Distinguished Service Medals. Lieutenant Kenneth Willett was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. A destroyer and a building at the King’s Point Merchant Marine Academy (KPMMA) were later named in honour of Captain Paul Buck. A destroyer escort was named in honour of Lieutenant Kenneth Willett and a gymnasium at the KPMMA in honour of Cadet Edwin O’Hara.

Notes:

1.The lastauxiliary cruiser HSK Hansawas the captured British merchantman Glengarrywhich had been converted for commerce raiding but did not see active service in this role.

SS Stephen Hopkinswas named after a prominent early colonist who became governor of Rhode Island, and was a signatory to the Declaration of Independence.

3.American Naval Armed Guards (NAG) were equivalent to the British Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships (DEMS) concept. While NAG personnel were a part of the USN most had no prior naval background and after a short one-month training course were allocated as gun crews in merchant ships. A DEMS party was usually commanded by a RN Petty Officer or Royal Marine Sergeant.

The debt owed to the Norwegian Merchant Service and MV Herstein

March 26, 2019

What if anything what does Norway, at the far end of the northern hemisphere, have to do with the wartime security of Australia? As this story unfolds the answer is, quite a lot.

Norway is a mountainous country (about the same area as the British Isles and Ireland) much of it inhospitable and covered in snow and ice. There is an extensive coastline stretching from the North Sea near the entrance to the Baltic to the Barents Sea in the Arctic. As a result of its many fjords and inlets it comprises the world’s second largest coastline, only surpassed by Canada, with Australia coming in at seventh place. The population is relatively small and at the outbreak of WWII was about three million.

Until the discovery of offshore oil in the 1960s Norway had few natural resources and turned to the sea for employment and the generation of income. In the Depression of the 1930s Norwegian ship-owners took innovative risks in replacing their merchant fleet with new tonnage. They looked to the future, investing in diesel powered vessels, with an emphasis on oil tankers. At the outbreak of WWII their fleet ranked fourth in the world behind Great Britain, the United States and Japan. Most importantly this fleet comprised 18% of world tanker tonnage in new hulls.

Commencing on 9 April 1940 the German occupation of Denmark and Norway was swift. In Denmark resistance was seen as useless and the occupation was completed in a matter of hours. The Norwegians were surprised by the German advance on their country as they had remained neutral during WWI. While ill-prepared they resisted and this was bolstered by support from British, French and Polish forces. This proved ineffective. King Haakon VII and the Royal family, together with a nucleus of senior government officials, were evacuated to Britain in the cruiser HMS Devonshireon 7 June to establish a government-in-exile.

The evacuation, which also included British forces, did not pass without incident as only thirty miles from Devonshire the converted aircraft carrier HMS Glorious and destroyers HM Ships Acastaand Ardent,were sighted by the German battlecruiser KMS Scharnhorst.In the subsequent engagement all three Royal Naval ships were sunk with considerable loss of life. We might ponder the outcome if Scharnhorsthad also intercepted Devonshire,crammed with 460 of the most influential Norwegian citizens. Three days later, on 10 June, all resistance ended and the German occupation was completed with the installation of the pro-Nazi Prime Minister, Vidkun Quisling.

At the outbreak of war, the British government pressuredits neutral Norwegian counterpart to provide additional shipping for the Allied cause. In November 1939 Norway agreed to charter 150 tankers and other vessels to Britain. They paid a price for this bold initiative, as even before the invasion of Norway, 58 ships and 400 sailors had been lost to enemy action.

In April 1940 the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission (Nortraship) was established in London. With about 1,000 ships it controlled the largest shipping company in the world and made a major contribution to the Allied war effort. The eminent politician and Noble Peace Prize laureate, Philip Noel-Baker, expressed it thus:

The first great defeat of Hitler was the Battle of Britain. It was a turning point in history. If we had not had the Norwegian fleet of tankers on our side, we should not have had the aviation spirit to put our Hawker Hurricanes and our Spitfires into the sky. Without the Norwegian merchant fleet Britain and its allies would have lost the war.

Nortraship had its main offices in London’s Leadenhall Street, a vibrant hub of international commerce where the offices of major shipping companies congregated, and business could be done on a handshake. Another important outpost was opened in New York, with further representation in major seaports including Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane, Fremantle, and Wellington in New Zealand.

The Norwegian merchant fleet supporting the Allies at the start of the war comprised about 1,000 vessels manned by 30,000 sailors. During five years of conflict 706 vessels were lost to enemy action and 3,670Norwegiansailorsdied,plusafurther977 foreign crew members helping to man Norwegian ships lost their lives.

MV Herstein

MV Herstein was typical of this modern fleet, a 5,100 gross ton freighter launched in 1939 by Burmeister and Wain of Copenhagen. She was 425 feet (129.5 m) in length with a beam of 56.7 feet (17.3 m). A 2-stroke, 8-cylinder B&W diesel engine gave a top speed of 14 knots. Under the command of Captain Gottfred Gundersen with a crew of 32 officers and men, she was owned by Sigurd Herlofsen and Company of Oslo. Of her crew, four came from Sweden (until 1905 Norway and Sweden were united) and one each from Australia, Estonia and the United States. It is assumed the latter joined to make good deficiencies caused by sickness or crew members jumping ship.

While details of her early voyages are imprecise we know that at the time Norway was occupied MV Herstein was in Hong Kong, and must have passed through Suez as we have another report of her in convoy east bound through Suez, arriving at Aden on 14 July 1940. She then reached the United States and departed New Orleans 1 October 1940 for passage via Panama to Auckland, Sydney and Melbourne. She was in Fremantle in November 1941 and was amongst ships searching for survivors from the sinking of HMAS Sydney,in what at that time was Australia’s worst maritime disaster. After searching in vain she sailed independently, reaching Sydney on 11 December.

Here Hersteinjoined convoy ZK5 with the 45,000-ton liner Aquitaniaand the 11,300-ton Sarpedon, taking onboard 4,250 troops and 10,000 tons of equipment for the defence of Port Moresby. They sailed on 28 December under the cruiser escort of HMA Ships Australia, Canberra, Perth and HMNZS Achilles.The convoy arrived safely on 4 January1942 and after unloading, Herstein

proceeded independently reaching Rabaul on 14 January to unload cargo from Sydney and Port Moresby. On 18 January she moved to a mooring and started loading a cargo of copra.

On 20 January after loading 2,000 tons of cargo, Rabaul was attacked by about 100 Japanese planes that bombed the town and its surrounds. Captain Gundersen was ashore visiting the ship’s agents when he saw his ship being attacked by three Val dive bombers that came down low to release their bombs. One exploded in the engine room resulting in a fire which the crew tried to extinguish, but this engulfed them and quickly spread through the ship. Her twin 0.303 anti-aircraft guns were in continuous use until a second bomb exploded knocking out the guns. When a third bomb exploded amidships the crew jumped overboard and swam ashore which they reached safely, except for one Swedish steward, Karl Thorsell, who was never seen again. Three injured survivors were admitted to hospital, another four received first aid for burns.

During the course of the night the mooring ropes burnt through and the ship drifted across the harbor and was still on fire the next morning. Owing to the ferocity of the fire fueled by the cargo of copra the ship became a total loss. During the afternoon news was received that the Japanese were preparing to land at Rabaul. Herstein’s crew was advised to get away from the town with others heading for the coast or into the mountains. Captain Gundersen was determined not to be captured and joined a group of Australians who proceeded overland, covering 300 miles in 78 days. During this ordeal half the party died but Gundersen and other survivors managed to reach a plantation at Jacquinot Bay where they were brought off by the PNG Governor’s yacht Laurabadacommanded by the bold Coastwatcher, newly commissioned LEUT Ivan Champion RANVR. They arrived at Port Moresby on 12 April and eventually reached Sydney on 26 April 1942.

The remainder of Herstein’screw remained at Rabaul, becoming prisoners of the Japanese. They later boarded the liner Montevideo Maruand with other Australian and British prisoners were bound for Japan. When off the west coast of the Philippines on 1 July 1942, they were torpedoed and sunk by the submarine USS Sturgeon SS-187. There were no survivors from the 1,050 Allied POWs. Included in their number was James Tynan, the young Australian mess boy who had so recently joined Herstein.This became Australia’s worst maritime disaster. After six years Captain Gundersen returned to his home in Norway in 1946.

Summary

The Norwegian contribution in ships and seafarers to the allied cause during the Second World War was proportionally greater than expected from a nation with such a relatively small population. But as a nation with ancient and proud seafaring traditions she was prepared to provide self-sacrifice in ships and men. Seventy percent of her vessels were sunk in enemy action and over fifteen percent of her seafarers gave their lives. All this was when their country was under occupation with no opportunity of seeing family and loved ones, and they stuck to their craft, demonstrating great fortitude and personal courage.

MV Laurabada arrives Port Moresby with survivors from New Britain, 12 April 1942

The story of one ship, MV Herstein, chartered by the Australian Government, gives an insight to this commitment. She started her war in the far distant Pacific and then, when sailing independently in waters where enemy raiders and submarines lurked, was called upon to search for survivors from Sydney, in what was thought to be our worst maritime disaster. Soon she was in convoy taking troops and equipment to New Guinea and, again in waters disputed by the enemy, proceeded without escort to meet her end in a remoteoutpostofNew Guinea.Withonesolitary exception her crew paid the ultimate sacrifice when they tragically died aboard the Montevideo Maru, ironically sunk by friend, not foe, in what was among our worst maritime disasters.

Australians must not forget their debt to the Norwegian Merchant Service and to its many brave men.