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Occasional Paper 49: The Good Times and The Bad Times

April 2019

The following paper describes the experiences of a young Royal Navy conscript, Gordon Cansdale who served in the Fleet Air Arm from 1945 to 1947.  Gordon describes the highs and tragic lows of service in the carrier HMS Theseus which visited Australia in 1947 to demonstrate naval air power and the capabilities of an aircraft carrier.

Gordon later settled in Australia where he has lived for more than 63 years.

The old saying that one only remembers the good times can be quite true, but in my case there was one bad time in particular that I will never forget.

As a teenager I learned a song that went something like this:

“Memories are treasures locked in my heart I mean to keep evermore.  Of all the treasures one stands apart, saved from the dear days of ‘Yore’.“

Years ago, (1945) I received notice that I was to be conscripted into the armed forces.  I was hoping that it would be the Navy as my father had served in the Navy in the 1914-18 war.

YES!! I was selected for the Royal Navy, better still, the Fleet Air Arm, a dream come true. Fighter aircraft, Rolls Royce engines, a chance to see the world, and of course a navy uniform.

Gordon Cansdale Air Mechanic (Engines) LFX786429

So, my adventure began by first learning how to march, handle firearms, and not forgetting plenty of naval discipline. Next step was the Rolls Royce School of Technical Training. THIS WAS IT!! learning about the mighty Merlin engine.

On completing this course, I was posted to a shore establishment HMS Blackcap inhibiting engines for storage.  This didn’t last long, as I soon learned that I had been given a sea-going draft. I was to become a member of 812 Squadron (Fireflies) and join HMS Theseus in Ireland.

After a short training period ashore in N. Ireland it was off to see the world.  Those faraway places with strange sounding names.  Gibraltar, Suez, Aden, Trincomalee, Andaman Islands, Nicobar Islands, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, New Guinea.

The reception we received in Australia and New Zealand was just great.  The street marches with the whole ship’s company through the streets of Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Auckland and Wellington.  The people were just fantastic, with dances and sight-seeing trips.  They also organized home visits, and food parcels for our families back home.

BUT! it wasn’t all plain sailing, whilst flying and demonstrating for the Royal Australian Navy there were several disasters.  Two Fireflies collided in midair over Port Phillip Bay and crashed into the sea killing both air crews.  One of the engines was pulled up out of the sea some fifty years later, and is now in the Australian F.A.A. Museum in Nowra which I often visit with an old ‘oppo’ Totty Allman.  The same day a Seafire crash landed on deck, the arrester hook striking a seaman in the walkway and killing him.

For me the worst was yet to come (my disaster day).  It was the job of the ground crew to assist the pilot out of the cockpit on landing. I was the fitter of the Squadron CO’s aircraft (Lt Cdr Wynne-Roberts) and would compete with my rigger mate ‘Spiv’ Daly to be first up on to the plane to do the job.  The winner would then have pole position sitting on top of the cockpit to watch the remainder of the aircraft land.

It was 6th August 1947 and Spiv had won the race, sitting on top of the cockpit, I had to settle for a seat on the wing.  The next aircraft landed OK, the crash barriers were lowered and it taxied forward. THEN ALL HELL LET LOOSE.  The third aircraft missed the arrestor wires and bounced over the crash barriers. To my horror I realised it was heading straight for us, so I dropped off the wing and ran for the ship’s side. It then clipped the second aircraft and dropped on top of ours.  On impact, debris was showered everywhere, and as I was dropping into the safety net, the batteries burst and I was splattered with acid.  Minutes later I was lifted out of the safety net and rushed below to sick bay, washed down, and treated for acid bums.  My clothes had to be replaced as they were covered in holes, burnt by the acid.

I asked about Spiv and was told that he was missing, presumed killed.  I couldn’t believe that I was with him just a short time before, and the last person to see him alive.  Could easily have been me.

The things I will always remember are the noise of the plane bouncing, the terrific noise of the impact, and someone shouting “There’s somebody down in the net” ME!!!  As they lifted me out there was a wheel, and Oleo leg nearby. All that remained of two aircraft.

When the deck was finally cleaned up, the last aircraft carne in to land, also bouncing over the crash barriers.  It clipped the Island before crashing into the starboard gun sponson, then tipped over nose first into the sea.  Luckily the aircrew were recovered safely.

From Australia, our next port of call was the Solomon Islands which was very interesting as there were ships and a submarine on the beach, Jap relics of the war a couple of years previous.

Port Moresby in New Guinea was also interesting, with a trip out to. Jackson airstrip which still had the odd Zero fighter, and a Betty bomber smashed up.  Also, a wine bar.

Back to Singapore where I learnt I was to leave Theseus and return home for demob with others who had the same demob number as me (72).

The rest of my service was spent at HMS Nuthatch, doing maintenance, cutting grass, painting fences etc.  Finally, my demob and the end of a great adventure with many good times, and a few bad.  Plus, many great friends, and a lot of MEMORlES.

HMS THESEUS – Colossus-class Light Fleet aircraft aarrier ordered under an Emergency War Programme and built by Fairfield at Govan Glasgow. Laid down 6 Jan 1943. Launched 6 July 1944. Commissioned 1946 and decommissioned in 1958. Roy Cragg image
A Fairey Firefly about to land on the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney (III) during the Korean conflict RAN image

The RAAF at Sea before World War II

The following article first appeared in the Air Power Development Centre Bulletin Pathfinder, Issue 175 dated April 2012 and is reproduced with their kind permission. The perspective of our sister service on the early days of naval aviation is greatly appreciated.

In the 1920s, when the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) came into being, the concept of the Australian government’s national defence was based predominantly on a maritime strategy led by Navy. Not only did the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) have the largest proportion of permanent full-time personnel but it also commanded the largest share of Australia’s total defence budget, despite expenditure cut-backs which inevitably followed the end of World War I. Doctrinally the RAN was tuned to operate in close concert with the Royal Navy within an imperial defence construct. The Singapore naval base, which served as the lynchpin of Britain’s (and hence Australia’s) plans for the defence of the empire east of the Suez Canal from the 1920s until 1942, was equally part of a maritime strategy.

The RAAF was formed in March 1921 on the explicit basis of maintaining the capability to support both the RAN and the Australian Army. This injunction was, no doubt, intended as unifying balm after a protracted and bruising battle between Army and Navy to win endorsement for their competing post-war air schemes. Their debate ended with the government’s decision in 1919 to have one separate Air Force serving the needs of both. Viewing the outcome purely in these terms, however, risks obscuring the fact that, from its earliest days, the RAAF had an underlying but rarely-articulated mission to assist the Navy in pursuing a maritime strategy for the defence of Australia.

Among the aircraft on the RAAF inventory in 1921 were six Fairey IIID floatplanes acquired from Britain to equip one of two planned seaplane squadrons under the initial organisational structure of the new service. The units failed to materialise after the planned scheme was curtailed for financial reasons, but the floatplanes remained in periodic use at Point Cook, where they proved useful for conducting surveys over coastal waters including the famous first flight around Australia in 1924. Although a training course for naval observers was started at Point Cook in 1923, it was realised that Air Force had no aircraft that could operate from the Navy’s main warships. Since the Fairey IIID was too large and heavy to fit into the limited space available, efforts were soon underway to find a more suitable aircraft type to replace it.

The Supermarine Seagull III amphibious flying boats that entered RAAF service in 1926 were actually little better than the Fairey IIID in both size and performance, but they were better suited to the task of assisting the Navy’s program for surveying the Great Barrier Reef – which became the main form of naval cooperation required of the RAAF for the next three years. The purchase of these aircraft was overtaken shortly afterwards by a government decision to also acquire for the RAN a 6000-ton seaplane tender, HMAS Albatross, with a surprise for the RAAF when it learnt that it was required to supply the aircraft and operating personnel to put onboard the new essel. Putting the Seagull IIIi nto Albatross was an expedient which lasted from February 1929 until  the ship was paid off from the RAN as an economy measure in 1933. During these years, however, Australia at least had the capability to conduct reconnaissance at sea, gunnery direction, torpedo spotting and survey work, all for the first time.

When first told in 1926 that it would be required to provide the aircraft for Albatross, Air Force set about drafting a specification for a new type of catapult-launched boat amphibian, but this failed to attract a manufacturer interested in building it, at least initially. By 1931, however, theVickersCompany in Britain had developed a design and asked the RAAF for a commitment to purchase. Although lacking any such authority, the Air Force chief gave the go-ahead and the result was that the RAAF received the first of 24 Seagull Vs in 1935. This aircraft (the first used by the RAAF with an enclosed cabin) proved useful not just for sea rescue work, but also carried bombs or depth charges, and soon won Vickers additional large orders from the RAF (which named the type the Walrus).

The Seagull V and Walrus aircraft, which the RAAF’s No 9 Squadron operated off the RAN’s cruisers, gave distinguished if unspectacular service until the squadron was disbanded in 1944. It was a sad statistic of the war that whenever the Navy lost one of its cruisers, it usually lost the RAAF detachment carried on board. The RAAF took casualties when HMAS Sydney was sunk in a clash with the German raider Kormoran in November 1941, when HMAS Perth encountered a Japanese invasion force in the Sunda Strait in March 1942, and when HMAS Canberra went down in the battle of Savo Island in August 1942. HMAS Australia also lost its Walrus and crew while attacking Vichy French naval forces at Dakar (in Senegal, West Africa) in September 1940. At least fifteen of 9 Squadron’s fatal wartime losses occurred during embarked action with the Navy.

In the preparations of the rearmament period before war began in 1939, the RAAF was also taking major new steps to strengthen its capacity to undertake long-range maritime patrols using land-based forces. From 1927 this role had been carried out mainly by two giant Supermarine Southampton flying boats based at Point Cook, but by the mid-1930s these were well and truly obsolescent. On the eve of World War II, the RAAF was in the process of raising a new maritime patrol unit (No 10 Squadron) equipped with giant long-range Short S25 Sunderland flying boats, to operate from a new seaplane base at Rathmines, on Lake Macquarie, NSW. Steps were in train to take delivery of the new aircraft as war began, causing the government to leave the squadron in England to fight alongside the RAF in Coastal Command.

The RAAF at Sea before World War II

Elsewhere within the RAAF, the Service had begun taking delivery from late 1936 of Avro Anson GR1aircraftpurchasedfromBritain. These  twin engine low-wing monoplanes, armed with bombs or depth charges, were considered suitable for coastal reconnaissance and had been adopted by RAF Coastal Command. Ultimately the RAAF would have over 1000 of these aircraft, though most were acquired for training rather than operational purposes. Late in 1938 the government had also approved the purchase of Bristol Beaufort aircraft, also from Britain, also for coastal patrol work, although none entered service before 1941.

The needs of fleet or naval cooperation, and the capacity to exert control over sea lanes and lines of approach to Australia, had demonstrably featured prominently in development plans for the RAAF virtually throughout its first two decades. This is exactly what might be expected of a Service required to participate in implementing the maritime strategy which underpinned planning for the defence of Australia between the world wars.

During the inter-war period the RAAF helped pursue a maritime strategy for the defence of Australia.

  • Technical limitations hindered efforts to operate from warships but in during 1929-1933 RAAF aircraft were embarked in an RAN seaplane carrier.
  • Navy’s cruisers carried Seagull V amphibians during 1935-1944, meaning many RAN combats resulted in RAAF casualties.

The full power of the Commonwealth Defence Force can only be developed if all its parts act in close co-operation one with the other. A portion of the proposed Air Force is, therefore, designed for co-operation with the Naval Forces and portion for co-operation with the Military Forces.

Submission to Australia’s Air Council on the Australian Air Force, December 1920

 

The Unit Citation for Gallantry of the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam Extraordinary and Gallant

By CDR Ian (Max) Speedy, DSC, RANR

With the passing of the years, we tend to forget just how defining the Vietnam War was in so many aspects. It was the first air mobility war using helicopters, the first time soldiers were taken into and out of battle by helicopters, obviating the ownership of ground between base and battle front, and the first war that could be watched with the evening TV news.

The key to air mobility is the helicopter. There has been no conflict since Vietnam where the helicopter in one role or another has not played an important and very impressive part: Iraq and Afghanistan for the US and Timor for the Australians are good examples. However in the early 1960s the US Air Force and US Army were in a bureaucratic war: the Air Force demanding ownership of all aircraft and the Army certain the USAF could not provide adequate support for its ground troops. At this time the US Army was experiencing a critical shortage of pilots but strengths would only rise to 12,800 by mid-1968 against a need for nearly 21,500.

At the working level in South Vietnam, Army and Air Force officers hammered out practical methods of solving their day-to-day problems and coordinating their efforts. The Chiefs of the US Army and Air Force eventually signed an agreement to be implemented in January 1967 that transferred the Army’s fixed wing Caribou to the Air Force and Army retained its helicopters. As an aside to this agreement the Caribou 135th became the 135th Aviation Company in April 1967 at Fort Hood, Texas and deployed to Vung Tau on 1 October 1967 with its UH-1 helicopters, becoming the 135th Assault Helicopter Company (AHC), the Experimental Military Unit (EMU) of the US Army and the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV).

The RAN had a long-standing requirement to provide a carrier task group for the SEATO annual combined exercise and this meant HMAS Melbourneand the Carrier Air Group, consisting of the frontline squadrons 816 and 817, were fully committed. The training squadrons 723, 724 and 725 were all actively engaged in meeting the fleet’s support requirements along with the scheduled air and maintenance training programs. In December 1966 a request from the United States Government for pilots and aviation specialists to supplement its own forces in the Republic of South Vietnam was added to these tasks.1

 Enter the Fleet Air Arm

The RAN gave some consideration to commissioning an additional air squadron, 852 Naval Air Squadron with UH-1 helicopters, to operate ashore in support of the Australian Task Force (ATF). This action would result in the RAN holding utility type helicopters well in excess of the required inventory at the conclusion of the conflict and so no further action was taken.2

2nd Contingent at Bear Cat March 69. OIC LCDR GR Rohrsheim RAN standing 3rd from right and the author far right

In a Chief of Naval Staff brief,quite a number of seemingly secondary considerations were raised as major inter-Service issues. Paragraph 10 noted that…the proposed deployment to Vietnam should take place as soon as possible as the Fleet Air Arm needs a raison d’être to maintain morale.

At a later lengthy discussion possible RAAF objections were raised to a helicopter flight: they would not be an identifiable Australian force, would not be engaged in Australian operations, could not be administered, and, very importantly, the RAAF would not see it as a naval job. The brief fortunately noted the FAA’s considerable involvement in Konfrontasi,that they were versatile pilots, and that the RAAF flew with the USAF Liberators in World War II. Lastly, RAN aircrew feel that they are not wanted in the Vietnam theatre and consequently are suffering from an inferiority complex. It is imperative that a worthy role be given to the [FAA] if morale is to be preserved.

The conclusion to the brief was that, amongst other things, the RAAF will raise objections that are not valid.

Initially an RAAF proposal had been formulated to request the United States to provide an additional four helicopters, to be flown and maintained by Australians in support of the ATF. The US had rejected similar requests by Thailand and could not see a way clear to agree to the Australian option.3The RAAF had also identified an immediate need in 9 SQN for additional qualified helicopter pilots for active service operations during 1967-69. To meet this unexpected demand the RAN agreed it could lend Navy helicopter pilots to the RAAF for operations with 9 SQN until its own (RAAF) training pipeline had been expanded. Eight pilots served with 9 SQN from May 1968 – April 1969 with some of them serving for various lengths of time with the 135th AHC.

The US Army logistic train to Vietnam was very long and this made the provision of additional helicopter crews and maintainers for another assault helicopter company for operations in South Vietnam difficult. The Australian Defence Department suggested the shortfall could be met in part by the RAN providing trained helicopter aircrew and maintainers to the US Army. This proposal was accepted by the US and that is how the RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam was born. The scheme of complement for the flight resembled that of a small naval air squadron and seems to be based on the four helicopters the US might have provided had the original RAAF request for assistance succeeded. It had pilots, observers, aircrew men, maintenance sailors, a cook, steward, photographer, writer, and finally a sick-berth attendant – about 46 souls in all.

The first contingent deployed to South Vietnam in two stages during October 1967 under the Officer in Command (OIC) Lieutenant Commander Neil Ralph RAN who left for Vung Tau with the first half and was followed a week later by Lieutenant Commander Pat Vickers with the remainder of the group, the first of a number of homes for the US Army’s 135th AHC. The length of a tour of duty was set at twelve months.

There was no end date established for operations in Vietnam and no indication that the conflict was ever going to draw to a conclusion. So in May and June 1968, replacement personnel joined 723 SQN at Nowra for pre-deployment training. This second contingent went to the Army’s Battle Efficiency Course at the Jungle Training Centre, Canungra, for three weeks of running, jumping, swimming, and muddy misery. Lieutenant Commander Graham Rohrsheim was its OIC. The third contingent served under Lieutenant Commander David Farthing 1969-70 and the fourth and last contingent under Lieutenant Commander Winston James served until June 1971 when the Australian government ended its support for the South Vietnam conflict. In all, 196 Fleet Air Arm personnel served with great distinction in the RANHFV.

A fifth contingent had been planned and its members nominated to replace the fourth group in October 1971. The group was of course stood down when Australia’s withdrawal was announced and the last operational day of the RANHFV was 8 June 1970.

Each contingent OIC had a directive by way of a letter assigning him the powers of punishment equivalent to that of the CO of HMAS Penguin, the administrative base for any navy personnel deployed overseas, and included inter alia:

Responsibilities: Should you be allocated a task, which, in your opinion, is contrary to the provisions of this Directive, endangers the national interests of Australia, or is likely to imperil unduly your Flightyou are to report the situation to COMAFV, having first informed the Commanding Officer of the Aviation Company to which you are attached of your intention. You are to establish safeguards to ensure your aircraft and personnel do not violate the territory, waters or airspace of countries bordering on South Vietnam, nor to take part in operations near the Cambodian border. (Author’s emphasis)

In practice the OIC’s directive was impossible to follow. Some of us would be flying as co-pilot with an American in command of the aircraft; just as often Aussies were in command of an American aircraft with US crew but you were one aircraft in a group of 15. Even though I frequently flew as the leader of the ten ‘Slicks’4or as the air mission commander, there was no way we Aussies could abort a mission just because we were ‘imperilled’. With a US or South Vietnamese battalion commander in the back of the C&C (Command and Control) aircraft directing operations – in fact commanding that his troops be put into a specific place – no pilot had the authority to refuse to obey. There was frequent discussion and generally, relationships were excellent between the US or South Vietnamese back seat commanders and us as air mission commanders in the front responsible for our aircrews. It didn’t stop the hot LZs we got into but we had a common cause.

You rarely knew if an LZ was going to get hot, mostly that happened when you got there. So, in the final analysis, all of us, Aussies and Americans alike, ignored the Chief of Navy directive and the US/RAN agreement.

The US and Australian agreement for the RANHFV with the 135th AHC included a number of novel, if not unique, criteria. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 9 November, 1967. One unique aspect was that the Australian OIC was to be the Executive Officer of the 135th under the US Army Major CO; when the Major went on leave, the Aussie XO took command. The rest of the Australians were integrated rank for rank within the company’s structure and became, in time, air mission commanders, platoon leaders, operations officers, gunship light fire team leaders and maintenance team leaders with the authority each of those positions held in the US Army’s structure. Working within an American culture far from our country and navy, in a very short time we became, to all intents and purposes, soldiers and apart from our beards and accents, frequently could not be identified as other than US Army.

Rules of Engagement

In February 1963 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had authorized an amendment to the rules of engagement for the US Army helicopters in Vietnam to allow them to engage clearly identified Viet Cong forces considered to be a threat to the safety of the aircraft and their passengers. JCS stated that the ROE for armed Army helicopters had been erroneously interpreted to mean that the helicopter must wait to be fired upon before initiating return fire. For the Navy aircrew, CNS’s directive to the OICs was that we conformed to the US rules. Specific Australian ROE, to be forwarded at some later date, never appeared.

The practice came down to this. Depending on the area we were operating in we would use suppressive fire without first taking enemy fire – the Nipa palm edges of most Delta LZs was a case in point, jungle clearings another. These places were pretty well always booby-trapped and the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) and VC (Viet Cong – Charley) could pop out of their bunkers and spider holes in seconds. The expenditure of 7.62 mm M60 rounds was phenomenal. We carried thousands of rounds per gun when 15 to 20 LZs was normal every day – each Slick’s M60 could use 500 rounds per insertion. Fuel and munitions were available at hundreds of places across the country and we refuelled and rearmed at wherever was closest on a ‘take what you need’ basis with no questions and no paper-work ever.

The US forces had quite specific rules on the Cambodian airspace and these were noted in the RANHFV OIC’s directive. Whilst the border areas were explicitly stated as no-go zones, the interdiction by US forces of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that ran the full length of North and South Vietnam went on day and night well inside the Cambodian and Laotian territories. We regularly operated within the buffer zone of the Cambodian border and on a few occasions in 1969, we crossed it. A line on a paper map did not translate to a line on the ground.

However in May 1970 the 3rd Contingent OIC was directed that his personnel were not to be involved if the US were to openly invade Cambodia. The result was that the 135th AHC had to be taken out of the operation because all but one of the Command and Control pilots and all of the Slick Lead Pilots5were Australian personnel. As a consequence, there were not enough qualified US crews to make up the 135th’s fifteen mission aircraft, much to the annoyance of Aussies and US alike. The 135th was assigned to the Mekong Delta instead.

When the 135th AHC became operational in Vung Tau, it operated mostly with the Australian Army – SAS and infantry insertions in Phuoc Tuy Province.6As 1967 wore on, the 135th was increasingly tasked to support South Vietnamese (ARVN) and US troops away from the Australians and frequently so far north that the decision was eventually made to relocate the company from Vung Tau to Blackhorse base some distance north of Nui Dat. The move took place on 1 January 1968. From then on, the 135th became even more engaged in the Mekong Delta, in the far west to the Seven Mountains on the Cambodian border, and south into the sanctuaries of the NVA in the U Minh forest and around Ben Tré. The 135th AHC moved successively to Bear Cat, east of Saigon, in December 1968 and then in September 1969 to Dong Tam in the heart of the Mekong Delta where the RANHFV and the 135th AHC remained until departing for home in June 1971.

Getting the Bloody Job Done

During the four years of the RANHFV, the 135th AHC missions were conducted across the length and breadth of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) and into the jungles and mountains of II CTZ as well as the streets and lanes of Saigon city during the Tet Offensive of February 1968. The 135th AHC was on standby in February 1969 to assist in the evacuation of the US Embassy in Saigon should it have been required.

Each flying day began at 0430 with aircrew at their allocated aircraft for pre-flight inspections. Every day the standard mission for the 135th and all other assault companies was much the same. Every task required ten Slicks, four gunships, and the command and control aircraft fitted out with its extra radios for the battalion staff in the back seat directing their troops on the ground. All we really had to know was where the first pick-up of the day was to be, everything after that was ‘Getting the bloody job done!’ the 135th AHC refrain.7

The aircraft was always flown with a crew of four: two pilots in case one was shot. The crew chief, a Specialist Class 4 of Leading Seaman equivalent rank performed the aircraft’s first line maintenance and then flew everywhere the aircraft went, manning one of its M60s. The gunner maintained the two M60 machine guns and about 3,000 rounds per gun or whatever he could fit into the biggest boxes he could find.

Typical Mekong Delta scenery. Landing Zone one minute, Pickup Zone for another LZ somewhere else the next. Hot or cold receptions were just a 50:50 bet.

All LZ insertions were company sized elements of 100 men, American or ARVN. At one stage the 135th was down to 17 out of its establishment of 31 aircraft but the maintainers worked miracles (under dreadful working conditions) and the 15 mission aircraft were always available. Such was the demand and the response; if the aircraft could be started, we flew it.

If, as happened frequently, the operation was across the country to the Cambodian border area, a transit of some 200 miles from our Blackhorse or Bear Cat base, a spare aircraft had to be included. If lucky, it would have a quiet day waiting at some POL (Petrol, Oil, Lubricants) spot near the day’s operations.

From then on, with up to dozens of company lifts in the day, every pick up and landing zone was always in the lap of the gods. You never knew if the first or any insertion was going to be hot, except perhaps in the notorious Ben Tré area where we always counted on a contested arrival. Once the first troops were on the ground a seemingly quiet LZ could erupt with dozens of the enemy standing up out of small spider holes and launching a blistering attack with AK-47s, RPGs and, if we stumbled into a larger formation as sometimes occurred, 30 or 50 mm machine guns.8We were then committed to a tough day not only reinforcing the troops already on the ground but also to rescue downed aircrew, MEDEVACs and finally to bring them home, late at night out of a hot withdrawal.

A four to five hour flying day was easy and probably only had three companies of a battalion (three lifts) inserted and withdrawn later. Eight to ten hours were not uncommon and could be the one battalion moved a number of times before going home or one company in contact and with others being inserted in blocking positions (easy) or into a hot LZ (hard). The long days were the worst – up to twelve and fourteen hours always meant a day of enemy contact, troops invariably killed and wounded and aircraft hit if not shot down.9 These days always seemed to involve our own casualties.

Combat assault flying days were programmed for five, six or seven days depending on the general tenor of operations and then for a rest, the company would be assigned to Direct Combat Support, known better as Pigs and Riceor Hash and Trash.10All ten Slicksand often four gunships would be tasked to a variety of small units in remote spots needing resupply of ammunition, personnel or equipment for an outpost under attack. The gunships would usually be in reserve against another company needing back-up. All these missions were fraught with danger and could be more dangerous than a standard combat assault day.

Ready Reaction Force (RRF) was another duty. This involved a normal day’s flying operations but instead of returning to our home base (Blackhorse or Bear Cat), we would go to places like Tay Ninh or Cu Chi in the north of III Corps near the border, to be ready for the night insertion of a relief force if a beleaguered out-post had been overrun.

Practice not Theory

Fortunately most flying was by day but our days stretched into night combat assaults making the flying that much more difficult.11As everything the Slicks did was in formation, being led to a touchdown in a dark clearing with no lights and virtually no ground references took some getting used to. It was no easier as the Slickleader with nine other aircraft nervously following your every move. The option of going around for another go was never countenanced – it had to be first time every time and made the flight leader’s role crucial.

In the close and hectic confines of a hot LZ, thumping into the ground was a comparatively minor hazard when the summer dust swirled up and obscured all vision. For all the risks, some amazing work was done at night, such as on 20 December 1967 when a late afternoon hot insertion finally led to the troops being extracted with the flight under constant fire for over four hours from midnight into the early morning. Only two aircraft were hit but there were many troop casualties.12

Combat damage was mainly small arms fire and most pilots made the most professional landings when shot down.13We flew at 1,500 feet when we could so as to stay clear of AK-47 fire but that did not always work.14Heavier calibre weapons were different. The RPGs or 50 mm fire would take you down with one hit, the resultant collision with the ground being largely a question of how much damage had been done to the controls or pilots.15Our aircraft was simple compared to today’s well armoured counterparts but provided the bullets did not mash up in the rotating machinery the Huey could take some incredible punishment and still keep flying.16

It was not always lots of hits and no casualties. The final roll of honour for the 135th AHC was 35 killed and far too many injured for an accurate count (over 100). Five RANHFV members were killed (of eight in all the RAN) and at least 22 wounded (two thirds of our 50 aircrew regularly flying!). In the 135th AHC in 1968/69, 13 were killed and 25 wounded (two RANHFV KIA and five WIA), a casualty every ten days or so more or less.

The case of Leading Aircrewman Noel Shipp and his gunship crew is the best known in the Second Contingent and also nowadays to many of the Australian public following the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal report into unresolved recognition for past acts of gallantry and valour. Shipp and his gunship crew were defending a hot landing zone when they were shot down and all four, three Americans and Shipp were killed. Shipp was proposed to the Tribunal for consideration of a posthumous Victoria Cross which in the event was not agreed. However, his name and gallantry that day, hanging out of his doomed aircraft and firing all the way to the ground, will be remembered at the RAN Recruit School, HMAS Cerberus,with one of the divisions there being named in his honour.

 The Final Tally

With at least 100 American soldiers being killed in a ‘good’ week and up to 600 in a ‘bad’ one, and eventually more than 58,000 deaths the final call for America, it is no wonder the public wanted to stop the war.

The Huey has become the iconic symbol of the Vietnam War. According to the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots’ Association, of the 7,013 Hueys that went to Vietnam, nearly half (3,305) were destroyed and with them 2,177 aircrew killed. Half the aircraft and two thirds of their crews were casualties – not good statistics yet we loved the aircraft and were proud to have flown it in the most intense of environments. We were face to face with our enemy on many an occasion, taking hits, being shot down, having the closest of shaves and regular ‘there but for the grace of God’ moments and still flying the next day to do it all again.

Maintenance Area at Bear Cat, open air day and torch light night, wet or dry according to season. The maintenance personnel did wonders. We had the aircraft from 0430 every day till our return, often as late as midnight, when the maintainers did their repairs for the next day.

On Medals

For reasons that are too tortuous to go into here, the RANHFV started off well behind the rest in terms of access to medal recommendations in Vietnam. Our ‘quotas’ began with having only half of our flying hours tallied and then one third of those hours counted for any medal considerations. The first cut we presumed was to be on the basis that we were only to be co-pilots in American aircraft yet we all became air mission commanders, Slick and Gunship Leaders while the maintenance personnel became the skills’ leaders in every trade. The second cut was on a World War II premise that only one third of our flying was in combat yet every time we went outside the camp perimeter, we were in a combat situation.

While only the aircrew were expected to go into danger, the rest of our personnel did so as well. They flew out into the field to effect repairs to our aircraft if it would allow that aircraft to keep flying on the day’s mission rather than getting a Chinook to lift it home. These same people mounted guard duties on the perimeter each night, they drove stores convoys and on more than a few occasions were ambushed and fought their way out. Photographers who had only ever taken happy snaps were manning the M60s and flying on combat assaults. The Sick Berth Attendants (Medics) performed amazingly in trauma wards for impossibly long periods during the Tet offensives of 1968 and 1969. Our cooks had the best chow halls throughout the Battalion for months on end.

Unit Citation for Gallantry

It has been said in places that the RANHFV was the most awarded unit of the RAN. On one count that might well be. When 18 MIDs were awarded to other people ‘…cheerfully carrying out their duties’ and similar words while not in combat danger, then an MID or other award for the most daring of rescues (under conditions which some equated to gallantry of the highest order) which were recommended and substantively approved and then later dismissed is worse than inequitable.

Against this background, some members of the RANHFV canvassed Navy in 2011 and eventually politicians for a Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal hearing which was finally held in October 2017. Not to seek personal entitlements but for a general recognition that the RANHFV had performed extraordinarily well. The Tribunal recommended and the Governor-General on 1 June 2018 signed his approval of the RAN’s second Unit Citation for Gallantry since World War II.

UNIT CITATION FOR GALLANTRY

For acts of extraordinary gallantry in action in South Vietnam from October 1967 to June 1971.

The Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam, as part of the Experimental Military Unit of the United States Army 135th Assault Helicopter Company, exhibited exceptional and extraordinary gallantry whilst engaged in offensive operations continuously throughout its four-year deployment. This exceptional gallantry was enabled by the efforts of the entire Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam.

The Flight was a unique unit and every member, regardless of mustering or category, either performed their duties with demonstrable gallantry or were used in roles for which they were not trained and still performed bravely. The administrative and maintenance staff were required to assist in the provision of base security in addition to their normal duties and almost all of the support personnel regularly volunteered to act as aircrew employed as door-gunners and Crew Chiefs. This was in addition to the extremely long maintenance hours required to support the tempo of operations conducted by the Flight. Over the course of the operations in Vietnam, the Flight accumulated a formidable record of operational flight hours and citations for individual gallantry. This has set it apart from other operational units.

While exposed to hostile fire and at great personal risk, aircrew flew on average 50 per cent more operational hours per month than other Australian aircrew in comparable roles with other units. Aircrew were constantly engaged by the enemy, faced the danger of booby-trapped landing zones and frequently found themselves fired upon by friendly forces. The personnel who flew with the Flight arguably saw the most intense combat of any Royal Australian Navy personnel in the war. Despite the fact that none of the personnel had previous operational service and none had been under fire, they were courageous in battle, exhibited exceptional and extraordinary gallantry and did so with great skill and heroic dedication in executing a mission far removed from those for which they had been trained. Over the period of the Flight’s operations in South Vietnam, five members of the unit died and 22 were wounded in action.

The extraordinary gallantry, dedication to duty and astonishing record of the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam conducting tasks far removed from the expectations of Naval service, has forever set it apart from other units. The extraordinary acts of gallantry and heroism consistently displayed by the personnel, combined with their loyal devotion to duty were in keeping with the finest traditions of the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Defence Force.

Max Speedy was the 2iC of the 2nd Contingent (1968/69). As a co-pilot for two months under a US Army Warrant Officer getting combat experience he then became 1st Platoon Leader (UH1-H troop lift helicopters) and flight leader of the 10 Slicks, ending his tour as Operations Officer and Air Mission Commander of the Slicksand Gunships. He flew 1,250 combat hours, was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross, two Vietnam Crosses of Gallantry, and a dozen US Air Medals. He flew most of the helicopters types in Vietnam at the time.

 

  1. 1. Information Paper for Cabinet, Request For Helicopter Pilots For Vietnam, Copy 2, May 1967, signed Allen Fairhall, Minister for Defence, National Archives, Canberra.

2    Navy Office File 79/201/3, 6 June, 1967, signed by DNAP, Capt H.E. Bailey DSC RAN.

3       CNS Brief by DNAP 9 May, 1967:

  1. COS Minute 40/1967 recommended that eight RAN pilots and supporting personnel be made available to fly helicopters provided by the US in South Vietnam, and envisages this force would be incorporated in No. 9 SQN, RAAF. The only costs expected would be those arising from daily pay and allowances.
  2. AJSS Washington indicated that the US could not accept the above terms as they had already refused a similar Philippines request and did not want to give the impression that they were forming a White Man’s Club in the operational area…

4    UH-1 helicopters tasked and configured for troop transport were often called ‘Slicks’ due to an absence of weapon pods

5    Jeffrey Gray, Up Top, The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955 – 1972, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1998, p 267

6    Including support of the Coral and Balmoral Fire Support Bases.

7    In the Seven Mountains area on the Cambodian Border on 27 January 1969 and near night-fall, the author in the lead was asked by the Battalion Commander if we could get the remainder of his 1300 troops changed over. It had already been a long day but the (tired) reply was that ‘We would get the bloody job done!’ which we did with nearly 12 hours flying to do so. This became the well-loved motto of the 135th AHC.

8    8 February, 18 May, 23 October, and 23 December in 1968 and 2 February and 31 May in 1969 to name a few.

9    While there were troops to be moved, we kept flying, hot refuelling (not shutting down) as necessary and then back to the fray. My longest day was nearly 14 hours of flying, the first seven hours and last six or so were done without shutting down and this was not an isolated experience; all of us had these days.

10  The only days the war seemed to stop officially were Thanksgiving, Christmas, Easter, and the Apollo Landing on 21 July 1969. There were still lots of aircraft movements on these non-combat days.

11  Of my 1,250 hours flying that year, 85 hours were night combat assaults, more than enough!

12  Ray Jones and Neil Ralph, The First HFV.In: Max Speedy and Bob Ray, Eds, A Bloody Job Well Done: The History of the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam, 1967 – 1971, Canberra, 2008, p 30. ISBN 978-0-646-50060-7

13  Almost every one of the 32 RANHFV pilots was shot down at least once, along with all of our US Army crew members. One of the US Warrant Officers was downed three times before his 21st birthday.

14  Lieutenant Commander P.J. Vickers was killed on 22 February 1968 when a round deflected off his rudder pedal while flying at this ‘safe’ height.

15  On 8 August 1968, Lieutenant Tony Casadio, Petty Officer O.C. Phillips and their American co-pilot and crew chief were all killed when an RPG hit their gunship while flying low. With no options, they landed in a bomb crater with a force too great to survive.

16  As Lieutenant Bruce Crawford DSC can attest (one amongst many): on 8 February 1968, his aircraft took 25 hits and kept flying. On 8 May, 1968, six aircraft were shot down in the one LZ and 125 troops were killed or injured. The EMU Shootof 23 October 1968 near Ben Tré, saw three Slicks and two gunships downed and reinforcements called in.

 

 

 

The Battle of the Coral Sea

 MIDN Lachlan Montgomery joined the RAN in February 2014 coming from a family of five in Ringwood Victoria. His father is a serving member of the Victorian Police Force and his mother an office manager at the Ringwood High School. He enjoys running, computers and flying with the career goal to become an Aviation Warfare Officer.

 Introduction

The Battle of the Coral Sea was a series of naval engagements off the north-east coast of Australia between the 4th and 8th May 1942. It is considered by many to be the turning point of the war against the Japanese. The Japanese advance on Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea was the precursor to the first aircraft carrier battle, in which the Japanese Fleet was badly damaged and forced to withdraw.The Battle of the Coral Sea resulted in Australia being released from the immediate threat of invasion by the Japanese, and prevented Australia from being isolated from its American allies. It also resulted in the Americans maintaining naval superiority of the Pacific region. The battle paved the way for a decisive Allied victory at the Battle of Midway just one month later, and hence is an extremely important event not only in regards to the survival of Australia, but to the downfall of the Japanese war machine. The aim of this essay is to discuss the lessons learnt from the Battle of the Coral Sea by examining the following points in addition to the involvement of the RANand the significance of the battle to Australia. These are divided into the following aspects:

  1. The influence of carrier air power upon the battle,
  2. The influence of intelligence upon the conduct of the battle,
  3. Claims of tactical defeat and strategic victory,
  4. The strategic impacts upon events ashore in New Guinea, and
  5. The involvement of the RAN and the significance of the battle to Australia.

Precursors to the Battle of the Coral Sea

The great war between the US and Japan opened in a totally unexpected manner. The destruction of much of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour was a huge blow to their tactical capability. However, as a result of all its Pacific aircraft carriers not being present at Pearl Harbour during the attack, the United States considered how to use these ships to reverse the Japanese expansion across the Pacific. (Stille).

Stillestates that as a result of the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor, air power was now considered a dominant factor in naval warfare. In order to avoid being totally defensive in the face of an unstoppable Japanese carrier force, the United States began a series of carrier strikes in the Central and South Pacific. These proved somewhat ineffective, but forced the Japanese to postpone their proposed Port Moresby operation. When the Japanese were ready to move on New Guinea in the South Pacific, two of the US Pacific Fleet Carriers had been deployed to conduct a raid on Tokyo, meaning the US could only send two carriers to the South Pacific to counter thepredicted Japanese offensive. With part of the Japanese Carrier Force committed to join theSouth Pacific operation, history’s first aircraft carrier battle seemed imminent.

The influence of carrier air power upon the battle

Millot (1974) contends that the war in the Pacific led to a new kind of warfare – one which relied on the use of air power. In fact, the Battle of the Coral Sea was based around a type of warfare where the opposing carrier groups never sighted nor fired upon each other.

The Carrier Air Groups of both sides were primarily made up of three types of aircraft. These consisted of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo aircraft, forming a ‘Combat Trio’ with the goal to project overwhelming force upon the enemy ships. As a primarily carrier only battle, these aircraft would prove vital to the attack of enemy forces – a new kind of ‘Over the Horizon warfare’ emerged.

The Japanese and Americans had very different aircraft design philosophies as seen below in figure 1.

Japanese Mitsubishi A6M.2 Type 0 Fighter American Grumman F4F Wildcat Fighter
Unloaded weight 1680kg Unloaded weight 2425kg
Loaded weight 2410kg Loaded weight 3179kg
Power/weight ratio 0.39hp/kg Power/weight ratio 0.32hp/kg
Cruising speed 207mph Cruising speed 147mph
Rate of climb 2571ft/min Rate of climb 2000ft/min

As shown above, the Japanese utilised lightweight, manoeuvrable and fast aircraft with high rates of climb. This came at the cost of reduced pilot protection, armour and special features such as self-sealing fuel tanks. The Americans however, had the slower, heavier Wildcat, inferior in almost every way to the Japanese Zeros apart from its stout construction. This interesting comparison proves the uniqueness of each carrier force and a few of the strengths/weaknesses of each.

Overall, the Battle of the Coral Sea had the strategic effect of ‘promoting’ the aircraft carriers’ importance to naval warfare, and thus resulted in a dramatic increase in numbers of these ships produced. It also essentially removed the battleship from the elevated position it held as the ‘flagship’ of navies worldwide and presented air power with utmost importance for future naval engagements. The Battle of Midway which occurred in early June 1942 is proof of this.

The influence of intelligence upon the conduct of the battle

Intelligence proved vital to the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea. As an over the horizon carrier battle, seaplanes were the primary method of predicting the next moves of the enemy forces. Australia played an important role with intelligence. Coastwatchers were on the job, spotting Japanese seaplanes as they departed their forward bases at Lae and Salamaua on the north eastern coast of New Guinea. The Australians observed the routines of the Japanese and hence discovered they had begun to mass air and sea power in the area – pointing to an attack on Port Moresby. This knowledge was a contributing factor to the American deployment of sea power to the area in anticipation of a clash (Hoyt).

Signal interception was also a means of intelligence prior to the battle. A joint USN/RAN Unit known as Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL) played an important role in the Battle of the Coral Sea. US Naval Intelligence was able to decode Japanese naval communications and as such was almost as well informed as to what was being planned as Japanese commanders were (Straczek). On 13 April, the British intercepted a Japanese message stating that the ‘Fifth Carrier Division’ was en-route to the area. Upon receipt of this intelligence from the British and confirming its authenticity, the US deployed all four of the Pacific Fleet’s available carriers to the area. Only two of these carriers, USS Lexingtonand USS Yorktownwere able to make it to the area of operations in time due to USS Hornetand USS Enterpriseconducting a raid on Tokyo. Interestingly, the Japanese believed only one American carrier was in the area of their planned operation, and did not expect such a strong carrier response to their invasion until it was well underway. This perhaps had a serious effect on Japanese performance during the battle, as they hadn’t expected the large American force present during their operation.

Therefore it can be said that intelligence had a significant impact upon the conduct of the battle, primarily involving American predictions of Japanese movements, and the subsequent deployment of carrier groups to the area. We must also not forget that the Japanese intelligence in this situation was inferior to that of the United States, demonstrated by their underestimation of US carrier power in the region. This is a vital lesson in the importance of intelligence in this kind of ‘blind’ warfare.  (Straczek & Hoyt).

Claims of tactical defeat and strategic victory

There is no doubt the Battle of the Coral Sea had a heavy impact on both the Americans and the Japanese, but who really won? There are claims of a tactical defeat along with strategic victory from the American point of view. Stille states that the battle has correctly been described as a strategic American victory. The Americans had, for the first time, repelled a Japanese attack and subsequently prevented the Japanese sea-borne invasion of Port Moresby. This attack was Japan’s best chance at taking the port and airfield, and hence posing a major threat to Australia’s security. The failure of the sea approach resulted in the later failed attempt to take the port by land over extremely rough terrain. So in the sense of a wide viewed approach, the United States had a strategic victory during the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Some possess the view that whilst a strategic victory, the battle was a tactical defeat for the US Navy. This can be attributed to the fact that whilst sinking only a light Japanese carrier Shohoand damaging a fleet carrier Shokaku, the US Navy lost Lexington, one of its four operational fleet carriers. Observing from an isolated perspective, this ‘tactical defeat’ could be considered true, however looking back to the broad strategic overview, this is not accurate, as the primary Japanese goal of achieving carrier dominance over the Americans had failed. Therefore it is apparent that whilst some considered the battle an American tactical defeat, the disabling of a large portion of the Japanese Carrier Force paid rich dividends for the American position in the Pacific.

Strategic impact upon events ashore in Papua New Guinea

As previously mentioned, the halt of Japanese naval advances on Port Moresby resulted in a land campaign over increasingly difficult terrain. This Japanese attempt proved to be unsuccessful, meaning that Port Moresby remained under Allied control. Resultantly, Australia was protected from the threat of invasion. It can be said that the Battle of the Coral Sea had a huge impact upon events ashore in Papua New Guinea, not the least of which was the survival of Port Moresby. Had this important port been taken in a Japanese naval assault, the enemy would have aimed to cut off Australia and its important contribution to the war effort. The consequences of this occurring would have been disastrous to Australia.

The involvement of the RAN and the significance of the battle to Australia.

The Royal Australian Navy had a significant involvement during the Battle of the Coral Sea. A Support Group attached to Task Force 17, the American Carrier group, consisted of HMAS Australia and HMAS Hobart as well as several USN ships. This group was headed by Rear Admiral J.G Crace of the Royal Navy. After being split from the carrier force to cover the Jomard Passage and intercept the Japanese invasion force as it exited, the support group became the target of heavy bombing and strafing attacks. After repelling these attacks, the group was free to intercept the Japanese invasion force. However Admiral Inouye, in charge of this invasion force, reversed his ships whilst they clarified the sightings of ‘battleships’ in the area. Had Crace’s ships not been detached from Task Force 17, the Japanese force would have been able to enter Port Moresby, resulting in grave consequences for the Allies.

As mentioned previously, Australia was a vulnerable target which relied greatly on Port Moresby for its security. The Battle of the Coral Sea resulted in Australia being protected from the threat of imminent invasion and supply lines between the United States and Australia remained open. It was also the first time Australian ships had been involved with a major US carrier group, a proud moment in history indeed. (Jacobsen).

Conclusion

Many lessons were learnt from the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first of which being the immense importance of air power in future naval engagements. As a new kind of ‘over the horizon’ warfare had emerged, it became apparent that aircraft would be vital to the success of any kind of naval warfare from that point onwards. Intelligence also proved to be an extremely important factor in deciding the victor in naval engagements. The Americans having effective intelligence prior to the Coral Sea battle meant they were able to deploy their carriers to the area, possibly changing the tide of the war in the Pacific. Despite losing a quarter of its carrier strength, the US had a strategic victory during this battle, one that assisted their position for later conflicts in the Pacific region, particularly the Battle of Midway. The Coral Sea battle held significant strategic importance insofar as control of Port Moresby being maintained by the Allies and in regard to the security of the Australian mainland. The Royal Australian Navy’s contribution, although small in the scheme of things, was significant and contributed to the final result not just during this battle but throughout the Pacific War.

 

Bibliography

Frame, T., The Battes that Shaped Australia. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994.

Hoyt, E.P., Blue Skies And Blood – The Battle of the Coral Sea. New York: iBooks, inc., 1975.

Jacobsen, M., The Battle of the Coral Sea 1942– Conference Proceedings 1992. Sydney: Australian National Maritime Museum, 1993.

Macdougall, A., Australia’s Navy. Waverton: Waverton Press, 2005.

Millot, B., The Battle of the Coral Sea. United States of America: Naval Institute Press, 1974.

Stille, M., The Coral Sea 1942 – The First Carrier Battle. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2009.

Straczek, J., Battle of the Coral Sea. [Online]  Available at: https://www.navy.gov.au/history/feature-histories/battle-coral-sea[Accessed 7 October 2014].

 

 

Our First Fleet Commander – Admiral Sir George Patey

By Walter Burroughs

 A summary of this paper was presented at a conference held from 30 September to 01 October 2014 at the Universidad Andres Bello, Chile on the maritime history of South America throughout WWI.

 Important men mostly leave behind them a written trail of evidence of their passing. Admiral Sir George Patey is an exception with no voluminous book or memoirs following in his wake. However there are plentiful references to his time as commander of the Australian Fleet and from these and other sources we are able to find out something about this remarkable man and his importance to Australian naval history.

Appointment as Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Fleet

On 4 March 1913 the Admiralty announced that Rear Admiral Patey had been appointed to the command of the Australian Fleet. The Times of that date commenting upon the appointment says: Rear Admiral Patey is an officer of wide experience and high attainment, and he is well qualified by his tact and temperament for the new post. And new post it was, as Rear Admiral commanding the Australian Fleet replacing the Royal Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Station. That change however was a little way off as the new Australian Fleet was at this time being assembled in England and would not sail from Portsmouth for their new homeland until July 2013.

Admiral Sir George Patey c1918                                               – National Portrait Gallery, London

Early Life

George Edwin Patey was born at Montpellier near Plymouth on 24 February 1859 to a naval family, his father a Captain in the Royal Navy having the same name set and his mother Lucinda the daughter of Vice Admiral Thomas Russell. He entered the Royal Naval College as a cadet on 15 January 1872, just shy of his thirteenth birthday.

Action in South America and South Africa

Young Midshipman Patey’s first sea posting was to HMS Shah. Shahwas commissioned in Portsmouth on 14 August 1876 by Captain F.G.D. Bedford, RN carrying the flag of Rear Admiral Algernon Frederick Rous de Horsey, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron. She was a large composite (sail and steam) frigate of over 6,000 tons, built with iron frames but wooden clad and armed with 26 guns and 4 torpedo launchers.

Patey’s first taste of action was off the Peruvian coast on 29 May 1877 during an engagement (later known as the Battle of Pacocha) between Shah and HMS Amethyst and the Peruvian rebel turret ship Huascar. The armoured Huascar proved virtually impenetrable to British guns and Shah fired the first British torpedo used in anger, but it missed the target and Huascar escaped. On Shah’s return voyage she was diverted to South Africa to assist in the Anglo-Zulu War. Sub-Lieutenant Patey was sent ashore to fight with a naval brigade and received the Zulu Medal.

Gunnery Specialisation and Naval Intelligence

Upon return to England with promotion to Lieutenant in August 1881 he joined the gunnery school HMS Excellent and after completing his course remained on the staff. In May 1885 came a posting to the gunnery training ship HMS Cambridge then based at Plymouth. The following year he moved to more distant shores in the corvette HMS Sapphire for squadron gunnery duties on the China Station. He then returned to Cambridge as Senior Staff Officer in 1889 and was later lent for staff duties in the Mediterranean Fleet. Promoted to Commander in 1894 he served as Executive Officer of the battleship HMS Barfleur during the Allied occupation of Crete in 1897 following the Greco-Turkish uprising on this island. Patey was appointed to the Naval Intelligence Division in 1899 and on promotion to Captain on 1 January 1900 became Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence. This was an important time in the future development of naval ships and armament giving rise to the Dreadnought era and the impending arms race with Germany.

Marriage and Command

On 12 March 1902 Captain Patey married Mary (Mollie) Augusta Yorke-Davies, the only daughter of the eminent Harley Street physician Dr Nathaniel Yorke-Davies. They were later to have two children, Rodney and Lorna. Lady Mary is remembered as an elegant chatelaine of Sydney’s picturesque Admiralty House with a Sydney newspaper columnist referring to her as ‘gay, natural and full of enthusiasm’.

Somewhat unusually Patey, who had never held command, was in November 1902 appointed Captain of the newly commissioned battleship HMS Venerable,flagship of Rear Admiral Mediterranean Fleet. In 1905 a second command beckoned in the same fleet as captain of another battleship HMS Implacable.For a big ship man in a hurry there was a quiet period when in November 1907 he became Inspecting Captain of Boys’ Training Ships. At this time the Royal Navy received most of its recruits from these training ships who were well grounded in naval routines and proved excellent seamen. This sinecure was not to last long with promotion to Rear Admiral on 2 January 1909 and later the plum posting in the Home Fleet as commander Second Division of the Second Battle Squadron.

 An Australian Command

Since federation of the Australian colonies in 1901 and formation of a Commonwealth Government a greater degree of independence was sought from the Imperial authority which extended to local command of defence forces. Amalgamation of colonial forces took time and replacement ships were sought to meet the needs of the newly formed Pacific nation. A small but well balanced force of new ships was built and Britain and by 1913 these were being readied for their voyage to the far end of the world.

Rear Admiral Patey’s appointment as the first commander of an Australian Fleet may have been influenced by the following. Firstly Sir George Reid, an advocate of Federation and former Prime Minister, who in 1910 became High Commissioner in London with a responsibility for overseeing construction of the Australian fleet – Lady Florence Reid launched HMAS Australia.Second was the influential retired naval captain Robert Muirhead Collins (later Sir Robert) who was the initial Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Defence before his appointment as Official Secretary to the High Commission. The final member of this interest group was Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson1who was instrumental in designing the structure for an Australian Fleet.

Admiral Patey’s Australian Service Record shows little of interest other than that he was appointed as a Rear Admiral in the Permanent Naval Force (PNF) on 23 June 1913 for a period of at least two years at a salary of £1,095.00 pa with Table Money of £1,642.10. On 14 September 1914 he was appointed a Vice Admiral in the PNF at a salary of £1,460 pa with the same Table Money plus War Service pay of £409 pa.

 

HMAS Australia

The famous Admiral Sir John (Jacky) Fisher is credited with modernising the Royal Navy and will forever be associated with the new type of battleship HMS Dreadnought which made other capital ships obsolete. Following this success Fisher envisioned another slightly smaller ship with similar offensive power but greater speed. To achieve this, armour protection was sacrificed for greater speed in a new type of vessel called a battle-cruiser. In 1905 the first of a new Invincible class was laid down. After lessons learned from their service three more improved Invincibles commenced, HM Ships Indefatigable and New Zealand and HMAS Australia.Each was of 18,800 displacement tons, with a length of 590 feet (179.8 m), 80 feet (24.4 m) beam and 30 feet (9.2 m) deep draught. Their armament comprised 8 x 12-inch, 14 x 4-inch guns and 2 x 18-inch torpedo tubes. They had a maximum speed of 25 knots, an economic endurance of 6,700 nautical miles and complement (as flagship) of 850 men. Later experience at the Battle of Jutland demonstrated shortcomings in their design when three battle-cruisers were sunk. Interestingly at this time the battle-cruiser Kongo was also being built in England for the Imperial Japanese Navy and she sailed from Portsmouth a month after Australia.With the latest 14-inch guns Kongo was one of the most heavily armed ships in the world.

HMAS Australia – from early postcard

Following successful gun, torpedo and machinery trials Australia commissioned at Portsmouth on 21 June 2013, under the command of Captain Stephen H. Radcliffe, RN. The battle-cruiser was inspected by HM King George V on 30 June 2013 and on that occasion Rear Admiral Patey received the singular honour of being knighted by his sovereign on the quarterdeck of Australia,an honour first bestowed by Queen Elizabeth on that legendary English hero and bane of the Spanish Main, Sir Francis Drake, some three centuries before.

On 21 July 1913 Australia sailed from Portsmouth and proceeded via Cape Verde (taking on 2,000 tons of coal) to Cape Town. Here she met with the new light cruiser HMAS Sydney which had departed from England before her. The locals turned out in force to welcome the visiting ships and were keen to compare the battle-cruiser with her sister ship New Zealand which had visited a few weeks earlier on her homeward voyage. The two ships then proceeded to Jervis Bay where they were joined by the cruisers HMAS Melbourne and HMS Encounter(on loan from the RN) and the destroyers HMA Ships Parramatta, Warrego and Yarra and readied themselves for an official fleet entry into Sydney Harbour.

A Personal Interview

The arrival of the first Australian Fleet in Sydney on 4 October 1913 was a platform for celebration and rejoicing – the nation had come of age. In those times public figures were often remote and courting media attention was unusual. It was therefore something of a coup when two days later on 6 October that the then Vice Admiral Sir George Patey granted an interview to a correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald. A few weeks previously he had a similar dialogue with a newspaper correspondent in Cape Town. In keeping with the traditions of ‘The Silent Service’ these interviews were restricted to precisely five minutes. A summary taken from these newspapers provides a personal glimpse of the man.

He is 54 years of age, of medium height, with aquiline features and iron grey hair. There is an engaging smile beneath sternly set features, which underlies a genial personality. Like the majority of sailors he is a modest public speaker but demonstrates a degree of eloquence. He is an admirer of the Henderson Scheme for naval defence. The Admiral noted that half of the men under his command were Australian and they came with good physique. The other half were from the Royal Navy or the Reserves. It would take some time to train all of these into a cohesive unit but they were all the same to him, he said, and they would all be officers and men of the Royal Australian Navy. He noted the opportunities in the Royal Australian Navy were greater than in Britain for promotion and that the pay was much better.

To those on the lower deck, often with discerning powers of observation, their Fleet Commander was known as ‘Gentle Annie’. A popular song of this period had lyrics which included: Fair and lovely Annie, Your gentle ways have won me. Their observation is possibly a parody on stern looks but a gentle demeanour.

War comes to the Pacific

Having worked in naval intelligence and attending war college before his flag appointment Patey had witnessed the great arms race between Britain and Germany and would have known better than most that a war was imminent. He therefore wasted no time in ensuring his new fleet was well trained and prepared. At the commencement of hostilities between Britain and Germany on 4 August 1914 the RAN was on a war footing and ready for action. At this time his Fleet comprised:

Battle cruiser Australia

Light cruisers Melbourne& Sydney and Brisbane (building)

Light cruiser Encounter(lent by Admiralty)

Torpedo boats Parramatta, Yarra and Warrego (and three others building)

Submarines A.E.Iand A.E.2

Ex-colonial and Admiralty ships Pioneer,Protector, Gayundah, Childers and Countess of Hopetoun (mostly obsolete)

The French cruiser Montcalm served with the Australian Fleet during 1914

The Japanese cruisers Chikuma and Ibukialso supported the Australian Fleet early in WWI.

At the start of the war there were 3,800 men in the PNF and 1,646 (mainly Reservists) in the Naval Brigade. At its peak, before large scale demobilisation in 1919, these numbers had increased to 5,250 PNF and 2,817 in the Naval Brigade. In addition there were 3,092 cadets under compulsory training schemes at the start of hostilities which had increased to 3,834 by 1919. Of the PNF figures, about twenty per cent were on loan from the Royal Navy.

On 2 August 1914 the Australian Naval Board established an Examination Service to check arrivals and departures of shipping at defended ports. Two days later on declaration of war this led to the capture of a number of German merchant ships that were in port or within Australian waters. On 3 August the RAN was placed under Admiralty control; on the evening of the same day the German passenger liner Seydlitz managed to slip quietly out of Sydney Harbour and make passage to Chile where she joined von Spee’s squadron.

While the Great War, afterwards known as WW I, was mainly a European conflict, it extended into the Indian and Pacific theatres as the Allies pursued the conquest of German colonies, closed German merchant trade and eliminated the threat from German naval forces. The most significant military action was the Japanese siege of Tsingtao, in what is now China, but smaller actions were also fought in German New Guinea and German East Africa. The German Navy also skilfully used commerce raiders and mined Australian and New Zealand waters with significant effect. Patey’s ships were also responsible for protecting convoys carrying troops and provisions to the Middle East in support of the Mother Country.

In August 1914 the only direct threat posed to both Australia and New Zealand was from the German East Asiatic Squadron, principally comprising the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and light cruisers Nurnberg, Leipzig, and Emden, under the command of Vice Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee. The light cruiser Dresden, at this time in the West Indies, made haste south to join von Spee, just managing to elude a British squadron under command of Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock making its way down the east coast of South America and she was able to transmit to von Spee details of Cradock’s squadron. Dresden joined her sisters off Easter Island on 12 September. Another ancient light cruiser Geier, operating off German East Africa, also attempted to join von Spee but was hampered by being low on fuel and with mechanical problems, forcing her to make to the neutral port of Honolulu. Here she was hemmed in by Japanese cruisers and was eventually interned by the United States.

The only Allied naval ship in southern waters that could outclass the enemy was Australia, as by this time New Zealand had returned to the First Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet. New Zealand commenced her return journey leaving Auckland in June 1913 making a leisurely passage across the Pacific as far north as Vancouver before proceeding south, two years before the opening of the Panama Canal2, with calls at Callao and Valparaiso before rounding Cape Horn and making her way to Britain where she arrived in November 1913. During this period the New Zealand Station remained dependent upon naval support from the Royal Naval China Station with an allocation of four older light cruisers and one sloop.

Relative Naval Strengths in the Pacific Theatre

While the Royal Navy outnumbered all other nations in the size and strength of its fighting ships it had allowed its China Station to decline in favour of building its forces in the Home Fleet to combat an increasing German presence. In August 1914 the China Fleet under command of Vice Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram had the cruisers HM Ships Monitor, Hampshire and Yarmouth and five destroyers at his disposal at his main base of Weihaiwei. The battleship HMS Triumph3, the light cruiser HMS Newcastle and the French cruiser Duplix were further south at Hong Kong.

The East Indies Station based at Colombo had been reduced to the obsolete battleship HMS Swiftsure4and the light cruiser HMS Dartmouth. The Imperial Russian Fleet at Vladivostok was depleted by the Russo-Japanese War with new tonnage going to the Baltic Fleet. The flagship Zhemchug when visiting Penang was to meet Emden with devastating results.

Although not required by the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan pledged support to Britain and formally declared war against Germany on 23 August 1914. While the European navies might not yet consider Japan an equal and doubted its capabilities, Japan had a vast fleet of 14 battleships and battle-cruisers, 13 armoured cruisers, 10 light cruisers and 50 destroyers and other vessels. As time would tell its standards of training were of the highest order and its ships highly efficient.

Immediately upon entry into the war Japanese forces were concentrated as the major partner in an Anglo-Japanese assault on the German fortress and naval base of Tsingtao (modern Qingdao) which was known as the Gibraltar of the East. The German garrison was stoutly defended and did not surrender until 7 November 1914. Admiral von Spee had left behind an antiquated Austro-Hungarian cruiser Kaiserin Elizabeth and some small craft which were lost in battle. In turn German torpedo boats sank a Japanese cruiser and a destroyer. It was a vicious siege with over 2,000 Allied (mostly Japanese) casualties and 700 German casualties.

While the Japanese Second Fleet was involved at Tsingtao, ships of the First Fleet joined with British, French and Australian ships in searching for von Spee’s cruisers. The Japanese also took the opportunity to increase their footprint in the Pacific through the capture of German colonies in the Caroline Islands, Marshall Islands and most of the Mariana Islands.

Belatedly another British naval squadron under Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock was dispatched around Cape Horn to plug the remaining escape route open to the Germans. The Fourth Cruiser Squadron which also doubled as a training squadron was renamed the South Atlantic Squadron. It mainly comprised obsolete ships and was not a front line unit suitable to take action against a determined and superior enemy.

Australian and New Zealand Pacific Campaigns

Pre-empting further Japanese expansion south of the equator, both Australia and New Zealand quickly formed expeditionary forces leading to the capture of German colonies. The first land offensive was the occupation of German Samoa by New Zealand forces. The campaign to take Samoa ended without bloodshed after over 1,000 New Zealanders landed on the German colony, supported by an Australian and New Zealand squadron led by Australia and the French cruiser Montcalm.

In August 1914 the Australian Government raised an Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force of 1,500 Army volunteers and 500 men from the Naval Brigades to secure German colonial possessions to the north of Australia. These troops were transported in the P&O liner Berrima which had been commissioned into the RAN. After a sweep of New Guinea waters by Patey’s squadron with no sight of von Spee’s ships a detachment from the Naval Brigade landed to silence a radio station at Bita Paka. They were repulsed by German led native troops but with reinforcements the radio station was captured with minimum casualties. It took several more days to reach the headquarters of the German Governor at Tooma and he proved obstructive. But following a bombardment by Encounter the German territories were surrendered on 17 September. Tragically the submarine AE1which was on patrol off Rabaul on 15 September was lost without trace with her crew of 34 officers and men. With the capture of two small German ships most of the squadron was dispersed with Encounter sent to patrol between Fiji and Samoa on the lookout for enemy ships.

 The German East Asia Squadron – We seek him here – We seek him there.

The elusive Scarlet Pimpernel who frustrated French authorities in their search for him gave rise to that famous parody ‘We seek him here – We seek him there’. Maximilian Graf von Spee became such a character frustrating a huge Allied naval force seeking him throughout the vast expanse of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It was inevitable that he would eventually be discovered and defeated but he gave a great account of himself and the officers and men under his command.

                Map showing voyage of von Spee’s squadron across the Pacific

At the declaration of war the German squadron was more than capable of defying the British China Fleet with the only potential threat coming from the Australian Fleet then many thousand miles to the south. Von Spee was particularly wary of the Australian flagship describing her as superior to his entire force. When Japan entered the war with her huge fleet it was inevitable that the German East Asia Squadron withdraw from Tsingtao and attempt to make its way back to the Fatherland.

Von Spee first brought his forces to Pagan Island in the Marianas where they reprovisioned and readied themselves to fight their way out of the Pacific. To retain the initiative von Spee devised a strategy designed to confuse and split the superior forces opposed to him. In this way his concentrated cruiser squadron would have a chance of clearing the Pacific or at least finding shelter in a neutral South American country. Emden was despatched from the main squadron to create as much noise as possible in the east of the Indian Ocean and disrupt shipping lanes. The armed merchant cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich was dispatched into the west of the Indian Ocean. This would divert Allied forces and permit the remainder of the squadron to move southeast away from potential Australian and Japanese forces towards the west coast of South America.

For a time Allied forces were unable to locate von Spee’s squadron, but in early September 1914, it attacked the British outpost on Fanning Island and destroyed the wireless station there. On 14 September, Emden appeared in the Bay of Bengal, where she sank five merchant ships and captured a sixth. Furthermore, on 22 September she bombarded Madras and on 27 September attacked Penang and sank the Russian cruiser Zhemchug and a French destroyer Mousquet. While in the Pacific, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau bombarded Tahiti on 22 September.

Emden’s luck ran out on 9 November 1914; when attempting to destroy radio installations on the Cocos Islands to the south of Java she was intercepted by the light cruiser Sydney.In the RAN’s first major engagement Emden was driven ashore and destroyed by gunfire with the loss of 136 men killed, plus 70 injured. The Australian losses were 4 killed and 16 injured.

Patey’s Dilemma

Admiral Patey considered the German’s could adopt one of four options:

  1.  Break out into the Indian Ocean via Malaysia
  2.  Reach the Indian Ocean by proceeding south of Australia
  3.  Continue operations in Australasian waters
  4.  Make for the coast of South America and thence reach the South Atlantic

Patey believed they would take the fourth course but felt unable to act until he had definite evidence of their intentions. On 17 September 1914 Patey received a telegram from the Admiralty advising of a changing situation with the appearance of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at Samoa and Emden in the Bay of Bengal. He was ordered to take Australia and Montcalm and cover Encounter from potential attack in New Guinea and then search for the enemy cruisers. Melbourne was to be used at the Admiral’s discretion and Sydney for convoying Australian troops to Aden in company with a Royal Navy and Japanese cruisers. Hampshire and Yarmouth from the China Fleet would search for Emden.

Patey, after conferring with his French counterpart Rear Admiral Albert Huguet, left Rabaul on 1 October taking his squadron east hoping to make radio contact with the Japanese ships operating to the north. While they were able to hear the Japanese they failed to respond to messages transmitted from the Australian flagship. Meanwhile the Australian Naval Board informed Patey that the German heavy cruisers had again been located when they raided
Tahiti and their light cruisers were operating off the South American coast. The Admiralty, which had received conflicting advice from British merchant ships, thought the heavy cruisers might return towards Samoa, Fiji or New Zealand. Accordingly they ordered Patey to make his headquarters at Suva.

Chile and the Falklands

The next engagement was fought off the coast of Chile, this was the decisive Battle of Coronel on 1 November 1914. A British squadron under Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock was sent to destroy the German ships. Craddock’s squadron was possibly more reliant on tradition of a naval service which had not suffered defeat in more than a century than the standard of its ships and training. The outcome was a devastating defeat with two British cruisers sunk and the remainder being forced to flee. Over 1,500 Royal Naval sailors died including the admiral while only three Germans were wounded.

The euphoria did not last long as the Admiralty, stung by the defeat at Coronel, despatched a powerful squadron from the Grand Fleet to intercept the Germans. This squadron was under the command of Vice Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, who wore his flag in the battle-cruiser Invincible. Included in his squadron was another battle-cruiser and six cruisers. Sturdee had previously served on the Australia Station and had been the first captain of New Zealand. The two forces met off the Falkland Islands on 7 December. The German ships were now low on coal and with most of their ammunition expended were no match for the superior RN ships and were soon defeated. Admiral Von Spee went down with his flagship and perished with about 2,000 of his countrymen.

                            German squadron at Valparaiso after Coronel                      – USN Historical Centre

The only German vessels to escape the Falklands engagement were the light cruiser Dresden and the auxiliary Seydlitz. Seydlitz fled into the Atlantic before being interned by neutral Argentina, while Dresden turned about and steamed back into the Pacific. She then took to commerce raiding without much success, until March 1915 when her engines began to fail. Without means of getting repairs, the German light cruiser sailed into neutral Chilean waters at the island of Mas a Tierra and here on 14 March she was cornered by British naval forces. After a short engagement in which four of her crew were killed Dresden was forced to scuttle with her crew interned by Chilean authorities.

The war ends in the Indian and Pacific Oceans

The AMC Prinz Eitel Friedrich had made her way from the Indian Ocean via Cape Horn into the Atlantic where she was unsuccessfully hunted by Royal Naval ships. On 10 March 1915 she sought sanctuary at the United States port of Newport, News where she was interned.

In 1915 the aged light cruiser Pioneer joined the East African campaign and on 6 July in an indecisive action engaged the cruiser SMS Konigsberg and later was involved in shore bombardments. A disguised armed German raider Wolf remained at large and sank 12 Allied merchant ships and laid minefields in shipping lanes off the north of New Zealand and the south east of Australia. Wolf was never captured and her mines were not finally swept until 1918. The sailing ship Seeadler also used as a raider was more of a romantic nuisance than a threat, she eventually foundered on an atoll in the Society Islands but her crew and prisoners escaped ashore. Her captain von Luckner took an open boat to Fiji with a small party where they were captured and interned in New Zealand. The remainder escaped by capturing a passing schooner which reached Easter Island with her crew interned by the Chileans in October 1917. The United States was involved in at least one hostile encounter with Germans in the Pacific during WWI when on 7 August 1917 SMS Kormoran was scuttled at Guamto prevent her capture by the auxiliary cruiser USS Supply.

Australia continues into the Atlantic

It was not until early December that Australia was ordered to proceed to England for service with the Home Fleet. She arrived at Valparaiso on 26 December where she took on coal and
then transited the Magellan Strait where a propeller was scraped on a rocky outcrop. She however continued and intercepted the German auxiliary Eleonore Woermann which was
captured and her crew taken off before being sunk by gunfire, Australia firing her only shots in anger during the whole of her service. Australia called at the Falklands to assess any
potential damage before proceeding to England, arriving at Plymouth on 28 January 1915.

On reaching England Australia was made flagship of the Second Battle-Cruiser Squadron in company with New Zealand and Indefatigable. Admiral Patey being senior to the upcoming star Sir David Beatty, was persuaded to accept a new posting as Commander-in-Chief of the North American and West Indies Station which included Melbourne and Sydney. Vice Admiral Patey’s flag was hauled down in Australia on 7 March 1915 although command of the Australian Fleet was not handed over to his successor Rear Admiral William Pakenham until 23 September 1916. On 1 January 1918 Sir George Patey was promoted Admiral.

 Reflections

The British strategy of concentrating its capital ships in Home waters at the expense of its China Fleet was sound providing it gave the Japanese authority to assume Allied responsibilities in this region. Not surprisingly it was reluctant to do this and as a result a smaller German force was able to exploit a poorly implemented command structure of a much superior Allied force.

The naval strategy adopted by the Allies appears disjointed and was hampered by the promotion of local enterprises for territorial gains of ex-German colonial possessions. Delays were also encountered by the reluctance of the Australian and New Zealand Governments to allow their troop transports to proceed without superior convoy protection – possibly unknown, their only potential enemy was the lone cruiser Emden.Had Patey taken Australia directly across the Pacific and joined Cradock’s squadron the disaster off Coronel might have been avoided.

After the Battle of Coronel, on 15 November, the Australian Governor-General was prompted, possibly urged by Patey, to transmit a message to the British Government complaining of bungled naval strategy and time wasted over Samoa and New Guinea rather than first seeking to destroy the enemy’s ships. He reaches the conclusion that ships of the Australian and China Fleets have been ineffective owing to remote and poor Admiralty control and that this has allowed the concentration of German forces off the coast of Chile with lamentable results. These comments would not have endeared Patey to the Admiralty and have adversely affected his future career.

George Patey had but one opportunity for greatness in bringing von Spee to action but this was never within his grasp. There were too many distractions, some planted by the enemy’s clever ruse which divided the Allies and had them chasing shadows. The greatest offenders were those seeking territorial gains at the expense of perusing the German squadron with all speed leading to its destruction. Patey must have been frustrated with a difficult command structure which left the Australian Naval Board virtually ineffective and, in dealing with a remote Admiralty. By the time Patey reached England he may have been past his prime and others such as Beatty, possibly with lesser talents, had found favour in seeking prized commands.

Admiral Sir George Patey should be remembered as a highly proficient officer who took a fledging Australian Fleet to its new homeland and ensured it was prepared and ready to take its place as a fighting unit amongst the world’s leading naval powers. This was achieved and as our first Fleet Commander he provided a sound platform for others to follow. Not leaving a great trail of personal documents there is difficultly in judging his character, suffice to say he was intelligent, energetic and resourceful man who maintained dignity and was held in high regard by those who served with him. In January 1919, at his own request, Admiral Patey was placed on the retired list; he lived in Plymouth and died there on 5 February 1935 aged 76. His wife Lady Mary predeceased him, having died at Plymouth on 27 May 1930.

 

1 In May 1910 retired Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson was invited by the Australian Government to provide advice on future naval infrastructure. His somewhat optimistic report provided the blueprint for future planning of ships, depots and manpower.

2 Although officially opened in August 1915 the Panama Canal was not available to belligerent nations in the Great War until after United States participation in the war in April 1917.

3 & 4 Ironically both Triumphand Swiftsure were laid down as the Chilean battleships Constitucion and Libertad but owing to financial difficulties were bought off the stocks by the Admiralty.

 

Bibliography

Bromby, Robert, German Raiders of the South Seas, Sydney: Doubleday, 1985.

Carlton, Mike, First Victory 1914, Sydney: William Heinemann, 2013.

Delano, Anthony, They Sang Like Kangaroos – Australia’s Tinpot Navy in the Great War,Melbourne: Arcadia, 2012.

Department of Defence (Navy), An Outline of Australian Naval History, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976.

Etherton, P.T. & Hessell Tilman, H., Japan: Mistress of the Pacific, London: Jarrolds, 1933.

Fazio, Vince,Monograph– The Battlecruiser HMAS Australia – First Flagship of the Royal AustralianNavy, Sydney: Naval Historical Society of Australia, 2000.

Gillett, Ross,Australian & New Zealand Warships 1914-1945, Sydney: Doubleday,1983.

Grove, Eric (Ed), Great Battles of the Royal Navy, London: Bramley Books, 1994.

Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War I, London, 1919.

Jose, A.W.,Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. IX, The Royal Australian Navy,Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1928.

Newspapers – various reports from newspapers published between 1913 and 1916 in Australia, Britain, New Zealand and South Africa.

Roberts, John A., Warship Monographs – Invincible Class,London: Conway, 1972.

Saxon, Timothy D., Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation, 1914-1918,Faculty Publications and Presentations, Paper 5, 2000. ˂http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/history_fac_pubs/5˃. Accessed 03 March 2014.

Service Record George Edwin Patey – The National Archives (UK) ADM/196/39

Service Record George Edwin Patey – Australian National Archives

Tromben-Corbalan, Carlos, The Chilean Navy: Two Centuries of Service, Sydney: Naval Historical Review, December 2013.

 

 

 

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