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Ship design and development

Occasional Paper 83: Current Australian Ship Naval Building Projects

This story, which was first published in the Australian Naval Architect, Volume 24 Number dated 2 May 2020 is reproduced with thanks to the Australian Division of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects.

More Patrol Boats for the RAN

The Commonwealth Government announced on 1 May that it will spend around $350 million to build six new Cape-class patrol boats for the Royal Australian Navy.

The vessels will be built by Austal in Western Australia, securing Australian shipbuilding jobs and maintaining strong border protection.

The Australian Border Force currently operates eight Cape-class patrol boats, while the Navy operates two leased vessels.

The six new Cape-class patrol boats will grow the patrol boat force to 16 vessels, while the new, larger Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels are introduced into service.

The Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon. Linda Reynolds CSC, said that the new vessels will play an important role in keeping Australia’s borders safe, while Navy’s new capability is brought online.

“These vessels will not only enhance national security, but will provide important economic stimulus and employment continuity during the COVID-19 pandemic,” Minister Reynolds said.

“The ability to build more of these vessels in Australia will deliver Australian industry content of more than 65 per cent, providing significant opportunities for Australian industry and Defence, as well as more than 1200 workers in the broader Australian supply chain.”

Austal Chief Executive Officer, David Singleton, said that the new contract both reaffirmed the Cape class as Australia’s pre-eminent patrol-boat platform and represented a clear commitment by the Australian Government to strengthen Australia’s sovereign shipbuilding industry during a challenging global environment, brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic.

“Since its introduction by the Australian Border Force (ABF) in 2013, the Cape class has proven to be a high-performing, reliable and effective maritime asset, utilised for a wide variety of constabulary and naval missions, playing a critical role in Australia’s national security,” Mr Singleton said. “With ten Capes currently in operation with the ABF and RAN, it is a smart, logical step to build upon the existing fleet with additional vessels which will enhance the nation’s ability to protect and secure our maritime borders.

“These new, evolved Capes add even greater national security at this critical time during the COVID-19 pandemic, by ensuring that at least 700 jobs are maintained at Austal, and supply chain opportunities continue for Australia’s shipbuilding industry.”

Austal is to build six evolved Cape-class patrol boats for the Royal Australian Navy (Image courtesy Austal)

Based on Austal’s proven 58 m aluminium monohull design, the new RAN evolved Capes will include a number of enhancements which further extend the capability of the vessel and the fleet. These evolved Cape-class patrol boats include modifications determined through the extensive in-service experience of the RAN and ABF Capes currently operating throughout Northern Australia.

Crew capacity has been increased by 10 people, to now total 32, and quality-of-life provisions have been enhanced, ensuring that those who operate the new Capes have connectivity to the outside world regardless of the operating environment. Further improvements have been incorporated into the new RAN Cape-class design, developed during the design and construction of two Cape-class patrol boats for the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard, an export contract awarded on 16 August 2019 and won with the strong support of the Australian Government and Export Finance Australia.

The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard Capes are currently in an advanced state of construction and are scheduled for delivery later in 2020. Construction of the six Capes for the RAN will commence immediately at Austal’s Henderson shipyard, with deliveries scheduled from September 2021, then successively through to mid-2023.

 Progress with the Offshore Patrol Vessel Program

On 9 April the National Shipbuilding Program reached another milestone with the ceremonial keel laying of the second Arafura-class offshore patrol vessel (OPV) in Adelaide.

The Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon. Linda Reynolds CSC, said that the keel laying reinforced the continued progress and ongoing success story of Government’s continuous shipbuilding endeavour in Australia.

“The Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels are larger than the Armidale-class patrol boats currently in service with the Royal Australian Navy, and will offer greater endurance and capability for patrolling Australia’s maritime borders,” Minister Reynolds said.

“Over the past 10 months, Luerssen Australia and ASC Shipbuilding have contributed an enormous effort to build and commence consolidation of the keel blocks which, when complete, will be part of a 1600 t ship.

“Defence and industry are working closely together to support our sovereign shipbuilding programs and Australian jobs in these challenging times, in a way which is safe for employees and the community.”

The Minister for Defence Industry, the Hon. Melissa Price MP, said that the OPV program is creating jobs right across the supply chain.

“This project is estimated to create around 600 jobs involving more than 300 small and medium businesses, reinforcing the Morrison Government’s commitment to maximising Australian industry involvement in our $90 billion shipbuilding program,” Minister Price said.

“The project also highlights Australian industry’s ability to deliver on schedule, with construction of the first offshore patrol vessel to be built in Western Australia commencing ahead of schedule.

The forward and aft hull modules of NUSHIP Arafuracoming together at Osborne recently (Defence photograph)

The Chief of Navy, VADM Michael Noonan AO RAN, announced that the second OPV will be commissioned as HMAS Eyre when it comes into operational service in early 2023.

“The next four OPVs will be named HMAS Pilbara, HMAS Gippsland, HMAS Illawarra and HMAS Carpentaria,” VADM Noonan said.

The OPVs being built by ASC Shipbuilding at Osborne Naval Shipyard are setting the foundation of continuous shipbuilding prior to prototyping commencing on the Hunter-class frigate program this year.

Construction of the first offshore patrol vessel (OPV) to be built in Western Australia began at the end of March. The future HMAS Pilbara will be the first to be built at the Civmec shipyard in Henderson, Western Australia.

After the first two vessels built by Luerssen Australia and ASC in Adelaide, the remaining ten vessels will be constructed by Luerssen Australia and Civmec at Henderson.

Luerssen Australia is the prime contractor working with key shipbuilding partners Civmec in Western Australia and ASC OPV Shipbuilder in South Australia to deliver the OPV capability for the Royal Australian Navy.

Evyenia Kontakos, fourth-year apprentice welder and boilermaker and Larry Lavallee, Offshore Patrol Vessel Block Construction Manager, ASC Shipbuilding, after hammering in wedges to secure the Chief of Navy’s ceremonial coin in place during the keel laying ceremony of Offshore Patrol Vessel 2, NUSHIP Eyre (RAN photograph)

Last Air-warfare Destroyer Delivered

In a ceremony in Adelaide on 28 February, the Royal Australian Navy’s third air-warfare destroyer, NUSHIP Sydney, was officially handed over to Defence. NUSHIP Sydney is the last of the three ships being delivered by the Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance which includes the Department of Defence, Raytheon Australia, and ASC Shipbuilding supported by Navantia Australia.

The Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon. Linda Reynolds CSC, attended the acceptance ceremony at the Osborne Naval Shipyard in Adelaide. “Today’s milestone demonstrates the success of the Government’s Naval Shipbuilding Plan,” Minister Reynolds said.

“While the delivery of NUSHIP Sydney marks the end of this program, it represents an exciting time for the National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise, as we continue to build upon the unique skills developed at this precinct and transfer them across the whole shipbuilding ecosystem. “I congratulate the 5000 workers who have worked directly on this program over the past decade, from the design phase through to the construction, integration and delivery of these magnificent ships.

NUSHIP Sydney entering Sydney Heads on 27 March at the end of her delivery voyage from South Australia (RAN photograph)

“The significance of this success cannot be understated and is reflected in the truly world-class capability of these warships, and the naval shipbuilding and combat system integration skills that have been developed at Osborne.”

NUSHIP Sydney arrived at her home port at Fleet Base East in Sydney on 27 March 2020 and commissioned into the RAN on 19 May 2020.

Further Reading

The Government of Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Plan, released on 16 May 2017, outlines the Government’s vision for the Australian naval shipbuilding enterprise and the significant investment required in coming decades.  It is available at https://defence.gov.au/NavalShipbuilding/Plan/

Royal Australian Navy, Arafura Class OPV, available at https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/future/opv

Royal Australian Navy, ADV Cape Fourcroy, available at https://www.navy.gov.au/adv-cape-fourcroy

 

HMAS Sydney (III) and her Propellers

We recently became aware of two propellers from HMAS Sydney (III) not far away from one another in the Shoalhaven. One was at the recently named Jervis Bay Maritime Museum (ex-Lady Denman Museum) at Huskisson and the other at the Fleet Air Arm Museum at HMAS Albatross at Nowra. The first of these is three-bladed and the latter four-bladed. Discussions with those who had sailed in the carriers Sydney and HMAS Melbourne and dockyard workers who had refitted them confirmed that these ships did indeed have three-bladed propellers on their port shafts and four-bladed propellers on their starboard shafts. No further explanation was forthcoming other than that the ships had suffered vibration problems.

Aircraft Carrier Designs

It was not until 1938 that the Royal Navy (RN) commissioned HMS Ark Royal, its first purpose built aircraft carrier. She was followed by others of the Illustrious and Implacable classes. These ships were expensive and took immense resources in design and construction. As an interim measure the need for a number of Light Fleet Carriers (LFC) was identified. These ships were designed and constructed by commercial shipyards as an intermediate step between the full-sized fleet aircraft carrier and the much smaller Utility Escort Carriers built from mercantile hulls with limited capability.

The LFCs first comprised the Colossus class: HM Ships Colossus, Glory, Ocean, Venerable, Vengeance, Warrior, Theseus, and Triumph. In addition, two Aircraft Maintenance Ships HM Ships Perseus and Pioneer were laid down as Colossus class. These ships were followed by the redesigned LFCs of the Majestic class: HM Ships Majestic, TerribleI, Magnificent, Hercules, Leviathan and Powerful. The Light Fleet Carriers were designed as disposable warships, using available materials, with a planned three-year service life. They exceeded these expectations handsomely and later helped form the basis of Fleet Air Arms in a number of countries.

Engine configurations of both the Colossus and Majestic classes were similar. The machinery was arranged in two compartments each containing two Admiralty 3-drum boilers feeding a Parsons geared turbine which were staggered, with the starboard compartment forward of the port. They provided 40,000 shp (30,000 kW) to two shafts driving two 3‑bladed propellers giving the ships a maximum speed of 25 knots. This meant the starboard propeller shaft was longer than the port shaft, which may have led to torsional vibration causing extra stress to the starboard propeller shaft.

Pioneer commissioned in February 1945, sailed the next month to join the British Pacific Fleet in Australia as an Aircraft Repair Ship and was later used to ferry aircraft. Possibly during her trials (a date has yet to be established) she suffered a severe implosion in the forward machinery space caused by the snapping of the starboard propeller shaft due to the torque applied to the much longer shaft. During repairs her starboard propeller was replaced with a four-bladed unit; subsequently all ships of the Colossus and Majestic classes had four-bladed propellers fitted to their starboard shafts and no further problems were experienced.

Reference to the above is to be found in Australian Aircraft Carriers 1929-19822 written by the respected RAN shipwright the late Vince Fazio who had served in this class of ship. He states that his information was supplied in 1962 by Mr. A. A. C. Griffiths, OBE, from the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, who specialised in carrier design and the associated problems.

Marine Propeller Design

The design of marine propellers is a complex matter best left to the experts but in general twin screw vessels have counter rotating propellers with identical specifications. The port propeller is usually left handed and the starboard propeller usually right handed. Three-bladed models were most commonly used by the RN as they give a higher maximum speed. However although slightly less efficient, four-bladed models can help reduce vibration and cavitation.

HMAS Sydney 3-bladed propeller at the Jervis Bay Maritime Museum – note this was a spare, unused, propeller obtained from Naval Stores in Sydney. Author.

While ships are known to have been designed with a mix of three- and four-bladed propellers this is usually when there is a centre engine linked to a large four-bladed propeller and two wing engines have smaller three-bladed propellers. No known original designs have been made with the modified system employed in the Colossus and Majestic classes.

This may lead to the conclusion that the three- and four-bladed combination found in the Colossus and Majestic classes was a short-term fix following a critical design failure in Pioneer. This proved so successful that the rest of the ships in these classes were retrofitted and this in turn provided a successful outcome.

Leyland Wilkinson, one of our stalwarts with an immense amount of experience at Garden Island Dockyard, has managed to dig up some details of the Melbourne/Sydney propellers from his old workshop notebooks. These give the following specifications:

Propellers No 2 J. Stone & Co3
Port Starboard
Diameter 14’ 0” 14’ 0”
No of Blades 3 4
Pitch 14’ 3” 13’ 7”
Developed Surface Blades 90 sq ft 99.3 sq ft
Projected Surface Blades 74.82 sq ft nk
Diameter of Boss (Max) 3’ 0” 3’ 0”
Blade Thickness Root 9” 6¾”
Blade Thickness Tip ⅝” 0.43”
Keys Off 2 2
Material Manganese Bronze Manganese Bronze
Direction of Rotation (Ahead) Outward Outward
Propeller Shaft – length4 28’ 5⅛” 28’ 5⅛”
Showing 3 and 4 bladed propellers fitted to ship in dry dock – believed to be HMAS Sydney Vince Fazio archive.

Leyland also provides some common sense argument to the propeller configuration in these ships using the following examples.

In 1831 a detachment of troops from the 60th Rifle Corps were marching four abreast over Broughton Bridge, a suspension bridge spanning the River Irwell near Manchester. It should be noted that the Rifle Corps of light infantry march at 140 paces per minute as opposed to normal infantry at 120 paces per minute. The bridge began to vibrate and then collapsed under them, reportedly due to ‘Mechanical Resonance’ induced by the troops marching quickly in step. As a result, the British Army issued an instruction that henceforth troops should ’Break Step’ when crossing bridges, which remains the current practice.

Could this effect also be applied to the regular beating of equal, multiple propeller blades, as the cause of vibration in lightly built ships driven by powerful engines?

High propeller speeds can also produce ‘cavitation’ by the propeller trying to drive the water astern faster than it can reach the blades from forward, thus forming vacuum pockets. When these collapse, water falls in suddenly and hits the blades with violent hammer like blows. “Change the beat and save the ship!”

RAN Service

In July 1947 the Commonwealth Government approved the formation of the Fleet Air Arm and the acquisition of two Majestic class Light Fleet Carriers. Because the first of these, Terrible, was nearing completion her construction was finished without major modification and she commissioned as HMAS Sydney on 16 December 1948. As her sister Majestic, which was to become HMAS Melbourne, was still undergoing modifications, another LFC, HMS Vengeance,was lent to the RAN as HMAS Vengeance from 1952 to 1955. When Vengeance was returned to the RN her crew transferred to Melbourne which was commissioned on 26 October 1955.

Sydney 4-bladed propeller outside the entrance to the Fleet Air Arm Museum at HMAS Albatross

The ‘Terrible’ Sydney had an exciting career completing two operational missions to Korea as part of United Nations forces opposing the invasion of South Korea, and later when converted as a Fast Troop Transport, supporting Australian forces during the Vietnam War. She finally paid off on 12 November 1973 and in 1975 was sold for scrapping in South Korea.

The ‘Majestic’ Melbourne with her angled flight deck, steam catapult and mirror assisted landing system was able to accept later generation and heavier aircraft. Melbourne was a great asset in developing a balanced fleet but she saw no wartime action. It is unfortunate she is remembered for her part in the sinking of two Allied warships. Melbournedecommissioned on 30 June 1982 and was sold for scrapping in China in 1985.

Should any of our readers have any further information on the history of the strange propeller configurations of Sydneyand Melbourne we should be pleased to hear.

Notes:

  1. While the remainder of the LFCs were constructed at commercial yards Terrible was built at the Devonport Naval Dockyard.
  2. Fazio, Vince, Australian Aircraft Carriers 1929-1982, Naval Historical Society of Australia, Sydney, 1997.
  3. In 1831 Josiah Stone established an engineering workshop specialising in producing cast copper nails for the Thames side shipbuilding industry. By 1881 the company (J. Stone & Co.) had expanded, becoming a specialist in casting large copper propellers. With wartime bombing the company moved to Birkenhead in 1941. During WWII Stone & Co. produced 22,000 propellers for the Royal Navy. Stone Marine Group remains in business providing worldwide services to the shipping industry.
  4. The listed lengths of the two propeller shafts are identical but this only concerns the last section of shafting (sometimes referred to as tail shafts). The length of the total line of shafting to the different engine rooms is not listed, which were made up of Thrust, Intermediate and Propeller shafts coupled together. As discussed in the above paper the overall length of the starboard propeller shafting was longer than that of the port propeller shafting.

 

Radar in the South and Southwest Pacific as at Savo Island in August 1942

By R. W. Madsen

This paper was prepared largely from notes made many years ago when I was at university and living with my grandparents. My grandfather, Sir John Madsen, lived in the Sydney suburb of Roseville.

John Percival Vaissing Madsen (1879-1969) studied both science and engineering in the fields of radioactivity and X-rays. He was awarded a doctorate in 1907 which led to a lectureship in engineering at the University of Sydney, where he became an Assistant Professor in 1912. During WWI he was commissioned into the AMF and commanded the Engineer Officers’ Training School at Moore Park. He returned to university as Foundation Professor of Electrical Engineering and developed a long and fruitful association with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. During WWII he led Australia’s contribution to the Allied development of radio direction finding and air warning systems. In 1941 John Madsen was knighted for his services to science.

Introduction

John Madsen was involved in radar support for the Allies in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) following visits he made to London and Washington in 1940. In 1941 the Radio Physics Laboratory (RPL) in Sydney became a defined sub-centre responsible for research and support to Great Britain.

Prior to leaving for Guadalcanal in July 1942, both HMAS Canberra and USS Chicago required work on their radars. Canberra did acceptance trials on a Type 290 Air Warning Set in conjunction with her Type 271 10 cm microwave surface search radar. Chicago had a CXAM Air and Surface warning set with Sir John assisting in its maintenance. In July 1942, RPL gave a demonstration to the RAN of a Type A271L 10 cm set at South Head which under excellent propagation conditions detected a 6,000-ton ship at 45 miles.

In an action on a dark humid night at Savo Island on 8-9 August 1942, Canberra, leading Chicago on a screening patrol at 12 knots, was attacked with 8‑inch armour piercing shells by several Japanese heavy cruisers. With no warning or ranging from her 271 set and without firing a shot in reply, Canberra was disabled in the space of three minutes. Chicago was hit in the bow by a Long Lance torpedo and taken out of action. It is believed that Chicago’s radars at this time were not in continuous operation. The Japanese cruisers then turned north towards a second US cruiser screening group which was engaged and destroyed, overwhelmed by the surprise and the accuracy of the Long Lance torpedoes and 8-inch AP shells.

In addition to surface warning radars the US cruisers in the Northern Group also had fire control radars which gave accurate ranging. The Japanese cruisers did not go on with an attempted destruction of the 19 transports of the US Amphibious Force which the Allied cruisers were screening.

HMAS Australia, with the light cruiser HMAS Hobart, a veteran of the Japanese night action at Java Sea, were on another screening patrol 11 miles to the east of Savo Island and were not attacked that night. They remained with USS San Juan, with SG 10 cm radar, as the remaining cruiser defence of the Transport Fleet. The radars on Australia and Hobart at this time did not include the Type 271, but Australia later had the updated Type 273.

Outline of HMAS Canberra showing Type 271 Radar

A reconnaissance flight by a B-17 with Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar had been requested for the northern approach to Guadalcanal on the afternoon of 8 August, but this was not carried out and the eight ship Japanese cruiser force remained undetected until only minutes before attacking Canberra. Two US destroyer radar pickets, US Ships Blueand Ralph Talbot, with surface warning radar (Type SC), were on patrols seven miles west of Savo Island steaming at 12 knots. The patrols of these ships had become unsynchronised so that when they reversed course at 0110 the gap between their paths had increased. When the Japanese cruisers passed between them at 0132 the gap was 14 miles and they passed without being detected. Using giant binoculars, the lead Japanese cruiser Chokai first sighted Blue at a distance of about five miles at 0054. The nearest point Ralph Talbot came to the Japanese cruisers was 6.5 miles.

Radar Development – US Navy to April 1942

The Naval Research Laboratory (Radlab) in Washington oversaw USN radar equipment developments. The first production radars delivered to the USN in 1940 were the CXAM and CXAM-1, these were air and surface warning sets. Chicago and CVs Saratoga, Enterprise, Wasp, and Curtiss, a seaplane tender, were fitted with this 1.5 metre equipment. The SC metre wavelength warning radar was developed for smaller ships. Fire Control radars FC and FD at 40 cm were installed from September 1941.

The first 10 cm microwave search radar for the US Navy was the SG developed by Radlab and Raytheon in June 1941 and proved to be one of the most successful radar sets, with the first installation going to sea in April 1942. Saratoga and San Juan had the second and third sets put into operation.

US Navy Guide to the Tactical Use of Radar-March 1942

On 9 March 1942 the C-in-C of the US Fleet issued Radar Bulletin No 1 setting out guidelines on ‘Tactical Use of Radar’. It was acknowledged that radar equipment was continuously undergoing improvements and officers and men associated with it should feel they had some latitude in exploiting its use; the bulletin was a guide for improvement after further experience afloat.

The bulletin covered radar use in aircraft carriers, surface vessels and submarines operating in conditions against Germany and Japan in the Pacific and warned of numerous limitations of navy equipment. The points addressed included:

  • Trouble from hasty installation; above a basic 50 hours training, many more hours were needed for operator proficiency
  • Reduction on operator strain, with two operators to alternate every half hour over two hour watches
  • A scarcity of IFF making ship identification difficult. The enemy could pick up radar transmissions at 250 miles and measures should be taken to reduce this risk
  • Keeping a good lookout was essential, even though radar was being used
  • False contacts may be obtained from ionised layers, most commonly around mid-day, and that at night there would be insufficient time to determine that a signal is false
  • The effectiveness of radar relied on data and orders being passed to the ships concerned in a minimum of time.

The bulletin set out that the Officer in Tactical Control (OTC) was to give orders determining which radar policy was put into effect and that in relation to Radar Guard Ships, the assigned responsibility should be the conduct of a continuous search of a sector using counter RDF measures or such radar control as the OTC may order. It was envisaged that each Radar Guard Ship would search an entire 360 degrees and that when a target enters the sector overlap between adjacent sector Guard Ships, the Guard Ship whose sector the target is leaving notifies the Guard Ship whose sector it is entering. It was recognised that Talk Between Ships (TBS) was the only means then available for rapid communication between ships and was to be put in large ships asap. By using low power at 60 mcs the range was anticipated to be 100 miles.

As a radar policy it was suggested that the following could be considered:

  • Radar transmissions only to be made when air-surface attack is imminent
  • Carry out a sweep every 10 minutes
  • Have no restriction on transmissions when the ship’s location was obvious to the enemy or for transmissions to take place using counter RDF measures.

A Radar Operator’s Log for each set was to be kept including details of the following: the radar policy in effect at all times; other general instructions given to the radar operator; time of commencement of transmission and time ceased; irregularities with the equipment; all unusual observations with the radar; name of the operator and time of start/finish and all initial detections and final observation of each target; time for a CXAM/SC sweep through 360 degrees and not taking counter RDF measures. No specific directions for counter RDF measures should be given, but considerable latitude allowed by following the general rule that the radar transmitter be used for the shortest possible time consistent with an effective search.

Type SG Radar Antenna – circled

Ranges with properly functioning radar equipment generally were more reliable than those obtained by ordinary coincidence or even stereoscopic rangefinders and it was of the utmost importance that all ships’ radars be maintained in perfect operating condition at all times, particularly for ranges greater than 10,000 yards. Optical bearings were always more accurate and reliable than radar bearings and should be used in preference to them.

With CXAM, CXAM-1, FC and FD the reliable range for surface ships was between 5 and 10 miles depending on the size of the ship. SC range was 4 to 10 miles. The antennas were always to be installed at the highest possible points of the ship.

 

Radar Equipment available at this time

CXAM: 1.5 m Air/Surface search, U frame antenna, 14 miles range on a large ship, 50 miles on aircraft.

CXAM-1: 1.5 m Air/Surface search, Mattress array 15 ft x 15 ft 8 inch, 68 miles on aircraft.

SC: 1.36 m, Air/Surface search, Mattress array 8ft 6 in x 7 ft, 4-5 miles on cruiser, A scope.

FC: 40 cm, Fire Control for cruisers, V mesh array, 10 miles range, A scope.

FD: 40 cm, Fire control for destroyers, pair of U mesh for array, 10 miles, A scope.

SG: 10 cm, Air/Surface search, single parabola, 17 miles on destroyer, 9” PPI, 5” A scope.

Type 271: 10 cm, Air/Surface search, Perspex Lantern, parabolas, 17 miles on destroyer.

Type A290: Surface Warning/Gunnery, 1.5 m.

ASV MkII: Airborne Air to Surface Vessel based on UK set adopted by US and Australia, 1.5 m.

 Operations at Savo Island 7-9 August 1942

A Liberator AL 515 fitted with ASV Mk II flew one of the first reconnaissance flights over Guadalcanal in late June 1942 from Garbutt Field at Townsville. Other Liberators, AL 570 and AL 573, probably also fitted with ASV, flew reconnaissance missions to Guadalcanal in July and August. The unit photographer Norman Carlson produced 12,000 prints for preparation of mosaics for the marines and navy before the landings at Guadalcanal on 7 August.

On 31 July 1942 an aircraft from Curtiss (AV-4) at Espritu Santo obtained an aerial photo of the Lunga Point Airfield, Guadalcanal Island. The Japanese had installed a Type II search radar, which when captured was the first example of Japanese radar taken back to the US for examination. It was not until 2 September that the US installed the first Type SCR-270 radar at Henderson Field, followed soon after by two Type SCR-270 AW.

The US Amphibious Force, the first of its type ever assembled, with great speed (but lacking in communication co-ordination), including 20 trans-ports, was able to achieve complete surprise at Guadalcanal on the morning of 7 August having sortied from Fiji over the previous two days without being detected. The Japanese radio traffic analysis had suggested that a major US Naval group had formed in Hawaii but was in fact 3000 miles nearer in Fiji.

At 1325 and 1500 on 7 August the Japanese made two attacks on the transports with bombers and fighters from Rabaul which were broken up by CV fighters located approximately 70 miles to the south west. With warning from Australian Coastwatchers on Bougainville, there was another raid which disrupted the unloading from transports. At 1830 on 7 and 8 August the Fire Support and Screening ships took up their night dispositions along with the transports, and during the 8th marines came ashore to take Henderson Field. At about this time Admiral Fletcher decided he would withdraw the carrier air support one day earlier than was planned on 9 August and that the transports, which were only partly unloaded, would also have to leave but this was delayed by one day after the loss of the air cover. Rear Admiral Crutchley (an RN officer on loan to the RAN) in Australia left his night screening position around 2100 on 8 August to confer on these new arrangements at the poorly equipped command ship McCawley. This left Canberra and Chicago in the Southern Screening Group covering the transports and US Ships Vincennes, Astoria and Quincy remained in the Northern Group with destroyer escorts. The two radar pickets Blue and Ralph Talbot were on the western side of Savo Island with special instructions that if a target was detected warning was to be given and that the target should then be ‘shadowed’.

Reconnaissance by an RAAF Hudson from Milne Bay with no ASV (the Hudson crew was not aware of the operation underway at Guadalcanal because of a secrecy embargo) at 1025 on 8 August indicated that a Japanese force of eight ships located on the eastern side of Bougainville was heading south and appeared to include a seaplane tender. This report was broadcast from Pearl Harbour on Fox and reached Admiral Turner in Guadalcanal at 1845, it was also broadcast on Bells from Canberra at 1817.

Japanese Navy Nikon 120 mm Binoculars

This force had been detected the previous day by a US submarine. A requested reconnaissance flight by a B‑17 for the afternoon of 8 August to cover the area from the northern end of the ‘Slot’ leading south to Guadalcanal was not carried out as an enemy night attack was not envisaged. It was expected that an extensive air search during 8 August would reveal any enemy naval forces heading for Guadalcanal.

At 2345 on 8 August Ralph Talbot detected by radar an unidentified plane flying low over Savo Island heading east towards Tulagi and broadcast on TBS and TBO (portable voice radio) ‘Warning! Warning! Plane over Savo Island heading East’ which was heard by the destroyers Blue and Patterson, the cruisers Vincennes and Quincy and some others. At 2313 the Japanese had despatched two planes to illuminate a course for the cruisers to ‘rush in’ and had previously used scout planes to confirm the Allied Forces disposition. They then developed their tactic of destroying one group first, and then going straight to the second group, and leaving to be clear of Allied planes by sunrise, making no special plans to attack transports.

At 0053 the lead cruiser Chokai sighted Blue with giant binoculars at 10,900 yards and turned to enter from the north passage, but at 0105 reverted back to ‘Enter from South Passage’ realising that she had not been detected by Blue or Ralph Talbot. Blue was lost at Guadalcanal on 22 August 1942.

USS Blue transferring survivors off Guadalcanal 9 August 1942

It would appear that Chokai, leading the column of Japanese cruisers and still undetected, sighted Canberra and Chicago at 12,500 yards around 0132-0136 on 9 August. Japanese 120 mm binoculars used with the larger 150 mm giant Navy Nikon binoculars detected 980 times as much light as the naked eye. Spotters were carefully selected for good night vision and crews were drilled to use flares and searchlights. Some 23 spotters were located on a cruiser.

At 2300 on 8 August, David Medley, Canberra’s young radar officer, visited the 271 radar station and found everything apparently working well. Since sunset all six radar operators had been on four hour watches, two men at a time working half hour tricks. The set was working normally but they were still having trouble with masking from nearby land but with the large number of vessels in working range it was practically impossible to tell friend from foe. Occasionally Canberra saw Blue and Canberra’s escort but if they came in too close they disappeared. Canberra could not see any ships in the Northern Group.

David Medley, a Masters graduate in physics from Melbourne University in 1941, had an interest in ham radio which led him to reply to an RAN advertisement for scientific people to join the navy to work on radar. His first task was to assist at Garden Island while Canberra was having a three-month refit and help to install the Type 271 and Type 290 radars. By the end of May Canberra was back in Sydney after a shakedown cruise to the Melbourne area where two magnetrons were provided to get the 271 working. The essential part of the work for Medley was to try and get the 271 integrated into the ship’s gunnery systems but first he was required to do the calibration work and then later to consider the tactical use of the radar; however at Guadalcanal the Captain and senior officers were not hopeful of the 271 being of any use. There was no telephone communication from the 271 to the bridge, and at the time of the Japanese contact there was no senior officer on the bridge. The scope of the 271 was a 6-inch CRT with range read off the scope and bearings determined from the ship’s head as there was no gyro compass in the radar hut. The aerial was rotated by hand and was located immediately above the transmitter.

In Canberra at about 0100 a plane was heard and this had been reported to the captain. At 0143 an explosion occurred due north, the captain was called and the ship went to Action Stations. Patterson at this time broadcast a TBS ‘Warning! Warning! Three strange ships entering the harbour’ but apparently this was not received in the majority of ships. Within Canberra in the next few minutes, events moved very quickly; while avoiding torpedo tracks across the bow and approaching down the starboard side, a salvo of shells hit the bridge, mortally wounding the captain and other officers, flares dropped by aircraft lighting up the scene. Between 0144 and 0148 Canberra was hit by 24 shells (AP). The ship quickly lost power and listed to starboard. Canberra’s guns were pointing to the port side but she did not fire any rounds. In the confusion it is possible that Canberra was hit by a torpedo on her starboard side fired from USS Bagley.

Canberra was scuttled in the early morning of 9 August. Captain Frank Getting, RAN, later died of wounds, and 84 of his ship’s company were lost. In hindsight, with a better understanding of her damage and what could be done for her in Sydney, she might have been saved.

Chicago was hit in the bow by a torpedo and she veered away to port, but neither Chicago nor Canberra alerted the northern Vincennes group of the Japanese action.

At 0137 Chokai sighted Vincennes in the Northern Group at 18,000 yards (the greatest distance at which visual sighting was reported during the action) and at 0150 Vincennes obtained a radar range on Chokai of 8,250 yards identified by the intermittent use of searchlights by the Japanese to pinpoint the three US cruisers. At 0151 Quincy obtained a range on Aoba using a stereoscopic range finder at 8,400 yards. Repairs to Astoria’s fire control radar had been successfully completed just prior to contact with the Japanese and at 0152, while waiting for orders from the bridge, the gunnery officer made a quick radar check of the report and observed four pips on the forward main battery fire control radar screen. These pips were Chokai, Aoba, Kako and Kinugasa. An initial range of 7,000 yards was obtained on the leading cruiser, which Astoria took as her target. At 0153 the radar range finder range of 6,800 yards on Chokai was correct. At 0155 Astoria was hit and she obtained no more radar ranges and was unable to get visual ranges as the Japanese had turned off their searchlights. By 0159 Astoria had fired off at least seven salvoes on Chokai which received several hits, some also from Quincy.

The three carriers Enterprise, Saratoga and Wasp approaching Guadalcanal on 5 and 6 August had 200-mile reconnaissance flights looking forward and sideways for enemy ships. The range of CXAM-1 on aircraft was 50-100 miles. For the first time the carriers were given the task of providing cover for a major amphibious landing expected to take three days to complete. On the early morning of 7 August Enterprise was positioned 50 miles SE of Guadalcanal near San Cristobal Island and at one hour before sunrise (0535) the carrier planes launched to rendezvous 30 miles west of Guadalcanal in the dark and then at 0615 the bombardment, aerial attack and marine landing commenced. At 1230 a large unidentified plane was detected and the CAP cover was vectored to the north-west by an error of the fighter director on Enterprise reading the wrong side of the azimuth ring on a radar scope, giving the reciprocal bearing. At 1100 Saratogadetected a bogey by radar to the NW at 150 miles which turned out to be a B-17 from Esperitu Santo on a Sector II reconnaissance. Throughout 7 and 8 August air cover was maintained in the face of two concerted Japanese attacks on the afternoon of the 7th by planes from Rabaul and also a further attack on the 8th, warned by the Coastwatchers on Bougainville. Over the two days Enterprise had 372 take-offs and 366 landings where 91 pilots had flown 1,000 hours. At the close of operations on the evening of the 8th, Admiral Fletcher considered his position was well known to the Japanese and it was time to withdraw his three carriers to the southeast. They were 160 miles away when radios began to announce some kind of surface action was taking place at Guadalcanal. The captured airfield at Lunga Point, Henderson Field did not become operational until 19 August.

As Chokai led the Japanese withdrawal around Savo Island north, Ralph Talbot encountered the cruiser Yubary and fired a second salvo using her radar range of 3,300 yards which was accurate. Ralph Talbot received a second hit in the charthouse which destroyed the SC and FD radars and fire control equipment.

At 0225 on 9 August the damaged Chicago had a radar contact at 7,000 yards; at 0232 Bagley was tracking a ship on her port side and at 0341 she was tracking further targets which probably included Patterson proceeding to pass south of Savo Island.

The SG radar on San Juan did not report any radar contacts during the night action and at 0911 on the morning of 9 August her air search radar detected a Japanese reconnaissance plane at 12 miles which remained unmolested for an hour before disappearing at 1004, having reported the presence of 19 transports. At 0700 Saratoga had detected search planes which disappeared at 0743.

Events Subsequent to Savo Island 7-9 August 1942

Following Coral Sea and Midway the third and fourth carrier battles were in the Guadalcanal campaign at the Battle of the Solomon Sea (24-25 August 1942) and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands (25-27 October 1942). Aerial reconnaissance was out to 200 miles with radar plots by Enterprise of raiders out to 88 miles, but on occasions at 50 miles on the CXAM-1. A large four engine flying boat had been detected at 55 miles. The problem with radar plots was to differentiate between friendly scouts and raiders.

The naval Battle of Guadalcanal (12-15 November 1942) was two night actions against the desperate Tokyo Express runs. At 0124 on 13 November, the light cruiser USS Helena detected Japanese ships with her radar and in the ensuing action USS Atlanta was sunk along with four destroyers. Two days later, on the night of 14-15 November the battleship USS Washington, with the effective use of her radar (CXAM-1 and five Fire Control radars), managed to avoid the crippled USS South Dakota and fired 16 inch shells at 8,400 yards, destroying the Japanese battleship Kirishma, which had to be scuttled. The loss of Kirishma was a turning point for Japanese radar when it was realised how significant its use had been in this defeat. (At the Battle of the Bismarck Sea on 2-4 March 1943 the Japanese attempted to reinforce Lae from Rabaul with a convoy of eight destroyers and eight transports but it was decimated after radar and decryption detection preventing further reinforce-ment into New Guinea.).

Two weeks later the US set a trap for an anticipated Tokyo Express run. The US Navy had two cruiser forces and one destroyer force with one SG equipped ship in each force. At 2306 on 29 November the Japanese were detected on radar, and at 2316 the destroyer USS Fletcher had enemy ships at 7,000 yards on SC but not following the plan she was not given permission to fire her torpedoes. Admiral Tanaka quickly counterattacked with Long Lance torpedoes from his destroyers on the four US cruisers, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Pensacola and Northampton. Three of the cruisers were severely damaged and one sunk. The Japanese ships escaped but without landing the desperately needed supplies.

Chicago was lost to an aerial torpedo attack at night on the 30 January 1943 where bright floating flares allowed a twin engine bomber to make an approach in darkness. The Japanese finally cleared their troops from Guadalcanal by 7 February 1943.

Canberra had the first 10 cm magnetron Australian radar to go into service, even though it was only for a very short time. The Type 271 was fitted to Australian destroyers and corvettes along with the Type 290, which came into service during 1942-43. Many of the damaged US cruisers from the Guadalcanal campaign made their way to Garden Island in Sydney for immediate repair before returning to the US.

In addition to the many US ships, as well as Canberra, which were sunk off Guadalcanal, a great many aircraft were lost in air battles defending Henderson Field, and the area now known as ‘Iron Bottom Sound’ has become sacred to the US Navy which each year makes a solemn pilgrimage to remember those lost.

Conclusion

This paper highlights the radar aspect of its implementation into the first major amphibious operation by the US in the Pacific War. This provided many lessons for subsequent operations leading to the eventual defeat of Japan in the SWPA and finally to Japan itself. The isolation of Rabaul and debilitation of the Japanese air force planes and navy due to the twin attacks by the Allies in the Solomons and New Guinea was finally achieved by the US carrier borne attacks on Truk in February 1944.

Occasional Paper 60: Naval Gigs: Past and Present

August 2019

By Dennis J Weatherall JP TM AFAITT(L) LSM, Volunteer Researcher, Naval Historical Society of Australia

Subsequent to the recent recovery of an HMAS Australia (1) Gig from bushland at Coles Bay, Tasmania, reported in Issue 28, March 2019 edition of Call the Hands, Naval Historical Society researchers attempted to determine where the gig was built.  They also examined the history and use of gigs which dates back to the 17th century.  This paper provides more information on the history of that particular gig and an overview of the use and development of gigs from e 17th century to the present.

Fortunately, the history of the Australia (1) gig was researched by Mr Mike Web of the Maritime Museum of Tasmania.  Mike provided the following history.

Two gigs were brought from Sydney to Tasmania in 1922 by HMAS Australia.  It appears they were used by HMAS Huon (naval base) in Hobart.  The 1st Derwent Sea Scouts based at HMAS Huon bought them in 1931 for one pound each.  They were named Bass and Flinders.  Both were sold in 1966 to the late Alan Emanuel, Lindisfarne, who was going to use them to make a catamaran.

In the 1967 bush fire Bass was ashore and was lost, Flinders was afloat and survived.  The Flinders was given to Maritime Museum of Tasmania in 1984.  As the Museum was then on a site at Battery Point with little space, it was stowed upside down at the work site of Philip Fowler.  It then went to the Augusta Road Primary School propped up by rocks.  There as it can imagined it received most of her damage.  She was then sold to a fisherman in 1996, Peter McGee, who took it from Margate to a site north of Coles Bay.  It was to be used to develop an oyster farm in November 2005.

Gig active with Sea Scouts at HMAS Huon in 1959

A neighbour of the property where the gig lay reported that there was an old inshore whale boat down in the bush at Coles Bay.  As Mike Web regularly visited Coles Bay he went to see this boat.  As a former Chief Officer of HMS Worcester (training ship on the River Thames) which had two gigs identical to the reported boat near Coles Bay identification was not difficult.  Further research found the gig was of an 1860 design which superseded the Captain’s Galley.

The Design was based on the West Country (UK) pilot gig that was normally about 32’ and had two masts, standing lug on the main mast and a dipping lug on the Mizzen mast and 6 oars.  Further contact with UK authorities indicated that the number 271 on the forward thwart of Flinders did not tally with their records.

28’ Gigs from HMS “Worcester, Mike Webb image

It has been suggested that the gig is built of Kauri.  Hence Mike believed she was built in Sydney to naval plans.  The register of boats when HMAS Australia sailed from the UK did not include gigs.  This being the case there were only two possible yards where the gig could have been built, either the Commonwealth Naval Dockyard at Cockatoo Island or Garden Island, Sydney.

A check of records of the Commonwealth Naval Dockyard at Cockatoo Island which built many small craft; cutters, whalers, skiffs, dinghies etc. for Naval Stores and specific ships between 1914 and 1921 showed that the registered number for the Australia (1) gig was not included in the records.

The Cockatoo Island Dockyard built two 30 foot gigs in 1914-15 for Naval Stores, but their numbers were 367 and 368.  A 24 foot gig was built in 1916 for HMAS Franklin (at a cost of £108), No. 369.  Several more from 18 feet to 24 feet were built for various ships, including transports which were generally not numbered.

There was no record of a gig with a length of 28 ft 4 inches or any boat numbered 271.

Having eliminated its construction in both the UK and Cockatoo Island it is quite likely to have been built at Garden Island and possible the ‘Boat Shed’ which is now home to the Naval Historical Society of Australia.

At the time, gigs were managed as a stores pool item as is the case with ships boats today.  Boats were not dedicated to any particular ship.

The heritage significance of the Australia (1) Gig is that it is the last of its type in Australia.

HMAS Australia 1 with ships boats slung on very high davits adjacent the main mast and funnel. RAN Image

By definition gigs are lightweight ships boats of varying length rowed by four, six, or eight long oars.  Traditionally, they were reserved as the captain or commander’s personal boat.  This being the case there is no surprise that the saying “A ship is known by her boats” developed.  The appearance of a gig was a matter of ships company pride.  This also applied to the crew’s appearance, handling, management and bearing.

Layout Plan of a GIG shown in Service Rig, Image from; The Pilot, Autumn 2007 edition No.291

When the Royal Australian Navy was established there were some seven types of boats carried in Royal Navy and RAN ships.  The mix of boats carried in a warship varied with the size and Class of the warship.  The range of boats used during the early years of the RAN included;

Pulled or Sail Powered

 
Launch 42ft,

Pinnace 30 or 36 ft,

Cutter 25 or 34 ft,

Galley 32 ft,

 Gig 28 or 30 ft,

Whaler 24 or 27 ft,

Dinghy 13.5 or 16 ft.
Steam Powered

 
Pinnace 40 or 56 ft,

Barge 40 ft

(for Admirals),

 Cutter (various lengths, 23, 25, 27 and 32 ft.)

 

With the advent of steam powered warships and their boats and phasing out of sailing ships as “men of war” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, pulling boats remained important for seamanship training and as a means of maintaining physical fitness.  Pulling events were also an outlet for competitive spirit amongst ships of the fleet.  “Away all boats, pull around the fleet” or “Man and Arm boats”, “Away duty sea boat” where piped for various drills.  Racing under oars or sail weren’t just for fleet regatta days.  Gig crews manned single-banked oars with the stroke pulling a starboard oar and the rest of the crew pulling port and starboard alternatively.

The earliest record of a gig dates from 1666 when Gigs from St Mary’s on the Scilly Isles rescued the crew of British East India Company’s Royal Oak which had been wrecked on the Bishop Rock.  There’s little documentation to be found on early Gigs but its design evolved over time until it matured in the early 19th century.  Records show a William Peters of Polvarth near St Mawes started building high quality Gigs in 1790.  His advanced design became the blue print for the Pilot Gigs that met the sailing ships and offered “pilot service” to inbound Merchant Captains.

In 1812 William Peters received an order for three Gigs to be shipped to Burma (today’s Myanmar).  However, due to lack of deck space on the ship transporting them to Rangoon one wasn’t embarked.  This Gig was in turn sold to the “Newquay Pilots” and it was named “Newquay”, this same vessel is still raced today by the Newquay Rowing Club UK, some 207 years on.

Most Gigs built for the Royal Navy were 30 foot in length and with a beam of 6 foot, fitted with two masts and a steel (70lb) centreplate, drop keel.  The Admiralty Manual of Seamanship states that the 30 ft Gig “was the fastest service boat under sail and oars!”.  The crew was six plus a coxswain.

Gigs remain popular today, particularly on the English south coast in Devon and Cornwell.  Here there is a large following of Pilot Gig racing with boats built in the traditional manner by local shipwrights.  The tradition stems from the race to get a pilot from shore to an incoming vessel in need of a pilot to navigate in confined waters.  The fastest gig rowers got the payment.

Cornish Pilot Gig under construction, looking aft. Brian Nobbs image.
Gig under construction in Launceston, Cornwall UK. Brian Nobbs image.

Construction takes from four to six months with the launch of a new Gig a major occasion.  Gigs are often launched at the World Championships in Scilly, where the local vicar blesses new vessels.  Through this sport traditional shipwright skills are maintained and knowledge of the historic Gig is not lost to history.

References:

The Pilot Gigs of Cornwall and The Scilly Isles, The Pilot, Autumn 2007 edition No.291, available at  http://www.pilotmag.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/pilotmag-291-final.pdf

Brian Nobbs Cornish Pilot Gig Builder, available at http://www.pilot-gig-builder.co.uk/pilot-gigs.asp

‘Up and Downers’ save the day

By Bob Hetherington

This story was first published in All Hands, the magazine for volunteers at the Australian National Maritime Museum (ANMM), and is reproduced with their and the author’s kind permission.  

 Just when reciprocating steam engines were looking like a dead duck, along came WWII and a new lease of life.

‘Up and Downers’ was the nickname given to the reciprocating steam engines which powered the Industrial Revolution. We have a classic example of one in the Australian National Maritime Museum’s Navy Gallery, but it’s not widely known how they got a second wind and powered the Liberty Ships which changed the course of WWII. And there’s an Australian connection. Up and Downers developed from the single cylinder steam engines which drove machines, ships and locomotives in the early 1800s. It was soon realized that coal consumption could be reduced by using the energy remaining in the steam leaving the cylinder, and triple expansion engines were introduced to feed the exhaust steam from the first (high pressure) cylinder into a second cylinder and then feeding its exhaust into a third (low pressure) cylinder. The pistons in each cylinder were connected to a common shaft which turned the wheels of industry. By the turn of the century triple expansion engines had become standard for marine propulsion. They had the advantage that they could be coupled directly to the propeller shaft and they ran at speeds suited to propeller efficiency.

SS Jeremiah O’Brien, one of 2075 Liberty Ships with good old fashioned steam technology.

 However, a rival soon appeared in the form of the steam turbine. Turbines generate a rotary rather than reciprocating (up and down) motion with the advantages of lower vibration, lower weight, smaller dimensions, fewer moving parts and lower maintenance. By the early 1900s turbines were replacing Up and Downers and their low vibration was a big plus for the prestigious passenger liners of the time. Olympic and Titanic were fitted with a combination of both types of engine but a few years earlier Cunard had taken the plunge and chosen all-turbine drive for Lusitania andMauretania.Turbines operate at high speeds and need elaborate precision reduction gearing to drive propellers at efficient speeds, typically 80–120 rpm. Specialist engineering companies grew up to design and build the gear trains needed for marine propulsion. By the 1920s marine diesel engines had made their appearance (they are almost universal today); in 1924 the Swedish-American Line Gripsholmbecame the first diesel powered liner to cross the Atlantic. It seemed to be the end of the line for the Up and Downers.

World War II erupted and it became clear that the Allies would not prevail without a massive supply of materials from the United States to Britain. This required a huge and urgent expansion of merchant shipping capacity and the Liberty Ships program was launched to make up the shortfall.

These ships were designed to be simple, cheap, quick and easy to build and to operate (at relatively slow speeds) under the convoy system. The idea was to have the components built in various locations outside Britain with the ships assembled and launched on the U.S. east coast.

Engines also needed to be simple, reliable and quick and cheap to build. Although steam turbines and diesel were by now the prevailing technology there were two major problems: Diesel fuel was in short supply and there was an acute bottleneck in the availability of the gear trains needed for turbines; new designs would be needed to cater for the slower ship speeds. This engineering capacity was dedicated to production and maintenance of warships. Time was absolutely critical so it was decided to dust off a proven ‘up and down’ design and standardise it so it could be built quickly in existing engineering facilities. The engine chosen was a tried and tested design from the North Eastern Marine (NEM) Company of Sunderland and Wallsend, producing 2500 HP at 76 rpm. These were fitted not only to U.S. built Liberty ships but to Fort, Park and Empire ships built in the UK and Canada. No less than 2075 Liberty ships were to be built, and the choice of the NEM engine proved to be a very good one. In this sense the Up and Downer really did help to save the day.

At the same time a similar story played out in Australia, albeit on a smaller scale, and again Up and Downers proved their worth. They were fitted to the sixty Bathurst class corvettes built here during the War. In 1938 the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board (ACNB) proposed a general purpose local defence vessel which would be easy to construct and operate and in 1939 the RAN completed a design for a 680-ton vessel with a speed of 15 knots to be locally built and, yes, fitted with a triple expansion steam engine which could be constructed in the existing workshops of train locomotive manufacturers. This was a demanding project for the local industry. Cockatoo Island Dockyard became the lead shipyard and in February 1940 laid down the first ship, HMAS Bathurst. Seven other yards were involved in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. Of the sixty vessels built, fifty six were commissioned into the RAN and travelled a total of twelve million kilometres during and after the war. The last to leave RAN service was HMAS Waggain 1960, taking with her (to the best of the author’s knowledge) the last Up and Downer in the fleet. Only two examples remain: HMAS Castlemaine is a museum ship in Williamstown, Victoria and HMAS Whyalla is a land based tourist attraction in Whyalla, South Australia. If you would like to see a marine Up and Downer in motion in Australia it seems you have limited opportunities. Close to home is the Museum’s SY Ena, but I should point out for the purists that her engine, while still live steam driven, is two cylinder, not triple expansion. To experience a live triple expansion engine you can take a trip on Sydney Heritage Fleet’s SY Lady Hopetoun. More pedestrian but larger examples are our own from the 1926 Sydney vehicular ferry Kara Kara, and in Melbourne you can visit HMAS Castlemaine. Sadly neither is steam powered any longer.

Bathurst class corvettes at Williamstown Naval Dockyard January 1946 – Allan C Green

 

Footnote: See www.hmascastlemaine.org.au for a good description of this Bathurst class corvette. As explained above the engines were sourced from existing local manufacturers, in this case Thompsons Engineering and Pipe Co. Castlemaine, Victoria.

 

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