Ship design and development

The RAAF at Sea before World War II

September 24, 2018

The following article first appeared in the Air Power Development Centre Bulletin Pathfinder, Issue 175 dated April 2012 and is reproduced with their kind permission. The perspective of our sister service on the early days of naval aviation is greatly appreciated.

In the 1920s, when the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) came into being, the concept of the Australian government’s national defence was based predominantly on a maritime strategy led by Navy. Not only did the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) have the largest proportion of permanent full-time personnel but it also commanded the largest share of Australia’s total defence budget, despite expenditure cut-backs which inevitably followed the end of World War I. Doctrinally the RAN was tuned to operate in close concert with the Royal Navy within an imperial defence construct. The Singapore naval base, which served as the lynchpin of Britain’s (and hence Australia’s) plans for the defence of the empire east of the Suez Canal from the 1920s until 1942, was equally part of a maritime strategy.

The RAAF was formed in March 1921 on the explicit basis of maintaining the capability to support both the RAN and the Australian Army. This injunction was, no doubt, intended as unifying balm after a protracted and bruising battle between Army and Navy to win endorsement for their competing post-war air schemes. Their debate ended with the government’s decision in 1919 to have one separate Air Force serving the needs of both. Viewing the outcome purely in these terms, however, risks obscuring the fact that, from its earliest days, the RAAF had an underlying but rarely-articulated mission to assist the Navy in pursuing a maritime strategy for the defence of Australia.

Among the aircraft on the RAAF inventory in 1921 were six Fairey IIID floatplanes acquired from Britain to equip one of two planned seaplane squadrons under the initial organisational structure of the new service. The units failed to materialise after the planned scheme was curtailed for financial reasons, but the floatplanes remained in periodic use at Point Cook, where they proved useful for conducting surveys over coastal waters including the famous first flight around Australia in 1924. Although a training course for naval observers was started at Point Cook in 1923, it was realised that Air Force had no aircraft that could operate from the Navy’s main warships. Since the Fairey IIID was too large and heavy to fit into the limited space available, efforts were soon underway to find a more suitable aircraft type to replace it.

The Supermarine Seagull III amphibious flying boats that entered RAAF service in 1926 were actually little better than the Fairey IIID in both size and performance, but they were better suited to the task of assisting the Navy’s program for surveying the Great Barrier Reef – which became the main form of naval cooperation required of the RAAF for the next three years. The purchase of these aircraft was overtaken shortly afterwards by a government decision to also acquire for the RAN a 6000-ton seaplane tender, HMAS Albatross, with a surprise for the RAAF when it learnt that it was required to supply the aircraft and operating personnel to put onboard the new essel. Putting the Seagull IIIi nto Albatross was an expedient which lasted from February 1929 until the ship was paid off from the RAN as an economy measure in 1933. During these years, however, Australia at least had the capability to conduct reconnaissance at sea, gunnery direction, torpedo spotting and survey work, all for the first time.

When first told in 1926 that it would be required to provide the aircraft for Albatross, Air Force set about drafting a specification for a new type of catapult-launched boat amphibian, but this failed to attract a manufacturer interested in building it, at least initially. By 1931, however, theVickersCompany in Britain had developed a design and asked the RAAF for a commitment to purchase. Although lacking any such authority, the Air Force chief gave the go-ahead and the result was that the RAAF received the first of 24 Seagull Vs in 1935. This aircraft (the first used by the RAAF with an enclosed cabin) proved useful not just for sea rescue work, but also carried bombs or depth charges, and soon won Vickers additional large orders from the RAF (which named the type the Walrus).

The Seagull V and Walrus aircraft, which the RAAF’s No 9 Squadron operated off the RAN’s cruisers, gave distinguished if unspectacular service until the squadron was disbanded in 1944. It was a sad statistic of the war that whenever the Navy lost one of its cruisers, it usually lost the RAAF detachment carried on board. The RAAF took casualties when HMAS Sydney was sunk in a clash with the German raider Kormoran in November 1941, when HMAS Perth encountered a Japanese invasion force in the Sunda Strait in March 1942, and when HMAS Canberra went down in the battle of Savo Island in August 1942. HMAS Australia also lost its Walrus and crew while attacking Vichy French naval forces at Dakar (in Senegal, West Africa) in September 1940. At least fifteen of 9 Squadron’s fatal wartime losses occurred during embarked action with the Navy.

In the preparations of the rearmament period before war began in 1939, the RAAF was also taking major new steps to strengthen its capacity to undertake long-range maritime patrols using land-based forces. From 1927 this role had been carried out mainly by two giant Supermarine Southampton flying boats based at Point Cook, but by the mid-1930s these were well and truly obsolescent. On the eve of World War II, the RAAF was in the process of raising a new maritime patrol unit (No 10 Squadron) equipped with giant long-range Short S25 Sunderland flying boats, to operate from a new seaplane base at Rathmines, on Lake Macquarie, NSW. Steps were in train to take delivery of the new aircraft as war began, causing the government to leave the squadron in England to fight alongside the RAF in Coastal Command.

Elsewhere within the RAAF, the Service had begun taking delivery from late 1936 of Avro Anson GR1aircraftpurchasedfromBritain. These twin engine low-wing monoplanes, armed with bombs or depth charges, were considered suitable for coastal reconnaissance and had been adopted by RAF Coastal Command. Ultimately the RAAF would have over 1000 of these aircraft, though most were acquired for training rather than operational purposes. Late in 1938 the government had also approved the purchase of Bristol Beaufort aircraft, also from Britain, also for coastal patrol work, although none entered service before 1941.

The needs of fleet or naval cooperation, and the capacity to exert control over sea lanes and lines of approach to Australia, had demonstrably featured prominently in development plans for the RAAF virtually throughout its first two decades. This is exactly what might be expected of a Service required to participate in implementing the maritime strategy which underpinned planning for the defence of Australia between the world wars.

During the inter-war period the RAAF helped pursue a maritime strategy for the defence of Australia.

Technical limitations hindered efforts to operate from warships but in during 1929-1933 RAAF aircraft were embarked in an RAN seaplane carrier.
Navy’s cruisers carried Seagull V amphibians during 1935-1944, meaning many RAN combats resulted in RAAF casualties.

The full power of the Commonwealth Defence Force can only be developed if all its parts act in close co-operation one with the other. A portion of the proposed Air Force is, therefore, designed for co-operation with the Naval Forces and portion for co-operation with the Military Forces.

Submission to Australia’s Air Council on the Australian Air Force, December 1920

Royal Navy Colours of World War Two – The Patterns 507, G10 and G45

July 30, 2018

Collaborative works by:

Michael Brown, Sean Carroll, James Duff, Lindsay Johnson

Introduction

In the final months of and in the years after World War Two, many resources, documents and records relating to Royal Navy camouflage were purposely destroyed. That there might have been future value in these resources was either not recognized or deemed unimportant. In the decades in between then and now, several researchers have attempted to piece together from old samples, eye witness accounts and photographic records, a view on what the Royal Navy’s colour palette was during the years 1939 to 1945. The authors’ motivation for writing this work stems from trying to reconcile contradictions in extant references and various anachronisms evident both in other published works and common belief as compared to formal documentation.

This work deals with the shades 507A, 507B and 507C, before moving on to the shades G10 and G45 which emerged in the 1943 series of Royal Navy camouflage colours.

All colour measurements made in the preparation of this paper were carried out using a Nix Pro Color Sensor; a hand held digital device with its own calibrated light source and which is operated using a smart phone application. This made it possible to take digital readings of extant samples in controlled environments where it was not possible to bring the samples to desk-top spectrophotometers. The author’s Nix sensor has been checked against published standard colours as well as spot checked against Sovereign Hobbies Colourcoats factory’s desk mounted spectrophotometer.

The authors trust that the methods, discussion and references made herein will be found to be a robust argument by the reader, and that based upon this writing the reader will be better equipped to both recognize 507A, 507B, 507C, G10 and G45 by time period, their common uses with other shades comprising typical Admiralty schemes and understand the nature of these colours.

The authors would like to extend thanks to the staff of The National Archives at Kew in London, along with Heather Johnson, Curator (Archives) of the National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth, and also a special thanks to Richard Dennis who provided a wealth of documentation directly relevant to this paper. This research would not have been possible without the accommodation and willingness of all these sources of primary source references.

Pattern 507 series

History and formulations

The first known reference to a Pattern 507 grey paint is in 1902. This was a dark neutral grey comprising only black and white pigments.

Sometime before WW1 a darker-still Pattern 507A was introduced, then a 507B as a distinct (lighter) shade in 1915 and a lighter-still 507C in 1916. The neutral-hued 507B & C continue until 1926, but at some unknown time after 1919 and before 1931 (probably 1926 also) both the original Pattern 507 and 507A greys were discontinued.

507C was the first to gain Egyptian Blue pigment in 1926, with 507B gaining blue pigment the following year.

In order to achieve uniformity of painting of ships a 1933 Admiralty Fleet Order (AFO) 1776 (NS1221/33) (27/07/33) introduced blue/black pastes in place of separate blue and black ingredients.

“Grey Paint, Home Fleet Shade, Pattern 507B”, was given the formula:

Pattern 409 White Lead 21lbs
Pattern 704 Zinc White 56lbs
Pattern 689 Marine Dryers 3,1/2lbs
Linseed Oil Raw 12 pints
Linseed Oil Boiled 8 pints
Turpentine Sub 2 pints (1 part spirit of turpentine to 3 parts white spirit)
Pattern 370 Blue Black Paste (1 tin) 7lbs
1 gallon Dark Grey Enamel Patt 11 of similar shade to be added to each 100wt. Add turpentine sub to tin of Blue/Black to ensure full removal.

There were adjustments made to the blue-black pastes in changing from Egyptian to Ultramarine Blue through the mid 1930s, with revised formulae given to maintain the intended shade.

By 1936 we see the 1939/early war formulations arrived at, as published in AFO 2680/36 (NS 3501/36) (05/11/36).

The two grey shades in use were described and specified in that document as:

Dark grey paint, Pattern 507B

Pattern 409 White Lead 21lbs
Pattern 104 Zinc oxide 56lbs
Pattern 689 Paste Driers 3.5lbs
Oil, linseed, raw 12pts
Oil, linseed, boiled 8pts
Turpentine substitute 2pts
Pattern 370A Blue-black paste 7lbs
Ten pints of dark grey enamel, Pattern 11, to be added to each cwt of paint

Light grey paint, Pattern 507C

Pattern 409 White Lead 28lbs
Pattern 104 Zinc oxide 50lbs
Pattern 689 Paste Driers 5lbs
Oil, linseed, raw 20pts
Pattern 371 Blue-black paste 7lbs
Six pints of light grey enamel, Pattern 12, to be added to each cwt of paint

In January 1939, a Pattern 507A grey paint was introduced but, as the AFO makes clear, it was the same shade as 507B. It is important for context to understand at this point at two enamel paints were also available and documented at this time, given the identifiers Pattern 11 for the Dark Grey to Home Fleet shade and Pattern 12 for Light Grey.

AFO 211. Mixed Paints (N.S./D.A. 1106/38-19.1.1939.) states the following:

Mixed Paints

Dark grey paint, Home Fleet shade, for other than weather work, is being added to the Authorised List as Pattern 507a. The formula is the same as Pattern 507B except that the enamel is omitted.

The description of Pattern 507B has been amplified to read:- “Paint mixed, dark grey, Home Fleet shade, for weather work”.

We see in this important AFO that Pattern 507A and 507B are both Home Fleet shade and featured identical pigmentation, only including or excluding the enamel paint and intended for different parts of the ship.

On the 17^th of October 1940 AFO 3935.- Economy of Paint during the War (D. 12427/40.-17.10.1940.) was published giving the following orders to the fleet (orders (i) and (ii) omitted by the authors as non-relevant to paint discussion):

During hostilities it has been decided that considerable economies are to be effected in the painting of H.M. ships and auxiliaries. The following instructions are, therefore, promulgated for information and guidance:- (iii) Finishing Coats:- The use of enamel is to be entirely suspended for the duration of the war in all ships, when stocks in the dockyards have been used up. For internal work … . For external work two coats are to be applied. For parts visible from outside the ship, the finishing coats are to be matt paint. (iv) Varnish.- The use of varnish on spars is to be discontinued, wood spars generally are to be painted. (v) Decks.- Bare steel weather decks visible from the air are to be painted with two coats of red oxide of iron followed by two coats of non-slip grey paint. Bare steel decks below …

Effectively this would have suspended 507B shortly thereafter and this was confirmed in AFO 4074 Economy in the Use of Zinc Oxides (D.8136/41 – 18. 9.1941) which explicitly discontinued the use of 507B during the period of hostilities.

Fundamental premises

In general, there have been claimed original paint samples held by various researchers over the years which have been identified by them as 507A, 507B and 507C respectively. The authors are unsure as to exactly where or when the widely held belief that 1930s and 1940s 507A and 507B were “Dark Grey” and “Medium Grey” shades respectively originated, but it seems to be a belief which gathered followers in the 1970s and has been consolidated and repeated since. We have found no evidence in primary source references to support this idea, and plenty of primary source references which directly contradict it. Based on the available references used in compiling this work, the authors believe that the early WW2 era patterns 507A and 507B were the same colour, known to the Admiralty as “Dark Grey, Home Fleet shade”. The only difference was the surface finish of the two, with 507B containing a proportion of enamel paint as described earlier making it somewhat glossier than 507A.

The widely held, yet problematic, modern understanding of the pattern 507 family is as follows, with Light Reflectance Value (LRV) of these shades noted below each, measured from Snyder & Short Enterprises’ cards using a Nix Pro Color Sensor hand held spectrophotometer using current industry standard D65 illuminant and 1964 10⁰ observer:

Light Reflectance Value is a measure of the total quantity of visible light reflected by the surface, or in layman’s terms, how bright or dark it appears. A low LRV gives a dark appearance and a high LRV gives a light and bright appearance. The following two blocks have the same saturation of red and blue, but on the left we have a low LRV and on the right a high LRV:

Saturation of colour is a measure of intensity of particular colours of visible light. Pure white and pure black are completely unsaturated, whereas a brilliant colour is highly saturated. The following two blocks have the same lightness, but on the left we have an unsaturated colour and on the right a highly saturated colour, but both are blues with no red or yellow content:

The 507 family of paints in the mid 1930s to 1940s are all low saturation blues, not neutral greys.

The National Archives at Kew, London, hold a number of original documents in a strictly controlled fashion. This assures the integrity of the document and in this case, the authenticity of the paint samples.

Amongst the documents reviewed, ADM212/124 Standardisation of Admiralty camouflage colours dated to 1942 contained genuine 507A and 507C samples. These samples were in the form of painted chips adhered to annotated leaves of thin paper. It is considered highly unlikely that this document has been tampered with given the control exerted by the National Archives on this record and the fragility of the backing paper.

(Image of colour chips presented in ADM212/124 held at The National Archives, Kew)

This document compared reasonably well physically with Colourcoats RN01 507A Dark Grey, and the Snyder & Short Royal Navy chips 507A sample that Colourcoats was originally based on but was slightly darker. This places the Kew sample, itself 75 years old at time of writing, below the lower end of the stated tolerance of Light Reflectance Value at approximately 7%. The 507C sample was similar in character to the Colourcoats RN03 507C Light Grey and hence Snyder & Short 507C sample, but quite noticeably darker.

507A and B

507A is described in various official documents, along with its Light Reflectance Value (LRV). These values are tabulated as follows:

It is noteworthy that ADM 204/2737 stands alone in quoting the LRV of 507A as being a percentage of another paint. The other sources either omit this statement, or expressly state that they are (as is standard practice) measuring paints against theoretically ideal white at 100% LRV.

Whilst values tabulated above clearly seem to be at or around 10%, the following renders illustrate the visual variance noticeable at the extreme ends of the scales, and these are compared with the currently recognised (distinct) shades of 507A and 507B.

The physical sample of ADM 212/124 may be taken as instructive of the character of 507A; i.e. a dark grey with a bluish caste. This correlates with the pigmentation formulae given earlier comprising white, blue and black content. The sample appears to be slightly darker than intended and the blue appears to be neutralizing and shifting to green, but this would be consistent with aging of linseed oil based paints.

The Snyder & Short 507A sample is slightly darker than the nominal intended value of 507A, whilst the 507B sample is significantly lighter.

In conclusion, the available evidence (and there is more to follow when we examine G10) suggests that the intended LRV of 507A (and therefore of its sister 507B) was 10%, but that up to 13% was evident.

507C

The lineage of 507C is somewhat less confused than that of the 507A and 507B paints. The colour remained essentially constant from the mid-1930s until its use ceased after the second world war. The pre-mixed blueblack paste used to make Pattern 507C Mediterranean Grey, or Light Grey, as it was also known, was different to that used for 507A, but no documents we have been able to obtain (which includes purchasing a copy of the defunct British Standard BS390 referenced in the Admiralty discussions) have ever revealed the exact composition of blue-black pastes, either pattern 370A or pattern 371, the latter of which was the one used in 507C. We can however refer to substitute mixes published by the Admiralty for use by ships unable to procure pre-mixed pattern 371 Blue Black Paste at their location using discreet black and blue pigments to arrive at the same shade. An example of this alternative is given in ADM 1/0002 New Zealand Station Memo NZ648/9778.

Pattern 507C Substitute in lieu of Patt 371 Blue Black paste

Pattern 409 White Lead 28lbs
Pattern 104 Zinc oxide 50lbs
Pattern 689 Paste Driers 5lbs
Oil, linseed, raw 20 pints
Pattern 8P Ultramarine Blue 3lbs
Pattern 110C Black 1.5lbs

From this, we can derive the proportions of blue to black in Pattern 371 Blue Black paste. Scaling down this formula to reproduce 507C has been carried out but requires extreme care. The simple ratio of 78lbs of white pigment to only 1.5lbs of black quite obviously means that when scaled down to sample quantities, the black contingent is both very small and extremely powerful. A very minor error in measuring out a small quantity of black pigment introduces substantial changes in the resultant tone of the paint. The authors did reproduce this paint using artists’ pigments, the stated liquid constituents and a set of precision digital scales, and the results support the extant samples in character of the shade.

The Light Reflectance Value of 507C is described in various official documents including ADM 212/124, RE/CAM 30/1/1 and RE/CAM/N/8 with a value of 45%.

At present, most with an interest in the Royal Navy around this time period will be primarily familiar with Snyder & Short’s 507C sample. This colour is generally considered reasonably accurate and characteristic of 507C insomuch as it is a cool, light bluish grey. It is however somewhat lighter than the documented values at approximately 52% Light Reflectance Value. This does not look out of place on models of ships of the pre-war Mediterranean Fleet in overall 507C which were typically photographed in very bright warm climate sunlight and reflecting a great deal of light. Keeping ships cooler inside in hot climates was indeed the reason ships were painted in 507C rather than 507B when on foreign stations such as the Mediterranean.

A 507C at 52% LRV does however begin to be problematic when used as part of a camouflage scheme and leads to a great deal of confusion when interpreting black and white reference photos. Specifically, the contrast between 507A and 507C in reality was not so great as many currently believe, and furthermore such a light notion of 507C risks confusion with MS4a (LRV 55%). In short, we cannot interpret black and white photographs if our understanding of the tone of paints is incorrect.

The results of darkening 507C to the target 45% value gives the following, illustrated beside both 13% and 10% LRV versions of 507A / 507B:

G10 and G45

The currently understood nature of G10 and G45 is that they are unique shades in the Royal Navy’s World War Two era colour palette. These are rendered below from measurements taken from Snyder & Short Enterprises’ cards as well as measurements from an original set of cards held at the Admiralty Library at Portsmouth using a Nix Pro Color Sensor hand held spectrophotometer using current industry standard D65 illuminant and 1964 10⁰ observer in all cases:

In May 1943 AFO 2106 and CB3098R were issued. In order to overcome confusion in the naming of paints these introduced a simple letter/number system: B for blue-grey and G for grey was followed by a number indicating the RF of the paint:

AFO 2106/43 also contains the paint mixing formulae for the entire series. Relevant here are G10 and G45 presented thus:

Whilst it is clear that both the G10 and G45 formulae again contain only white and blue-black pigments and thus are both bluish greys, we have found no documented evidence whatsoever suggesting the existence of an alternative shade of G45 with a warm hue, which requires a yellow and/or red component.

However the key thing about these mixes is that the selection and proportions of pigments are identical to the 1941 onwards mixes for 507A and 507C resulting from AFO 4074/41 which reversed their pre-war quantities of white lead and zinc oxide, so G10 was 507A and G45 was 507C.

AFO 2016/43 tells us explicitly that 507A = G10 and 507C = G45:

The Snyder & Short colours are based upon original samples of the paints obtained by John Snyder & Randy Short. The authors have no reason to believe these have not been replicated faithfully. G10 sample measures slightly darker than specified, with a noted green content and very marginal blue component as compared to a perfectly neutral grey comprised purely of black and white. The G45 sample measures notably darker than specified with a relatively strong yellow content and noted green content. The Portsmouth samples have not darkened so much, but exhibit stronger green and yellow. Overall, the Portsmouth samples would appear to have degraded worse than the samples the Snyder & Short colours were matched to, although all have been affected by time elapsed since they were made.

As we have seen from the formulations above, the ingredients used to produce both comprised linseed oil which darkens and yellows with age, lead white (which darkens and yellows with age), zinc white, ultramarine blue and black. Even if we assume that Section 9’s wording in AFO2106/43 was careless, it is clear that a combination of white, ultramarine blue and black pigments cannot make yellowish or greenish shades of grey. It is also widely known both in the paint industry and in the art world that both linseed oil and lead white are susceptible to both darkening and yellowing with age.

In these different ways AFO 2106/43 therefore further confirms that 507A was a 10% reflection factor paint and 507C a 45% reflection factor paint, and that both were greys with a blue caste. The intended shades of G10 and G45 were therefore as follows:

References

In compiling this work, the authors have specifically referenced the following resources, and encourage the reader to review these sources for themselves:

(October 1942). ADM212/124 Standardisation of Admiralty camouflage colours. [File] The National Archives, Kew, London

AFO 2106/43 External and Camouflage Painting (HM Ships) – Available to download from the Australian archives http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/admiralty-fleetorders/1943

CB3098R/45 THE CAMOUFLAGE OF SHIPS AT SEA – 1945 – available at the Admiralty Library, Portsmouth

We have consulted every paint and camouflage-relevant file, AFO and CAFO we have been able to find or access in UK and Australian archives amongst which the following proved directly relevant to the 507s, G10 and G45 although many others helped shape our thinking:

A.F.O.679 SEA-GOING CAMOUFLAGE DESIGNS FOR DESTROYERS AND SMALL SHIPS – 9^th

April 1942 – Available at The National Archives, Kew, London

ADM 212/124 Standardisation of Admiralty camouflage colours – (including AD.29 dated 15^th October 1942) – Available at The National Archives, Kew, London
AFO 2106/43 External and Camouflage Painting (HM Ships) – Available to download from the Australian archives http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/admiralty-fleetorders/1943
CB3098R/43 THE CAMOUFLAGE OF SHIPS AT SEA – May 1943 – republished by White Ensign Models using Snyder & Short paint chips (Print 2) (Prints 1 and 2 appear to have used different colours)
AFO 3113/44 External and Camouflage Painting (HM Ships) – – Available to download from the Australian archives http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/admiralty-fleetorders/1943
AFO 3545/45- External and Camouflage painting of HM Ships and Vessels – Available at The National Archives, Kew, London
CB3098R/45 THE CAMOUFLAGE OF SHIPS AT SEA – 1945 – available at the Admiralty Library, Portsmouth
Camouflage Colour Standards for H.M.C. Ships, Dept. of National Defence, Naval Service, June 1945 – Available at Canadian archives

Letter: The Kangaroo Symbol on HMA Ships

March 24, 2018

The picture of the commissioning of HMAS Hobart on the front cover of the December 2017 edition of the Naval Historical Review – particularly that of the red kangaroo symbol affixed to the superstructure – has prompted me to write with a possible explanation of how and when this symbol originated.

Early in 1958, and just prior to a nine month tour of duty with the Far East Strategic Reserve, a Leading Signalman in HMAS Voyager took an Australian penny over to a workshop on Garden Island Dockyard in Sydney and asked his contacts there if a template of a kangaroo could be cut based on the design on the coin.

At that time HMA Ships at sea flew the British White Ensign and carried no other symbols which identified them as Australian. To rectify this – particularly when carrying out RAS with United Navy vessels – the Leading Signalman came up with the idea (supported I believe by the Yeoman of Signals) that a discrete red kangaroo be painted on the back of the 10 inch signal lamps on both sides of the flag deck. These lamps could then be turned around during RAS with our American cousins to show the jumping marsupial – so declaring, to all who saw it, that we were Australians.

It worked a treat and Voyager found within a short time other HMA Ships adopted the practice – some even wanting to borrow our template to paint the back of their signal lamps. When later asked what prompted him to think of this the Leading Signalman, a WW11 veteran (like many of the senior ratings at the time) said: “He wanted to make sure the first Australian Daring class destroyer to be allotted duty in the FESR carried something that clearly identified her as Australian and the kangaroo design on the penny fitted the bill.”

I played a very modest part in all of this because at the time I was an Ordinary Signalman serving in my first sea draft and, along with other duties assigned, mostly of a manual nature, I was responsible for drawing the paint from the ship’s paint locker and painting the kangaroos!

Gavin Ryan – Perth, WA

By Editor: In checking our archives our archives the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Headmarkdated December 2013 contains a story on the First Red Roo. In summary this says in the 1950s the RAN converted four of its five Q-class destroyers to Type 15 fast anti-submarine frigates. HMAS Queenboroughcompleted her conversion in 1954 and the following year undertook a global circumnavigation.

While in British waters she operated with an RN squadron which used the Red Hand of Ulster as a funnel emblem. To retain a visible Australian identity, Queenboroughalso displayed her own red kangaroo. This remains the first known use of the red kangaroo on the funnel of an HMA Ship. By the 1980s the insignia had been adopted across the RAN’s major surface fleet.

Looking back even further a photograph is found in the AWM collection (078677) of Able Seaman John Conway keeping watch aboard ML 802 during amphibious operations off New Guinea dated 28 January 1945. Fairmiles were known for their harsh living conditions which resulted in a degree of latitude being given to the dress and appearance of both men and boats. In this instance in the background a solid kangaroo motif (colour unknown) is attached to the vessel. The mystery continues.

The World’s Fastest Ship

December 6, 2017

The RAN’s experience with catamaran hulls has been limited and has produced mixed results.

The first experiment with catamaran hulled fibreglass minehunters, built by Carrington’s at Newcastle between 1986 and 1987, was not successful. These two vessels, HMA Ships Rushcutter and Shoalwater, were plagued by problems and were placed into Reserve in 1999 and disposed of shortly thereafter.

At the same time in 1999 owing to a short-term gap in operational logistical support during the Timor campaign Navy leased an Incat designed and Tasmanian built Bass Strait ferry, commissioned as HMAS Jervis Bay. With high speed wave piercing characteristics she was able to rapidly move both troops and materials between Darwin and East Timor. At an average speed of 45 knots she could make the passage in 11 hours and in her two years of operation made 107 crossings, before she was handed back to her owners in 2001. This operation proved very successful and despite the continued garlands won by Incat in furthering Australian shipbuilding industrial credentials there has seemingly been little more RAN interest.

It might be time to reintroduce readers to the latest Incat success story. This is the 1,516 tonne, 99 meter long, 27 meter beam and 3 meter draught Francisco which on trials achieved a lightship speed of 58.1 knots. When loaded with up to 1,000 passengers and 150 cars she has a service speed of about 50 knots.

The vessel’s high speed is attributed to the combination of Incat wave piercing catamaran design, the use of lightweight but strong marine grade aluminium, and the power produced by two 22MW GE LM2500 gas turbines driving Wartsila LJX 1720 SR waterjets. Francisco was constructed in Hobart for service with the Buquebus Company on the River Plate between Buenos Aires and Montevideo. She is the eighth Incat vessel operated by Buquebus and their associated companies.

Incat has now built 25 high speed craft and the past three consecutive winners of the Hales Trophy, the Transatlantic Blue Riband record for commercial passenger ships, were all built by Incat. The average speed over three days of the Atlantic crossing for an unrefueled voyage was 41.28 knots. Truly an amazing story of Australian ingenuity most worthy of continued local support.

Our Spanish Cousins: Politics and shipbuilding capabilities

December 5, 2017

Political Intrigues

For centuries there was natural rivalry between Britain and Spain in the fields of colonial expansion, maritime trade and commerce. Relationships, at least from the time of the 1588 Armada, were acrimonious. As a counter to Spanish success Britain built a friendship with Portugal, a small country sharing a common heritage and border with Spain. This goes back even further in time to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1373, the oldest such treaty in the world which remains extant.

In 1662, in a political move set to embarrass their Spanish neighbours, the Portuguese Princess Catherine of Braganza married British King Charles II and as part of her dowry Tangier, in the modern Kingdom of Morocco, became a British possession. This was significant as it gave Britain a gateway to the great Mediterranean Sea leading to the Orient and the East Indies. Huge sums of money were spent improving the port and its defences and a large garrison was involved in keeping the Moors at bay.

There were immediate complications, as Spain had previously annexed Portugal and refused to acknowledge Portuguese independence and its right to cede territory. This meant the new British colony faced an unfriendly presence from the near north and from their Moroccan neighbours, who deeply resented having another foreign enclave in their country. In the end, after only 23 years of occupation Britain destroyed most of its improvements and abandoned the settlement.

However the situation improved for Britain following the outcome of the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714) when Spain ceded Gibraltar and the island of Minorca to Britain. Gibraltar has remained a British colony to this day but Minorca was fought over a number of times and returned to Spain in 1802. Our own first governor, Arthur Phillip, was an 18 year old Midshipman at the 1756 Battle of Minorca where a British fleet was defeated by the French, leading to the controversial court-martial and death by firing squad of Admiral John Byng.

In the 1700s Spain was amongst the world’s most prosperous nations. From then on a series of disputes regarding the succession to the Spanish throne and the eventual loss of its colonies led to a national decline. A revolution in 1866 was the catalyst for further turmoil which was not finally resolved until the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939. Remaining neutral in both world wars,Spain again gradually built the relative stability and prosperity she enjoys today.

The Spanish Navy has a long and proud history and at one time was the world’s largest navy. During the 17th and 18th centuries its naval forces were sorely tested protecting worldwide trade against the rigours displayed by the ‘wooden walls’ of England. When looked at through dark Spanish eyes this was no more than piratical interference of trade for wanton greed and destruction, with molestation undertaken with impunity in favour of awards and prizes justified by Admiralty Courts of dubious morality.

For over three centuries the Spanish empire expanded across South America, through the Caribbean, Central America and much of North America. The first signs of instability occurred in 1763 when much of its vast Louisiana Territory was ceded to France, and later sold to the United States. The destruction of the main Spanish fleet, under French command, at Trafalgar in 1805 undermined Spain’s ability to defend its empire. Further lands in Louisiana and Florida were ceded to the Unities States in 1819 and the Mexican-American War of 1846-48 resulted in the loss of Texas.

Marriage of Catherine of Bragnza to King Charles II, from old print

Starting in 1810 a period of insurrection occurred in Spain’s South American colonies and continued for the next twenty and more years as they sought independence. The final nail in the coffin was the Spanish-American War of 1898 with America giving aid to Cuban rebels and this extended to the loss of its Pacific possessions, most notably the Philippines and Guam.

Spanish Shipbuilding Capabilities

The rugged northwest coastal region of Spain has a centuries old tradition of ship construction and repair. From the 19th century Spain’s warships were primarily sourced from Britain with some construction in government owned naval dockyards. In 1887 a consortium of British and Spanish firms formed a private company, Astilleros del Nervion in Bilbao. They produced three cruisers, basically an enlarged version of the RN Orlando class.

In 1909 the Sociedad Espanola de Construction Naval (SECN) was created by a new consortium of British shipyards (Vickers, Armstrong & John Brown) to rebuild the Spanish fleet. They leased the three government dockyards, effectively privatizing their operations. Over the next twenty years SECN built numerous warships based on British designs, including three Dreadnought-type battleships. While the privatized yards had mixed success they greatly aided the expansion of commercial shipbuilding. The downside was a continuing heavy reliance on overseas technical support.

At the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939 SECN was reorganised, the three major shipyards restored to government control and British workers returned home. This led to a decline, with only a handful of small warships being constructed during WWII.

This all changed in 1953 with the signing of the ‘Pact of Madrid’ between Spain and the United States. The Pact provided for mutual defence and US military aid to Spain for the construction of bases that could be used by the US, in particular Rota near Cadiz. Over the next decade the US transferred destroyers and minesweepers as well as extensive funds to modernise naval infrastructure and for improved naval training. The first major US warships transferred to Spain in 1957 were three Fletcher-class destroyers. Rota is now a Spanish naval base shared with considerable US forces and is fully funded by the United States.

The next major step taken in the mid 1980s was the building of US designed guided-missile frigates under licence at the Bazan El Ferrol shipyard. The six-ship Santa Maria-class, a variant of the US Oliver Hazard Perry-class, is similar to the RAN’s Adelaide-class. With technological transfer from the US this proved the turning point in Spain’s ability to build modern warships. The major difference between this approach and the previous British initiative was that technology was transferred directly to the indigenous labour force. They also entered into a long-term relationship with the renowned ship-design house of Gibbs & Cox which allowed seamless integration of local requirements into American hulls.

Spain was incorporated into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 and the European Commission (EC) gave new impetus and aid to restructuring unproductive industries. Spain had a significant commercial shipbuilding industry which was entirely government owned, under direction from the EC this was privatised. However essential security involving defence industries could be retained in state hands. This solution allowed Spain to protect its military shipyards which later emerged under the Navantia umbrella.

EEC involvement in the1990s saw more cooperation with European neighbours on joint ship design projects for frigates and logistic support vessels. In particular the Patino–class replenishment ship was designed in collaboration with the Netherlands. A huge leap in faith was the design of Juan Carlos I, the largest and most expensive ship in the Spanish Navy. The accumulated experience of design and building complex warships led to the establishment of export markets. The first major export contract came in 1992 with construction of the VSTOL aircraft carrier Chakri Naruebetfor the Royal Thai Navy.

The 2007 Global Financial Crisis which in Spain is known as the Great Recession had a devastating impact upon the local economy. Through mismanagement and less than prudent fiscal controls an over inflated economy imploded with business closures, high unemployment and reduced wages. However with continued government support much of the Spanish shipbuilding industry weathered the storm and maintained reasonable forward order books. In winning new work the longer term profitability of business may be questionable, but at least in the short-term, this appears to favour customers.

In 2005 the military yards in El Ferrol, Cadiz and Cartagena were formed into a new company, Navantia. A great confidence boost to the new company was the award of a contract by Norway to build five Aegis frigates at a time when the first Spanish ship of this type was not yet commissioned.

Australian Naval Requirements

The RAN traditionally relied upon British designed warships as these formed part of a global naval strategy augmented by ships from the Dominions. Nothing much changed until the Vietnam War, in which Britain did not participate, and our closer ties with the USN saw the introduction of American built warships. Since then there has been an uneasy proliferation of design options including American, Australian, British, French, German, Italian and Swedish, but until recently Spanish designs did not feature.

Our involvement with Spanish shipbuilding started in 2003 when the RAN was in the process of revitalising shipbuilding capabilities to include construction of three Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs) and two Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious ships. Early studies for the AWD included designs of the German Sachsen, the Spanish F100 and the American Arleigh Burke. Surprisingly the favoured Sachsen was the first to be eliminated from the competition and ultimately the larger Arleigh Burke (a new derivative by Gibbs & Cox) lost out in favour of the more advanced Spanish design.

In 2005 the Australian Government announced the Spanish modified AWD was the preferred design. At the same time, competition for the amphibious ship program intensified between the French joint-venture shipbuilder Armaris with its recently-commissioned Mistral–class, and Navantia’s proposal based on the yet to be completed, Juan Carlos I. The selection of both Navantia proposals was confirmed by Australian authorities in June 2007 which involved teaming with local builder Tenix for construction of the LHDs. The LHD Canberra-class was primarily constructed at El Ferrol but with fitout integrated in Australia and the AWD Hobart-class built entirely by ASC Shipbuilding in Adelaide.

The Spanish Armada’s combat logistic ship ESPS Cantabria served on the Australian Station from January to November 2013. In a ‘Try before you Buy’ program she bridged the gap in the fleet when the replenishment ship HMAS Successwas in extensive refit. Cantabria performed 63 replenishments and her officers and crew were a credit to the Armada. It is perhaps noteworthy that Cantabria and her smaller sisterPatino were recently lent to the Royal Canadian Navy when they too had a short-term lack of logistic support vessels. However the RCN is awaiting delivery of German designed vessels to replace its two aging logistic ships.

The overall Australian acquisition program appears successful with the LHD lead ship Canberra commissioned in November 2014 and her sister Adelaide in December 2015. Continuing the progression, in March 2016 the Minister for Defence announced that Navantia had beaten the offer of a major Korean shipbuilder for construction of two auxiliary oil and replenishment (AOR) vessels to be delivered from 2021. More recently from February to June 2017 we had the company of ESPN Cristobal Colonon which class the RAN’s new Air Warfare Destroyers are based. While here she participated in exercises and provided invaluable training opportunities to most of the ship’s company of our first AWD HMAS Hobart which commission on 23 September 2017.

Summary

An article entitled Our Most Welcome Spanish Guestin the March 2014 edition of this magazine contained a few words which remain pertinent:

Spanish guests are only infrequently welcomed to our shores, in fact this seems to occur about every 200 years. The famous navigator Luis Vaez de Torres visited in 1606 and two centuries later in the early 1800s, Spanish prizes taken by privateers off the Pacific coast of South America started to appear at Port Jackson. These included the handsome schooner Bethlehem which for a time wore the broad pennant of Commodore Bligh. Another 200 years have passed and we have discovered the wonders of Spanish shipbuilding, leading to the invaluable loan of a Spanish naval ship to the RAN.

Looking down from our lofty perch there is much to be learned from our Spanish cousins who had sailed into the unknowns searching for Terra Australis many centuries past. Turing to the present, Spain has built an enviable reputation as a shipbuilder by accepting transferred technology, being ably supported by the best of overseas designers, and integrating the vast hidden value of research and development, previously absorbed in global platforms. We might aptly conclude with an example taken from the great navigator Torres who on completing his task sought no glory but through his pen offered the world further enlightenment.