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HMAS Arunta I

Australians in the Decisive Thrust KING II – The Leyte Landings

 By Paul Baker

Seventy-five years ago, on 18 October 1944, beaten only by the fast minesweepers and the attack forces securing the mouth of the Gulf, the crew of HMAS Gascoyne became the first Australians to enter Leyte Gulf since an RAAF Mosquito had carried out the initial aerial reconnaissance of the Gulf seven weeks earlier. The KING II landings conducted by Australian, British and US forces of the South-West Pacific Area (SWPA) and the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) two days later not only led to the liberation of the Philippines, but proved to be the decisive thrust of the war against Japan, dealing the final destructive blow to the Japanese Navy’s ability to field a fleet, decimating the Japanese Air Forces to the extent they felt forced to adopt kamikaze tactics and driving a wedge between Japan and their critical resources in Southeast Asia. As SWPA Land Forces Commander General Blamey explained to Prime Minister Curtin, ‘There can be no question about the strategical correctness of the seizure of the Philippines, since this aimed straight at the heart of the Japanese ocean area’.

Although the Australian contingent in the landings only consisted of approximately 3,500 sailors, 236 soldiers and 20 airmen, they were far from minor players ‘attached’ to US forces as is so often reported. They were, in fact, integral members of SWPA units allocated to the KING II operation as a continuation of the SWPA offensive that began in earnest in 1943. With the most powerful warships in the Seventh Fleet, Australia provided half the major firepower for the Close Support Group as well as the critical interservice communications capability for US ships of the Group. To secure the ‘back door’ to the landing beaches, Australian landing ships landed a brigade sized unit to safeguard a critical passage used by PT boats in the Battle of Surigao Strait, while Australian signals intelligence personnel provided critical early warning of Japanese air attacks against the beachhead. Thirty Australians were killed in the fighting during KING II, and they are commemorated on the Australian Philippines Liberation Memorial in Palo on Leyte.

Australian Philippines Liberation Memorial Palo NHS

MUSKETEER – The Plan for SWPA Forces to re-occupy the Philippines

By July 1944, the eastern perimeter of the new Japanese defensive zone from Western New Guinea to the Mariana Islands had been penetrated at the extremities. In the north, the Marianas had been occupied by POA forces and were to be used as B-29 Superfortress bases for attacks on Japan. In the process of doing so, they had sunk two of Japan’s remaining three large aircraft carriers and shot down approximately 350 aircraft in a single day in what became known as the ‘Marianas Turkey Shoot’, gaining complete command of the sea and air in the Western Pacific. In the south, the Australian, British, Dutch and US forces of the SWPA had reached Biak on the north coast of New Guinea, one step short of Morotai in Indonesia, the final springboard to the Philippines. The two Allied commands were now converging on the Philippines. On 10 July, General Headquarters (GHQ) SWPA issued the MUSKETEER plan, for the conduct of the Philippines campaign. The basic scheme of manoeuvre remained unchanged from New Guinea, establishing air superiority over an area with airstrips, preventing the enemy from reinforcing the area, taking it by amphibious assault and then using the airstrips to establish air superiority over the next objective along the path of advance. The plan included four phases of amphibious landing operations:

Map of forces approaching Leyte
  • The KING series to secure initial lodgment in the Philippines and to establish a base of operations.
  • The LOVE series to secure a safe route to and bases from which to support operations in Central Luzon.
  • The MIKE series to destroy the Japanese garrison, occupy Luzon and support operations against Japan.
  • The VICTOR series to consolidate areas by-passed in KING, LOVE and MIKE operations.

Leyte’s position on the Philippines’ central eastern seaboard made it an obvious choice for the main effort of the KING operations. The Leyte Gulf provided an excellent anchorage with direct access to the open Pacific as well as the waters of the archipelago, while the north-eastern coastal plain of Leyte held a main airfield at Tacloban and a new Japanese airfield system under development with four airstrips in the Dulag area 30 kilometres to the south. Importantly, the 50 kilometre stretch of beaches between Tacloban and Abuyog to the south, aside from being in close proximity to the airfields, also had the best landing beaches on the island with an absence of reefs or coral heads, and a favorable under-water gradient in selected localities which, except for occasional high surf, provided relatively few problems for an amphibious assault. In mid-September, POA carrier-based aircraft attacking Japanese airfields in the Philippines supporting the SWPA landing at Morotai destroyed or severely damaged about 500 of the estimated 884 Japanese aircraft in the country. POA reported that few serviceable planes in the Philippines were left to the Japanese, the bulk of the enemy’s oil supplies was destroyed, there was no shipping left to sink, the enemy’s non-aggressive attitude [was] unbelievable and fantastic, and ‘the area is wide open’. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered that some planned intermediate operations including the KING I landings in Sarangani Bay be cancelled and that A-Day for the ‘main effort’, the KING II landings in the Leyte Gulf, be brought forward to 20 October. Preparations for the SWPA’s expeditionary force’s leap forward to the Philippines were stepped up accordingly.

SWPA’s Expeditionary Force and the Australian Contingents

While maintaining responsibility for the defence of Australia and securing territory behind the line of advance, General Headquarters SWPA had developed what was effectively an expeditionary force which continued to grow in air and land strength. The Allied Air Forces (AAF) had been divided into two separate commands, the Fifth Air Force (5AF) including some RAAF squadrons becoming essentially an independent expeditionary tactical air force to support advancing army operations in New Guinea while RAAF Command with some US squadrons was responsible for the defence of Australian and AAF long range strategic operations beyond the envelope of tactical air force operations. In June, the AAF had been reinforced when the US Thirteenth Air Force (13AF) was reallocated from POA’s South Pacific Area to SWPA. Subsequently in September, as part of the plan for 13AF to take over 5AF airbases in New Guinea and Morotai as 5AF moved north for the Philippines campaign, the AAF commander ordered that the RAAF squadrons constituting No. 10 (Operational) Group under 5AF would be transferred to 13AF and would not take part in KING II. RAAF wireless units, however, were field units of GHQ’s Central Bureau providing dedicated signals intelligence support to SWPA. While Australian and US Army field units intercepted Japanese army communications, the interception of Japanese aircraft communications to provide local early warning of air attacks was solely the responsibility of the RAAF’s 1 Wireless Unit on Biak. With that unit remaining behind to support 13AF, 6 Wireless Unit (6WU), with a strength of 19 RAAF members, was raised from 1 Wireless Unit personnel on 9 October 1944 specifically to support 5AF during KING II.

SWPA Allied Naval Forces were structured along similar lines to the AAF. The Seventh Fleet was the SWPA’s naval combat and assault force, while the South-West Pacific Sea Frontier Force was responsible for defending Australia and the sea lanes. The Seventh Fleet was still relatively small in mid-1944, its combat units consisting of the Australian cruisers HMA Ships Australia and Shropshire, three US cruisers, 27 US destroyers and the Australian destroyers HMA ShipsArunta and Warramunga, 10 US torpedo boat squadrons and 30 US submarines. Despite SWPA Commander-in-Chief General MacArthur’s wishes, the dispersal of POA’s South Pacific Area assets in June saw POA retain the Third Fleet leaving the Australian heavy cruisers with their bigger guns the most powerful surface ships in the Seventh Fleet.Australian ships also played a major role in the Fleet’s Amphibious Force. HMAS Manoora had been the first landing ship made available for the force when it was established in 1943 and, due to the higher need for transports in other theatres, Manoora, HMA Ships Westralia, Kanimbla and a similar US ship were the only transports available to the Seventh Amphibious Force until April 1944. Australian frigates were also regularly assigned to the amphibious force as escorts and for service in the hydrographic and survey unit, while Australian escorts and auxiliaries were also allocated important tasks within the fleet. For KING II, Gascoyne and Harbour Defence Motor Launch (HDML) 1074 were assigned to the Mine-sweeping and Hydrographic Group. The total number of RAN personnel involved in KING II would eventually be about 3,500.

By September 1944, SWPA Allied Land Forces (ALF) had swelled from 12 Australian and four US divisions a year earlier to seven Australian and 15 US divisions. MacArthur initially proposed using the two experienced AustralianImperial Force (AIF) expeditionary divisions which constituted Australia’s I Corps separately under US corps commanders in KING II and a MIKE operation. The proposal was rejected by ALF commander Australian General Blamey who could under no circumstances concur in the use of Australian troops unless they operated as a corps under their own corps commander and his staff who were highly trained and were long and well experienced. The Australian Prime Minister later explained to MacArthur that it was laid down in the 1914-18 war that the Australian Forces serving outside Australia should be organised into and operate as a homogeneous formation appropriate to their strength, and that they should be commanded by an Australian officer. MacArthur, however, considered it impossible to utilise the entire corps in the initial landing force, probably because as his Chief of Staff later told Blamey that it was not politically expedient for the AIF to be amongst the first troops into the Philippines, in large numbers at any rate. As a result, the plan was changed with a view to employing the Australian Corps for an operation against Aparri on the northern coast of Luzon prior to a landing at Lingayen Gulf in early 1945, after which a third Australian division would be used in the final drive on Manila.

Australian soldiers were, however, allocated to other roles for KING II. At least four officers from Australia’s First Corps were assigned to US units in the landing as observers. Attached to the three Australian landing ships were Royal Australian Engineers’ Landing Ship Detachments, a total of 201 soldiers, which had been attached to the ships at the request of the Navy since the Seventh Amphibious Force was formed and played their part in every major amphibious operation, launching assault craft and unloading equipment and ammunition as well as manning light anti-aircraft gun stations and anti-submarine watches. A further 27 soldiers from the Royal Australian Artillery’s 1st Australian Naval Bombardment Group were attached to the Seventh Fleet’s two Australian and three US cruisers for the landings, acting as the interface between the assault troops and the ship’s gunnery fire control team. Four Australian Army intelligence analysts from the

Central Bureau and a British soldier on secondment were also attached to 6WU.

Grumman Avenger from escort carrier USS Santee covers Australian landing ship and destroyer escort off Panon beachhead 20 October 1944            AWM

POA Augmentation

The distance involved in leaping from SWPA’s forward-most base on Morotai to Leyte was over 1,000 kilometres. The isolation of the KING II landing sites and the size of the force to be landed meant it could not be carried out by SWPA resources alone, and would require massed carrier-based air support as well as the combined amphibious and naval forces available at the time. In order to capture the airfields quickly, the SWPA plan called for the simultaneous landing of two divisions in both the Tacloban and Dulag areas. As such, planning relied on POA’s Third Amphibious Force being attached to the Seventh Fleet to provide enough transport for the operation. As a result of the cancellation of the planned POA landing on Yap, however, the Attack Force, in its entirety of both assault shipping and troops, two POA divisions, were assigned to SWPA for KING II. Despite being a SWPA operation, there was now a perfect delineation between the Seventh Fleet landing of SWPA divisions in the Tacloban area called the Northern Attack Force and the Third Fleet landing of POA divisions in the Dulag area called the Southern Attack Force. With the Seventh Fleet’s Australian and US cruisers escorted by Australian and US destroyers constituting the Close Covering Group supporting the Northern Attack Force, the Third Fleet also provided protection and support in depth with a Bombardment and Fire Support Group of six battleships and six cruisers from the Third Fleet out in Leyte Gulf. Beyond them, sixteen escort aircraft carriers from the Third Fleet provided close air support and cover for the landings while, even further afield, the remaining six battleships, seventeen aircraft carriers and fifteen cruisers of the Third Fleet provided overall cover and support for the landings.

KING II – The Australian Experience

The need to secure the two islands in the mouth of the Leyte Gulf and the tip of the island to their south to ensure uninterrupted access into the gulf, intelligence reports of at least three minefields across the entrance to Leyte Gulf and the presence of a few shoals in the approaches to the landing beaches near Tacloban meant there were tasks that had to be completed before A-Day on 20 October. Accordingly, a vanguard consisting of a small Seventh Fleet attack group and the hydrographic unit, a combined Third and Seventh Fleet minesweeper unit, and a Third Fleet Beach Demolition Group arrived outside the Gulf on the evening of 16 October. Under cover of the Third Fleet’s battleships and cruisers, fast minesweepers led the attack group into the mouth of the Gulf on the morning of 17 October to land troops to secure the three islands. The hydrographic unit led by Gascoyne joined them in the Gulf on 18 October and immediately began marking shoals in San Pedro Bay. Gascoyne was attacked by a Japanese aircraft for the first time that evening, the bombmissing while the aircraft was possibly shot down. By the following evening, the minesweepers had cleared 227 mines while Gascoyne and her charges, HDML 1024 and two US minesweepers, had laid 32 buoys marking channels, beach approaches and shoals.

Soon after midnight on 20 October, A-Day, the Seventh Fleet’s Close Covering Group and the two Attack Forces moved down the cleared channel into the Leyte Gulf to prepare for the landings. Shortly after, Manoora, Westralia and Kanimbla peeled away from the Northern Attack Force as it continued on towards Tacloban accompanied by the Close Covering Group. Feeding into the southern end of Leyte Gulf, the Surigao Strait had been recognised as a vulnerability to the main landings, a ‘back door’ through which the Japanese could attack. To mitigate the threat, the three Australian ships had been tasked with landing a brigade-sized force on the southern tip of Leyte and the adjacent Panaon Island, securing the Panaon Strait to permit the passage of motor torpedo boats into the Mindanao Sea where they maintained early warning picket lines at the entrance to the Strait.

Escorted by HMS Ariadne and US destroyers, the convoy was attacked by a single Japanese fighter after daylight, but its bomb fell harmlessly well astern of Westralia and the aircraft disappeared. The landing was unopposed and, after the Australian Army detachments had offloaded the US force, the three Australian ships commenced their journey back into the Gulf proper while subjected to four unscuccessful single aircraft attacks, all driven off by anti-aircraft fire. They departed for Jayapura the next morning with the US landing ships of the Northern Attack Force.

Further north, as the Third Fleet’s battleships and cruisers were firing their pre-assault bombardment to cover the landings near Tacloban and Dulag, Australia, Shropshire and the two US cruisers of the Close Covering Group, each with an Australian Army bombardment liaison team aboard, were escorted by Arunta, Warramunga and five US destroyers into positions just off shore and immediately adjacent to the approaches to the assault beaches. They commenced bombarding the landing beaches, adjusting their fire as the assault troops approached the beaches, accompanied by their Australian observers. Once ashore the troops advanced, supported by naval gun fire requested through the shipborne bombardment liaison teams. It wasn’t until that afternoon that the Japanese really began to press with air attacks, and on the following morning the Australians suffered a disaster when a Japanese aircraft attempted to strafe the cruisers before passing between them where it was hit by fire from both ships and turned, bursting into flames and crashed into the foremast of Australia with its wing root from astern before going over the side of the vessel. Petrol that had probably gushed from ruptured fuel tanks of the aircraft caught fire and spread into the bridge. Thirty men including the captain and navigator were killed immediately or died of wounds over the following three days. Another sixty-four including soldiers were wounded. The number of casualties and the damage caused to the superstructure left the ship ineffective and Australia withdrew from Leyte Gulf that afternoon escorted by Warramunga.

Two soldiers and four airmen of a 6WU signals intelligence advance team aboard one of the command ships had actually intercepted a Japanese message ordering the aircraft to apparently concentrate on the two Australian cruisers close inshore. The team subsequently went ashore on 21 October where they were joined by the remaining 18 members of the unit on the following day. A camp was set up in the vicinity of some small hills approximately four kilometres from Tacloban where they began regular interception work. The intelligence gained by 6WU, including Japanese convoy movements as their progress was reported by aircraft covering them, was fed directly into the AAF intelligence staffs to be fused with other intelligence. From the beginning, AAF’s intelligence branch had a substantial Australian staff and at least one RAAF intelligence officer was also selected to move forward for KING II, boarding the aircraft carriers US ShipsIntrepid and Cabot from 20 October to brief pilots and aircrewmen.

The Japanese ‘Victory’ Operation

As the KING II landings were in progress, preparations for a major Japanese counterattack they had triggered were also underway. Following the loss of two of their three remaining large aircraft carriers in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June, and at the same time as the SWPA MUSKETEER plan was being developed, the Japanese developed plans to commit all available sea, air and ground forces to a decisive battle at one of four points along their inner defensive line where they expected the Allies to land. On 18 October, orders were given to implement the Philippines contingency version of the plan to crush the enemy. Confusion, disagreements and logistics meant that committing maximum ground strength to defend Leyte would take time with only one division on Leyte at the time and a second division to join them from Mindanao on the night of 24 October. A third division from Luzon and another on its way to the Philippines would also deploy to Leyte as soon as possible. In the meantime, the Navy and Air Forces were commencing the first phase of the Victory Operation, a concerted assault on the enemy invasion fleet.

The navy’s part of the plan called for almost the entire surface combat strength of the Fleet consisting of the last remaining large and five light aircraft carriers, two battleships converted to launch aircraft, seven battleships and 21 cruisers to be divided into three forces. The northernmost force centred on the large aircraft carrier augmented by three of the remaining five lighter carriers and two battleships fitted to launch aircraft by catapult, but with only 108 aircraft between them, was tasked with luring the Allied naval forces to the north. This was intended to allow a force of five of their remaining seven battleships, including the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi, and 12 of their remaining 21 cruisers and escorts, supported by land-based aircraft attacking the US carriers, to pass through the San Bernardino Strait in the central Philippines and destroy the Allied landing forces at daybreak on 25 October. A third force in the south, composed of the remaining two battleships, a cruiser and four destroyers was to pass through the Surigao Strait to assist in annihilating the Allied landing forces. Another group of three cruisers escorted by destroyers was to follow this third force through the Surigao Strait.

The POA carrier-based air attacks over the previous month had crippled the Japanese Army and Navy air units in the Philippines. Even with reinforcments arriving, the Japanese Army’s Fourth Air Army only had 150 aircraft while the Navy’s First Air Fleet had less than 50 and the Second Air Fleet 196 aircraft on the eve of a coordinated air offensive planned for 24 October in support of the Navy’s surface attack. Given the lack of aircraft, the First Air Fleet at Mabalacat, which had been specifically ordered to neutralise the US carriers of the Third Fleet by 25 October, decided that the most effective method of attack would be to crash dive Zeros loaded with 250 kilogram bombs into the US carriers and twenty-six of their Zeros were formed into a new unit given the title of Kamikaze Special Attack Corps. Unfortunately for the Japanese ships approaching Leyte, the unit was unable to launch a successful attack until 25 October.

The Battle of Surigao Strait

In addition to the troops on Panaon Island landed by the Australian landing ships, PT Boat and destroyer picket lines at the southern end of Surigao Strait while battleships were ordered to steam each night across the northern end, Seventh Fleet submarines were also ordered to patrol the western entrances to the Sulu and Celebes Seas and off northern Luzon to provide early warning of Japanese ship movements. Beginning just after midnight on 22 October, the submarines began to pick up major Japanese ship movements in western Philippine waters and sank two cruisers of the Japanese central force on the following day. Allied air searches on 24 October, the same day as the Japanese launched their air offensive, identified the three separate Japanese forces, one off north eastern Luzon, one heading for the San Bernardino Strait and the last for the Surigao Strait. Fortunately, attacks by Allied carrier aircraft that day managed to sink one of the super-battleships, Musashi, and forced the central Japanese force to withdraw. That night, the strong US Third Fleet covering force of newer battleships and large aircraft carriers, accompanied by light carriers, cruisers and escorts, moved north away from the San Bernardino Strait to attack the Japanese carrier decoy force, unaware that the centre force of Japanese battleships had again turned around and was again heading for the Strait, intending on converging on the Leyte Gulf with the southern Japanese force then passing through the Surigao Strait.

In the Leyte Gulf that night, the Third Fleet battleships, cruisers and destroyers under operational command of the Seventh Fleet began to take up battle formation with the Seventh Fleet’s three remaining cruisers (including Shropshireand all with Australian Army bombardment liaison teams aboard) and six remaining destroyers (including Arunta) at the northern end of the Surigao Strait in order to attack the Japanese force approaching the southern end. As the Japanese ships passed Panaon Island in the Strait after midnight, they were first attacked on the flanks by PT boats and then by destroyers including Arunta firing torpedoes as they closed on the northern end of the strait. As the Japanese ships continued towards the Leyte Gulf, they sailed directly towards the line of US battleships running perpendicular across their path which was flanked by the Allied cruisers including Shropshire. By morning of 25 October, the Allied torpedo attacks and subsequent gunfire from the battleships and cruisers had sunk both battleships, the cruiser and three of the four destroyers in the Japanese southern force. The group following them decided against entering the Strait but still lost one of its three cruisers to air attack later in the day. The Battle of Surigao Strait had been a resounding victory.

As the morning progressed, the Third Fleet began attacking the northern Japanese force of carriers, sinking its three light and one large carriers. In the meantime, however, the centre Japanese force of battleships and cruisers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait and turned south to attack the Third Fleet escort aircraft carriers and their destroyers which had been placed under operational command of the Seventh Fleet to provide close air support and cover for the landings. As the northernmost escort carrier group located east of Samar came under attack, the Japanese Kamikaze unit made their first successful attacks on the escort carriers as well. In the meantime, the victorious ships of the Battle of Surigao Strait were preparing to sail north to engage the central Japanese force when the Japanese suddenly ceased their attack and withdrew in order to continue on their primary mission to Leyte Gulf.

When they were approximately 80 kilometres from the mouth of the Gulf, however, the lack of information on whether the decoy carrier force in the north had suceeded in luring away the Third Fleet’s newer battleships and large aircraft carriers combined with a report that a large US carrier task force had been spotted to their northeast, and the knowledge that the southern force had failed to break through to the Gulf while there were indications that Allied reinforcements were concentrating there, it was decided to turn around yet again to attack what turned out to be a non-existent US carrier task force. At that stage, lack of fuel became a determining factor and the Japanese centre force turned back through the San Bernardino Strait to return to Brunei Bay, sustaining further losses as they withdrew. By the end of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, by some accounts the largest sea battle ever fought and, in the Surigao Strait, the last of the ‘big gun’ naval battles, the Japanese Fleet lost their last large aircraft carrier, three of their five light carriers, three of their seven battleships and nine of their 21 cruisers

Brunei Bay Postscript

As the Japanese naval forces withdrew, the Allies knew that the surviving Japanese ships were all probably damaged but could not be struck off the list, still posing a raiding threat to the Seventh Fleet’s cruisers once the Third Fleet battleships were withdrawn. Even the Seventh Fleet’s most powerful cruiser, Shropshire, was no match against Yamato. As a result, B-29 Superfortresses based in India bombed the Japanese dry docks in Singapore on 5 November to deny them repair facilities. Two days later, on 7 November, a US reconnaissance aircraft discovered a Japanese aircraft carrier, four battleships including Yamato and five cruisers still in Brunei Bay, as well as two cruisers off nearby Miri. While they had been able to refuel upon returning to Brunei Bay, ammunition resupply had to wait until the aircraft carrier Junyo arrived with the necessary ammunition on 6 November, the unloading of which was only completed after the ships had been spotted by the US reconnaissance aircraft. Coincidentally, that same evening, eight RAAF Catalinas were taking off from Darwin for Morotai from where they were scheduled to mine targets in Borneo, including four sorties against Brunei Bay on 9 November.

Considered ‘Navy business’, the ‘attack aviation’ focused AAF commander shunned aerial mining from its introduction in SPWA in 1943 in favour of more direct action while the Seventh Fleet’s aircraft were too few and poorly position to take on the role. RAAF Command, on the other hand, embraced the role and by September 1944 had three squadrons tasked solely with mine-laying, working to broad targeting directives from Commander Seventh Fleet in his capacity as Allied Naval Commander. At the end of October, after the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Commander Seventh Fleet had decided to extend the SWPA aerial mining program to targets on northern Borneo including Brunei Bay. With the discovery of the Japanese fleet, the Catalinas’ tasking was changed on arrival in Morotai for all available aircraft to conduct the Brunei Bay mission. That same day, however, partially in fear of an air raid possibly after spotting the US reconnaissance aircraft, the Japanese fleet put to sea and was seen sailing through the Balabac Strait into the Sulu Sea. As six Catalinas were dropping their mines in Brunei Bay that night, six of the cruisers were again spotted in the Sulu Sea. It was only on 11 November that two of the Japanese cruisers returned to Brunei Bay while the other warships refueled at Miri, although a reconnaissance of Brunei Bay and Kota Kinabalu harbour failed to find any Japanese ships at all on 12 November.

It was only on 15 November that reconnaissance aircraft again spotted up to three Japanese battleships and five cruisers at anchor in Brunei Bay where, by pure coincidence, the laying of a second round of mines by RAAF Catalinas had been planned since the start of November for that very night, most likely as a result of the sighting of the Japanese ships. With the Catalinas having closed the door on the Japanese ships in the Bay that night, some 40 13AF B-24 Liberators were sent from Morotai to bomb them on the following day. Although official reports state that photographs taken during the raid revealed that there was only one battleship, two cruisers, six destroyers and auxiliaries visible in the bay at that time, at least one eyewitness account suggests there were four battleships and six cruisers present. Five Japanese fighters attacked the bombers with one fighter shot down, while three of the Liberators were lost to antiaircraft fire. Unfortunately, only light near-miss damages were inflicted on the Japanese ships which had been seen and, after the raid, the Japanese fleet split up with three battleships including Yamato and escorts sailing for the Japanese homeland while the others headed southwest to Lingga anchorage south of Singapore. Four days later, on 20 November, the three battleships and their escorts passed the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait and, in order to save fuel, ceased zigzagging as a defence against submarine attack. The ships were spotted by a US submarine just after midnight and the Japanese battleship Kongo was sunk in the ensuing attack, leaving the Japanese with only three serviceable capital ships.

Commemoration

The sailors who died from the attack on Australia are now recorded on the Australian Philippines Liberation Memorial which was dedicated in Palo in 2014 near where the attack happened, and where an annual ceremony is held to commemorate the KING II landings on Leyte.

 

 

Letter: HMAS Arunta and Operation Hamburger

Dear Editor

The December 2017 edition of the NHR contains an article on the evacuation of Lancer Force from Timor by HMAS Arunta in January 1943. As my father was CO of Lancer Force I have a little further information which may be relevant.

Dili airport received an abnormal amount of rain in the days leading up to the evacuation. Japanese planes parked adjacent to the strip could not be moved because of the muddy conditions. If they had been airborne I doubt if the evacuation would have been the great success it undoubtedly was. This is further backed up by remarks made by SBLT John Leggoe, RANVR who was First Lieutenant of HMAS Patricia Cam then working out of Darwin. Before Arunta departed for Timor the CO of Patricia Cam, Lieutenant Sandy Meldrum, RANR(S), because of his local knowledge of these waters was temporarily seconded to assist in the navigation of Arunta for the beach landing.

Iris Nesdale in her book “Action Stations – Tribal Destroyers of the RAN” on page 18 contains a summary of a conversation with John Leggoe made some years after the incident in which he says: The Commandos knew that the Japanese had torpedo bombers lined up at Dilli, the monsoonal rains had been exceptionally heavy and Arunta did get away before dawn. The bombers were hopelessly bogged, which was just as well. The rescue operation could have ended disastrously.

Regards, Jim Walker

HMAS Arunta and Operation Hamburger

Whichever way you looked at a Tribal class destroyer, she was not just handsome, she was beautiful. The balance between hull and superstructure and the proportions of her two funnels were perfect. Add to this the strong clipper bow with a graceful sheer, running back to the break of the fo’c’sle and you have a word picture that does not do justice to the actuality of the best looking destroyers ever built1.

Operation HAMBURGER

We were recently approached by Jim Walker, whose father Major Edward (Mac) Walker was commanding officer of the 2/4th Independent Company (Lancer Force) fighting against the Japanese invaders of the then neutral Portuguese colony of Timor. Jim suggested that we might care to publish an article relating to the evacuation of Lancer Force by HMAS Arunta from Timor on 9/10 January 1943. While his late father never talked of these events he apparently spent the night in the captain’s cabin recovering from the effects of being waterlogged. Jim Walker has conducted his own research and believes that the men of Arunta who carried out the rescue mission have not been properly recognized, especially those who manned the small craft in treacherous conditions.

Operation HAMBURGER was the name given to the delivery of men and supplies in support of Sparrow Force in Timor which began on 27 May 1942. Sparrow Force changed its name to Lancer Force in November 1942 and the operation ended with the evacuation of Lancer Force on 10 January 1943.

Over these months our commandos in large and small groups harassed the enemy, which outnumbered them 100 to one. Some slipped into Dili, the capital, and shot-up Japanese headquarters, then melted back into the bush. There was plenty of cover, for steamy, rugged Timor rises from reef strewn beaches to forested parallel mountains chains with peaks reaching up to 10,000 feet.

Much has been written about the RAN’s involvement in the Timor campaign which tends to be overshadowed by the tragic losses of HMA Ships Armidale and Voyager.The brief but successful operation by Arunta in this conflict now barely rates a mention in her otherwise distinguished wartime career. However it is difficult to reflect upon Arunta’s role in Timor without acknowledging some previous operations. On 12 September 1942 HMAS Kalgoorlie sailed from Darwin with an advance party of the 2/4th Independent Company comprising the Commanding Officer Major Edward Walker and 12 other mainly officers and NCOs. They were taken ashore by boat at Betano Bay on 15 September and on landing were met by members of the 2/2nd Commando Company and escorted to various operational centres located within a 30 mile radius. A week later on 22 September a number of officers reassembled on the same beach awaiting the arrival of Voyager with the major component comprising 250 officers and men of the 2/4th Independent Company.

Voyager sailed from Darwin on 22 September and at last light the following evening began disembarking her troops and cargo at Betano Bay. While all troops were landed safely the ship grounded and could not be refloated. The next morning Voyager was sighted by two Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, one of which was shot down. As the ship could not be saved she was abandoned before the inevitable bombing raids which began in the afternoon. During the evening her crew had the unenviable task of laying demolition charges and the ship was destroyed. On 25 September the Bathurst-class minesweepers HMA Ships Kalgoorlie and Warrnambool safely evacuated the entire Voyager ship’s company and brought them back to Darwin without any casualties.

The ship and her mission

Arunta was the first of three Tribal class destroyers built in Australia. In all there were 27 ships in this class, 16 for the Royal Navy, eight for the Royal Canadian Navy and seven were intended for the Royal Australian Navy. But we had to be content with Arunta, Warramunga and Bataan, as with the end of the war in sight, the remainder were no longer required.

HMAS Arunta (1) in camouflage c1943

One thing for certain is that Arunta was a happy ship with much credit due to her first captain James (Ginger) Morrow, DSO, DSC, RAN who was highly regarded by both officers and men. He had gained wartime experience as First Lieutenant of Voyager, serving in the Mediterranean in the thick of convoys and campaigns in Greece, Malta and Tobruk. He was highly efficient and a skilful ship handler, and as a leader, he inspired confidence. During the extraction of Lancer Force CMDR Morrow must have been extremely conscious that in similar conditions, only four months previously, his old ship Voyager had carried reinforcements for Lancer Force to Timor and during that operation had grounded and perished on an exposed Timorese beach.

From the official war history and her Report of Proceedings (RoP) and extracts from her Bridge Log Book we are able to gain a reasonable understanding of the situation but one important document, a separate paper which is mentioned in her January 1943 RoP relating specifically to the Evacuation of Timor2, remains elusive, hidden in some dusty archive. We are however able to access some first-hand accounts of these events from those who served in the ship but these may have been written some time later.

Summary from the Official War History of the RAN

On 2nd January 1943, N.O.I.C. Darwin told the Naval Board and COMSOUWESPAC that the total withdrawal of Lancer Force might be necessary within the near future, and requested the allocation of a destroyer. Arunta was allocated and she reached Darwin from Cairns on 7th January, embarked eight Army assault craft, and sailed from Darwin at 7 a.m. on the 9th. She crossed the Timor Sea in overcast weather with heavy rain and wind squalls which provided excellent cover from enemy reconnaissance planes and at 1.30 a.m. on the 10th anchored in 27 fathoms about three-quarters of a mile from the beach at Quieras. Boats were quickly lowered and the first motor launch towing four assault craft departed from the ship at 01.40 a.m. with the second motor launch and another four assault boats leaving at 2.00 a.m.

The beach conditions were bad, with heavy surf running and capsizing and swamping several of the assault boats, and it was found impossible to load them with their correct complement of 15 men and crew of five. The first boat to return with wounded troops arrived alongside Arunta at 4.10 a.m. Also on board was the Adjutant, Lieutenant Rex Lipman; he had been given orders by Major Walker to convince Commander Morrow to delay the ship’s departure until all the troops were safely on board. After this Morrow told the beach party that no more equipment or stores would be taken and that the men must swim through the surf and board the assault craft outside it, otherwise there would be no chance of getting them off before daylight. At 5 a.m. there were still about 100 men on shore, but Morrow decided to wait and get them off if possible before daylight, hoping to run into bad cyclonic weather when about 30 miles clear of the coast. The last boats returned to the ship at 6.20 a.m., and ten minutes later Morrow proceeded at best speed. At 07.10 a.m. it was daylight and much too clear, but they steered towards rain squalls and from 08.15 a.m. onwards the visibility was never more than two miles until approaching Darwin.

Major Edward Walker (clean shaven) commander of the 2/4th Independent Company with Major Geoff Laidlaw Commander of the 2/2nd Independent Company at Lancer Force HQ in Timor. AWM

Arunta secured alongside at Darwin at 7 p.m. on 10th January, bringing with her 24 officers and 258 other ranks of Lancer Force, eleven women and children, and twenty Portuguese who had been working with the army. Morrow, in his report, stated that Mr Ley, Commissioned Gunner (T), was in charge of the boats inshore, ‘and I consider that it was only due to his fine seamanship and drive that all the troops were brought off. He was most ably assisted by Leading Seaman Power and Able Seaman Asser, who were outstanding in handling their boats and generally taking charge.’

Events as seen from the Lower Deck

Jim Hodge was an Able Seaman serving in Arunta when she rescued troops from Timor. In later life as a parliamentary journalist he wrote of his experiences which appeared in the Canberra Times on 18 October 1975. A summary is quoted below.

Late one January afternoon in 1943 a salt-stained destroyer steamed into bomb-battered Darwin harbour, grey decks lined with several hundred silent, gaunt, heavily beared troops clad in tattered remnants of army uniforms and bits and pieces of sailors’ gear.

From the tiny tender which opened the steel anti-submarine net to let the incoming destroyer go through came the hail: ‘Any of you blokes lend us a razor-blade?’

The whiskered company was Lancer Force, back from, enemy infested Timor in the Tribal class destroyer Arunta. When she berthed its members followed bare-footed officers down the gang-plank, and fell-in on the wharf. After months of isolated jungle fighting, ambushes, sickness, wounds and constant movement over rough country, they paraded as if they had just completed a ceremonial refresher course in a training camp.

We are able to trace other similar stories from those preserved by the ‘Arunta Association’. Much of the following is attributed to radar operator Tom Clark who was in the relief boat crews.

After anchoring at Darwin some rather flimsy looking flat-bottomed boats were brought onboard for our inspection and crews were told off to man them. Then to help with our training we had to row them around the harbour using paddles, with the coxswain steering with a splay oar.

When we arrived off the Timorese coast the boats’ crews were mustered and issued with tin hats and ‘Mae West’ life preservers. In darkness the ship anchored and the boats were then lowered and we manned these unfamiliar and clumsy craft. Two ship’s motor boats then each towed a trot of four assault boats inshore. The passage was calm when moving towards the dark coastline where fires marking the landing points were burning. As we neared the coast we were cast adrift from our tow and a thumping roar could be heard, which was the noise of big rollers breaking on the beach. Our craft were picked up and we fell out as they were dumped into the roaring surf. In pitch blackness with water over our heads we somehow scrambled up the beach and located our boats.

With a load of soldiers, some injured and wearing bandages, all sitting down in the boats, the crew using paddles sought to propel the craft through the breakers and back to the waiting motor boats. Not all went according to plan and many a boat was capsized with all occupants ending up in the sea. With the aid of the soldiers we lifted the boats over the breakers and then scrambled back onboard. After several such trips the crews were exhausted and had to be replaced.

Each of the assault boats was designed for a crew of five to take 15 passengers but given the conditions it was impossible to load this many so more ferry trips were necessary. Each assault boat is thought to have made about four round trips bringing off a total of309 from Lancer Force, 20 Portuguese civilians and 11 women and children – this equates to between 10 and 11 passengers per trip. Where they could make it without assistance the troops and civilians were brought on board from the boats using scrambling nets. With the last trip completed there was no time to recover the assault boats, which were stove in with axes and allowed to sink.    

After arrival onboard the cooks came to the fore with the first good meal our guests had seen in a long time. Everyone had a mug of hot soup and a meal of sausages and vegetables. Many had lived off the land and not eaten so well for a long time. They wolfed it down, until the heaving and rolling, pitching and driving of the destroyer got the better of them, and its decks became a slippery mess for crewmen to clean up for days after.

Ken Piesse, a non-commissioned officer of the 2/4th prepared notes relating to the ship’s arrival which are included in the book covering the Unit’s history3. These include the following comments:

The destroyer was now proceeding dead slow as she threaded her way past the many wrecks in the harbour. As the ship made fast we quietly thanked our sailor friends and filed across the deck of the hospital ship (possibly the motor passenger ship Centaurwhich had been requisitioned for use as a hospital ship on 9 January 1943) which we had berthed alongside.

A sizeable crowd had gathered on the wharf and once we had disembarked our officers quietly formed us into platoons where our parade was brought to attention. Following a brief word from the CO three cheers rang across the harbour for the crew of Aruntawho had done such a magnificent job in bringing us safely home without any loss of life.  

Following the evacuation of the majority of Lancer Force in Arunta a small rearguard party remained behind. These were taken off by the submarine USS Gudgeon on the night of 10 February 1943 and taken to Fremantle. This closed Operation HAMBURGER and the Australian operation in Timor which ended only a few days less than a year from which they began.

Quarantine and Recuperation at Larrimah

Prior to Arunta’s arrival at Darwin orders were issued that all military personnel would be quarantined for an indefinite period. On disembarkation and after all formalities had been completed the troops were entrained the following day for Larrimah, a staging camp located approximately 500 km south of Darwin. Doctors specialising in the treatment of tropical diseases including malaria, dysentery, tropical ulcers and other kindred troubles were on hand. Within four weeks the overall health of the unit improved considerably and on 23 February they left the camp and finally arrived home in Adelaide on 2 March. Extended leave was granted and the 2/4th regrouped at the Jungle Warfare Centre, Canungra, Queensland in April 1943.

Following further specialized training in the Atherton Tablelands the unit, now attached to the 9th Australian Division, sailed for New Guinea on 10 August 1943. As part of the 26th Brigade the unit was involved with the amphibious landing at Lae in early September 1943. The 2/4th came ashore in the second wave where they suffered heavy casualties when their landing craft was torpedoed, killing 34 members. After this action they saw further service in New Guinea before returning to Australia in March 1944.

After regrouping and further training the unit left Australia in April 1945 for Morotai and were engaged in the Tarakan campaign. On returning to Australia the unit was disbanded on 8 January 1946.

Arunta does not go quietly

Arunta had a significant war history with contributions to many of the campaigns in the Pacific extending all the way to the capitulation of Japan. On 21 December 1956 she paid off and was placed into operational reserve at Sydney’s Athol Bight Dolphins. Here she remained until November 1967 when she was sold for demolition to the China Steel Corporation of Taipei in Taiwan.

She departed on her final voyage for the breakers yard on 12 February 1968 under tow by the Japanese tug Toko Maru. The old warhorse was reluctant to leave her homeland and the following day, in good weather when off Broken Bay, she inexplicably began to list to starboard; as the list increased the tug master turned around and attempted to take his charge back to Sydney. But the list increased and as Arunta lay over on her side the tow was slipped and in deep water she disappeared below the waves.

There was much ill feeling about her demise; after spending most of her life fighting against the Japanese it was thought an ignoble end to be towed by a Japanese tug. The mystery of her sinking has never been fully explained and the press of those times published theories of sabotage. The loss of Arunta was investigated by maritime authorities but the results were inconclusive.

 

Notes:

1    A view from a proud onetime captain of HMAS Warramunga, CMDR John Alliston, DSO, DSC & Bar, RN.

2    HMAS Arunta Report of Proceedings No 1/43 dated 12 January 1943 ‘Evacuation of Timor’.

3    Commando from Tidal River to Tarakan, compiled by G. E. Lambert and published by the 2/4th Commando Association, 1994.

 

 

The Royal Australian Navy at Leyte Gulf October 1944

By Kingsley Perry

The series of sea battles at and around Leyte Gulf in October 1944 marked a turning point in the Pacific war. Despite together representing the greatest sea battle in history, the Battle of Leyte Gulf is not as well-known as many other naval encounters of that war. This article gives a brief description of the great battle, highlighting the Royal Australian Navy’s contribution to the huge American naval force which took part.

Introduction

A casual armchair history buff might remember Leyte Gulf simply as the place where a great armada of landing ships congregated during the Pacific war, and where General MacArthur waded ashore on his famous return to the Philippines. But of course there was much more to it than that. It witnessed a hugely successful series of operations and great sea battles that set the final course for victory in the Pacific.

The Royal Australian Navy was there. October 25 2014 marks the seventieth anniversary of the events. Now is an opportunity to provide a brief summary of its contribution to that momentous Battle of Leyte Gulf.

General MacArthur had been planning the liberation of the Philippines since early in 1943. As the war in the Pacific progressed, detailed plans were prepared for landings in Leyte Gulf and then at Luzon in late 1944 and early 1945. By March 1944 the Japanese were aware of the probability of attacks and landings at Leyte Gulf in late October, and were planning their defence. This was seen by the Japanese as their key to survival. They could not afford to lose the Philippines and be cut off from their communication with the vital resources of the southern regions. The forthcoming battle for Leyte Gulf was certain to be the greatest and most decisive battle of the war. The Japanese committed their entire and still vast navy to the battle. By this time the American navy’s presence in the Pacific was enormous.

The RAN’s contribution to the large task force for the landings in October 1944 consisted of the County Class heavy cruisers HMA Ships Australia and Shropshire, the Tribal Class destroyers HMA Ships Arunta and Warramunga, the River Class frigate HMAS Gascoyne, and Harbour Defence Motor Launch (HDML) 1074. In addition, there were three converted merchant cruisers, the infantry landing ships HMA Ships Manoora, Westralia and Kanimbla. This article concentrates on the contributions of these ships.

The Landings

Task Force convoys for the Leyte Gulf landings left Humboldt Bay and converged on the Philippines in mid-October 1944. At one stage there were 471 ships in the bay, ready to go. On 18 October Gascoyne, which has been specially fitted for hydrographic duties, entered Leyte Gulf through a bombardment task group of battleships and other warships. Gascoyne was to mark shoals and lay buoys for the swept channel into San Pedro Bay. She completed that task by noon the next day. Meanwhile, HDML 1074 entered the bay to patrol the northern part of the Gulf. By nightfall all was ready for the landings, and early in the morning of 20 October the huge armada of landing craft made its way into the Gulf under an umbrella of heavy naval gunfire support. Manoora, Westralia and Kanimbla broke off from the main attack face to head south west for Panaon Island to take part in the landing to secure the Panaon Strait. Fortunately the landing at Panaon Island was virtually unopposed. The ships were able to get close to shore and the landing of troops and equipment progressed without interference. Having completed their tasks, they proceeded back to Leyte Gulf to join up with landing ships from other units. The only opposition then was from one enemy aircraft, but it was driven off by anti-aircraft fire. On 21 October, the convoy of ships left the area to return to Humboldt Bay, their valuable work completed.

Map of battle area

Meanwhile, in the morning of 20 October, Australia, Shropshire, Arunta and Warrego moved past Gascoyne and HDML 1074 close into the Gulf to provide fire support for main landings in the northern part of the Gulf. The off-shore bombardments continued throughout the day. On that day alone, 18,150 troops (including General MacArthur, of course) and 13,500 tons of equipment were landed.

The following day, 21 October (Trafalgar Day), was a bad day for the Royal Australian Navy. At about 0600, a Japanese aircraft appeared while the ships were stationary and dived at Shropshire. It came under heavy fire, turned, but crashed into the foremast of Australia. Fierce fires and explosions caused significant damage and killed the majority of the bridge and control personnel. Thirty officers and men in Australia were killed or died of wounds (including the Commanding Officer) and 64 were wounded, 26 seriously. The ship was rendered ineffective. Warramunga was assigned to escort her, and in company with the crippled US cruiser USS Honolulu and a US destroyer, they departed the scene and headed for Manus Island. Wartime action for Australia, however, was far from over – she was ready for action again in less than two months. Shropshire and Arunta remained on patrol at the Gulf.

Gascoyne and HDML 1074 continued their survey work throughout 22 and 23 October. Shropshire and Arunta were recalled from patrol by day for fire support. They were settling into a routine, but it would soon be interrupted. The main force of the Japanese Combined Fleet was converging on Leyte. The landings had been a resounding success, but the second phase, the naval battles, was about to begin.

The Japanese naval forces

By 24 October it was clear that Japanese naval task forces were heading to attack the allied ships and forces at Leyte. A successful attack would have been a disaster for the allies who had just established a bold presence in the Philippines. One Japanese task force was attempting to traverse San Bernardino Strait to the north of Leyte in an easterly direction, then to head south to the Leyte Gulf. Another, composed of two separate task forces, was heading eastward towards Surigao Strait, to approach Leyte Gulf from the south. At this stage there were about 200 ships still in Leyte Gulf. They were coming under heavy attack from enemy aircraft.

The northern Japanese force heading for San Bernardino Strait was a formidable fleet composed of six battleships, ten heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Just off Palawan, about 500 miles short of the strait, two of the heavy cruisers were sunk by torpedoes from two US submarines, and one other was severely damaged. Later in the day, the force also came under heavy air attack by American aircraft. The giant battleship Musashi was sunk, and a heavy cruiser was disabled. Nevertheless the depleted but still formidable force continued towards the strait.

Meanwhile, yet another Japanese naval force of one fleet carrier, three light carriers, two converted battleship carriers, three light cruisers and nine destroyers was hovering some 200 miles to the north-north-east. It was a decoy. In a controversial move, the American naval command of the task forces thought to be defending any Japanese approach through the San Bernardino Strait decided to attack this other fleet, and took after it with a task force of three fast carrier groups and all its battleships and cruisers, leaving San Bernardino Strait unguarded. At the same time, the two separate Japanese task forces to the south were still steaming eastward towards Surigao Strait. However, plans were in place to cope with this.

The Battle of Surigao Strait

At 1900 on 24 October, Shropshire and Arunta were part of two task groups taking up position at the northern entrance to Surigao Strait at the southern end of Leyte Gulf. A battle line, comprising six battleships with a screen of six destroyers, was steaming line ahead, east and west at five knots along a line of about eleven miles. Flank forces maintained station on the battle line. Shropshire and Arunta were part of the right flank of some 14 warships. They awaited the arrival of the Japanese through the strait. The night was clear and dark, and the sea calm.

The first Japanese group, comprising two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers, was making its way eastward then northward into Surigao Strait, steaming line ahead. The second, comprising two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and four destroyers, was 30 miles astern. In the early hours of 25 October, the first group was under attack by PT boats, the firefight and search lights marking its progress towards the waiting battle line.

USN Battle Line Leyte Gulf – USN

At about 0300, five destroyers of the waiting allied right flank were speeding south toward the approaching first Japanese force. They attacked with torpedoes and then withdrew at high speed under heavy fire. One Japanese battleship and one destroyer were sunk. Six more destroyers of the allied right flank, including Arunta, were also despatched southward to attack. They broke into two sections, one of which was under the operational tactical command of Arunta. Torpedoes were fired by the destroyers, and two Japanese destroyers that had been badly damaged in the earlier attack were sunk. However, the three remaining Japanese ships, a battleship, a heavy cruiser and a destroyer, continued northwards in the strait.

At 0350 the order was given for all ships in the American and Australian battle line to open fire. The battleships and cruisers immediately did so. All hell broke loose. The light and sound must have been incredible. So many big ships with such enormous armaments, blazing away at night at a frantic rate and with such fire power. It was seen and heard from many miles away. This was the last time battleships were utilised in a battle line as a tactical device.

The three Japanese ships were drenched with gunfire. In just 16 minutes, Shropshire fired thirty-two 8-inch broadsides of eight guns at the Japanese battleship. Arunta fired eleven 6-gun salvoes from six and half miles away, and then fifteen 6-gun salvoes attargets a little closer. Moreover, this battle was all in confined waters, the strait being as little as 12 miles wide. While trying to execute a torpedo attack, a US destroyer was crippled, and there were considerable casualties. The order to cease firing was given shortly afterwards at 0409. The open fire phase lasted less than 20 minutes.

The remaining Japanese battleship was badly damaged. It turned to retire but capsized and sank. The heavy cruiser caught fire and was put out of action. It was sunk later in the morning. Of the seven warships that started in this group, only one Japanese destroyer survived.

The second Japanese group (comprising two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and four destroyers) that was entering Surigao Strait and following the first that was being decimated in the firestorm in the strait, lost one cruiser to a torpedo at about 0325 before the remaining two heavy cruisers and four destroyers caught up with the remnants of the first group in the strait. They attempted one torpedo run, but then retired under heavy fire and headed south at best speed.

Suddenly all was quiet in Surigao Strait. What remained of the retreating Japanese force was subjected to further harassment by ships (including Shropshire and Arunta) and aircraft as they fled. In the end, of those two Japanese naval groups that tried to force Surigao Strait only one heavy cruiser and four destroyers survived. The American’s only loss was one heavily damaged destroyer. A spectacular naval battle had been won decisively by the American and Australian naval forces.

The finale

The Royal Australian Navy had made its presence known in no uncertain terms in the landings in Leyte Gulf and in the Battle of Surigao Strait. The American operations, however, were not complete. The depleted but still formidable Japanese naval force now approaching through San Bernardino Strait and the decoy force further north had still to be dealt with.

The Japanese naval force passed through the now unguarded San Bernardino Strait as the Battle of Surigao Strait was under way, and in the early morning of 25 October was heading south towards Leyte Gulf. It now comprised four battleships, six heavy and two light cruisers and 15 destroyers. It engaged weaker American escort carrier groups that had been patrolling outside Leyte Gulf. Despite inflicting losses on the Americans, it was not successful in breaching the makeshift naval defences. After only about two hours of battle the Japanese retreated through the strait under heavy attack. Meanwhile the American task force that had been lured some 200 miles north to deal with the decoy Japanese force did so, inflicting heavy losses.

Shropshire and Australia From USS Phoenix at Leyte (later General Belgrano sunk by HMS Conquerer in Falklands. Windows Live Photo Gallery

The Australian ships Shropshire and Arunta that were with the force still active in Surigao Strait were recalled to help repel the Japanese attempting to take Leyte Gulf from the north, but they did not meet up the Japanese fleet before it hurriedly retreated through San Bernardino Strait.

The battle for Leyte Gulf resulted in a decisive allied victory over the Japanese. It is said to have been the biggest naval engagement of all time. Tonnage sunk was 341,000 tons, greater than Jutland, and more than the total in all other battles in the Pacific. In just one day, 25 October 1944, fourteen Japanese ships were sunk. Five American ships were sunk, all in repelling the Japanese force attempting to reach Leyte Gulf by way of the San Bernardino Strait. The losses, particularly the Japanese, would undoubtedly have been much greater had the main American naval task force not been lured away from guarding the San Bernardino Strait area by the decoy to the north.

On hearing the result of the battle for Leyte Gulf, Winston Churchill telegraphed President Roosevelt to tender his congratulations for ‘the brilliant and massive victory’, graciously adding that he was ‘pleased to know that an Australian Cruiser Squadron had the honour of sharing in this memorable event’.

Shropshire and Arunta continued to serve and fight in the Philippine region for some time after the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Gascoyne and HDML 1074 also continued with their operations there. Other ships of the Royal Australian Navy, including the repaired flagship Australia, also took part in other significant operations in the Philippines in 1944 and 1945, leading to the advance on Japan and eventually to victory in the Pacific.

The hugely successful Battle of Leyte Gulf decided the fate of the Philippines. Those who were serving in Australia, Shropshire, Arunta, Warramunga, Gascoyne and HDML 1074 as well as in the three infantry landing ships Manoora, Westralia and Kanimbla can be justly proud of their contribution. The historic battle will be well commemorated on its seventieth anniversary.

[The author is indebted to Tim Ayling and Paul Baker of the Australian Embassy, Manila, for their paper An Undervalued Sacrifice – Commemorating the Australian Contribution to the Liberation of the Philippines (November 2013). There is a detailed description of the RAN’s part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf and subsequent operations in G. Hermon Gill’s Royal Australian Navy 1942-45 (Chapter 17).]

 

 

Kamikazes, Suicide Bombers and Us

The following speech was delivered to the Australian Naval Historical Society on Monday, 26 June, 2006

Thank you for the opportunity to speak about kamikazes. But let me enlarge on the title – ‘Kamikazes, Suicide Bombers and Us.’ The Japanese word ‘kamikaze’, as you probably know, means ‘divine wind’ and originated in 1281 when the Mogul chief, Kublai Khan, tried to invade the island of Japan with a fleet of 3000 vessels crammed with mercenaries from China and Korea. In sight of their goal a ‘divine wind’ eliminated this great fleet. Japan was saved. These winds, known to us as cyclonic winds, were called kamikazes or ‘divine winds’.

When the Japanese carrier strike force attacked Pearl Harbour on December 7th 1941, without warning and with devastating effect, such winds were not needed. All they needed were carrier borne aircraft which they used to good effect. Was the attack expected? I have reason to believe that it was, but the warnings did not get through to the White House, or if they did, no one paid any attention to them.

When I left school in 1940 I went to work in the National Bank at Northcote, WA. After a year in the branch I was transferred to the Chief Manager’s Department in Collins Street as a junior. Now and again I would see a three ring commander, resplendent in naval uniform. He was the brother of Lionel Nave, the chief manager’s secretary. I wondered what his job was. Years later I learned that it was he who had broken the Japanese code. Thanks to him the cryptographic teams were set up which enabled the Allied Forces to anticipate the Japanese advance in the Pacific.

February 15th 1941 witnessed the fall of Singapore. Bali and Timor were attacked on the 19th and 20th. A Japanese carrier force raided as far south as Darwin inflicting heavy damage. Eight or more ships were sunk, 450 people were killed. Broome was also attacked. The Philippines were overrun. General MacArthur was forced to quit, but said, ‘I will return’ and this he did, as we know, in October 1944. February 27th, ABDA, that is, the American, British, Dutch, and Australian naval forces, were annihilated in the Battle of the Java Sea. HMAS Perth was sunk. In the space of less than three months the Allies had lost two capital ships, five cruisers, a seaplane carrier and seventeen destroyers in defence of South East Asia. There was nothing to prevent the Imperial Japanese Navy from overrunning the entire western half of the Pacific.

On April 20th, a Japanese invasion force left its new fleet base at Truk, in the Caroline Islands. This move brought on the Battle of the Coral Sea, May 7th – 9th, the first battle in which the protagonists didn’t see each other, a game in which the weather proved to be a key player. It was to be a game of hide and seek with both using carrier borne aircraft. The Japanese lost a light carrier, Shoho, the carrier Shokaku was badly damaged, and Zuikaku was left with a much reduced number of aircraft. The US lost the carrier USS Lexington, the oiler USS Neosho, and the destroyer USS Sims. The US lost 75

HMAS <i>Australia</i> at action stations image courtesy of Topmill Pty Ltd
HMAS Shropshire at action stations
image courtesy of Topmill Pty Ltd

aircraft, the Japanese 74. The situation on the 7th was confused due to heavy cloud. Many planes were lost and some Japanese planes attempted to land on the American carriers, mistaking them for their own. They were politely waved off! Tactically it could be argued that the Battle of the Coral Sea was a drawn battle, but strategically it went to the US Navy because it prevented the Japanese from capturing Port Moresby. Rear Admiral Fletcher had detached our Australian squadron north to the Jomard Passage without air cover to stop the Japanese invasion force from moving south and then to Port Moresby.

The Australian squadron consisted of HMA Ships Australia and Hobart, USS Chicago and three destroyers. Task Force 44 under Rear Admiral Crace was attacked by enemy aircraft, but no ship was damaged. A photo taken by Hobart suggests Australia was obliterated by waterspouts from the bombs. Thanks to bad intelligence the Japanese, thinking our forces were bigger than they were, retreated, fortunately for us.

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