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Occasional Paper 16: HMAS Australia and Atlantic rescue of Coastal Command Sunderland – 1940

October 2017

On Monday 28th October 1940, I was serving as an eighteen year old Midshipman in HMAS “Australia”, an 8 inch gun cruiser. At that time, we had arrived on the Clyde at Greenock, Scotland, only two days earlier, after passage from Gibraltar. What a contrast we found the weather from our recent time in the tropics; cold days and even colder nights, and rough Atlantic weather to cope with at sea.

We were ordered to sea that afternoon, to join a search for a German merchant raider, reported operating against our shipping, keeping open the life line from the United States. The convoys were necessary for Britain’s survival, bringing food, oil, etc., to allow the continued struggle against Germany by Britain and her dominions, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In 1940, this small group alone represented the free world against the might of the Third Reich.

The “Australia” and her crew were here to play our own small part in those very dark days. Notwithstanding the growing U Boat menace, and the wide geographic area covered by German aircraft, our merchant ships and those of many neutral countries were still at sea; many ships survived to arrive at their destinations on the West coast of the United Kingdom.

As Tuesday dawned, we learned of a coastal command Sunderland flying boat which had made a forced landing in the Atlantic Ocean West of the Hebrides. Our task was to try and locate this R.A.F. aircraft. There was a gale blowing, the barometer had fallen, visibility was poor, and finding the Sunderland in such adverse conditions appeared difficult, if not unlikely. The ship was running with an extremely rough sea, rolling heavily. During the afternoon, the flying boat kept up transmissions on her radio so that we could use our direction finding equipment to locate her, and then search along this D/F bearing. Just after noon we received a message from the flying boat: “Hurry up – am breaking up“.

As we approached closer to her estimated position we made smoke at intervals, hoping the crew could spot us.

Visibility was now very low, and we had increased speed to 26 knots in an attempt to arrive before it was too late – but the ship was making very heavy weather of the prevailing conditions. A huge sea was running and our heavy cruiser, which picked up on the crest of each wave then surfed down it the next trough, and the wind was blowing a gale.

At 1435 the Sunderland was sighted ahead, her tail occasionally visible above the huge waves – a crew member constantly operating a flashing light to guide us. When only half a mile from the boat, one of her floats dropped off; a moment later, an enormous wave picked the Sunderland and flipped it completely over on it’s back. We could see only one crew member perched on the upturned boat.

We now approached from upwind drifting down onto the wreckage, ropes having been prepared over our starboard side. Scrambling nets, and jumping ladders were also placed over the starboard side.

We suddenly sighted a group of airmen in the water with life jackets on – the ship drifted towards them and rescue ropes were passed.

Artist’s rendering of the mid-Atlantic rescue

However, the rough and icy Atlantic prevented the airmen from securing a rope to themselves – they were too exhausted to tie a knot – salvation at hand, but were the elements going to win after all? “Australia” was rolling heavily, one minute the starboard side would be feet under water, then a heavy roll would reverse to port, and the starboard side would be well clear of the water. Given the force of the wind, and the state of the sea the only way to pluck the survivors from the Atlantic was to send several officers and sailors over the side with bowlines to secure to the airmen. These were led and encouraged by the Commander J.M. (“Jamie– or “Black Jack”) Armstrong RAN. One by one they had to be hauled on board, With the ship rolling heavily, the airmen’s heavy water-logged gear made for a long and difficult task. Persistence and sheer bravery from those over the side securing each airman finally triumphed. Nine of the crew of thirteen were finally on board, suffering from exposure, but they would be safe after time spent in the sick bay.

The remaining four of the crew drifted out of reach past the “Australia“. I can still recall the utter frustration of seamen trying to reach this group with heaving lines, but the wind force made it totally impossible to cast a line – it merely blew back in one’s face before achieving its objective – to reach the doomed four. At 1725 we were forced to abandon our rescue attempts, altered course to the South and proceeded at only 9 knots into the face of the storm.

The Sunderland had left its base at 1700 on Monday evening, sent out to escort a convoy.

The poor visibility prevented them finding their convoy, and the weather was too bad to enable the crew to obtain a D/F bearing of their base. The high winds caused more petrol to be used than normal, and so at 0700 next morning they ran out of fuel and were forced to attempt a landing in the Atlantic Ocean. It was a magnificent feat of airmanship for the pilot to put his flying boat down into this raging sea without capsizing it. The Sunderland had survived seven and a half hours in a howling Atlantic gale before their luck ran out, and the boat was overturned. The airmen were all sea sick and very weak from this ordeal. Although this rescue took place over fifty six years ago, I can still visualise the joy on the faces of those rescued, and remember the anger and the sadness we all experienced at having to leave the remaining four to face a certain death.

 

About the Author: 

Lieutenant Commander Mackenzie ‘Mac’ Jesse Gregory joined the Royal Australian Naval College at HMAS Cerberus in January 1936 as a 13 year old Cadet Midshipman.

During World War II he served aboard HMAS Canberra and then HMAS Australia.  He served in Australia in the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans as well as the Mediterranean Sea.  He retired in 1954 after a distinguished career.  Late in his life he received news that a project initiated by him to erect a statue of a sailor with his kitbag at the end of Station Pier, Melbourne in memory of the thousands of navy personnel who embarked there for service in WWII would be fully funded and be realized. The statue was unveiled by Chief of Navy in 2016.  Mac Gregory died on 27th August 2014.

Originally published in March 1997 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)

Available online at  https://www.navyhistory.org.au/atlantic-rescue-of-coastal-command-sunderland-1940/

‘Mission to Kerguelen’ – An Australian Military Operation in the Sub-Antarctic islands in 1941

By Rohan Goyne

I refer to the excellent article Antarctica the forgotten Continent by Hugh Farmer in the Naval Historical Review Vol. 38 No2 June 2017 and offer the following comments: Macquarie Island is territorially part of the State of Tasmania and not in the same category as Heard and McDonald Islands which are overseas territories for the purposes of International Law. The RAN also operated in the Antarctic during WWII with the expedition of HMAS Australia to mine the Kerguelen Islands to deny their harbours to German raiders operating in the Indian Ocean. The attached copy of my article on this operation published in Sabretache, Vol. 55 Issue 3 (September 2014), the journal of the Military Historical Society of Australia (MHSA) may be of interest to your members.

The genesis for the article was from the memoirs of Australia’s Antarctic pioneer Dr Philip Law – Antarctic Odyssey – where Dr Law refers to his expedition to establish an Australian base on Heard Island and stopping over at the Kerguelen Archipelago. In the introduction to the chapter on Iles de Kerguelen, Dr Laws notes that HMAS Australia visited the island in 1941 to lay sea mines to deny the enemy use of the main harbours of this Sub-Antarctic island.

The official history records Australia’s operation in the Kerguelen as: ‘For the rest of the year she was on escort and patrol duties on the South Atlantic Station, this period included a brief visit to Kerguelen to seek for possible raiders’.1For example, the official history also records that the German raider Komet was present at Kerguelen in March 1941.

On 1 November 1941, Australia under the command of Captain George Moore, RAN arrived at Kerguelen Island and proceeded to undertake a sweep of the island to detect if there was any evidence of the activity of German commerce raiders utilising the island’s sheltered harbours as refuges whilst undertaking offensive operations against allied shipping lanes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

On the strength of her investigations Australia laid magnetic mines in four locations at the entrances to the harbours of Kerguelen Island.2In particular sea mines were laid at the entrance to the old French whaling station at Port Jeanne d’Arc, as shown on the map of the island.

The strategic importance the German Navy placed upon Kerguelen Island is represented by the German plans to establish a meteorological station on the island as late as May 1942. The German raider Michel transferred a meteorologist and two radio technicians to a supply ship which was to transport them to Kerguelen Island to establish the station. Whilst in transit the orders were countermanded thus the plan was never put into action. The effectiveness of the sea mining operation conducted by Australia was therefore never tested as to whether the mines could deny enemy shipping access to the secure anchorages on the island.

Subsequently, the continued presence of the magnetic mines laid by Australia was reported by Phillip Law in 1949 as affecting the passage of the Landing Ship Tank, HMAS Labuan whilst making a landing at Kerguelen. The ship was supporting the Australian Antarctic Expedition to the continent, which was being led by Dr Law.

‘The passage to the anchorage was hazardous, for the mines laid in 1941 by HMAS Australia had blocked the normal entrances and the ship was forced to pass through a narrow gap 120 feet wide between two rocky islets’3

The continued presence of the sea mines is reported in the literature associated with the island as recently as 2008.

 

Notes:

Gill, G.H. Australia in the War of 1939-45 – Navy 1939-42, p 511

ADM 1/12148, Review of Kerguelen Sea Mining by HMAS Australia 1941-1944, National Archives of the UK

Law, Dr P. Antarctic Odyssey, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1983, p 53

 

 

Book review: Flagship: The Cruiser HMAS Australia II and the Pacific War on Japan

By Mike Carlton. Penguin Random House, Sydney, August 2016. Hardcover 642 pages with illustrations and many b&w photographs. RRP $50 – discounts available.

Some naval history books traverse well-worn tracks where many authors have been before and contribute little that is new or engaging. Mike Carlton’s new book Flagship is not such a book. On the contrary, this book has been missing from the literature. It is a timely book that will fill the general void in the public’s understanding of the Royal Australian Navy’s war at sea 1939 – 45 and the Pacific campaign in particular.

It is remarkable how many of our fellow citizens are well versed in the stories of Tobruk, Alamein, the fall of Singapore and the battles for the Kokoda Track. Whereas the loss of the light cruiser HMAS Sydney with all 645 of her men off WA in 1941 has been exhaustively retold, the lives of the sailors who served in the ships of the RAN and the Australian merchant navy in the Pacific war remains largely unknown. The RAN deployed to war in the Pacific in December 1941 to stem the Japanese invasion of South East Asia and Australia’s northern waters. By January 1943 the USN and the RAN with the RAAF had secured the sea lanes from an enemy that had planned to dominate Australia’s links to the world as a part of its plan to maintain Japanese dominance in the South West Pacific.

We are approaching the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea, where the Japanese advance was first halted. The story told in Flagship of how Admiral Jack Crace, originally from Gungahlin near Canberra, took his RAN/USN squadron and blocked the Jomard passage to the Japanese should be better known and its significance more widely understood. Crace and his men, RAN and USN, despite being under air attack fought and survived and in doing so deterred the Japanese High Command from attempting to carry out their plan for a seaborne invasion of virtually defenceless Port Moresby.

Flagship covers the tragic night battle at Savo Island off Guadalcanal, the bombardment of New Guinea beaches as the allies went north and the vast sea battles off the Philippines at Leyte Gulf, Surigao Strait and Lingayen Gulf, when the Japanese surface fleet ceased to exist as a fighting fleet. These events are infrequently recalled and not formally taught to a rising generation. The few Australians with whom the names of these sea battles may resonate have little or no understanding that cruisers and destroyers of the RAN fought with the USN, and later the powerful British Pacific Fleet, right through the Pacific campaign from 1942 – 1945.

During those years RAN and USN ships sustained the allied armies fighting in jungles. They poured naval gunfire down on Japanese coastal strongpoints and softened up resistance saving thousands of allied soldiers and marines from virtually certain death as they disembarked from landing craft. Flagship brings these engagements vividly back to attention. The RAN paid a very high price in fine ships and young lives for being in the thick of the fight so often and for so long. The repeated and often fatal kamikaze attacks which HMAS Australia’s crew endured in late 1944 and early 1945, while continuing to do their duty, should be the stuff of national inspiration. It is not.

Why is there such a blind spot in the general knowledge of the RAN’s role in the Pacific? What accounts for this national amnesia? It may owe much to the lack, until now, of one good book which is available and easily read by any who wish to learn what happened to Australian sailors at war in the Pacific. Australia’s naval history in World War II is a significant part of the nation’s story and deserves to be formally taught to each generation. Flagship is the book every school could use for this purpose.

Sterling work has been done by generations of naval historians who have explained in ships histories where the RAN was in action. The sacrifices of the men who fought their ships is well documented.  But much of that work is long out of print and none of those writers, since the official historian of the RAN in WWII, G.H. Gill, have worked on such a wide canvas as Flagship does. This book tells the whole story of the contribution of the heavy cruisers, Australia and HMAS Shropshire, made in the countless engagements large and small which led inexorably to the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay.

But this is not a dry account of maritime campaigns only of interest to naval history buffs. Flagship is a rattling good read, full of fascinating detail and grounded in excellent research aided by the professional historians at the Sea Power Centre – Australia where the Navy keeps its historical archives. Flagship is also a social history of a very particular, never to be repeated, human experience. It asks, and answers, the question how did young Australian civilians transform and adapt to what the Naval Prayer calls ‘the dangers of the sea and the violence of the enemy.’

Flagship reaches into the cruisers’ mess decks and gunrooms and tells through their letters and diaries the stories of the young men who lived there, often for years, while their ship carried them into danger and back out again. Here are the lives of those who lived and returned to Australia, and those who were killed in action and buried at sea by their grieving shipmates, usually the same day. Flagship also deals with the role that the American High Command in Australia and the Australian Naval Board played in the decisions about where and when the RAN went into action. Key allied commanders and their political masters made choices which determined the outcome of the Australian contribution to the war in the Pacific.

The manifest failures that led to disaster at the night battle of Savo Island and the loss of HMAS Canberra are not glossed over and the sad truth that it was a badly aimed, hastily fired, American torpedo which first crippled the Australian cruiser is not shied away from. This fact has been widely accepted and documented since 1994 when it was fully explained by those RAN officers who were there and much later in life gained access to the USN’s archives. It is right that this sad truth should be re-stated with supporting evidence. But also here is the epic account Canberra’s surviving crew who recovered from the loss of their captain, their ship and shipmates and went to war again in Shropshire, an RN cruiserfreely given by Winston Churchill to the RAN. Her guns crews avenged their eighty four dead Canberra shipmates when they attacked the Japanese battle line at Surigao Strait and earned the high praise of the Americans for the speed and accuracy of their 8 inch salvos. That is a great Australian example of ‘never say die’ and Flagship tells that story, and many others, with the generosity, accuracy and the compassion which the men who lived these quietly heroic lives richly deserve.

The generation of RAN sailors who went to war in the Pacific in Australia, Canberraand Shropshire are very nearly all gone now. The author interviewed the few who are left and recorded their memories. These last sailors standing were very young when they went to war but their insights and memories bring freshness to the battle scenes described. The author also read the unpublished accounts, held in private family archives, of those who wrote what they remembered of the times they survived. More work on the RAN in the Pacific war awaits those historians who wish to explore further into the archives and diaries.

This well illustrated, very substantial new book with 560 pages of text does justice to those men who are still with us, to those who were killed by kamikaze attacks at their action station in HMAS Australia, to those men who came home from war and lived their lives among us. It pays tribute to those eighty four sailors and officers who still lie in Iron Bottom Sound, off Savo Island, with their lost cruiser, Canberra.

Reviewed by Desmond Woods

 

 

The Battles for Leyte Gulf: where Australian ships fought in one of the greatest battles in naval history

By David Scott

 David Horace Ford Scott grew up on a soldier-settler block near Holbrook, NSW but his parents were forced to walk off the property during the Depression and live with grandparents. David gained a bursary to Melbourne Grammar School and on completion of his secondary education entered the navy. He served as an Able Seaman in HMAS Arunta as part of her gun’s crew. Pride in his ship and affection for his mates was mixed with the horrors of combat, which included the Battles of Leyte Gulf. After the war David settled down to married life and became a director of the Brotherhood of St Lawrence and Community Aid Abroad. He was also involved in the struggle for self-determination for the people of East Timor. For his ‘outstanding achievement and service’ he was made an officer of the Order of Australia. He died in Melbourne on 22 April 2012. 

David wrote of his experiences in Arunta in 2004. A copy of the manuscript was recently presented to the Naval Historical Society by one of his shipmates, Ray Northrop, past President of the HMAS Arunta Association. Minor amendments have been made to this previously unpublished work..  

 HMAS Arunta

I was an eighteen-year-old Able Seaman, anti-aircraft gunner on the Tribal-class destroyer HMAS Arunta, she was a member of an Australian task force attached to the United States Navy in July 1944. The force consisted of heavy cruisers HMA Ships Australia and Shropshire and our sister ship HMAS Warramunga.  Arunta was a fast ship of 2,500 tons capable of a top speed of 36 knots, an exciting and formidable speed to be pushing nearly 3,000 tonnes through the water. She was built for a crew of 260 but had 320, the number needed to man the extra guns and equipment installed during wartime. My gun was a 20mm Oerlikon positioned on the port side of the flag deck, just below the bridge.

Arunta about to commence jackstay transfer with Shropshire      – author

A month earlier Arunta covered an American landing on the island ofBiak off what was then the Dutch East Indies. It was one of the thirteen landings Arunta covered with the force of US and Australian cruisers and destroyers.The landing followed the familiar pattern of heavy air bombardments followed by shelling of the landing area by ships and a dash for the shore by the troops in landing craft. At night at full speed we chased Japanese destroyers but failed to catch up with them.

Sixty years later I discovered how close to destruction we were. Battleship Musashi by Akira Yoshimura is a splendid account: The Making and Sinking of the World’s Biggest Battleship1. Reading it, I discovered that in early June 1944 Musashi was on her way to Borneo where the vessels of the entire Japanese Combined Fleet were gathering for a decisive confrontation later with the US.When reports reached the Japanese fleet that the Americans were landing on the Japanese base of Biak Island, northwest of New Guinea, Yamato and Musashi (the largest and newest battleships in the world) set a course for the island with an escort of destroyers and a land based air patrol of 480 fighters (2).

On the way to Biak the Japanese General Staff advised Musashi that a large portion of the US Fleet was heading for Saipan (Taiwan) and ordered Musashi to break off its attack on Biak and rejoin the Combined Fleet. The battleships must have been very close if the destroyers escorting Musashi were the ones Arunta chased in the night. In half an hour and at long range they could have sunk every vessel in our modest task force, including Arunta.

The Big Picture

At this time President Roosevelt was meeting Naval and Army chiefs in Hawaii to determine a strategy for winning the Pacific War. The US Navy had been restored and strengthened and had won notable successes against the Japanese Navy.The question to be decided was how should the huge fleet, the hundreds of transports, the many divisions of troops and squadrons of aircraft now available be employed to bring the war to a speedy and victorious conclusion. Macarthur bottled up some 250,000 Japanese forces along the coast of New Britain and New Guinea and in the Dutch East Indies of West Papua. Where to next?

Admiral King planned to establish a small base in the southern Philippines to contain the southern Japanese fleet around Singapore and Borneo and lock up the Japanese armies in the Philippines and along the China coast. This would isolate Japan from its supplies of coal and other raw materials. He could then sweep across the Pacific to the Marianas and Formosa (Taiwan) islands that would provide bases close to Japan for the final assault on the mainland.

General MacArthur insisted that priority be given the re-conquest of the Philippines to redeem his pledge to the 70,000 US and Filipino soldiers he had left in Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines, that he would return.Roosevelt decided on a compromise, perhaps persuaded by reports that Macarthur, a popular hero, might contest the Presidency of the United States. There would be a big leap across the heavily defended southern Philippines island of Mindanao, for a landing on the smaller island of Leyte. The Army would proceed north from there to Manila3.

Back to Arunta

Aboard Aruntaon 13 October 1944 the order over the loud speakers was: Cable party of the white watch muster on the foc’sle. Hands out of the rig of the day off the upper deck. Close all X doors, scuttles and deadlights. Special sea duty men to your stations. Then from Hollandia we set out to join the immense force of six battleships, eight cruisers and twenty one destroyers, many tankers, troop carriers, aircraft carriers, supply, repair and maintenance ships, tank and personnel landing barges heading for Leyte Gulf to take part in ‘the final and most decisive surface engagement of the Second World War’4.

The fleet of the more than 450 vessels spread out on the calm seas from horizon to horizon in every direction was uneventful. Historian Richard Hough said that Overlord, the force that launched the invasion of Europe, ‘was a trifling affair compared with the Leyte Gulf operation.’5. The convoy speed for the journey of 1,250 miles was 9 knots. A light following wind of about the same speed created a still miasma of heat and funnel exhaust. The day before a lone Japanese aircraft had spotted the main landing on 20 October 1944 as minesweepers were clearing a passage through small islands at the entrance to Leyte Gulf.

An immense bombardment by bombers, heavy ships and seemingly endless rocket barrages precededthe landing. The wakes of hundreds of landing craft snaked across the water as they carried 100,000 men to the shore. Arunta fired a total of 745 round sat targets, leaving only 369 for future use6.It was a watchful but uneventful time for the anti-aircraft gunners sweating in anti­flash gear consisting of a treated smock, balaclava and gloves and an uncomfortable helmet. Arunta with Warramunga bombarded gun emplacements on a hill south of the village of Tanauan in Leyte Gulf. The huge rolling bombardment moved along the coast and shifted inland as landing craft came close to the beaches. At 0945 MacArthur disembarked from the cruiser Nashville, waded through the shallows and walked up the beach to announce ‘I have returned.’At dusk Arunta helped lay a smoke screen to cover the transports at the vulnerable time of the day when enemy aircraft flew at water level to take a target among the ships. They attacked frequently as we patrolled off the landing beaches. One lone pilot flew down the line of anchored heavy ships, and dropped a torpedo, hitting the US cruiser Honolulu and killing sixty officers and men.

Bombardment from HMAS Arunta’s 4.7-inch guns                – RAN

The next morning, 21 October, the heavy cruiser Australia was getting under way from its anchorage when its radar picked up an approaching aircraft, then two, three and four. The Japanese had chosen an angle that prevented most of Australia’s guns from firing at them. Sailors in Australia watched, aghast, as one plane headed for the bridge and crashed into the foremast. Debris and burning fuel sprayed on to the air defence positions above the compass platform killing 30 men, including Captain Dechaineux and wounding another 64, 26 of them seriously. Australia and the damaged Honolulu were escorted south by Warramunga and a US destroyer for repairs at Manus Island.

It was assumed Australia was chosen as a kamikaze or suicide target then and on later occasions because it looked large and clumsy compared to the sleek American cruisers. Being high out of the water it was also an easier target to hit. But John Alliston, commander of Warramunga, speculated that the special attention given to Australia could be explained by the fact that Commodore Farncomb flew his broad pennant from the main mast7. US flag officers, he said, were forbidden to fly their admiral’s flag in action. If true it was a remarkable and lethal example of Nelsonian bravado. The suicide attack on Australia heightened tension as we patrolled across the Gulf. A further dimension to conflict was added by knowing that pilots were prepared to sacrifice their lives life to make sure they hit their targets.

On 24 October we were at action stations or ‘second degree of readiness’ all day. ‘Action Stations’ required everyone to be at his position on a gun, at signaling equipment, on the bridge, in the engine room or locked in the ammunition magazines below the water line.At ‘’second degree’ we could relax around action stations but always with headphone link to the bridge but ‘closed up’ our particular action station. I thought how unbearably claustrophobic it would be below decks, in the engine room or in ammunition magazines with the heavy watertight doors ‘dogged’ on the outside. Meals were mostly tea and sandwiches collected from the galley.On the evening of Tuesday 24 October our captain, Commander A.E. Buchanan, announced that Arunta was moving south down Surigao Strait, which leads into Leyte Gulf, to engage a large enemy force. We were closed up at ‘action stations’ for the next twenty-four hours.

Battles for Leyte Gulf

‘Look at this,’ said the radar operator inviting me through the heavy black out curtains into the radar room, little bigger than a cupboard, a few metres from my gun on the flag deck. He pointed to the thin beam of light rotating from the centre of the screen. As it passed a southeasterly position several maggot-like shapes appeared in line moving northwest. We learned later they were two Japanese battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers, part of the planned Japanese response to the Leyte Gulf landings. It was the first stage ofthe Japanese Sho, or Victory Plan, that almost succeeded.

The Japanese command had anticipated that MacArthur would land in the Philippines and on 18 October Admiral Toyoda, commanding officer of the Japanese Navy, activated three separate naval forces to destroy the US fleets and the immense invasion force in Leyte Gulf. The decision he said was ‘as difficult as swallowing molten iron’ but his Admirals Kurita, Nishimura and Ozawa welcomed the plan. Ozawa was taking an immense gamble. He was prepared to sacrifice his entire force to lure the US Third Fleet away from Leyte Gulf. From then on historians recorded ‘everything went wrong for the Japanese’8.

Suddenly star shells burst above us. It was as light as day. Bob Rule, the loader on my gun, signalman ‘Spider’ Currie and I peered in to the darkness beyond the arena of light. A moment later water spouts from Japanese shells erupted near us. Buchanan reported that some shells fell to the right and some fell short. ‘As the enemy were not engaged’, he wrote in the log, ‘I expected a heavy volume of fire’. Caught literally like rabbits in a spotlight we waited for 18-inch shells to crash down before we could reach the shelter of the smoke screen. I recall feeling detached, a spectator waiting for the show to begin. You could try to duck or take shelter from an aircraft or even a bomb and flex for the impact as a torpedo trail was sighted but there was nowhere to hide from an 18-inch shell. But the Japanese did not continue firing, possibly to avoid giving their position away to the US battleships.

Torpedo Attacks

Arunta, leading other destroyers, fired its four torpedoes at 6,500 yards. One from our force, credited to be from Killen, hit Yamashiro. Hearing gunfire and believing a US destroyer was engaging the enemy, Buchanan turned back to provide support. At 0345 we opened fire at a target. The fire ended abruptly at 0356 as we heard on the TBS (open talk between ships) the order to ‘Happy Hour’, our code name.‘This is Big Boy. Get out or be blown out’, we were told as the battle force across the head of the straits opened fire.

The unassuming Commander Buchanan gives a bland account of the incident in Arunta’s action report:

We were steaming south at 15 knots rather like Mr Micawber hoping for something to turn up. It did. We were told to cease fire and get out. With the vivid recollection of what the gunfire of our battleships and cruisers could to the enemy, we retired at 25 knots tothe north.

The Commander (C.T.G. 773) happily took charge of the situation and saved us from an engagement with our own battle fleet.

Admiral Oldendorf, commander of the Allied Force in Leyte Gulf, watched the progress of the Japanese and the attacking destroyers on his radar screen. He had placed his six battleships, five cruisers and nine destroyers in a double line across the Surigao Strait, which was only twelve miles wide at this point. (Edwards in Salvo!says ‘two of Arunta‘s torpedoes slammed into Yasmashiro but it ploughed on’. This alerted me to read historians with caution.

As soon as the torpedo attack was completed, Oldendorf ordered the deadly accurate heavy guns from his five battleships and seven cruisers lying broadside across channel to open fire. Edwards says ‘these double-banked ships mounted between them over 3,000 heavy guns including sixteen 16-inch and thirty-six 14-inch – a massed array of weaponry never before seen in the history of naval warfare. In twenty minutes 3,250shells were loosed off’9. Shropshire fired 32 eight-inch broadsides, a total of 214 shells in 15 minutes.

Other Firsthand Accounts

John Date of Shropshire wrote: ‘The battleships West Virginia, Tennessee, California and Maryland repeatedly hit Yamashiro. The scene was unforgettable: the magnificent and incredible rate of fire of the Americans, particularly the cruisers with their tracer ammunition the sight of the battleship Yamashiro, flagship of Nishimura, on fire bow from stem to stern and the unbelievable use of searchlights by the Japanese, undoubtedly the last occasion in naval history’10.

The horizon crackled like a fuse as salvo after salvo arced through the air towards the Japanese. An American destroyer captain described it as ‘a continued stream oflighted railroad cars going over a hill.’At 0349 the battleship Fuso blew up. Its two halves drifted crazily down the Strait for some time before sinking. In the confusion, as Yamashiro altered course, the American destroyer Grant came under a hail of 6-inch shells from American cruisers, killing thirty-four and wounding ninety-four before Oldendorf ordered a cease-fire.

Yamashiro had no radar and took a fearful pounding as it steamed north to find a target. Oldendorf ordered a cease-fire at 0409 when he discovered Grant was being shelled. Yamashiro was by then burning from stem to stern. She sank at 0419 and with her almost the entire crew of more than 1,000.Admiral Nishimura went ‘to the warrior’s death’ one historian wrote, ‘he seemed to be seeking’ in steaming on in the hail of fire. Only the destroyer Shigure escaped.

As dawn broke we saw columns of smoke rising from burning oil. The ship’s surgeon Shane Watson said each destroyer was given permission to pick up not more than 70 Japanese survivors but most of the hundreds in the water refused to be rescued. Watson described seeing destroyers stalking a Japanese whaler with four crew sitting upright in the stern as it chugged towards land. Some Japanese sailors were shot by fire from US ships, others left in the water and afterwards many bodies were washed up on the shores of Surigao Straits.

Admiral Halsey

Meanwhile to the north Kurita’s fleet, including the newly built battleships Yamato and Musashi, three old battleships, twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers had been detected and attacked by US submarines and 250 aircraft from Admiral Halsey’s carriers. Eight-inch plates and a speed of 30 knots were not sufficient to protect Musashi and she was sunk together with two cruisers and five destroyers11.

Battleship Musashi 1942                                               – USN

At this point Halsey turned away to chase the Japanese fleet under Ozawa which had decoyed Halsey well away from Luzon. Kurita re-grouped; emerging from San Bernadino Strait and heading south for Leyte Gulf he ran into a US force of six light aircraft carriers escorted by seven destroyers. ‘In a courageous running fight the US lost a carrier and three destroyers and Kurita two of his heavy cruisers. This setback, and a belief that Halsey’s main force was returning persuaded Kurita to call off the fight and turn back to San Bernadino Strait’12.

At 0420 on 25 October, after the destruction of Nishimura’s fleet in Surigao Strait, Admiral Kincaid at the Leyte Gulf beachhead sent a signal to Halsey: ‘Are the fast battleships guarding San Bernadino Strait?’ Kincaid did not receive the negative answer until three hours after he had asked the question. Kincaid had assumed Halsey was going north with only his carriers and that his fast battleships had been left to guard San Bernadino. But Halsey had assumed that Kurita had been so badly damaged to the west of the Strait that ‘he could no longer be considered a serious menace to the Seventh Fleet’.

Arunta once more

Soon after Kincaid’s cable, Arunta and the smaller ships headed back to Leyte Gulf leaving columns of smoke still rising from the battleground13.The news that Kurita’s force had passed through San Bernardino Straits and Halsey’s battleships were not there to confront them was deeply worrying. The battleships and cruisers of Oldendorf’s bombardment force and our task force, with magazines and shell-rooms depleted, was all that stood between Macarthur’s vast invasion fleet and its destruction.

‘Consternation reigned in Admiral Kincaid’s flagship in Leyte Gulf’ said historian Donald Mcintyre. A cable from Blue Ridge said: ‘People here feel that the Third Fleet battle ships are chasing a secondary Japanese force, leaving us at the mercy of the enemy’s main body. We are the ones trapped in Leyte Gulf. As soon as the Jap finishes off our defenceless CVE (escort carriers at San Bernadino Straits), we’re next and I mean today’.

Arunta refuelled and took on ammunition in Leyte Gulf. I remember it well. I was standing on a plank between the supply ship and Arunta, part of a chain passing cordite cylinders and shells from the supply ship to Arunta. Suddenly I was flying through the air and into the water with a 55-lb cordite cylinder in my arms.I dropped the cylinder, wondering if this was a punishable offence, hit the water and surfaced to see a line of laughing faces looking down. No one had noticed the ships drawing apart until the plank and I tumbled down. I swam a few strokes through oil and rubbish and clambered up a rope ladder thrown over the side. After a clean-up I was back in the chain, but not on the plank.

We stood by the guns all day. On night patrol, two Japanese destroyers were detected but not attacked in the hope they would lead us to bigger game. They did not, but we spent a weary night at action stations. There were constant air attacks around the gulf. We escorted two small carriers, ready to pick up any pilots who might crash while landing. One evening, ten fighters returning late took over an hour to land, as the flight decks could not be illuminated.

Another evening alarm bells rang as were going the regular dusk ‘action stations’. A carrier opened fire on our port side. I opened fire as an aircraft roared overhead, getting away almost a full drum of shells before the cease-fire bell rang. It was a US Grumman Martlett that was coming in to its carrier from the wrong direction. Another was shot down.

We went alongside the battleship Maryland on one patrol to replenish our depleted stores. It was a ‘first’ for both of us. We had never been alongside a ‘battler’ and they had never had an Australian destroyer alongside.About midday of the next afternoon, two Japanese aircraft hovered above the US destroyer Abner Reid close to us. One plane came in low as if to make a torpedo attack but continued on and hit Reid just for’ard of the gun on her stern, blowing her up with a tremendous explosion.

Nearby ships blazed away at the second aircraft coming down in a steep dive to finish off Reid. Nearing its target it faltered, hit the water and blew up a few yards astern of the stricken destroyer. Two destroyers stood by Reid as it blazed furiously. A big column of smoke billowed up and an explosion told us the magazines had exploded.Reid turned on her side, bows in the air and slid under, leaving a great oil blaze on the surface. Before she sank we spotted torpedo wakes from Reid heading for one of the battleships. All ships opened up with 5-inch and close range weapons at the trail in the water. Some shots strayed dangerously close as we scuttled for shelter on our decks.Our first sight of a kamikaze attack so close was unsettling and we were deeply sorry for the crew of the Abner Reid, with whom we had shared operations. A US Admiral wrote:

Among us who were there I doubt if there is anyone who can depict with complete clarity our mixed emotions as we watched a man about to die in order that he might destroy us in the process. There was hypnotic fascination to a sight so alien to our Western philosophy.

Supplies were again low. This time we went alongside the battleship Mississippi. As we tied up the entire crew seemed to be looking down at us from dizzy heights. One asked for an ‘Aussie cigarette’. A packet was thrown up and showers of US cigarettes were thrown down to us. Next it was money and soon the air was thick with cigarettes, dollar bills, ships’ tally bands, candy, chocolate and anything that could be exchanged The stores they gave us were exotic compared to our meagre rations.

On Monday 13 November Warramunga arrived with our mail. It was always a great occasion for the married men and those with steady girl friends who withdrew to the quietest place they find to read and re-read the letters from their wives and families. Two days later, with salt-caked funnels and blackened gun barrels, we headed south for Manus Island.In his Report of Proceedings for 29 October, the again unassuming Commander Buchanan wrote:

It was a crowded and strenuous ten days for all. There have been long periods at Action Stations and in second degree of readiness; continual air raids and alerts were, and still are, the order of the day. A surface action has been fought.

The end of this month marks the end of the 12 months since Arunta sailed from Brisbane to Milne Bay. The ship has visited Sydney twice – once for 21 days and once for 17 days -total of 38 days. This is the only time officers and men have been out of the ship. The remainder of the time has been spent in the tropical waters of New Guinea and now of the Philippines. Owing to the danger of tropical diseases ashore the complete lack of facilities and the ship being at short notice, officers and men have remained on board throughout this period. That is, they gave been shut up in a crowded steel box in conditions of tropical heat for almost a year. I emphasise these conditions because they represent, I believe, a fine instance of the staying power of bothofficers and men.

The claims of historians that the Battle of Leyte Gulf, made up of three engagements, was the greatest naval battle in history rests on comparisons of the number of ships in a battle. There were 254 ships comprising 1,616,000 tonnes and 8,826 men were killed in the Battle of Jutland in the First World War. In the Philippines 282 ships took part, the total tonnage was 2,014,000 and 10,278 men were killed14.

 

Notes:

  1. Yoshimura, Akira, Battleship Musashi. The Making and Sinking of the Biggest Battleship in the World. Kodansha International, Tokyo, New York. 1991
  2. Yoshimura, Akira, Battleship Musashi.
  3. Edwards, Bernard, Surigao, in Salvo!: Epic Naval Gun Actions, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1995.
  4. Australian War Memorial, HMAS Aruntareference.
  5. Hough, Richard, The Longest Battle: The War at Sea 1939-45, Cassell & Co, London, l986.
  6. ‘Action Report’ by Captain A.E. Buchanan, HMAS Aruntafor 13-29 October 1944.
  7. Allison, John Destroyer Man,Greenhouse Publications, Melbourne 1985
  8. Steinberg, Rafael, Return to the Philippines, Time-Life Books, 1979.
  9. Edwards p. l80.
  10. Hough (1986) p 328
  11. Yoshimura Akira, Battleship Musashi
  12. Edwards p. 184.
  13. ‘Heroic Arunta Fought Jap Battleship’, the Melbourne Ageannounced, saying Aruntawas the only Australian destroyer to have tackled an enemy battleship.
  14. Roscoe, Theodore, United StatesNavy Destroyer Operations in WW2, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1953.

 

The Battle of the Coral Sea

 MIDN Lachlan Montgomery joined the RAN in February 2014 coming from a family of five in Ringwood Victoria. His father is a serving member of the Victorian Police Force and his mother an office manager at the Ringwood High School. He enjoys running, computers and flying with the career goal to become an Aviation Warfare Officer.

 Introduction

The Battle of the Coral Sea was a series of naval engagements off the north-east coast of Australia between the 4th and 8th May 1942. It is considered by many to be the turning point of the war against the Japanese. The Japanese advance on Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea was the precursor to the first aircraft carrier battle, in which the Japanese Fleet was badly damaged and forced to withdraw.The Battle of the Coral Sea resulted in Australia being released from the immediate threat of invasion by the Japanese, and prevented Australia from being isolated from its American allies. It also resulted in the Americans maintaining naval superiority of the Pacific region. The battle paved the way for a decisive Allied victory at the Battle of Midway just one month later, and hence is an extremely important event not only in regards to the survival of Australia, but to the downfall of the Japanese war machine. The aim of this essay is to discuss the lessons learnt from the Battle of the Coral Sea by examining the following points in addition to the involvement of the RANand the significance of the battle to Australia. These are divided into the following aspects:

  1. The influence of carrier air power upon the battle,
  2. The influence of intelligence upon the conduct of the battle,
  3. Claims of tactical defeat and strategic victory,
  4. The strategic impacts upon events ashore in New Guinea, and
  5. The involvement of the RAN and the significance of the battle to Australia.

Precursors to the Battle of the Coral Sea

The great war between the US and Japan opened in a totally unexpected manner. The destruction of much of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour was a huge blow to their tactical capability. However, as a result of all its Pacific aircraft carriers not being present at Pearl Harbour during the attack, the United States considered how to use these ships to reverse the Japanese expansion across the Pacific. (Stille).

Stillestates that as a result of the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor, air power was now considered a dominant factor in naval warfare. In order to avoid being totally defensive in the face of an unstoppable Japanese carrier force, the United States began a series of carrier strikes in the Central and South Pacific. These proved somewhat ineffective, but forced the Japanese to postpone their proposed Port Moresby operation. When the Japanese were ready to move on New Guinea in the South Pacific, two of the US Pacific Fleet Carriers had been deployed to conduct a raid on Tokyo, meaning the US could only send two carriers to the South Pacific to counter thepredicted Japanese offensive. With part of the Japanese Carrier Force committed to join theSouth Pacific operation, history’s first aircraft carrier battle seemed imminent.

The influence of carrier air power upon the battle

Millot (1974) contends that the war in the Pacific led to a new kind of warfare – one which relied on the use of air power. In fact, the Battle of the Coral Sea was based around a type of warfare where the opposing carrier groups never sighted nor fired upon each other.

The Carrier Air Groups of both sides were primarily made up of three types of aircraft. These consisted of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo aircraft, forming a ‘Combat Trio’ with the goal to project overwhelming force upon the enemy ships. As a primarily carrier only battle, these aircraft would prove vital to the attack of enemy forces – a new kind of ‘Over the Horizon warfare’ emerged.

The Japanese and Americans had very different aircraft design philosophies as seen below in figure 1.

Japanese Mitsubishi A6M.2 Type 0 Fighter American Grumman F4F Wildcat Fighter
Unloaded weight 1680kg Unloaded weight 2425kg
Loaded weight 2410kg Loaded weight 3179kg
Power/weight ratio 0.39hp/kg Power/weight ratio 0.32hp/kg
Cruising speed 207mph Cruising speed 147mph
Rate of climb 2571ft/min Rate of climb 2000ft/min

As shown above, the Japanese utilised lightweight, manoeuvrable and fast aircraft with high rates of climb. This came at the cost of reduced pilot protection, armour and special features such as self-sealing fuel tanks. The Americans however, had the slower, heavier Wildcat, inferior in almost every way to the Japanese Zeros apart from its stout construction. This interesting comparison proves the uniqueness of each carrier force and a few of the strengths/weaknesses of each.

Overall, the Battle of the Coral Sea had the strategic effect of ‘promoting’ the aircraft carriers’ importance to naval warfare, and thus resulted in a dramatic increase in numbers of these ships produced. It also essentially removed the battleship from the elevated position it held as the ‘flagship’ of navies worldwide and presented air power with utmost importance for future naval engagements. The Battle of Midway which occurred in early June 1942 is proof of this.

The influence of intelligence upon the conduct of the battle

Intelligence proved vital to the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea. As an over the horizon carrier battle, seaplanes were the primary method of predicting the next moves of the enemy forces. Australia played an important role with intelligence. Coastwatchers were on the job, spotting Japanese seaplanes as they departed their forward bases at Lae and Salamaua on the north eastern coast of New Guinea. The Australians observed the routines of the Japanese and hence discovered they had begun to mass air and sea power in the area – pointing to an attack on Port Moresby. This knowledge was a contributing factor to the American deployment of sea power to the area in anticipation of a clash (Hoyt).

Signal interception was also a means of intelligence prior to the battle. A joint USN/RAN Unit known as Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL) played an important role in the Battle of the Coral Sea. US Naval Intelligence was able to decode Japanese naval communications and as such was almost as well informed as to what was being planned as Japanese commanders were (Straczek). On 13 April, the British intercepted a Japanese message stating that the ‘Fifth Carrier Division’ was en-route to the area. Upon receipt of this intelligence from the British and confirming its authenticity, the US deployed all four of the Pacific Fleet’s available carriers to the area. Only two of these carriers, USS Lexingtonand USS Yorktownwere able to make it to the area of operations in time due to USS Hornetand USS Enterpriseconducting a raid on Tokyo. Interestingly, the Japanese believed only one American carrier was in the area of their planned operation, and did not expect such a strong carrier response to their invasion until it was well underway. This perhaps had a serious effect on Japanese performance during the battle, as they hadn’t expected the large American force present during their operation.

Therefore it can be said that intelligence had a significant impact upon the conduct of the battle, primarily involving American predictions of Japanese movements, and the subsequent deployment of carrier groups to the area. We must also not forget that the Japanese intelligence in this situation was inferior to that of the United States, demonstrated by their underestimation of US carrier power in the region. This is a vital lesson in the importance of intelligence in this kind of ‘blind’ warfare.  (Straczek & Hoyt).

Claims of tactical defeat and strategic victory

There is no doubt the Battle of the Coral Sea had a heavy impact on both the Americans and the Japanese, but who really won? There are claims of a tactical defeat along with strategic victory from the American point of view. Stille states that the battle has correctly been described as a strategic American victory. The Americans had, for the first time, repelled a Japanese attack and subsequently prevented the Japanese sea-borne invasion of Port Moresby. This attack was Japan’s best chance at taking the port and airfield, and hence posing a major threat to Australia’s security. The failure of the sea approach resulted in the later failed attempt to take the port by land over extremely rough terrain. So in the sense of a wide viewed approach, the United States had a strategic victory during the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Some possess the view that whilst a strategic victory, the battle was a tactical defeat for the US Navy. This can be attributed to the fact that whilst sinking only a light Japanese carrier Shohoand damaging a fleet carrier Shokaku, the US Navy lost Lexington, one of its four operational fleet carriers. Observing from an isolated perspective, this ‘tactical defeat’ could be considered true, however looking back to the broad strategic overview, this is not accurate, as the primary Japanese goal of achieving carrier dominance over the Americans had failed. Therefore it is apparent that whilst some considered the battle an American tactical defeat, the disabling of a large portion of the Japanese Carrier Force paid rich dividends for the American position in the Pacific.

Strategic impact upon events ashore in Papua New Guinea

As previously mentioned, the halt of Japanese naval advances on Port Moresby resulted in a land campaign over increasingly difficult terrain. This Japanese attempt proved to be unsuccessful, meaning that Port Moresby remained under Allied control. Resultantly, Australia was protected from the threat of invasion. It can be said that the Battle of the Coral Sea had a huge impact upon events ashore in Papua New Guinea, not the least of which was the survival of Port Moresby. Had this important port been taken in a Japanese naval assault, the enemy would have aimed to cut off Australia and its important contribution to the war effort. The consequences of this occurring would have been disastrous to Australia.

The involvement of the RAN and the significance of the battle to Australia.

The Royal Australian Navy had a significant involvement during the Battle of the Coral Sea. A Support Group attached to Task Force 17, the American Carrier group, consisted of HMAS Australia and HMAS Hobart as well as several USN ships. This group was headed by Rear Admiral J.G Crace of the Royal Navy. After being split from the carrier force to cover the Jomard Passage and intercept the Japanese invasion force as it exited, the support group became the target of heavy bombing and strafing attacks. After repelling these attacks, the group was free to intercept the Japanese invasion force. However Admiral Inouye, in charge of this invasion force, reversed his ships whilst they clarified the sightings of ‘battleships’ in the area. Had Crace’s ships not been detached from Task Force 17, the Japanese force would have been able to enter Port Moresby, resulting in grave consequences for the Allies.

As mentioned previously, Australia was a vulnerable target which relied greatly on Port Moresby for its security. The Battle of the Coral Sea resulted in Australia being protected from the threat of imminent invasion and supply lines between the United States and Australia remained open. It was also the first time Australian ships had been involved with a major US carrier group, a proud moment in history indeed. (Jacobsen).

Conclusion

Many lessons were learnt from the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first of which being the immense importance of air power in future naval engagements. As a new kind of ‘over the horizon’ warfare had emerged, it became apparent that aircraft would be vital to the success of any kind of naval warfare from that point onwards. Intelligence also proved to be an extremely important factor in deciding the victor in naval engagements. The Americans having effective intelligence prior to the Coral Sea battle meant they were able to deploy their carriers to the area, possibly changing the tide of the war in the Pacific. Despite losing a quarter of its carrier strength, the US had a strategic victory during this battle, one that assisted their position for later conflicts in the Pacific region, particularly the Battle of Midway. The Coral Sea battle held significant strategic importance insofar as control of Port Moresby being maintained by the Allies and in regard to the security of the Australian mainland. The Royal Australian Navy’s contribution, although small in the scheme of things, was significant and contributed to the final result not just during this battle but throughout the Pacific War.

 

Bibliography

Frame, T., The Battes that Shaped Australia. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994.

Hoyt, E.P., Blue Skies And Blood – The Battle of the Coral Sea. New York: iBooks, inc., 1975.

Jacobsen, M., The Battle of the Coral Sea 1942– Conference Proceedings 1992. Sydney: Australian National Maritime Museum, 1993.

Macdougall, A., Australia’s Navy. Waverton: Waverton Press, 2005.

Millot, B., The Battle of the Coral Sea. United States of America: Naval Institute Press, 1974.

Stille, M., The Coral Sea 1942 – The First Carrier Battle. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2009.

Straczek, J., Battle of the Coral Sea. [Online]  Available at: https://www.navy.gov.au/history/feature-histories/battle-coral-sea[Accessed 7 October 2014].

 

 

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