HMAS Melbourne II

The HMAS Melbourne-Voyager Collision: A Tragedy that Damaged and Reformed

December 28, 2016

By MIDN Mollie Burns, RAN – NEOC 54 Naval Historical Society Prizewinning Essay

Introduction

The collision of HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager remains the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) worst peacetime disaster. Occurring off the New South Wales coast in 1964, the aircraft carrier Melbourne and destroyer Voyager were engaged in night flying exercises when Voyager inexplicably turned in front of Melbourne’s bow. The destroyer was cut in half and sank; of a company of three hundred and fourteen, eighty two men were killed (Spicer 1964). For the flagship and escort to collide in home waters and calm conditions with such heavy loss of life shocked the RAN and Australia.

The collision heavily damaged trust in the RAN and its standing with the Government and Australian public. Two Royal Commissions were convened over the incident, however, the investigations were poorly handled and compounded the detrimental effects of the incident.

The collision and its aftermath is of massive significance to the RAN and eventually led to large training, operational and cultural changes. This essay examines the impact such serious incidents have on the public and parliamentary perception of the RAN, and the impact it had internally. It also reviews improvements to Officer of the Watch (OOW) standards, Command Team training and operational procedures.

Impacts on the RAN’s Reputation

Serious maritime/naval accidents can cause immense damage to the public and government perception of the RAN and the trust placed within the organisation. This damage comes from various sources.

Faith in the RAN’s competency is lessened when serious incidents occur. A key factor is what errors, failings or lack of knowledge may have led to the event. This has widespread implications up to the international level; a finding of negligence would impact standing with allied naval forces.

Secondly the handling of the incident affects public perception. This involves how information is communicated immediately after the incident, the transparency of the investigation process and any actions taken as a result.

Finally, the RAN is judged on the manner in which it treats individuals involved. This includes post-incident care and ensuring a fair review process for members.

Even prior to the collision, the RAN was under increasing public and parliamentary scrutiny (Frame 1992). The service was balancing multiple goals, struggling to define its organisation and role in post-war Australia and had suffered multiple serious incidents.

The RAN was compromising between several constraints and aims. Firstly, the fleet had been in material decline since the Second World War and was aging rapidly (Frame 1992). Whilst rising tensions in Indonesia had resulted in some investment, it was also forcing ships through rapid work–up exercises such as those Melbourneand Voyagerwere engaged in (Frame 1992). In addition, Frame (1992) states the RAN was under pressure to prove herself to the two major allies, the Royal Navy and United States Navy. Finally, questions were being raised in Australia about the role and relevance of the RAN.

The RAN had not assisted itself in responding to these queries by becoming an increasingly insular organisation (Frame 2005). The ‘silent service’ was still a very British institution, particularly in the officer branch. Inherited traditions shaped the culture and young adolescent officers were indoctrinated into the naval way of thinking and acting during their four year education at the Royal Australian Naval College. More advanced training was generally undertaken at similar British institutions. Consequently, RAN officers were very familiar with naval practices but less so with civilian procedures. The Navy itself was primarily directed by the increasingly powerful Naval Board (Frame 1992). Frame (1992) highlights the separation of the RAN from government; independence the RAN viewed as strength. However this clear divide between RAN leadership and government led to RAN officers and the Navy being viewed as arrogant and unwilling to accept external review (Frame 1992).

The harshest scrutiny, however, arose from a series of escalating incidents and the associated fatalities (Frame 2005). This culminated in 1963 with the drowning of five junior officers who were sent on a twelve hour, out–of–sight sailing exercise in dubious weather (Frame 1992). While the Captain involved was initially convicted at the resulting court martial, this was overturned by the Naval Board who effectively sent the Captain on a promotion course (Frame 1992). The lack of accountability and action by the RAN disgusted Parliament and the public. Trust in the organisation and its self–management was quickly eroding.

Into this environment, the Melbourne–Voyager collision stunned Australia and further damaged the failing reputation of the RAN. That one RAN ship could effectively slice another in half with such a loss of life in home waters during peacetime was shocking (Four Corners, ABC Television, 10 February 1992). Furthermore, these deaths were not ‘a sacrifice for the country’s defence … [but resulted] from human error or negligence’ (Frame 1992).

The consequential falls in recruiting demonstrated the lack of faith in the RAN (Frame 1992). Despite a heavy recruiting campaign commencing almost immediately after the incident, numbers were significantly lower and did not recover for several years indicating the persistent nature of the damage to the RAN’s reputation (Frame 1992).

The negative perceptions of the RAN and their longevity were compounded by the handling of the collision.

While the RAN expected a Naval Board of Inquiry, public and parliamentary mistrust, frustration at the information flow and the need for an impartial review resulted in a Royal Commission being convened (Frame 1992).

The Commission was characterised by a hostile approach to witnesses and the initial report is poorly regarded (Frame 1992). It highlights the unsuitability of a Commission as means of investigation and lack of naval knowledge held by the civilian investigators (Frame 1992, Ferry 2014). It also contentiously held Melbourne’s Command Team partially responsible for failing to prevent the collision, leading to the Captain’s resignation (Spicer 1964). , a finding overturned in the second Royal Commission after the resignation of the Captain involved (Hall 1982).

The second Royal Commission was driven by parliamentary backbench campaigning against a reluctant Government and Naval Board (McCarthy 2015). It overturned the Melbournefinding but, again, was unable to determine the cause (Hall 1982). Both investigations were drawn out, controversial and a source of additional pain (Frame 2005).

Internal relationships within the RAN were also damaged by the treatment of members involved.

Voyagersurvivors, who had been through a horrific experience, lost the ship that they lived aboard and any possessions, were granted a week of leave to return home before being posted to a sister ship (Four Corners, ABC Television, 10 February 1982). There was minimal post-collision mental care or recognition of trauma. In later years, many compensation cases were raised and, since 1964, the RAN has improved greatly in this field (Anderson 1993).

Tension also arose from the treatment of members during the investigations, particularly the Melbourne Command Team. They were viewed as scapegoats and the Naval Board was seen to have abandoned or sacrificed its members (Hall 1982). This view was compounded by Captain Robertson’s resignation and Hall (1982) describes the tension caused within the mid-officer ranks.

As with any serious maritime/naval accident, the Melbourne-Voyagercollision significantly damaged the RAN. It also highlighted numerous deficiencies, particularly those occurring on the ship’s bridge, and forced critical review and improvement.

Impacts on OOW standards and Command Team training

When Melbourne and Voyager collided, both bridges were manned by their respective Captains, navigators, OOW and various lookouts. Whilst the exact cause of the collision has never been determined, it is clear there were multiple failings on one or both bridges.

Oxenbould (2004) asserts that the insufficient lookout onVoyager, criticised in both Commissions, was the main reason the ‘collision was not prevented’. Voyager’s most experienced watchkeeper was absent, their OOW was inexperienced and the key lookout was on his first sea voyage (Oxenbould 2004). Furthermore, Oxenbould (2004) argues the inexperience of the both bridge teams in working together on their respective ships also contributed. On that night, Captain Stevens aboard Voyager was the only “old hand” on either Command Team (Frame 1992). Every other officer had been recently posted onto Melbourne or Voyager and this was their first night at sea in company in over five months (Oxenbould 2004). It is likely this inexperience and unfamiliarity contributed in some way to the collision. Hence, while the primary cause can only be speculated on, the collision had clear implications for the standards of the OOW and Command Team training and preparation.

A range of measures were introduced after the collision to address the deficiencies that became evident.

There was a lack of formal qualifications for an OOW on given platforms and different evolutions, and no measure of their experience, platform training and currency (Ferry 2014). Objective platform qualification and periodic retesting combined with the use of advancing technology in the Bridge Simulator have greatly improved OOW training (Oxenbould 2004). Complex evolutions can now be simulated for practice and the ‘inexperienced [who] must gain experience’ (Spicer 1964) can first do so in simulated settings.

Furthermore, alterations to workups ensure they are of structured to progressively build up; close-quarters night flying exercises would not occur on directly after a long refit with new command teams (Oxenbould 2004). Such exercises would be practiced in the daylight hours initially after graduation from simpler manoeuvres; from this perspective the Melbourne-Voyagerexercise program has little apparent preparation and seems overly ambitious.

Independent trials and tests are also conducted before operational workups to assess basic drills and safety procedures (Oxenbould 2004). Following any major change in Command Team, such drills are conducted before a ship goes to sea to ensure cohesion, competency and efficiency on the bridge (Oxenbould 2004).

Operational and Procedural Changes

In addition to improved OOW and Command Team training, practices relating to communications, escort ships and rescues were refined.

In regard to ship-to-ship communications, speculation that the collision may have been caused by misinterpreted signals resulted in the confirmation of ambiguous signals being encouraged (Frame 1992). Quick challenges were made mandatory if a ship’s course was not understood or caused concern (Oxenbould 2004). Ships conducting similar evolutions were also to be assisted from their Operations Room, something that did not occur on the night (Ferry 2014).

Furthermore, rigid regulations for operating with Melbourne were released (Hall 1982). For example, a clear zone was established 2000 yards ahead of the carrier which escorts were not to enter without express permission and turns toward Melbourne to take up station were prohibited (Oxenbould 2004).

Safety and rescue also became a higher priority; on the night, poor swimming ability likely led to several deaths and helicopter rescue was underused (Ferry 2014). Furthermore, some escape hatches on Voyagerfailed to open and lifejackets were not readily available (Chapman 1979). The RAN swimming standards were raised in response and escape and rescue procedures strengthened and practised (Ferry 2014).

Cultural Significances

In addition to procedural changes, the collision eventually forced the somewhat-reluctant RAN through positive cultural change (Chapman 1979). Safety, constant improvement and professional discipline became key goals.

Improvements in Command Team training also shifted the responsibilities of the Captain and surrounding officers. Whereas previously a Captain was rarely questioned and had almost autonomous power, all members of the bridge were encouraged to raise any concerns (Ferry 2014). Similarly, Captains were under more stringent medical reviews (Frame 1992). The Captain did not lose responsibility, but was more accountable and supporting members were empowered.

This was only one aspect of the significant cultural change the RAN underwent. Prior to the collision, the RAN was relatively isolated and self-contained; this led to a glaring cultural clash during the Royal Commissions (Frame 2005). The RAN officers lacked knowledge of the process, deferred to rank and honour while failing to raise key points and were often naïve in the face of a hostile investigation (Hall 1982). The need for the RAN to have stronger relationships with government and be more aware of civilian processes was evident. It would also need to become accustomed to external reviews. In building these connections, the RAN became a more open and transparent organisation with greater public and parliamentary accountability.

Conclusion

The Melbourne-Voyager collision is one of the RAN’s most devastating disasters. For so many men to be killed in a training exercise severely damaged the RAN’s standing with the Australian Government and public. It also highlighted numerous weaknesses and OOW standards, Command Team training and operational procedures were improved as a result.

The collision also spurred the inertial RAN through significant cultural change with an increased focus on safety and the correct following of procedures. These reforms eventually led to the RAN becoming a more open and accountable organisation. Whilst the collision itself is one of the service’s most damaging events, it and the resulting alterations laid the foundations for many practices of the modern RAN.

Bibliography:

Anderson, D., 1993, The Voyager disaster: a 30 year saga, Issues brief number 6, Parliamentary Research Service, Canberra.

Chapman, A.I., 1979, The ‘Melbourne’ collisions: ‘Voyager’, 10th February 1964, ‘Frank E. Evans’, 3rd June 1969, a treatise of analysis and opinion, Department of Defence, Canberra.

Ferry, D., 2014, HMAS Melbourne/Voyager collision: cause theories and inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E. Evans collision), Headmark, 151, p 2-16.

Frame, T., 1992, Where Fate Calls: the HMAS Voyager tragedy, Hodder & Stoughton, Sydney.

Frame, T., 2005, The Cruel Legacy: the HMAS Voyager Tragedy, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest NSW.

Hall, T., 1982, HMAS Melbourne, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

HMAS Voyager: the cruel legacy, 1992, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).

McCarthy, E., 2015, John Jess, Seeker of Justice: the Role of Parliament in the HMAS Voyager Tragedy, Sid Harta Publishers, Victoria.

Oxenbould, C., 2004, The Sinking of HMAS Voyager: What Happened?, The Sydney Papers, 16 (2), p 103-110.

Spicer, J., 1964, Report of Royal Commissioner on loss of HMAS Voyager: Melbourne, 13th August 1964, Commonwealth Government Publisher, Canberra.

Occasional Paper 4: HMAS Melbourne II

December 1, 2016

December 2016
By Tom de Voil

Introduction

I recently had a brief article about HMAS Melbourne, the aircraft carrier, published and consequent on that I was asked to give this talk. It will be a brief history, some description of the ship with a few anecdotes thrown in. I see that I have also been asked to provide some comments on HMS Ark Royal.

Early History

HMAS Melbourne was laid down during the Second WW at Vickers Armstrong in Barrow-in-Furness. She was launched in 1944, named Majestic, and was designed for service in the Arctic convoys as a light fleet carrier. Just under 700 ft long, beam 80 ft, 18,000 tons displacement. Design speed 25 knots. The war ended before her completion. I have here her “Machinery Information” handbook with a stamp: “Engineer Officer HMS Majestic” – pretty basic by today’s standards of documentation. She lay uncompleted for some time and, I guess, during the Korean War when HMAS Sydney was providing active air cover for military operations in Korea the ACNB decided to acquire her for Australia, updated with the most modern aviation facilities at the time.

HMAS Melbourne was commissioned into the RAN in 1955 eventually operating squadrons of Sea Venom jet fighters and Fairey Gannets – great hulking planes – for A/S work. At the time, whilst not being the largest aircraft carrier at sea, she was the most modern, I believe, incorporating for the first time, in one ship, three elements necessary for effective modern naval aviation at sea. These were:

an angled flight deck
a steam catapult and
gyro stabilised landing mirrors

1963 – 1965

My first contact with HMAS Melbourne was in 1963 as a Direct Entry Engineering Officer when I was posted to her for 6 months to get my engineering watchkeeping certificates – boiler room and engine room w/k certs and so on. Although she was fairly newly commissioned her machinery was of war-time and pre- war vintage. All manually operated and enormous amounts of wild heat. Two shafts, but the starboard propeller had 4 blades and the port 3. She was a DC ship with 5 generators. Unlike most warships, for each shaft there was no separate boiler room and engine room but a Machinery Space (FMS and AMS) which housed 2 boilers, propulsion turbines, a turbo-generator, distilling plant and ancillary equipment. They were very noisy and hot. Air conditioning was almost non-existent and in the tropics my cabin on 4 deck was 93F at night and 96F during the day. Mess decks on 4 deck were similarly stinking hot.

After a year’s posting away I re-joined HMAS Melbourne as a watchkeeping engineer for a year. There were about 12 Lieutenants in the Engineering department, a 2 1⁄2 who was the Senior Engineer and Commander E, the head of department. We all shared HQ2 as our working office space – from memory about 16 ft square. The bulkheads were lined with banks of sound powered phones – DC, fuel and liquid management, machinery compartments, etc, with numerous State Boards. There was a central console where whoever was in charge during DC evolutions sat and conducted the show. Against the inboard port bulkhead, in a small alcove, was Cdr E’s desk. Even though we all worked in the same cramped area one still almost needed an appointment to talk to him. He was God. Little did I know that 16 years later I would come back as God!

This picture shows the flight deck with everyone working hard. (Digby Johns – Cdr Air and Ken Shands – XO).

In HMAS Melbourne the marine engineering department not only looked after the traditional things but ME ratings also operated the catapult, arresting gear and bulk aviation fuel delivery to the flight deck. You will have seen in movies and news clips kids in bright coloured vests scuttling about under aircraft. They were my kids. At Flying Stations, the pressure of the forward boilers was increased from the normal 400 psi to 430 psi, to allow the catapult steam accumulators to be charged. This really tested the metal of the PO(ME) steaming as this was just below the set pressure for the safety valves. And on top of this anything might happen. There was nothing more attention grabbing during the Middle Watch when you were trying to remain attentive than to get a FULL ASTERN, as happened to me when a Gannet lost power on launch.

During this period in the Far East (1965) we embarked an RN Squadron of Wessex A/S helos. These had dunking sonar and it was a trial to see how they went, I believe. The RAN subsequently acquired its own Wessex. I managed to hitch a ride on one sortie but this was not too successful since the Auto Hover controls insisted in making the helo dive downward, and at 60 ft this was not very comforting. I have it in my memory that a Skyhawk jet made a touch and go but I am not sure. All very exciting for a young lad.

1968

My next contact with the ship was when I joined Garden Island Dockyard towards the end of 1968. I was promptly put in charge of the dockyard’s set-to-work team at the completion of Melbourne‘s modernisation carried out that year. A bit of a disappointment since I thought I would escape steam for a couple of years.

The modernisation was built around being able to operate A4 Skyhawk jet fighters and Grumman Tracker A/s aircraft, together with Sea King helos. The catapult and arresting gear were upgraded, storage for 70,000 gallons of AVGAS, 133,350 gallons of AVCAT, new avionics, communications and electronics, a turbo alternator and a diesel alternator for AC power, TV through the mess decks, improved air conditioning, LOX, new electric engine telegraphs – these were the main changes. Displacement now 20,000 tons.

Unfortunately, while I was still at GID the collision with USS EVANS occurred and I saw her steam up the harbour to Cockatoo Island where the bow was repaired. But the poor ship seemed never far from problems. While she was alongside at the Fitting Out Wharf I saw, personally, a freighter coming out of Woolloomooloo Bay collide with her port aft sponson and a Sydney Harbour ferry ran straight into her stern whilst she was at a buoy on the Rose Bay side of GI. Neither her fault! Then, in the mid-70s (David Martin was CO) her LWO2 radar antenna fell over the side whilst she was crossing the Tasman Sea.

Nevertheless, she gave sterling service until the 80s. Habitability was always a problem and, in an attempt to fast track accommodation and habitability improvements a “HABITABILITY FUND” was set up, outside the normal, cumbersome A&A procedures, administered by the ship and the Fleet Commander.

1981

I was appointed MEO in April 1981 and renewed my acquaintance with her. Time had not mellowed her. I was now God! One thing I learned as MEO – it was 103 vertical steps from the Control Platform in the FMS to the Bridge, which I traversed many times to report Main Engines to the CO. In the time it took to make that journey I always wondered if the machinery state was still the same when I arrived on the bridge as it was when I departed the FMS!

That was quite a busy year for her. We deployed to the FE again, worked around the EA Exercise areas and participated in Exercise K 81 off Shoalwater Bay in Queensland. As we left Fremantle bound for Manila in company with USS Coral Sea and a US TF, my catapult engineer suffered a medical problem and we ceased flying, until we arrived in Manila where a previous catapult engineer met us, having been pulled out of his own ship. Why does an aircraft carrier go to sea? Not many brownie points for that effort. Did you know that there was never a handbook for the catapult – a very complex system and all we had to go on was a note book and sketches made by a previous EO (Mark Russe ll). My favourite time was to be on deck at the Howdah when we were operating Trackers at night. Red, yellow and orange flames, carbon, etc. spewed into the night sky as the engines revved up.

We survived that deployment and all the other sea time that we did, except one incident sticks in my mind. I mentioned previously that two alternators were added to the ship in 1968 to provide power for electronic and communication systems. Well, you can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. For these AC systems there was never any redundancy and back up in power supply. Normal steaming was with the T/A running and the D/A shut down, but ready to go. I was on the bridge one day when we were steaming about 12 k towards a nice sandy beach to anchor. The lone turbo alternator tripped and all internal comms failed, including the engine room telegraphs and conning intercom! ……just as SSD were to be piped. Temporarily, there was no control over the ship and I genuinely raised a cold sweat! The voice pipe to the wheel house was useless, the sound powered phone to the FMS was too difficult to use because of the ambient noise. Temporarily there was a total loss of control over the ship! Think of the consequences. There were other technical incidents but we arrived back home in due course.

Well, we arrived back in Sydney in November 1981 and sat alongside for 3 months, nominally preparing for an Extension of Life Refit. Even then, Melbourne would still give us little dramas to keep us on our toes. Then the political decision was made to decommission her and scrap her. She decommissioned at the end of June 1982.

And finally:

Designed for use in the Arctic convoys of World War II; launched in 1944; left unloved until acquired by Australia; finally commissioned into the RAN in 1955; a leader in naval aviation at this time; a turbulent life with final fixed-wing operations in November 1981; decommissioned in June 1982. She was a great leveller, providing stability to the RAN; and for generations of officers and sailors of the RAN she was a measured, standardised yardstick for training, leadership, tradition and life at sea in our Service.

One thing I think that is now missed is the performance of Ceremonial Sunset by the Fleet Band in some foreign port. Many’s the time that I watched foreign dignitaries and senior military officers moved by the haunting music as the ensign was lowered – “The day thou gavest Lord now is ended”. Inexpensive diplomacy.

HMS Ark Royal

At the end of 1982 I was posted to the UK to take up an exchange posting with the RN. I was sent to Newcastle on Tyne where I was on the staff of PNO Tyne – overseeing the construction of Ark Royal, a T42 destroyer and a couple of T22 frigates at Swan Hunters, as well as other interesting work. With the arrival of an Australian Brass Hat the rumour immediately went around the shipyard that there was an order for a fourth carrier!

The overseeing organisation was interesting, run by the RCNC. The RCNC was the professional home of Naval Architects employed by the MOD. It was established by Royal Charter in 1883. Interestingly, all Constructors went to sea for 2 years early in their career and wore uniform – a Lieutenant’s uniform with gray distinguishing lace. I found them to be a very professional and competent group of people. The overseeing organisation was a mature organisation. We were largely left alone by MoD head office provided costs and schedule were under control.

I could spend another 1⁄2 hour talking about my time in the NE of England but that is another story. Ark Royal was designed to operate STOVL aircraft, such as the Harrier. She had the classic ski jump flight deck. At 22,000 tons she was slightly heavier than Melbourne, but she was physically larger and higher because of her lighter construction and more modern construction techniques, 698 ft x 120 ft x 24 ft.

Propelled by 4 Olympus gas turbines (100,000 HP) and >30kots. Armed with Sea dart, Phalanx & 20 mm mtgs. Up to 18 Harriers with 4 Seakings, or variations. 1000 crew. Marvellous ships. A great pity we did not acquire one when it was offered by Margaret Thatcher, a lost opportunity.

Nauru – the Pleasant Isle

March 24, 2013

By Walter Burroughs

In the December 2012 edition of this magazine there appeared an article on the Cocos and Christmas Islands. This theme is continued with a discussion on Nauru which has many historical similarities to Christmas Island and both feature in the Australian Government’s ‘Pacific Solution’ to illegal immigration.

The Pleasant Isle

Nauru is a small oval shaped island of just 8.1 sq miles or 21.1 km², measuring 6 km by 4 km with a circumference of 19 km, lying in the western Pacific just south of the equator. It has a small fertile fringe and a central plateau rising to 65 metres above sea level. Its nearest neighbour 305 km to the east is Baanaba (Ocean) Island in Kiribati, formerly the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The current population is 9,378 (2011 estimate) which had been larger, but from 2004 to 2006 some 1,500 immigrant workers were repatriated. It is also one of the world’s smallest independent nations. Nauru is remote, being 2,174 nautical miles or 4,029 km and about 5 hours flying time from Sydney and from Honolulu.

The island is surrounded by a coral reef which is exposed at low tide. There is no natural port but a deep water anchorage is served by a cantilever system for loading phosphate and by lighters for the loading and discharge of other cargo.

Nauru was populated by a Micronesian race at least 3,000 years ago but was unknown to Europeans until discovered in 1798 by Captain John Fearn in the whaling ship Snow Hunter on a voyage from New Zealand to China. Fearn, an ex-Royal Naval officer, named it Pleasant Island due to the attractive and lush vegetation and friendly nature of its inhabitants. Subsequently whaling ships called for supplies, especially fresh water. In return they brought disease, and traded alcohol and firearms leading to tribal warfare. The Sydney Morning Herald of 16 August 1843 published an extract from the diary of Captain Beckford Simpson of the barque Giraffe which had called at Pleasant Island in February of that year when on passage from Sydney to Manila, which relates: ‘…this island and many others in the Pacific are infested by Europeans, who are either runaway convicts, expirees, or deserters from whalers, and are for the most part men of the very worst description, who it appears prefer living a precarious life of indolence and ease with the unenlightened savage.’

Anglo-German Convention

During the late 19th century rivalry between colonial powers caused friction in the Pacific which in 1886 led to the Berlin Anglo-German Convention, whereby the oceanic area was divided into two spheres of influence. The small Pleasant Island fell within an agreed German sphere. Two years later on 01 October 1888 the German gunboat SMS Eber arrived and landed an armed party of 36 marines who hoisted the German flag and installed a new governor. The marines held the native chiefs hostage until the warring islanders had been disarmed, alcohol banned and evangelism encouraged. The new authorities were greatly assisted by William Harris, an escaped prisoner from Norfolk Island, who had settled on the island and married a local woman and with her had several children. In the same year the island, then known as Nawodo, was incorporated into the German Marshall Islands Protectorate.

Discovery of Phosphate

In 1899 an enterprising Englishman, A.F. Ellis of Sydney, discovered that a lump of rock which originated from Nauru and was being used as a door-stop in his firm’s office was phosphate rock of the highest quality. The phosphate rock is amongst the highest grade in the world with a typical percentage of 80% phosphate to lime. This led to the formation of the Pacific Phosphate Company (PPC), a British company which purchased the rights to mine the minerals on Nauru and Ocean Island. Exports of ore began from 1907 with the assistance of indentured labour imported from China and neighbouring islands. Nauru then developed as one of three great phosphate islands in the Pacific, the others being Baanaba (Ocean Island) in Kiribati and Makatea in French Polynesia.

Impacts of WW I

At the outbreak of WW I Nauru had a native population of 1,400 plus some 100 Europeans who were predominately English and German. Locally, the administration was conferred on the manager of the Jaluit Trading Company, but it practical terms it was run by the PPC.

Nauru and Yap, which are 2,000 miles apart, were the main communications stations covering the German Pacific chain. The Bitapaka station at Rabaul was still unfinished at the outbreak of war and was then hurriedly completed.

After assisting in the successful occupation of German Samoa on 9 September 1914 the cruiser HMAS Melbourne landed a surprise armed party of 4 officers and 21 men on the island and, on capture of the administrator, gained an unconditional surrender without a shot being fired. The landing party then disabled the radio station. As Nauru was short of provisions, Melbourne did not leave an occupation force behind and it was not until 6 November 1914 that an official occupation took place and the British flag was raised over the island.

League of Nations Mandate

Under a section of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles sovereignty of Nauru was vested in the British Crown. Later a Nauru Agreement was entered into by Australia, Britain and New Zealand which led to the creation of the British Phosphate Commission (BPC), which took over mining. The BPC was a board with representatives from Australia, Britain and New Zealand who managed the extraction of phosphate from Christmas Island, Nauru and Ocean Island from the 1920s until the 1960s. In 1923 Australia was granted a League of Nations mandate over the island.

Impacts of WW II

On 6 and 7 December 1940 the German auxiliary cruisers HSK Komet and Orion accompanied by their supply ship Kulmerland sank five ships waiting to load phosphate in the vicinity of Nauru, after which Komet shelled the mining areas, oil storage depots and the shipping facilities. These attacks seriously disrupted phosphate supplies which were needed in Australia and New Zealand for fertiliser but more importantly for the manufacture of explosives. In response, two detachments of about 50 men with two 18-pdr guns drawn from the 2/13 Australian Army Field Regiment were sent in February 1941 to garrison Nauru and Baanaba against a possible repeat of raider attacks. These were known as Heron Force (Baanaba) and Wren Force (Nauru). Two new detachments were raised in Sydney, known as the Ocean Island Force and the Nauru Force, and these relieved Heron and Wren Forces in August 1941. They voyaged to the islands in HMAS Westralia which on her return escorted a group of merchantmen which had taken off a total of 93 non-essential Europeans from the islands.

The day after Pearl Harbor in December 1941 Japanese planes carried out a series of bombing raids which silenced the radio station, after which the decision was taken to evacuate the remaining Europeans and the Australian garrison. In February 1942 some 500 persons including the garrison were evacuated using the Free French destroyer Triomphant which was supported the BPC ship Trienza. Seven Europeans remained at Nauru including the Administrator Lt. Colonel F.R. Chalmers, CMG, DSO, and six Europeans remained at Ocean Island. Owing to atrocities of war only one of them survived captivity.

The first failed attempt to occupy Nauru and Ocean Island was made when a Japanese naval invasion force of one cruiser, two destroyers and two minelayers with troops under command of Rear Admiral Shima Kiyohide departed from Rabaul on 11 May 1942. This force was attacked by the US submarine S‑42, leading to the loss of the large minelayer and flagship IJNS Okinoshima. Attempts were then called off when reconnaissance planes sighted US carriers.

A second Japanese invasion force led by the cruiser IJNS Ariake departed Truk on 26 August 1942 and three days later, following a bombardment by Ariake, a landing party of the 43rd Guard Force conducted an unopposed landing. They were joined by the 5th Special Base Force Company intent on building an airstrip. By October 1942 there were 11 officers and 249 Japanese soldiers on Nauru. With imported labour for construction work by June 1943 the population reached 5,187, which included 1,388 military personnel. In September 1943 the Japanese began sending islanders to work as labourers in the Truk (now Chuuk) and Caroline Islands but this was interrupted when a ship intended to take evacuees was torpedoed and sunk. The same month a Japanese freighter bringing supplies and personnel was torpedoed and sunk with the loss of over 400 lives. Of the 1,200 Islanders deported as labour many suffered severe hardship and only 737 survivors returned after the war.

Nauru Island under attack from US Air Force bombers

The airstrip led to multiple bombing attacks by the US Army Air Force from March 1943, but the island was bypassed in the Allied drive north. The current excellent international airport enjoyed by Nauru is a legacy of this earlier wartime construction. On 8 September 1945 Australian aircraft dropped leaflets on the island signalling that the war was over and that an occupation force would soon arrive. Five days later on 13 September HMAS Diamantina escorting the Australian merchantmen Burdekin River and Glenelg River arrived when the Japanese commandant Hisayaki Soeda surrendered to Brigadier J.R. Stevenson on board Diamantina. The following day 500 troops from the 31/51 Battalion AIF landed and raised the union flag. At the time of the surrender there were 2,681 Japanese troops and 1,054 Japanese and Korean workers on the island, out of a total population of 5,329. Owing to Allied bombing and air superiority, the islands had not received any supplies for over a year. The inhabitants were in desperate need of food and there was a general breakdown in health and sanitation. Some 300 of the former enemy had died and another 130 were hospitalised. A similar surrender ceremony was held on board Diamantina off Ocean Island on 1 October 1945 where an Australian force of 140 men took over control from a Japanese garrison of over 513 men, mostly naval personnel. After the two merchant ships had discharged all their supplies they embarked the Japanese prisoners and Koreans who were repatriated firstly to Bougainville. All but one platoon was withdrawn in December 1945 and it was finally withdrawn in February 1946.

United Nations Trusteeship and Independence

In 1947 a United Nations Trusteeship was established over the island, with Australia, Britain and New Zealand becoming trustees for 20 years, when self-determination was to be enacted. Nauru became self-governing in January 1966 and became fully independent on 31 January 1968. In 1967 the people of Nauru purchased the lucrative assets of the BPC for $A21M and in June 1970 control passed to the locally owned Nauru Phosphate Corporation. Income from the mines gave Nauruans one of the highest standards of living in the Pacific with the economy peaking in the early 1980s. The small republic had at one time annual revenues in excess of $A100M providing a surplus of about $A80M, which was invested in a development fund, mainly in international real estate. At its peak this fund was valued at over one billion dollars. Inexperience, economic mismanagement and extravagant spending by Nauru led to financial ruin and a dramatic decline in living standards. Phosphate reserves are now almost entirely depleted, which has left a barren terrain. Run-off has also affected the surrounding seabed.

In 1962, well before Nauru took over the phosphate industry and achieved independence, the United Nations had offered a cautious note:

‘The problem of Nauru presents a paradox. The striking contrast is between a superficially happy state of affairs and an uncertain and indeed alarming future… But this picture of peace and well-being and security is deceptive. Indeed it is a false paradise. For these gentle people are dominated by the knowledge that the present happy state of affairs cannot continue.’

Somewhat illogically, this tiny speck in the South Pacific with finite resources and no long term future was granted full independence as a stand-alone nation with little thought for future social and structural development. A legacy of phosphate mining and subsequent abundance of money resulted in a heavy reliance on imported goods. Unfortunately, this trend has continued with a highly urbanised community hardly able to sustain itself. With the collapse of the mining industry the population has begun to decline, but historically it remains far in excess of sustainability given the existing resources. It is noteworthy that the neighbouring but smaller Ocean Island of 6 km² (now Baanaba) also reliant on phosphate mining, had similar problems to Nauru; but after WW II the British authorities relocated most of the population to Fiji, thereby avoiding latent problems. The current population of Baanaba is about 330 persons. A plan by partner governments to resettle Nauruans on Curtis Island off the north coast of Queensland was abandoned in 1964 when the islanders decided to stay put.

Over a century of continuous mining had stripped the island of four-fifths of its topsoil creating a virtual desert. In 1989 Nauru took legal action against Australia in the International Court of Justice over Australia’s administration of the island and, in particular, its failure to remedy the environmental damage caused by mining. This led to an out-of-court settlement to rehabilitate mined-out areas. Plans to rehabilitate the islands were drawn up in 1993 with compensation paid by Australia and with Britain and New Zealand paying a small annual subsidy. In the 1990s Nauru briefly became a tax haven and money laundering centre but this has now ceased.

Under an informal agreement Australia is responsible for Nauru’s defence and the country uses Australian currency. In September 2005 a Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and Nauru provides the latter with financial aid, currently running at about $A20M pa, and technical assistance. In return Nauru provides assistance with the housing of asylum seekers while their applications to enter Australia are processed. In addition to aid another $A8M is generated annually from the camps in accommodating, feeding and transporting overseas employees and officials. Playing a diplomatic role in supporting foreign government initiatives through the United Nations, the Nauruan Government has also managed to gain aid from a number of other countries, notably Taiwan (ROC) and China (PRC) and Russia.

The Pacific Solution

Over recent times problems have arisen through the arrival in Australia of a large number of persons claiming refugee status. While most in this category arrive by air a large number have arrived by sea, usually after an intermediate stop in Indonesia. During the period 1 July 1998 to 27 July 2012 there were 33,412 arrivals by boat, most of who claim refugee status and apply for protection visas. Just as the Allied forces in 1943 bypassed Nauru and left the Japanese garrison to wither on the vine, again with the arrival of the 21st century Nauru had been largely bypassed and left to wither. Help came from a most unexpected quarter when in August 2001 a Norwegian container ship, responding to a distress call, rescued 438 Afghans from a small fishing boat sinking in international waters about 140 km north of Christmas Island. In what became known as the ‘Tampa Affair’ the ship, despite Australian protestations, anchored off Christmas Island and eventually its human cargo was transferred to HMAS Manoora. In the same timeframe 231 Iraqi and Palestinians were picked up from a boat off the Ashmore Reef and these were added to Manoora’s passengers, all of whom were taken to Nauru.

In response to the ‘Tampa Affair’ the Australian Government developed its ‘Pacific Solution’ of transporting asylum seekers to detention centres on small remote Pacific islands, rather than allowing them to land on the Australian mainland while their refugee status is determined. The Pacific Solution comprises three elements. Firstly, for this purpose many smaller islands were excised from Australia’s migration zone or Australian territory. Secondly, the Australian Defence Force commenced ‘Operation Relex’ to interdict vessels carrying asylum seekers. Finally, these asylum seekers were removed to third countries in order to determine their refugee status and moved using RAN ships to detention centres established at Christmas Island, Manus Island and Nauru.

From the time of the first arrivals at Nauru in 2001 until the centre on the island was closed in March 2008, a total of 1,321 (which includes 19 births and one death) have been processed at Nauru. While there are arguments for and against this policy it could be seen as being partially successful as it stemmed the refugee flow. The cost however appears disproportionately high with over one billion dollars spent on the overall scheme. On Christmas Island new detention facilities were built and on Manus these were formed from PNG Defence Force naval base, previously HMAS Tarangau, and at Nauru two new camps were built. Christmas Island can house about 1,500 detainees (note at one time the maximum number actually held was about 2,700), Manus 900 and Nauru 1,500. All centres are manned by civilian contractors. In 2008 the Government closed the off-shore centres at Manus and Nauru. Since then, with increasing numbers of refugees arriving by boat, these centres were refurbished and are now being reopened with the first arrivals of refugees coming from Christmas Island to Nauru by air charter in September 2012 and at Manus Island in November 2012.

Lessons from History

The assimilation of new arrivals into the Australian community has, since the infancy of a colonial past, provided a constant stream of difficulties from intransigent British and Irish convicts to indentured Pacific Island labour, Chinese gold workers and post war European migrants. Further difficulties arising from the new chapter of migrants seeking escape from war torn regions of the Middle East should come as no surprise. In Australia problems now arise from the acknowledgement of obligations under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which can run counter to certain national community expectations. The Pacific Solution seeks to provide a short-term interim solution which satisfies few.

This remote Pacific atoll, first known as the Pleasant Island, has a long history which largely remained undisturbed for three millennia. But since European discovery just over two centuries ago the changes have been traumatic. Nauru has moved from a traditional tribal society to a colonial outpost, and then, surprisingly, been involved in two world wars and finally been granted a hasty and seemingly unsustainable independence. In 2003 the respected Economist called Nauru ‘…one of the world’s most dysfunctional countries…’, a statement unfortunately supported by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which in 2004 stated that Nauru is among the most egregious examples of corruption, profligacy and mismanagement in the South Pacific. While progress has been made it remains a troubled nation dependent upon aid. A new chapter in the islands history has just begun and Australia and in particular its Defence Forces may yet have much more involvement in making this once more a Pleasant Island.

Bibliography

Brown, M. Anne (Ed), Security and Development in the Pacific Islands, Lynne Rienner, London, 2007.

Gill, G. Hermon, Australia in the War of 1939-1945 Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957.

Gill,G.Hermon, Australia in the War of 1939-1945 Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1968.

International Business Publications, Nauru Country Study Guide, Washington, 2008.

Jose, A. W., Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol. IX, The Royal Australian Navy (Eighth Edition), Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1940.

Mansted, Rachel, The Pacific Solution- Assessing Australia’s Compliance with International Law, Journal – Bond University Student Law Review Vol 3 Issue 1, Gold Coast Qld, January 2007.

McCarthy, Dudley, Australia in the War of 1939-1945 South-West Pacific Area First Year, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959.

Metcalfe, Susan, The Pacific Solution, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2010.

Numan, Peter, HMAS Diamantina – Australia’s last River Class frigate 1945-1980, Slouch Hat Publications, Rosebud, Victoria, 2005.

The Impact of Jet Propulsion on RAN Aviation Squadrons

December 16, 2011

By Midshipman S.R. Gidley, RAN

MIDN Gidley grew up on Sydney’s North Shore but in 2011 moved to Jindabyne in the Snowy Mountains. After completing secondary education at Sydney’s Shore School in 2007 he was accepted into the Australian Defence Force and later undertook training as an Army pilot. Unable to complete his pilot training in 2010 he transferred to the RAN as a direct entry Seaman Officer. His interests include recreational flying, vehicle modification and motorsport and he also enjoys competitive sailing and skiing.

For once you have tasted flight you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards, for there you have been and there you will long to return – Leonardo da Vinci

Introduction

The development of aircraft propulsion through history had a significant impact on the Aviation Squadrons of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), especially regarding the military integration of the gas turbine engine in both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. The development of aircraft propulsion in the mid 20th century had a profound impact on all world aviation as the gas turbine engine was introduced as an efficient and viable alternative to conventional reciprocating piston engines. This engine development entered the RAN in the form of the Sea Vampire in 1954¹, and continuous engine research and development brought with it new aircraft with new capabilities that helped to bring Australia on to the world stage with its aviation capability. In 1953 the RAN’s first helicopter entered service, and again, history shows the benefits of employing gas turbines as the power source to all of the RAN’s helicopters.

History of the Gas Turbine

Jet propulsion was first devised more than two thousand years ago, but was not used effectively until the 13th century in China, when gunpowder rockets were used as fireworks. Air breathing gas turbine engine development incorporating the Brayton Cycle commenced in the mid 1930s. After the resolution of countless issues relating to safety, reliability and weight, the first jet propelled aircraft, Ernst Heinkel’s He 178, flew in 1939².

During World War II great advances were made in improvements to aircraft engine performance. Continued development made by the He 178 led to early operational gas turbine engines including the Caproni Campini N1 and the Japanese Tsu-11. While neither of these engines provided efficient propulsion alternatives for piston driven aircraft, they paved the way for military versions of gas turbine engines. Research breakthroughs towards the end of the war eventually led to the world’s first jet engine fighter, the Messerschmitt Me 262³. The arrival of the Me 262 into mass production marked the entry of the jet engine as an efficient and effective means of aircraft propulsion for the future.

Jet Powered Fixed Wing

The first gas turbine aircraft flown by the RAN was the de Havilland Vampire Mk T.22⁴. The first Sea Vampire was received on 18 June 1954 by 723 Squadron and most were used as training aircraft. Australia predominantly used variants of the Vampire aircraft in the RAAF, however the RAN flew the Vampire through 723 and 724 squadrons. Soon after acquiring of the Vampire, the RAN gained a number of de Havilland Sea Venom FAW53 aircraft. These new aircraft were comparable to the Vampire and performed a similar role. Later in their service life the Sea Venoms were used predominantly in a training role which included aircrew instruction, simulated airborne attack and the training of Direction Officers at the Pilot Branch, and also for towing targets using a Delmar Target Towing System for air-to-air training⁵. The Sea Venom became the RAN’s first jet propelled airborne anti-surface capability.

The Australian carrier, HMAS Melbourne, equipped with Sea Venom aircraft established itself in Australia and overseas in the Pacific, the United Kingdom, and South East Asia as an efficient operational platform. 808 Squadron became known as a formidable fighter unit in its participation in the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) exercises, and a later deployment gave 805 squadron the opportunity to perform operations from a carrier as an all weather night fighting unit. These new jet aircraft proved superior to the existing piston powered capability as they could be flown further and for longer to complete their mission. However the design of the aircraft to accommodate the higher top speed required a higher velocity on final approach, which in turn required frequent maintenance to both the aircraft and the landing platform when operating from a carrier.

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Chloe and Sadie – or 100% Pitched and Ditched

December 16, 2011

This article is by Fred Haynes who for many years worked at Garden Island Dockyard firstly as a Scientific Instrument Maker and later as Technical Officer in charge of the Optical and Periscope Workshop. After 36 years at GID Fred served another 9 years as an Assistant Curator at the Naval Heritage Centre collection at Spectacle Island.

In the Fleet Air Arm different aircraft were unofficially rated by their pilots for their takeoff performance on the catapult. This was the ability to become airborne after launch, or being ‘pitched’. Performance of individual aircraft varied greatly and sometimes for some reason flight could not be maintained. This invariably meant the aircraft would crash or ‘ditch’ in the sea. The ratio of successful launches to failure was colloquially called the ‘pitched and ditched record’.

When the RAN took delivery of HMAS Melbourne it came fitted with the latest developments in naval aviation technology including the British designed steam catapult, angled flight deck and mirror landing system. In fact it was the decision to fit these to Melbourne that resulted in her delivery being delayed. Both HMAS Sydney and Melbourne were laid down as Majestic Class light fleet carriers towards the end of WW II but only Sydney was completed and commissioned as HMS Terrible. The uncompleted second ship was laid up at the end of hostilities and remained incomplete until the decision by the RAN to acquire two carriers for its new Fleet Air Arm. It was also decided to acquire a third carrier HMS Vengeance on loan from the RN until Melbourne was completed.

The newly acquired HMA Ships Sydney and Vengeance aircraft were Hawker Sea Fury FB11 and Fairey Firefly 5. Both these aircraft were catapult launched and often relied on JATO rockets for necessary additional thrust for takeoff when fully loaded. While these ships required conventional skills for refit maintenance of their hulls and propulsion systems the maintenance of their catapults presented new challenges for Garden Island Dockyard.

Catapults previously fitted to RAN ships such as the cruisers Australia, Hobart and Sydney used either compressed air or cordite charges. The aircraft sat on a cradle fitted to the catapult and required a crane to lift them into position prior to launch. The usual method for testing was to fire a large test baulk of wood to simulate the weight of the aircraft.

The new carriers required a different method of testing catapults leading to the design of a re-useable four wheeled test vehicle which the Dockyard called ‘Sadie.’ Sadie was used during the active service lives as RAN carriers Sydney and Vengeance. When Melbourne was introduced with her modified design she was able to launch the later jet powered de Havilland Sea Venom FAW53 and twin turboprop Fairey Gannet AS1 and 4. Sadie was no longer able to cope with these new requirements and a new test vehicle was built, fitted with a four wheel undercarriage from a Canberra jet bomber It contained ballast tanks that could be filled with water to simulate different aircraft weights.

The new vehicle was christened ‘Chloe’ after the famous painting in the landmark Young & Jackson’s Hotel in the ship’s namesake city. Testing was conducted when the ship was alongside resulting in a large splashdown up to 200 metres ahead of the ship. The float was then lifted back onboard with the aid of the 250 ton hammerhead crane. On one occasion a commercial fisherman returning to the then commercial Woolloomooloo Bay ignored repeated warnings and was distraught when covered in spray after Chloe landed alongside.

Following Melbourne’s 1967 – 1969 major refit came new aircraft, the Douglas A4G Skyhawk and Grumman S2 Tracker. This required an upgrade of Chloe with saddle tanks added to reflect increases in weight, but this upset the test vehicle’s already pedestrian aerodynamics. Accordingly another test vehicle was introduced comprising a steel girder frame forming a sled plus a large cylindrical tank for ballast water. The sled was not fitted with wheels but had two wooden skids. This produced unpredictable and spectacular results and as a result use of this unloved and unnamed test vehicle was discontinued shortly after its introduction. Both Chloe and her unnamed successor were last seen in a derelict condition at the old Rydalmere Naval Stores. Certainly Sadie and Chloe held the record of 100% pitched and ditched in RAN service.