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HMAS Nepal

HMAS Nepal and Operation ES – June and July 1942

The Society received the following letter which explains this unusual circumstance.

A recent application to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal has cast light on a hitherto unknown operation undertaken by the destroyer HMAS Nepal in the Norwegian Sea in June and July 1942. Nepal formed part of the escort for a convoy which was intended to act as a decoy for German forces and thus provide a diversion for the key PQ 17 convoy to Russia. This effort had the code name of ‘Operation ES’.

No record of Nepal’s actions appears to exist in any Australian archive or published source. Both the official history of the RAN in World War II and the more recent volume by the Naval Historical Society on the history of the five N class destroyers in RAN service from 1941 to 1945 describe Nepal as having conducted only a work up at Scapa Flow before deploying to the Indian Ocean. UK records, however, confirms not only the details of the operation but Nepal’s involvement.

The Tribunal is of the view that the service of Nepal nd her crew should be recorded and publicised. I am therefore enclosing for you a summary of the Tribunal’s research and findings which I hope you will include in your archives and, if possible, publish. I am sure that making this significant episode more widely known to the Australian public would be a source of great satisfaction to the surviving personnel from HMAS Nepal, as well as to the families of the entire crew. While Convoy PQ 17 met with disaster for other reasons, it is clear that ‘Operation ES’ was a deliberate effort to draw aircraft, U-boats and even surface raiders away from the main convoy and one conducted at some risk to the ships involved.

HMAS Nepal Shen serving with the Royal Navy. Royal Navy photo

Nepal was the fifth and last of five N class destroyers to be commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy. She was built by Thorneycroft at the company’s Woolston shipyard. Laid down in September 1939, she was originally to be named Norseman and was intended for transfer to the Royal Netherlands Navy. On 18 December 1940, the hull was badly damaged on the slipway in an air raid, delaying the launch of the ship until 4 December 1941 and forcing a change in the Admiralty’s intended distribution of the eight N class to Allied navies. She was reallocated for manning by the RAN, renamed Nepal (to honour the contribution of that country’s Ghurkha regiments to the war effort) in January 1942 and commissioned into the RAN on 11 May 1942.

Nepal completed her builder’s trials and initial rectification before sailing to Plymouth. She left there on the evening of 29 May 1942 and arrived at Scapa Flow to begin her work up for operational service on 31 May. Such a workup generally involved basic exercises and weapon firings to bring the crew to the required level of efficiency and identify any remaining material defects. It was, however, the practice to use destroyers which were working up to meet operational requirements for the Home Fleet, particularly those arising in the locality of Scapa Flow. On this basis,Nepalundertook an anti-submarine patrol with two British destroyers on 14 June in the vicinity of 60 degrees 40 minutes North and 5 degrees West. She returned to Scapa Flow on the evening of 15 June 1942 and otherwise appears to have worked in the local exercise areas when not anchored in the Flow.

Nepaland her sister, the Dutch destroyer Tjerk Hiddes, completed the required weapon practices by the end of June. At this point, both ships were due to return south to complete their final defect rectification and equipment fit before deploying to join the Eastern Fleet.

A critical convoy, PQ 17, was due to sail from Iceland to Russia on 27 June 1942. This was a large and heavily escorted convoy carrying vital supplies for Russia and its despatch and arrival were considered to have great political as well as operational significance. In high summer, however, and with powerful German air, submarine and surface forces, including the battleship Tirpitz, arrayed against the convoy, it was viewed as being extremely vulnerable. In an attempt to confuse the Germans and force them to divert some of their units away from PQ 17, Operation ES was set in train. This was a decoy convoy which was intended to proceed north-east into the Norwegian Sea from the main British naval base at Scapa Flow in order to attract attention from German reconnaissance units and lure the enemy into allocating forces to attack it.

Nepaland Tjerk Hiddeswere allocated to the escort of the decoy convoy. While such allocation was within the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet and the Rear Admiral (destroyers) Home Fleet, it is possible that the ship’s commanding officers volunteered for the sortie in order to give their crews some operational experience before the long passage to the Indian Ocean. This is consistent with the testimony of crew members concerning the address to them by the captain, Commander F.B. Morris, RAN.

The decoy convoy, designated Force X, consisted of a naval minelayer and five merchant ships converted to minelayers, together with four colliers, with an escort of two anti-aircraft cruisers, six destroyers and four anti-submarine trawlers. It should be noted that the anti-aircraft cruisers Sirius and Curacoa had also been working up before their assignment to Operation ES. Under the command of the Rear Admiral (Minelayers), Rear Admiral T.B. Drew, OBE (2), the force sailed from Scapa Flow at 0400 on 29 June 1942.

The maximum sustained speed of the convoy was no more than 10 knots, given the presence of the colliers, and was more likely that of a normal ‘slow’ convoy, which was 8 knots. According to the British Admiralty’s originally classified Naval Staff History, Arctic Convoys 1941-45, Force X proceeded to a position 61 degrees 30 minutes North and 001 degree East before reversing course sometime on 30 June without being sighted by the enemy. This position is approximately 180 nautical miles from Scapa Flow and is consistent with the convoy maintaining a speed of advance of 8 knots after sailing. Force X did not immediately return to base, but at some time on 30 June reversed course and again proceeded to 61 degrees 30 minutes North and 1 degree East. After reaching this point once more on 01 July, the force then turned back to Scapa Flow.

HMAS Nepal Passage track 29 June – 4 July 1942

The operational concept for Operation ES seems to have been focused on diverting the German air and surface threats. Analysis of the Speed-Time-Distance elements suggests that there was little risk of the convoy becoming embroiled with German surface ships, notably Tirpitz, since it did not remain long enough in the Norwegian Sea for any queuing by reconnaissance forces to take effect. Tirpitz could not have sailed and moved far enough west to intercept the convoy before the latter was too close to British coasts. However, there was a serious risk of significant air attack and this was probably the reason why two anti-aircraft cruisers were part of the convoy’s close escort.

Later on 1 July Force X divided in two. The minelayers, accompanied by Sirius, Nepal, TjerkHiddesand two other destroyers headed for the minelayer base (Port ZA) at the Kyle of Lochalsh on the Scottish West Coast, while the colliers and the remaining escort proceeded to Scapa Flow. Both convoys arrived at their intended destinations on 02 July. The minelayers all had maximum speeds of at least 16 knots and it is therefore likely that they proceeded as a ‘fast’ convoy with a speed of advance of up to 15 knots (but probably 12 or 13 with zig-zags). This is consistent with the distance between Force X’s final point in the Norwegian Sea and the Kyle of Lochalsh (approx. 330 n.m.), as well as that to Scapa Flow (180 n.m) for the slower ships.

Nepal appears to have been detached from the minelayers at the Kyle of Lochalsh on their arrival there and proceeded independently through the Irish Sea and into the English Channel to Portsmouth, it is likely that she remained in company with the similarly detached Tjerk Hiddes until the latter went into Liverpool for her own final shipyard work. Nepal made for Portsmouth and berthed at her builder’s yard which is nearer Southampton on 04 July after a 700 n.m passage from the Kyle of Lochalsh. She there underwent her final defect work and equipment fit before sailing for Greenock on 13 July 1942. She then departed UK waters for the Indian Ocean.

Convoy PQ 17 was to suffer terrible losses after a mistaken assessment that Tirpitz was on the point of attacking the convoy brought an Admiralty order for the ships to scatter. Isolated and undefended, most of the merchant ships were picked off by aircraft or U-boats. The fate of the convoy remains a controversial topic to this day. Nevertheless, Operation ES was clearly a significant attempt to confuse the Germans, disperse their efforts and reduce the pressure on the main convoy. It is clear that this episode of Nepal’s operational life has never been directly known to Australian authorities or historians. It is not mentioned in the official history of the RAN, or in the Naval Historical Society’s history of the RAN’s N Class destroyers. Operation ES did not succeed in its purpose, but was an attempt worthy of recognition, as is the part played by Nepaland her crew.

 

Notes:

  1. The reports of proceedings (ROPs) for HMAS Nepaldo not exist in the Australian or British archives for 1942 and therefore reconstruction of the ship’s movements has had to be done through alternative primary and secondary sources. Advice from the British Naval Historical Branch is that individual ship ROPs were not written by units in British home waters at this particular period and that any operation report would have been compiled by the force commander. Although a search of the British archives was conducted, including the files related to PQ 17, no report from Operation ES was found.
  2. Sources which do cast light on the operation include the Home Fleet and Home Fleet Destroyer Command War Diaries from the British National Archives (TNA ADM 199/427) which have been transcribed and are available online at www.naval-history.net, as well as the Rear Admiral (Minelayers) War Diary which is not available online, but was accessed at the British National Archives at Kew (TNA ADM 199/421).

Another important source is Arctic Convoys 1941-1945: Battle Summary No. 22, Naval Staff History Second World War issued as a Confidential Book (CB 3305(4)) in December 1954 by the Historical Section of the British Admiralty. Page 55 describes Operation ES and pp 53-71 PQ 17 and its other associated activities.

  1. On reaching age 55 Rear Admiral Drew was transferred to the Retired List. Seeking continued service he took a step down and was lent to the RAN as a Captain on 01 April 1943 as Commanding Officer HMAS Cerberus, a few months later on 26 June he was promoted as Commodore Superintendent of Training and in command of Cerberus. He was promoted Vice Admiral Royal Navy (in retirement on 21 July 1943) and was appointed a Commander of the Bath (CB) in the 1944 Imperial New Years Honours List. Commodore and Mrs Drew returned to England aboard SS Rimutakain November 1945 and his appointment to the RAN terminated on 13 March 1946 when he reverted to his Royal Naval rank of Vice Admiral.

Book Review: The Kellys

The Kellys – British J, K & N Class Destroyers of World War II
By Christopher Langtree
Published by Chatham Publishing, Kent, England
Distributed in Australia by Peribo
58 Beaumont Street, Mount Ku-Ring-Gai NSW 2080.
Hardcover 224 pages, RRP $110.00.

Reviewed by Vic Jeffery

One could be forgiven for thinking a book with the title, The Kelly’s, relates to the 19th Century Australian bushranger Ned Kelly and the infamous Kelly gang.

Not so; author and historian Christopher Langtree uses the name ‘Kelly’ as shorthand for all 24 members of the group which comprises three flotillas of eight each, of those magnificent British J, K and N class destroyers of World War Two.

The flotilla leader, HMS Kelly of course, was Lord Louis Mountbatten’s flagship and the most famous of the group. Of the three flotillas, the N-class flotilla was the only one to be entirely non-Royal Navy manned with five being Australian, two Dutch and one Polish-manned.

I believe they were perhaps the most handsome destroyers ever constructed. With their sleek low silhouettes, single raked funnel and a certain jauntiness about them, fast, heavily armed, innovative, and highly manoeuverable, they were a considerable advance in British destroyer design.

The five that served in the Royal Australian Navy during the War, Napier, Nizam, Nepal, Nestor and Norman were awarded 24 battle honours between them including Malta convoys, Atlantic, Bismarck 1941, Crete, Libya, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, Pacific, Burma and Okinawa.

Amazingly, although the RAN’s N-class destroyers had a very busy war, only four men were lost to enemy action, in the Mediterranean when four stokers were killed when Nestor was near-missed by two heavy bombs which flooded the boiler rooms and caused the ship to lose power. A sister ship HMS Javelin took the stricken Nestor under tow, but as the tow parted twice and with more air attacks imminent at dawn, the daunting task of getting the crippled destroyer back to Alexandria 250 miles away became impossible. The decision was made to scuttle Nestor; her crew was taken off and she was sunk with a series of shallow set depth charges dropped nearby on 16 June 1941.

The second part of this book covers the entire service careers of the ships in detail, including the 12 lost on wartime service. It is indeed interesting to read the postwar careers of the four surviving RAN N-class ships after they reverted to Royal Navy control in 1945.

The five N-class in reserve, four former Australian and the former Polish Piorun (ex-Nerissa), came under close scrutiny for conversion to Type 16 frigates as part of the program to combat the new Soviet high-speed submarines that were entering service, which were faster than the wartime constructed anti-submarine frigates and sloops.

It was decided to produce a different type of conversion, the Type 18. These ships would have two primary purposes, firstly to protect convoys against submarine attack and secondly a seek-anddestroy role, in cooperation with aircraft if necessary.

History reveals that as the N-class destroyers were halfway through their hull lives, the project was not proceeded with. They remained in reserve until 1955 when the decision was made to dispose of them.

The 113 photos selected for this book are first class, with many never published previously.

The book fittingly opens with a doublepage spread of one of the finest destroyer shots of World War Two, a magnificent photo of HMS Kimberley at a vital moment of the Second Battle of Sirte on March 22, 1942. Kimberley is seen pounding through rough seas at 30 knots with guns elevated as the 14th Destroyer Flotilla turn to make a torpedo attack.

As well as the photographs, 24 technical and line drawings by John Lambert, 12 tables and eight appendices support this commendable book. John Roberts provides the known 17 colour camouflage schemes used by these ships.

These destroyers were certainly among the best destroyers of the Second World War. Ships based on the original design were still in service in the 1970s, long after these greyhounds of the sea had been scrapped.

Author Christopher Langtree is to be commended on his first effort in producing such an excellent reference book in an easy-to-read format, and also producing a work which fills a void in naval history.

 

Attack on Sabang, Northern Sumatra, 1944

This article refers to the British Eastern Fleet’s first attack on Sabang in Northern Sumatra, in April, 1944. To relieve some of the pressure on his own forces, Admiral King had asked the British for this strike against the Japanese. 

The photograph shows the "N" class destroyer Nepal coming up astern of the battleship "Queen Elizabeth" to receive a package from Admiral Somerville. Astern is the battleship "Valiant". The officer standing in the destroyer's bow is Leut. Brian Murray (later Rear Admiral Sir Brian Murray). The writer of this article is on the flag deck.
The photograph shows the “N” class destroyer Nepal coming up astern of the battleship “Queen Elizabeth” to receive a package from Admiral Somerville. Astern is the battleship “Valiant”. The officer standing in the destroyer’s bow is Leut. Brian Murray (later Rear Admiral Sir Brian Murray). The writer of this article is on the flag deck.

On the 16th April, 1944, a British Task Force left its anchorage at Trincamalee to attack a Japanese Naval Base in Northern Sumatra. It was the beginning of the road back for the British. Not since that disastrous Java Sea Battle in February, 1942 had the Royal Navy been in a position to carry the fight to this enemy.

For some months, Admiral Somerville had been gathering this powerful Force. The list of ships was pinned to the notice board in the radio room of the Australian destroyer “Nepal” complete with the various ships’ names and their “coded” call signs.

They were divided into two groups. Force 69 included the battleships, “Queen Elizabeth” and “Valiant”. Force 70, the battle cruiser “Renown” and the French battleship “Richelieu”, the aircraft carriers “Illustrious” and the American “Saratoga”.

The Cruiser Squadrons consisted of “London”, “Ceylon”, “Nigeria”, “Newcastle”, “Gambia” and the Dutch “Tromp”. The destroyers forming the two screens were, Royal Navy “Penn”, “Petard”, “Racehorse”, “Rotherham”, “Quadrant”, “Quilliam” and “Queenborough”; the Australian destroyers were “Napier”, “Nizam”, “Nepal” and “Quiberon” and the Dutch “Van Galen”. The American destroyers accompanying their Carrier were “Cummings”, “Fanning” and “Dunlap”.

On the 18th April at 1600, the two forces were 350 miles from their objective “Sabang” and on the morning of the 19th at 0430, the planes began taking off from the carriers. The “Nepal’s” ship’s company went to an early breakfast and action stations.

Our aircraft began returning from 0830 onwards and expecting a hostile air attack, Force 69 joined Force 70 and they did not have long to wait. Enemy torpedo bombers attempted to get at the carriers and were destroyed by the fighter screen.

Two were shot down on the Fleet’s starboard side and one right aft of the cruiser “Ceylon”.

The operation was reported to be very successful. Two merchant ships and two warships were sunk in the harbour. Twenty-seven aircraft were destroyed on the ground besides hangars, workshops, oil wharves and a wireless station.

The Royal Navy submarine “Tactician” observing the attack rescued a pilot whose aircraft had ditched a mile offshore. The submarine had to travel on the surface for two miles whilst under attack from shore batteries.

At dusk, Admiral Somerville split his two forces again and at 1930, Force 69 opened fire on torpedo aircraft approaching the ships on the port side. It was an amazing sight observing two battleships firing their main armament at night. At 2230 the sky was again brilliantly lit when Force 70, 12 miles distant opened fire on aircraft.

Later during the night, a lone DC3 transport en route from Cocos Islands was approaching Force 70’s destroyer screen. The destroyers in turn opened fire on the unfortunate aircraft right out in the Bay of Bengal. One could have imagined the aircraft’s crew would have thought they had the sky and the ocean to themselves and had neglected to turn on their IFF (indicate friend or foe transmitter).

The next afternoon, the Admiral ordered “Nepal” to approach the flagship and collect a package. It was an order to join the Carrier escort screen. Light rain was encountered en route and emerging from one rain squall into another, the two capital ships were momentarily seen several miles away beautifully silhouetted against the setting sun. “Renown” was firing her twin 4 inch armament at what we thought must have been enemy torpedo bombers somewhere ahead of us. Seconds later when we emerged from another rain squall, “Renown” was still firing but then the firing suddenly ceased.

In the half light, the tracer curves of the shell groups could be readily seen, then suddenly it was obvious they were heading our way. For the ships’ company observing the scene on the upper deck, there was a mad scramble to take cover.

During the next few seconds, the air was filled with screaming shells as they passed over the ship to burst off our starboard side.

“Renown” unaware of our orders to join the Carrier Force, had mistaken “Nepal” for a Japanese destroyer and was taking no chances. From her bridge, she was signalling “report casualties”.

At midday on the 20th April an excited BBC announcer broadcast the news of a successful operation which was the best news the British had heard in this area for a long time. Admiral Somerville remarked the Japanese were caught with their kimonos up and their heads down.

The Fleet entered harbour on 21st April, 1944.

 

Editors note: The British Eastern Fleet was later called the British East Indies Fleet (Nov. 1944)

 

N Class – The Bird Cage

HMAS Nepal
HMAS Nepal

Some former “N” Class matelots may remember the additional bit of structural hardware, shaped like a bird-cage, on top of a mast above the four inch gun on the NEPAL and perhaps may have wondered just what it was all about. If the readers will bear with me for a while as I reminisce back to those first few months in the Royal Navy I may then have explained the bird-cage, or I should say High Frequency Direction Finding or HFDF for short.

I started off Navy days with a six months stretch at HMS Royal Arthur, a peacetime Butlin’s Holiday Camp, at Skegness on the east coast, where I was trained in telegraphy. Incidentally, it was winter time (November 1941 to April 1942) and pneumonia took its toll on trainees at that time – in a holiday camp inadequately equipped for English winter conditions. Having completed the training I was despatched to Portsmouth to await drafting instructions and one day as we practised Morse Code exercises a Chief Petty Officer came around asking if anyone would like to have a two-week holiday at Scarborough (a top sea-side resort not far from my home town, Hull). So, abandoning all the advice I had been given earlier (never volunteer for anything) I was soon on my way to join this mystery trip to Scarborough where I met others who had also taken up the offer. The hotel where we stayed compared very favourably with Pompey barracks and it all seemed to be very promising even though somewhat mystifying.

The mystery continued on the first morning as we left the hotel in a coach, windows all blacked out, heading for a village about ten miles away. It was there, in a secluded old building, where we learned all about German wireless telegraphy and communication systems operating between German and German-occupied shore stations, and submarines and surface craft in the Atlantic and elsewhere. Maintenance of WT silence was just as important with the Germans as the Allies but occasionally the silence was broken and U-boats transmitted short urgent signals to the controlling shore station. We learned that when a U-boat was shadowing a ship or convoy a series of “E Bars” (di di dah dah di di) would be transmitted, and when an attack was about to be made, the signal would be “B bars” (dah di di di dah). It was all very interesting but the purpose of the training became clear only when we learned how, with HFDF, it was possible to obtain a bearing on the U-boat. Of course speed was paramount as the signals were brief and had to be identified amid all the signals from the shore station transmitting on the same frequency. The training included some practical work, tuning in to the Lorient, in occupied France, the shore station controlling U-boats in the Western Approaches – and sure enough signals other than from the shore station were identified. The training continued with the use of a goniometer, an instrument with a 360 degrees face and a manual rotating device used to determine the strength of the signals. A zero reading of a signal would indicate the direction from which the transmission was made and the nearness of the transmitter could be assessed by the width of the zero reading – the narrower the nearer. There was another important element, however, that is the metal structure of the ship, which had the effect of distorting the direction of the zero reading. Having taken a reading it was necessary to amend in accordance with pre-determined calibration tables related to particular radio frequencies. The most effective use of HFDF was achieved with two or more units obtaining bearings from varying positions, thus providing a pretty accurate fix on the marauding unit. In this way HFDF played a large part in locating U-boats in the North Atlantic during those very critical war years when enormous volumes of supplies and equipment were shipped across from America and Canada.

Hopefully, the readers may now have a rough idea of what HFDF was all about but perhaps these jottings beg more questions than they answer and what about the birdcage down aft? – well that was the special aerial designed to receive the high frequency transmissions.

Letters: A South Atlantic Incident

I wish to make the following correction to my article ”A SOUTH ATLANTIC INCIDENT” published in the September, 1990 edition of the Naval Historical Review.

An ex Communicator might be forgiven for being a mere layman when it comes to describing anti-submarine warfare.

In the radio room, I assumed the ship to be almost stationary, when in fact, it was underway in a creeping attack, before gathering speed to drop charges. Steam turbines are quiet at slow speeds!

I trust Vice-Admiral Sir James Willis, Rtd. and Rear Admiral Sir Brian Murray, Rtd. our Signal Officer who served in Nepal at that time, will also forgive this mistake.

Leonard J. Cox

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