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You are here: Home / Archives for Australian Navy / HMAS Perth II

HMAS Perth II

Occasional Paper 75: The Vietnam War and the Royal Australian Navy

April 14, 2020

The following address was delivered by Captain Ralph T. Derbidge MBE RAN (Retired) at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance to mark Vietnam Veterans Day on 18 August 2010.  It describes the commitment of RAN fleet and air units to that War and the variety of essential tasks and services they provided in support of both the ground and air war.

Captain Derbidge concluded his 36 years of service in 1990 as the Director of Facilities Planning-Navy.  A specialist Gunnery Officer he served in that capacity in five RAN and RN ships.  He had intervening tours as a Staff Officer to the Australian Naval Attache in Washington, as Deputy Director of Surface and Air Weapons and with the Joint Intelligence Organisation.  He commanded HMA Ships Stuart, Canberra and Success and the RAN Apprentice Training Establishment, HMAS Nirimba.

Vietnam – tropical, alluring, fun-filled, breathtakingly beautiful, gastronomically exciting and friendly – today, a magnetic attraction for numerous tourists, businessmen and capital investors, many of them Australians, including Vietnam War veterans.  Ask my wife about Vietnam.  She welcomed me home from the war 39 years ago, but in recent times she enjoyed greatly with friends a group bicycle tour from Ho Chi Minh City to Hanoi. I didn’t go – I get sunburnt!

But it was not always like that.

Vietnam, some 7,500 kilometres to our north west as the crow flies from Melbourne, and three hours behind Australia’s Eastern Standard Time, lies between the Tropic of Cancer and the Equator.  It is bordered to the west by Cambodia and Laos, and to the north by China.  The northern part of the long eastern shoreline sits within the Gulf of Tonkin while to the south the coastline is washed by the South China Sea.  The shorter western shore faces the Gulf of Thailand.

The scope of my primary interest covers the period from 1956 to 1975 when the country was divided at the 17th parallel of latitude by the Demiltarised Zone (or ‘DMZ’) into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam, albeit South Vietnam.  To understand the Vietnam War, and the Royal Australian Navy’s involvement in that war, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the relatively modern history of Indo-China and Vietnam.

Indo-China had been a sphere of French protectorates and colonisation since the 1850’s but the French influence was interrupted by World War 2 and supplanted by Japanese occupation.  The French returned in 1945 to face much turmoil and unrest as the countries of the region sought self-determination as the sun was setting on British and European empires.  It is not in my brief to dwell at length on the complex issues and proceedings that spawned communist parties and governments in the region and to the north in China and Korea, as Cold War tensions mounted.  It is sufficient for me to note that the Viet Minh forces of northern Vietnam, under the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap, comprehensively defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu some 320 kilometres from Hanoi in May 1954 to end the First Indo-China War.

The armistice and Geneva Conference that followed, and the division of the country at the DMZ, set the scene for future hostilities in the guise of the Vietnam War.  At the time of the French defeat, I was a 14 year old Cadet Midshipman in my first year at the Royal Australian Naval College, then located at Crib Point on Mornington Peninsula.

The Vietnam War officially was a Cold War military conflict that occurred in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 1 November 1955 to 30 April 1975 when Saigon fell.  This war followed upon the First Indo-China War and was fought between the communist North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies, and the government of South Vietnam, supported by the United State and other anti-communist nations, including Australia and New Zealand.

The Viet Cong, a lightly-armed South Vietnamese communist-controlled common front, largely fought a guerilla war against anti-communist forces in the region.  The North Vietnamese Army engaged in a more conventional war, at times committing large units into battle.  US and South Vietnamese forces relied principally on air superiority and overwhelming firepower to conduct search-and-destroy operations involving mainly ground forces, artillery and airstrikes.

The United States entered the war to prevent a communist take-over of South Vietnam as part of their wider strategy of containment.  Military advisers arrived, beginning in 1950.  US involvement increased in the early 1960’s, with US troop levels tripling in 1961 and tripling again in 1962 when Australian military advisers were first sent to the country.  US and Australian combat units were deployed, beginning in 1965.  Operations spanned borders, with Laos and Cambodia being heavily bombed.  Involvement peaked in 1968 at the time of the Tet Offensive.  After this, US and Australian ground forces were progressively withdrawn as part of a policy called Vietnamisation.  Despite the Paris Peace Accords, signed by all parties in January 1973, fighting continued in the South.  The capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese army in April 1975 marked the end of the Vietnam War.  North and South Vietnam were reunified the following year.

It can be argued that the first peripheral involvement by the RAN in the Vietnam War occurred between 1956 and 1963 when six Australian naval vessels in successive pairs visited the Republic of Vietnam, beginning with HMA Ships ANZAC and TOBRUK, followed by VAMPIRE and QUICKMATCH and, lastly, QUEENBOROUGH and QUIBERON.  Former Saigon, now Ho Chi Minh City, was primarily the focal point for this ‘showing of the flag’ as it is colloquially known, but demonstrating at the time, in concert with the United States of America, support for the internally and externally hard-pressed South Vietnam regime of the aloof President Diem and his domineering sister-in-law, Madam Nhu.

Politically and militarily, in and around the Capital, in the Highlands and the Mekong Delta, and in the Central Lowlands, the South was opposed by the increasingly worrying Viet Cong, supported by surrogate North Vietnam, and home grown military and religious dissidents.  Who can forget the images of self-immolating Buddhist monks.

I first visited South Vietnam in 1963 as the Gunnery Officer of HMAS QUIBERON, then exercising this form of ‘gunboat diplomacy’.  It was two years after the Bay of Pigs and Cuba, when the Cold War perhaps was at its most threatening.  Memories of the Malayan Emergency and the Korean War were still vivid, confrontation with Indonesia over newly formed Malaysia was under way and the ‘Domino Effect’ of successively falling democratic governments in Asia and South East Asia was the all pervading fear of the free world lead by the United States of America.  Australian membership of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, or SEATO, and the Australia New Zealand and United States, or ANZUS, Treaty both had implications and obligations for our nation.  A vigorous stand would soon be taken by the United States and some of her allies in South Vietnam.

But back in 1963, I recall a good will port call at Nha Trang, the riviera of Indo-China, and a flurry of official social and ceremonial activity in once Saigon.  All seemed relatively calm and business-like in the South’s capital, but there were disconcerting signs for the keen eyed visitor that not all was well – such as the transit of the scenic Saigon River with overhead escorting aircraft, the requirement to travel in armed convoys up-country and the militarisation of, and midnight curfew in, the city.  I was 23 at the time and unaware that I would return to this troubled land eight years hence in far less pacific circumstances as the Gunnery Officer of HMAS BRISBANE.  Within three years, the Diem regime had been toppled from within and Australia would soon find itself engaged in active hostilities alongside the United States.

As mentioned earlier, Australian Army advisers were sent to South Vietnam as early as 1962 and an RAAF transport flight, No 35 Squadron, was established at Vung Tau in Phuoc Tuy Province in 1964.

But it was not until 1965 that the RAN was in the front line, so to speak, when the former aircraft carrier HMAS SYDNEY, as a fast troop transport, made the first of her 22 trips to South Vietnam to off-load initially an Australian infantry battalion and supporting infrastructure at Vung Tau.  Australian military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam was substantially increased from mid-1966 and it is fitting that I pay tribute to the important logistic role played by the RAN in delivering and returning Australian troops, equipment, ammunition and supplies to and from the war until December 1972.

HMAS Sydney

From June 1966, HMAS SYDNEY was supported in this role by the Australian National Line coastal cargo ship MV JEPARIT, commissioned into the RAN in 1969, and by another ANL vessel, MV BOONAROO, being the first ship commissioned under the new RAN White Ensign in March 1967 for her second voyage to Vietnam.  Escorts for this seaborne logistic lift effort to and from Vietnam over the course of the war were HMA Ships ANZAC, DERWENT, DUCHESS, MELBOURNE, PARRAMATTA, STUART, SWAN, TORRENS, VAMPIRE, VENDETTA and YARRA.

Although the logistic ships and escorts had been ferrying Australian troops and supplies to Vietnam from May 1965, the RAN did not enter the war in a combat role until February 1967 when a six man clearance diving team arrived in country to carry out harbour defence, salvage, explosive ordnance  disposal and a variety of special operations.  This unit, Clearance Diving Team 3, was formed specially for service in Vietnam and eight contingents of the team were to be deployed in-country until May 1971.

In March 1967, the new US built guided missile destroyer or DDG, HMAS HOBART, was deployed for service in Vietnamese waters to join the US Seventh Fleet in operations entailing coastal surveillance and interdiction, shore bombardment of North Vietnamese military targets and similar naval gunfire support of ground operations in the four military regions of South Vietnam.  Sister ships HMAS PERTH and HMAS BRISBANE followed in rotation for a total of eight typical deployments of seven months each until this commitment was withdrawn in October 1971.  The Australian built Daring Class destroyer, HMAS VENDETTA, complemented this effort with one such deployment.

HMAS Hobart

During these operations, HOBART and PERTH came under fire on numerous occasions.  PERTH was hit once during her first deployment and HOBART was struck inadvertently in the dark of one night by missiles fired from a US Air Force aircraft.  BRISBANE, during her first deployment, suffered a gunmount crippling inbore detonation of a faulty high explosive shell in the forward 5-inch gun barrel.

When not on typically month-long Gunline operations, the RAN destroyers were employed on escort duties with United States Navy aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf or receiving ammunition, stores, food, spare parts and mail by underway replenishment from USN fleet train supply ships in the South China Sea.  Periodic detachments were scheduled for routine one-week-long ship maintenance periods and ‘R & R’ in ports such as Subic Bay in the Philippines and Hong Kong and Singapore.  In their five years’ service in the Vietnam War, the four Australian destroyers steamed over 397,000 nautical miles and fired 102,546 rounds of 5-inch and 4.5-inch ammunition amounting to some 2,800 tonnes of high explosive.

HMAS Boonaroo

The RAN Fleet Air Arm, as a separate entity, was also actively and uniquely engaged in the war from late 1967 when the first contingent of the RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam was integrated fully with the US Army’s 135th Aviation Company.  Four contingents of the Flight served in Vietnam until June 1971, flying mainly in the Mekong Delta in support of ground operations, a hazardous business at the best of times.

There were other, smaller, but no less important RAN contributions to the war effort in South Vietnam, such as Fleet Air Arm helicopter pilots serving with 9 Squadron RAAF at Vung Tau, detached medical officers in Australian and US military hospitals and liaison personnel in Saigon.  Several sea transport officers were seconded from the Department of Shipping and Transport and commissioned into the Naval Reserve.  Back home, a number of dedicated staff in Navy Office and Fleet Headquarters, and in the operational and training establishments, looked to the professional, military intelligence, logistic support and welfare needs of those personnel, ships and aircraft deployed to the war.

The return of HMAS BRISBANE to Sydney from her second deployment on 15 October 1971 marked the end of the RAN’s combat role in the Vietnam War.  All told, some 2,800 naval personnel, all male and volunteers, saw active service in Vietnam.  Of these, eight were killed while 15 received serious injuries.  Eighty naval personnel were honoured with decorations and awards, the majority ‘mentioned-in-despatches’.

Today, Vietnam is united and at peace, but there was a time when we were adversaries of those who sought and gained that unification by a spectrum of ideological and military means.  It was a complex and costly war, and the longest to that point fought by the United States and Australia.

To put it into one context, nine million men served in the US military during the Vietnam War, one third of whom went to the Vietnam theatre, and there has been little latter-day recognition of how brutal the war was for those who fought it on the ground.  Those who believe the war was fought incompletely on a tactical level should consider Hanoi’s recent admission that 1.4 million of its soldiers died on the battlefield, compared to 266,000 Army of the Republic of Vietnam deaths and 58,000 total U.S. dead.  Those who believe that it was a ‘dirty little war’, where the bombs did all the work, might contemplate that it was the most costly war the U.S. Marine Corps has ever fought; five times as many dead as in World War I, three times as many dead as in Korea, and more total killed and wounded than in World War 2.

Significantly, those sacrifices were made at a time when the United States, and to a lesser extent Australia, were deeply divided politically and societally at home over our military involvement in Vietnam, particularly after the Tet Offensive in 1968.  Ask any surviving veteran who returned from that war.  He will tell you all about that!

The Missing DDG

March 22, 2016

By John Smith

A question was recently posed why hull number 40 is not used by HMA Ships. The DDGs Perth 38, Hobart 39 and Brisbane 41 are to be followed by the AWDs Hobart 39 and Brisbane 41.

This article deals with guided missile destroyer (DDG) pennant numbers, also known as hull numbers. More specifically it addresses the pennant number D41 of HMAS Brisbane.

HMAS Brisbane (DDG 41) – RAN

The first two RAN DDGs, HMA Ships Perth and Hobart, were ordered in 1962 and were allocated by the RAN the pennant numbers D38 and D39 respectively for the reasons explained later. The third RAN DDG, HMAS Brisbane, was ordered later in 1963, her pennant number being D41. Why was it not D40?

Insofar as most of the Western Nations were concerned, post 1960 there were two principal authorities which assigned, but did not co-ordinate between them, the allocation of pennant numbers. They were the United States Navy and a loose coalition of NATO and Commonwealth Navies.

Looking firstly at the USN system, traditionally ships were numbered sequentially by type, e.g. battleships, cruisers, destroyers.

USS Gyatt, DD712, was commissioned as a Gearing class destroyer in 1945 and then in 1956 was converted to a DDG and became DDG712. As this was a new type of ship, her designation was changed in 1957 to DDG1. Gyatt was followed by the 23 USN Charles F Adams (CFA) class DDGs, DDG2 to DDG24 inclusive, the last of which was USS Waddellc ommissioned in 1964.

As the three RAN modified CFA class DDGs were ordered before the USN order was completed, the USN designated the RAN vessels as DDG25, 26 and 27. Soon afterwards, the West German Navy also ordered three modified CFA class DDGs and these were designated by the USN as DDG28, 29 and 30. Neither the RAN nor the FGN utilised these pennant numbers, nor were they subsequently reallocated to USN ships.

Rather than building a new DDG class after the CFAs, the USN decided to convert some of the Forrest Sherman, Mitscher, Hull and Coontz class vessels to DDGs and numbered them DDG 31 to 46 inclusive. Note that this includes DDGs 38, 39 and 41 which were the pennant numbers already allocated separately by the RAN to Perth, Hobart and Brisbane and commissioned as such.

Looking now to the other principal system for allocating pennant numbers, which came into force in about 1960, and was contained in a NATO publication Allied Communications Publication (ACP) No. 130, NATO Supplement 1, Section 2 titled ‘Decoding of visual callsigns (pennant numbers) allocated to Ships and to Certain Authorities of European NATO Countries and of the Countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations (excluding Canada)’. As the USN had its own system as already explained, their ships were also excluded from the publication. As from January 2012, the above supplement is now an integral part of NATO publication ACP 113 (AI) ‘Call Sign Book for Ships’ as Annex B. For information, it encompasses the following countries:

NATO – Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, HMAS Brisbane (DDG 41) RAN

Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

Commonwealth Nations – Australia, Kenya, Malaysia and New Zealand.

Perhaps surprisingly, Annex B is sponsored and co-ordinated by the Australian Department of Defence through the Directorate of Multinational Relations and Interoperability. This Annex does not differentiate between destroyers and DDGs. In it the RAN allocation of pennant numbers for destroyers in 2012 was as follows:

D08 spare

D38 spare

D39 HOBART

D40 spare

D41 BRISBANE

D42 SYDNEY

D57 to D59 spare

D109 to D162 spare

Although this system ensures that there will be no duplication of pennant numbers in types of ships of the participating countries, there will be duplication in numbers between, say, destroyers and frigates. Thus there could well be a D30 and a F30. As most navies do not have the type letter painted on the hull as well as the pennant number, there is the possibility of ships with the same number operating in company. Bearing in mind that the USN has its own system, there could have been, for example, a USN DDG, an RAN destroyer and a Spanish frigate all with the same hull number operating together.

It has been predicated by some that Brisbane was designated D41 and not D40 so that it would not duplicate the DDG40 pennant number of Coontz. However this theory is not agreed with. As explained earlier, USN ships were numbered in accordance with a different system to the RAN and Coontz was not designated as DDG40 until 1975, well after Brisbanewas commissioned. It would appear that there was no logical reason as to why Brisbane was therefore not designated D40 as this allocated to the RAN.

The answer would appear to be in an RAN file now archived away. Would that someone in Canberra with time to spare could search the archives to resolve this recurring issue! By the way, what happened to the Royal Canadian Navy in all of this? But that is another story.

 

Red Lead – A Cat’s Tail

June 24, 2014

By Walter Burroughs

 One of the privileges of writing naval history is occasionally being invited to visit ships and establishments and meeting some of the fine men and women who serve in them. One such event involved a visit to the Anzac Class frigate HMAS Perth during the 2013 International Fleet Review, giving rise to this article. Research material was provided by the timely release of Mike Carlton’s epic Cruiser and, contacting some very senior veterans who survived the sinking of HMAS Perth (I). Reference is also to be found in Shipmates, self published in 1998 by Vic Cassells, with illustrated tales of mascots carried in RAN ships.

 Where it began

At the start of WW II the Australian Fleet comprised just fourteen warships. Pride of the fleet was the cruiser force headed by the two County Class heavy cruisers HMA Ships Australia and Canberra with their 8-inch main armament, followed by three Leander Class light cruisers – HMA Ships Hobart, Perth and Sydney with 6-inch main armament – and lastly the older Town Class light cruiser HMAS Adelaide, again with 6-inch armament. They were all well found and capable ships and, other than the obsolete Adelaide, were more than a match for any potential enemy.

During battle with Vichy French, German, Italian and Japanese forces they were sorely tested. Half of their number, Canberra, Perth and Sydney, were lost in action with Hobart also being severely damaged. This is a small part of the story of one of these fine fighting ships, HMAS Perth.

HMAS Perth (I)

Perth was one of three modified Leander Class light cruisers originally intended for the Royal Navy. She entered service in 1936 as HMS Amphion, but was transferred to the RAN in England’s historic Portsmouth Dockyard on 29 June 1939 and placed under the command of Captain Harold Farncomb, RAN. While Farncomb and some of his officers and senior NCOs were experienced, the majority of her crew were young men, with many raw recruits straight out of Flinders Naval Depot.

After work-up with the Royal Navy it was intended that Perth would proceed home via Panama, but this was interrupted by the declaration of war against Germany when she was placed at the disposal of the RN. She had a quiet introduction to war, being based in the Caribbean where she conducted patrols and convoy protection. Perth eventually arrived in Sydney on 31 March 1940. Many of her crew had been absent for nearly a year and now considered themselves seasoned old salts, but they had not fired a shot in anger. After maintenance and some well earned leave she was assigned to mundane escort duties in home waters.

HMAS Perth (I)

In November 1940 Perth was on her way to relieve her sister HMAS Sydney, which had carried out sterling work in the Mediterranean under the overall command of the formidable Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, who liked the forthright character of Australians. While Captain Farncomb was not universally admired he was one of ours and, all on board must have been surprised at the choice of his successor, the aristocratic Sir Philip Bowyer-Smyth, RN. They need not have worried as the new captain proved himself worthy of any man’s trust, being both fair and fearless. Another officer who features in the annuals of Perth’s history is LCDR Charles Reid, RAN, who was her First Lieutenant on commissioning and remained with the ship until the commencement of her last fateful voyage. Being a sticker for protocol, Reid could upset the lower deck. However he was efficient and at times served in an acting capacity as both Executive Officer and Commanding Officer.

The Mediterranean

On Christmas Eve 1940 Perth reached Alexandria in Egypt, the then headquarters of the Eastern Mediterranean Battle Fleet where she was assigned to the 7th Cruiser Squadron. It was a hectic and dangerous period of activity, contending with the perils of mines, ships and submarines and incessant air attacks, nearly all without covering air support. At times it seemed all was lost, but training and dedication and working until both men and machines were exhausted paid dividends and the ship and her crew performed miracles. After surviving 257 air attacks she escaped virtually unscathed for months until one bomb too many struck home. On 30 May 1941 she was hit by a bomb that exploded in ‘A’ boiler room. The ship still limped into port with nearly 1,500 troops she had rescued from Crete, but four of her crew and nine troops died. Her war was not yet over, with further action against the Vichy French in Syria. On 17 July 1940 Perth was relieved on station by her other sister HMAS Hobart and shortly after she returned home battle worn, to some much needed leave and an urgent refit.

While refitting at Cockatoo Island Dockyard, Captain Sir Philip Bowyer-Smyth quietly left his command, without due acknowledgment of his exceptional contribution and skills. He was relieved by Acting Commander Charles Reid. Nearing the end of her refit an accidental fire occurred resulting in a further month’s delay. While there was an enquiry it was impossible to lay blame, with Charles Reid, possibly unfairly, bearing the brunt of the Naval Board’s criticism which ruined his career. In October 1941 a new commanding officer Hector (Hec) Waller was appointed, not long from his own successes in the Mediterranean as CO of HMAS Stuart. Hec had earned his reputation as an excellent captain who knew how to get the best out of man and ship and was widely respected for his no-nonsense approach to service life.

Red Lead arrives

As the last liberty boat was leaving before Perth departed from Sydney on 30 November 1941, two young Able Seamen, Bob Collins and Ray Firminger, were making their farewells. Ray’s wife and his young daughter Pat, who was cuddling a tiny grey and white tabby kitten, were saying goodbye. Bob was chatting to the little girl when she reached out to him and told him he should take the kitten. Bob was taken aback but as the liberty boat was about to leave he accepted the gift and hurriedly stuffed the kitten into his jacket.

King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions forbade pets aboard HM Ships, but in the interest of morale a blind eye was often turned to this restriction. To the larrikin Collins this was a challenge and as he knew pets were forbidden, this could incur the wrath of his disciplinarian Executive Officer, Acting Commander Reid. Where to keep the cat until it found its sea legs was a problem solved by use of the paint locker. In those days when ships were primarily made of steel, there was a need for continuous maintenance of surfaces against the effects of corrosion. Teams were constantly chipping, scraping and wire brushing metal surfaces and then painting them with a primary coat of red lead. Ships had many gallons of this ubiquitous paint which is now known to be injurious to health. What could be more likely to happen in a crowded paint locker than the cat knock over a pot of red lead, leaving incriminating paw marks. Hence the name Red Lead was acquired.

Bob Collins still had the tricky task of gaining acceptance for his feline friend and a cunning plan was devised. Hec Waller was thought to be favourable to pets as in Stuart they had a monkey ‘Chico’ as mascot. During this period Perth was on the ‘ferry service’ escorting ships between Sydney and Fremantle, sometimes this could be exciting when doing high speed runs with Queen Mary and Aquitania, but usually it was with ships of lesser importance and with reduced speed. After leaving Fremantle in good weather, when he knew the Captain was on the Bridge and thought to be in a favourable mood, Collins introduced Red Lead to the command by letting her wander around until seen by the Captain. Thankfully he seemed quite amused to see the kitten and rolled up some signal paper for it to play with. After this Red Lead was allowed to roam free and Collins was assigned her guardian. One up for the larrikin!

On 10 February 1942 Perth called at Melbourne where a change-over of Executive Officer took place, with Charles Reid being relieved by Commander William Martin, RAN. Undoubtedly the former was replaced as a result of the fire and his subsequent Naval Board censure but this may also have saved his life.

The Battles of Java Sea and Sunda Strait

Perth was now on her way up top to shore up defences to our north but on 15 February 1942 Singapore fell to the Japanese. This disaster, where 80,000 British, Indian and Australian troops had surrendered, completely changed Australia’s perception of the war. New ways had to be found of stopping the ever advancing Rising Sun. Perth was ordered to join the largely dysfunctional ABDA (American–British–Dutch-Australian command. On 24 February she first called at the Batavian port of Tanjong Priok for fuel. While here they were over-flown and bombed by Japanese aircraft, causing the Dutch Army ashore to open up with anti-aircraft fire, joined by Perth’s armament. There was little damage other than to a Dutch tanker.

The next day in company with the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter and her attendant destroyers, Perth proceeded to Surabaya to join the ABDA fleet under the command of the Dutch Rear Admiral Karel Doorman, flying his flag in the light cruiser HNLMS De Ruyter. In addition to the Dutch ships they were greeted by the USN heavy cruiser USS Houston and her four older four stack destroyers. Shortly after the combined fleet sailed to intercept a Japanese invasion force which was located on 27 February. After a bloody and violent encounter few Allied ships survived the Battle of the Java Sea. Hec Waller as the senior remaining commanding officer ordered both Perth and Houston to make for Tanjong Priok.

Supplies at the bombed-out port were limited, with minimal fuel and only 4-inch ammunition available. Possibly showing a cat’s famous ‘Sixth Sense’ of Extrasensory Perception, which provides them with their keen intuition when all is not well, Red Lead took fright and went AWOL. Able Seaman Collins was sent to find her, which he did. Jan Creber, the Master at Arms, then solved the problem in restricting shore leave by placing the escapee in her own cell made from a kerosene tin with plentiful air holes cut into it.

As soon as they could after darkness had fallen the ships sailed in company, attempting to make the comparative safety of the southern port of Tjilatap. This involved transiting the narrows of the Sunda Strait, then believed clear of the enemy. Late at night on 28 February they came into contact with screening destroyers of a strong Japanese naval force. Perth and Houston fought gallantly, but with limited ammunition and the enemy’s overwhelming superiority the end was inevitable.

Into Captivity

Just after midnight when the order for abandon ship was given, Bob Collins took the plunge hanging on to his beloved Red Lead. Bob was to survive but Red Lead was last seen clawing on to a piece of wooden wreckage. Amongst those killed was Bob’s friend Ray Firminger, and father of Pat, the little girl who had given them her kitten. What became of Red Lead no one knows we can only hope that she found her way ashore, but this seems doubtful. Of the 681 men aboard, 353 were killed in this final battle and all but four of the 328 survivors were captured as prisoners of war. Of these, 106 died in captivity, only 218 returning home to their families. Astute mathematicians will have noted a discrepancy of four in the above numbers.

Paymaster SBLT Gavin Campbell was thrown overboard by an explosion before Perth sank and was struggling in the water when he was hauled aboard a life raft. As Gavin’s leg was broken strips were torn from his overalls which were used to secure splints made from floating debris – the temporary medic who carried out this potentially life-saving work was none other than Bob Collins. It was weeks later before Gavin was seen by Dutch doctors who decided, as the wound had healed, there was nothing more they could do. To this day Gavin walks with a limp with one leg slightly shorter than the other, but fondly remembers the care provided by the cat man.

The trials of Perth’s men as POWs were many, being sent throughout lands controlled by their new masters, most on the Thai-Burma Railway. After completion of this infamous project on which about one third of prisoner workers perished, most survivors were shipped to slave labour camps in Japan. Now running perilously short of merchant ships, convoys were assembled using any rust buckets that floated, taking essential materials and men to fuel the war machine. One such convoy included Rakuyo Maru with several hundred Australian prisoners, including 45 men from Perth. The convoy was intercepted by USN submarines, unaware of the human cargo, and was torpedoed with devastating loss of life. The few survivors were mostly rescued the following day, ironically by USN submarines, and taken to their base on Saipan. On 18 October 1944 the minelayer USS Monadnock arrived in Brisbane with 36 Australian survivors of this ordeal. There were only four from the RAN which included the cat-loving Able Seaman Bob Collins. There to greet him was his old adversary and Executive Officer, Charles Reid. The two men warmly greeted one another with all thoughts of past differences long forgotten. It was to be nearly another year, mostly in October 1945, before the remainder of Perth’s men who had been ‘Guests of the Mikado’ for three and a half years were released from various prison camps and at last reunited with their families.

Red Lead lives on

There was of course another ship of this name. HMAS Perth (II) was the lead ship of three American-built guided missile destroyers which provided admirable support to the RAN for more than three decades, especially during the Vietnam War. Within this ship there was however no mention of our feline friend.

HMAS_Perth_(FFH_157)_near_Garden_Island_Naval_Base

HMAS Perth (III) is the last of eight Anzac Class frigates and it is in her that the tradition of Red Lead survives. On her bridge there is a picture of Red Lead and on the companion way leading to the bridge are to be found her tell-tale paw marks. To complete the picture the wardroom door has a cat flap, although no cat has been known to pass through it and new pets are not encouraged. There is one surprising anomaly as Red Lead shown in the picture is a (lucky) black cat while in ‘Cruiser’ and ‘Shipmates’ she is mentioned as a grey and white tabby. ‘Shipmates’ notes a further reference to the memoirs of another Perth veteran, Signalman Bill Bee. Bill wrote ‘All Men Back – All One Big Mistake’ which mentions Red Lead but does not allude to her colour. Unfortunately Bob Collins is no longer with us, but two other survivors (SBLT Gavin Campbell and Able Seaman Frank McGovern) maintain she was ginger. An Australian National War Memorial tribute also speaks of Perth’s black cat. Whatever her colour, and black she was not, she was a remarkable feline who helps us remember the proud deeds of those who have gone before.

Red Lead

One further disturbing piece of news is that the remains of the original Perth are not safe even after 70 years. While the site was known to local fishermen the wreck was not discovered by divers until 1967. A few relics were retrieved including the ship’s bell which is now displayed at the National War Memorial in Canberra. The wreck is not a protected war grave and in late 2013 it has been reported that material from it was being salvaged for scrap. This matter has been raised with the Chief of Navy and through his office with relevant Ministers who are working through the issues with Indonesian authorities in the hope of a satisfactory resolution.

 

 

 

The Importance of Defence Strategy following the Battle of Sunda Strait

March 13, 2014

By Sub-Lieutenant G. Bateman, RAN

Garry Bateman was born in Plymouth on 23 July 1980. His father was a Chief Petty Officer in the Royal Navy serving in submarines. This awakened an interest in the maritime environment, which in later years would become part of his keen interest in wreck diving. Following secondary school he gained entry to Portsmouth University and graduated with a Masters in Electrical and Electronic Engineering. He later worked in industry involved in the development of weapon control systems and also managed to find time to become qualified to teach scuba diving. In 2007 this eventually brought him to Australia where he was teaching diving in Cairns and Sydney. The next year he returned to engineering.

In 2013 Garry, now an Australian citizen joined the RAN and graduated from New Entry Officer Course 49. At the end of the year he married his long-term girlfriend Winnie with eleven of his classmates from HMAS Creswell forming a guard of honour. In January 2014 he was posted to HMAS Cerberus to join the Engineer Officer Application Course, leading to a seagoing posting.

 

Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

Sun Tzu1

Introduction

The Battle of Sunda Strait took place shortly after the ‘collapse of Allied sea power’2 at the Battle of the Java Sea, on 28 February 1942 and concluded with the eventual sinking of HMAS Perth and USS Houston early on 01 March 1942. Perth, under the command of Captain Hector Waller, was ordered to head to Tjilatap by means of Sunda Strait. The American British Dutch Australian command (ABDA) had suffered considerable losses to the superior force and magnitude of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), and the move was made to cease the pursuit of protecting Java in favour of defence of the Coral Sea.

It was unexpected by the allied forces that the IJN would have such a capable presence within the Sunda Strait. By the time Captain Waller had realised this was an oversight it was too late. The errors in judgement made by the ABDA command, coupled with an apparent lack of capability, allowed the Allied forces to be easily outnumbered, overpowered and outflanked by their Japanese counterparts.

The aim of this essay is to address defence strategy and, in particular, maritime doctrine. This essay will draw upon lessons learnt from the Battle of Sunda Strait, and from methodology employed by the IJN during 1941-1942; which empowered them to be a superior naval force at such battles. The final area that this essay will cover will be how strategy and doctrine are implemented in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) today.

Comparison of IJN and ABDA strategies

The Japanese military utilised a strategy known as a ‘centrifugal offensive’3 to gain momentum in establishing a defensive perimeter in Southeast Asia. Japan’s objective to secure this defensive perimeter, stretching from Singapore to Sumatra and Java, across the northern shore of New Guinea to Rabaul in New Britain, was pursued with the eventual intention to negotiate a settlement on favourable terms. To succeed with an offensive strategy of this scale required a great deal of planning and foresight. To enable this, the Japanese Total War Research Institute4 studied previous historical events with similar objectives, as a platform to build a strategy to suit their objectives. They studied a strategy using warlike simulation, known as war-gaming which was employed by the Prussian Army in the early 1800s5 and by using simulation the IJN gained a thorough understanding of various possible mission contingencies, outcomes and potential threats to missions proposed. This technique actually allowed the Japanese to overestimate the likely casualties and losses of assets early in the Pacific war. In conjunction with this methodology, the IJN also looked to its own cultural history to develop the ‘Japanese Octopus’ tactic.6 The ‘Octopus’ was a clever idea that linked an early Japanese military strategy of ‘Yogei Sakusen’7 with the way in which an octopus overwhelms its prey. It achieves this with a series of simultaneous attacks on its prey, to initiate control and suppression. Yogei Sakusen can be translated as a ‘Decisive Battle’, and was a strategy of direct attack used by Samurai warriors in early Japan.8

Japan is a nation of hard warriors, still inculcated with the samurai do-or-die spirit which has, by tradition and inheritance become ingrained in the race.

Ambassador Joseph Grew (U.S. Ambassador to Japan, 1939).9

Direct decisive action upon multiple strategic targets that were smaller in scale allowed the IJN to quickly suppress their targets, whilst dividing Allied resources. This required the IJN to create a larger and more technologically superior naval force that could achieve its objectives simultaneously. The Japanese plan established a two-sided strike force – the eastern and western invasion forces. This provided the size and strength to outflank and outnumber ABDA naval forces that were already split. In short, the IJN assumed a position of superior sea control.10 Also, through extensive military simulation, the Japanese understood the need for cohesion between their land, sea and air forces to achieve success over the Allied forces in the Pacific region. This required careful planning of their offensive whilst keeping to a strict timetable to enable them to achieve their set objectives ahead of schedule and with very few losses.11

At Sunda Strait, shortly after the ABDA defeat at the Java Sea, the IJN was in a dominant position with their strategy clearly working. It was at this point the Allied forces realised that Java, a key operational location within the region, was soon to be lost. As the Japanese forces occupied Timor in February 1942, they had reached the tipping point in the plan to subdue and control Indonesia. Java, ripe for the harvest, was isolated, surrounded and cut-off from potential assistance.12

Japanese dominance in the region was expected, but their presence at Sunda Strait was not. Prior to the ABDA’s commencement of transit towards Sunda Strait, there had been some airborne surveillance, that indicated presence of only Australian corvettes in the region. This surveillance had also reported at 1500 h on 28 February 1942, that there had been a sighting of a Japanese invasion fleet. This was said to be 10 hours away and was not likely to interfere with the exodus via the Sunda Strait. This intelligence was later found to be inaccurate, with the IJN being 4 hours ahead of schedule.13 In fact, General Imamura’s Western Invasion convoy, heavily fortified with 56 transports and a powerful escort14 were closer than ABDA reconnaissance had thought, but were equally unaware of the movements of Perth and Houston. The only consolation was that ABDA forces were proceeding without the Japanese being aware of their presence. The Japanese were concentrating their efforts on the landing and suppression of Java. However, the magnitude and preparedness of the IJN fleet meant that any surprises could be dealt with, thanks to early strategic planning.

The Battle of Sunda Strait was without doubt an unexpected encounter for both sides. The Allied forces were forced to employ a strategy which did not have the level of sophistication that the IJN strategy used. The ABDA command observed its recent losses, and ordered the retreat from the region. This meant accepting the substantial losses incurred to that point, including Java, in favour of regrouping the remaining resources to protect a new objective – the Coral Sea.

The retreat tactic worked for the most part. It allowed a number of vessels to escape to safety, before unexpected battle commenced with the Japanese. This gave ABDA a short window of time to escape and thwart the enemy who had not planned for this manoeuvre. In fact, it came at a time when the Japanese were preoccupied with their plan to land on Java. It did lack the resources and time needed to develop an understanding of the enemy, which explains the losses sustained. It appears that in an attempt establish sea control the ABDA command took an opportunity to generate a plan to safeguard the Coral Sea. To the Allied credit the Battle of the Coral Sea marked the point at which the Japanese advance into the southwest Pacific was arrested.15

 Problems with ABDA command at Sunda Strait

ABDA was a coalition of four nations that required far more involved political constraints in planning for and actioning their objectives. They were defeated by the Japanese at the Battle of the Java Sea, and again at Sunda Strait for a number of reasons linked to their lack of cohesion; including fatigue from constant patrol, older ships, lack of common language or common codebook, the lack of communication with shore commanders, and a command force which was composed of men of different nationalities, who therefore lacked training in common tactics.16 An example of this was the Dutch destroyer Evertsen; which did not accompany Houston and Perth, due to apparently not receiving orders to do so.17 Again the lack of communication regarding replenishment resources available to the Allies in Tanjong Priok, left both Houston and Perth with no means of attaining battle readiness for their mission. Meeting an IJN force, as they did, meant very quick depletion of their ability to remain offensive, and leading to their tragic end.

Constantly developing defence strategy and doctrine

Development of defence strategy and doctrine requires experience from hard-learnt lessons, such as the losses at Sunda Strait. It requires forward planning to meet the needs of enhanced capability. Since 1976, the Australian Government has been addressing this requirement by producing a document for defence strategy, and its continued development. The Defence White Paper is Australia’s primary policy document available to the public that announces the Government’s long-term strategic direction, Australia’s national defence commitments, and future plans to enhance capability. The Government aims to release an updated white paper every 5 years.18

There is no greater responsibility for a national government than the defence of the nation, its people and their interests. Successfully meeting that obligation requires sound long-term planning, guided by regular thoughtful assessments of the country’s strategic outlook and potential threats to our sovereign interests.

Joel Fitzgibbon (Minister for Defence, 2009).19

At its most basic, the white paper introduces policy that explains why Australia needs a defence force, the current and perceived threats to Australia, and the measures required to achieve self-reliance. This helps the people of Australia to understand the need for development in the capability of its defence force. This degree of strategic development shows that Australia has been learning from its successes, mistakes and failures in order to create an educated current policy. The most common element of the defence strategy discussed in each of the papers written since 1976 has been that people remain to be the largest and most important resource. People are ‘integral’ to implementation of strategy and doctrine. Essentially, the calibre of personnel in terms of their training, leadership, professionalism and technical expertise is how Australia has maintained its defence capability.20

The policies written in each white paper provide the basis for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to create doctrine. For the RAN, the doctrine published is called the Australian Maritime Doctrine (AMD). The AMD highlights the specific strategies that Navy uses, or intends to employ in the future to meet future defence requirements. Maritime doctrine teaches the fundamental principles that the Navy uses to determine its course of action to support national objectives.21

The purpose of maritime doctrine is to give naval command clarity in their approach to conflict, dangerous or unusual situations. It is derived from analysis of historical events, and Australia’s military experience. In brief, it is a strategy that describes the function of the RAN. Doctrine provides a basis for action founded upon knowledge.22 The AMD lays out the most important tactics and strategies that the organisation must employ to be an effective tool in the defence of Australia. In essence, it sets the tone and limitations for the actions that the Navy takes to achieve its mission ‘to fight and win in the maritime environment’.23 The RAN relies entirely on the ‘way that technology is employed’, and it is essential that people remain the ‘most important factor for maintaining naval effectiveness’.24

Implementation through Navy values

The RAN implements strategy and doctrine through its people. Focussing on professional mastery at every stage, it is instilled through excellence in the development of leadership, teamwork and specialised skillsets. Ultimately the responsibility of ensuring continuity and cohesion between strategy and people lies with the people who train, instruct and have a responsibility to develop Navy people. Positive reinforcement, effective comm-unication and a thorough understanding of historical events, such as those presented in this essay, all contribute to developing a Navy that functions effectively.

The requirement to develop future capability and operation remains in the present with Navy’s current leaders. Knowledge of historical events develop an understanding of how to prevent incidents such as the loss of Perth, whilst professional specialty training enables Navy and its people to develop specific methods of enhancing the defence of Australia. It is the effectiveness of Captain Waller’s leadership that kept his men fighting to the end, even after they had ran out of ammunition and the loss of Perth was inevitable. Waller acted with bravery in an uncertain circumstance, he led his crew to the end and went down with his ship, but his calm leadership throughout would have instilled much confidence them. This stands testament to the current values that the RAN operates by.

Conclusion

This essay has shown that the development and implementation of defence strategy and doctrine can enhance the capability and effectiveness of the RAN. The need for a continually developing organic defence policy has been driven by hard learned lessons in wartime, and events such as the Battle of Sunda Strait have highlighted that the organisation must learn something from every failure and emulate those strategies and behaviours from times of success. The benefits of generating strategies through analysis, simulation and war gaming has been proven, by the Imperial Japanese Navy in this example, to be a far superior way of achieving operational success.

Being prepared, as the IJN had been in 1941-1942, allows for a far more thorough understanding of the cost of conflict, and the potential losses in engaging in battle. This strategy alone is a very useful command tool since it poses the question of whether it is necessary to go to war or not. Modern strategy employed by the RAN is determined by means of policy documents such as defence white papers and is implemented through doctrine by means of one very important factor – people. The RAN prides itself on quality leadership and focuses entirely on the development of its people to achieve its objectives.

 

Bibliography:

Budge, Kent G. The Pacific War Online Encyclopaedia, Published online, 2013.

Caffrey, Matthew, History of Wargames: Toward a History Based Doctrine for Wargaming, Published online, 2000.

Department of Defence, Defending Australia – Defence White Paper 2013, Australian Government Publishing Services, 2013

Department of Defence, Defending Australia – Defence White Paper 2013, Australian Government Publishing Services, 2009

Dull, Paul S., A Battle History of The Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

Gill G. Hermon, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, The Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942, The Australian War Memorial, 1957.

Gustafson, Gary, A., The Strategic Culture of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Military History Online, 2012.

O’Hara, Vincent, P, Battle of Sunda Strait: 28 Feb.-1 March, 1942, Published online, 2007.

Sea Power Centre – Australia, Australian Maritime Doctrine, Australian Government Publishing Services, 2010.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War (translated by Lionel Giles, M.A.), 1910, Published online through Project Gutenberg, 2013.

 

 

Footnotes:

1   Sun Tzu 1910, The Art of War (translated by Lionel Giles, M.A.), p 182

2   Vincent P. O’Hara, ‘Battle of Sunda Strait: 28 Feb.-1 March, 1942’, http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/sunda_strait.htm, accessed 25 August 2013, p1

3   Kent G. Budge, ‘Centrifugal Offensive’, The Pacific War Online Encyclopaedia http://www.pwencycl.kgbudge.com/C/e/Centrifugal_offensive.htm

4   Matthew Caffrey 2000, ‘History of Wargames: Toward a History Based Doctrine for Wargaming’, The Strategy Page http://www.strategypage.com/articles/default.asp?target=WARGHIS2.htm&reader=long

5   Kent G. Budge, ‘War Games’, op cit

6   Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2010, Australian Maritime Doctrine, ‘Maritime Operational Concepts’, p 96

7   Gary A. Gustafson, 2012, ‘The Strategic Culture of the Imperial Japanese Navy’ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/strategiccultureijn1.aspx

8   Gary A. Gustafson, 2012, ‘The Strategic Culture of the Imperial Japanese Navy’, op cit

9   Gary A. Gustafson, 2012, ‘The Strategic Culture of the Imperial Japanese Navy’, op cit

10         Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2010, Australian Maritime Doctrine, op cit, p 205

11         Kent G. Budge, ‘Centrifugal Offensive’, op cit

12         Hermon G. Gill, 1957, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, The Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942, The Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p 596 http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67910

13         Vincent O’Hara, loc cit, p 1

14         Hermon G. Gill, loc cit, p 619

15         Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2010, Australian Maritime Doctrine, op cit, p 73

16         Paul S. Dull, 2007, A Battle History of The Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Chapter 5, ‘From The Fall of Java to the Invasion of Burma’, p 87

17         Vincent O’Hara, loc cit, p 1

18         Department of Defence 2013, ‘The Defence White Paper’, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/

19         Joel Fitzgibbon, Department of Defence 2009, ‘Defending Australia – Defence White Paper 2009’, p 9

20         Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2010, Australian Maritime Doctrine, op cit, p 175

21         Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2010, Australian Maritime Doctrine, op cit, p 1

22 ibid, p 1

23 ibid, p 9

24 ibid, p 9

 

 

Australian Naval History on 9 November 2009

November 9, 2009

A de Havilland Canada DHC-8-202Q Dash 8 commenced flying for the R.A.N. Hydrography Institute.

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