Royal Navy

Petty Officer Fredrick Harold Harvey and Colombian Naval Service

February 27, 2019

As told by his son CMDR Vic Harvey, RAN, Rtd

Fredrick Harold Harvey was a proud Geordie lad, born in Newcastle-upon-Tyne’s suburb of Benwell, on 13 August 1899. Benwell in the West End of Newcastle, with many streets of neat terraced houses, is dominated by its colliery. After leaving school at 14 Fred found work with the tramways and became a tram conductor.

At the time of the Great War on 30 July 1917 he entered the Royal Navy as a Boy Seaman, a month later on his 18th birthday, he signed a 12 year engagement. On entry Fred was only 5 feet 3 inches tall, so he instantly earned the nickname ‘Shorty’, had brown hair, grey eyes and a fresh complexion with a couple of well–earned scars, as Shorty was known for getting into scraps.

Only known photo of
Frederick Harvey in naval uniform – Family

At this time there was little shore–side training and his first ship was the formidable looking four-funnel cruiser HMS Powerful, but she was from a past age, had most of her armament removed, and was used as an accommodation ship. He later joined the armoured cruiser HMS Shannon, she had been built pre-war and after Jutland became flagship of a cruiser squadron patrolling in the North Sea. Fred remained in her until she paid off in May 1919. There must have been some action concerning ship salvage as post-war Fred received £4/13/6 in prize money.

It was then off to warmer climes for service with the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron in the Mediterranean in HMS Centaur. On New Year’s Day 1921 Fred was promoted to Able Seaman. With vast post-war reductions to the fleet Fred had quite a few posting ashore to the training depot HMS Vividat Devonport, which later became better known as HMS Drake.Fred was promoted to Leading Seaman while still in Vividon 10 December 1925 and passed out for Petty Officer on 6 July 1926.

At the time his engagement expired on 12 August 1929 he was serving in the distinctive new battleship HMS Rodney. Her main armament comprised nine 16-inch guns in three turrets, all forward of the bridge. From Rodney Fred was issued with a ‘Gunnery History Sheet’ providing a record of his proficiency in gunnery examinations conducted in all his seagoing ships and a ‘Trade Certificate’ signed by Captain F.L. Tottenham, RN (later Admiral Sir Francis Tottenham). The latter document notes ‘a thoroughly reliable Leading Seaman displaying intelligence, energy, initiative and power of command’.

In 1926 Fred married childhood sweetheart Dorothy Elaine Rodgers and they set up house in Plymouth where the first of two boys, Frederick Harold, was born in 1927. But 1929 was not the best of times to be leaving the comfort and security of the Royal Navy with the Great Depression beginning to cast an ominous shadow over industrial England. With little prospect of work the family migrated to Windsor in Ontario where they had relatives. While some work was found conditions in Canada were not much better than England and the harsh winters did not suit Mum especially with young Victor Edward coming along in 1931. The next year they returned to Plymouth.

South America

In the 1920s the Admiralty authorised the establishment of British Naval Missions in various countries with the aim of providing training and support with increased cooperation through targeted ship visits. This in turn aimed to demonstrate British technical expertise and encourage foreign shipbuilding orders.

In 1932 a conflict erupted between Colombia¹and neighbouring Peru regarding a border dispute in the region of the Amazon River. This led to the re–establishment of a Colombian naval service, which had previously been disbanded. A Royal Naval Mission was quickly dispatched to assist the Colombians. This was mainly in response to a potential ‘Red Threat’ with Peru acquiring two older Russian destroyers, renamed Almirante Villar and Almirante Guise, from the politically unstable Republic of Estonia in 1933. Colombia is strategically placed between South and Central America with many neighbours and responsibility for its naval waters over both the Atlantic (Caribbean) and Pacific oceans. In this instance the Peruvians, with their naval forces based only on the Pacific coast, sailed a task force into the Atlantic – so the threat was real.

Post WWI the Admiralty invited requests from British shipyards for new destroyer designs. The winning designs were from Yarrow and Thorneycroft resulting in the construction of one ship from each yard, HM Ships Ambuscade and Amazon. A year after commissioning in 1928 these ships were sent on a cruise around South America, which included calls at Colombia and Peru, and home via Panama and the West Indies.

The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 called for significant reductions in naval tonnage resulting in the Royal Navy having no suitable ships to offer Colombia. However a class of six new destroyers based on the Ambuscade design was being built for the Portuguese Navy. The first quarter of the 20th century was tumultuous in Portuguese politics as Britain’s oldest ally transitioned from a catholic monarchy to a socialist republic, cumulating in a 1926 military coup. Despite this two ships were built in Britain (NRP Vouga and Lima) and the remainder in Portugal.

With British assistance two of the Portuguese built vessels were purchased off the stocks by the Armada Nacional Republica de Colombia (ANC) and renamed Antioquia and Caldas. The Portuguese then built two further replacement ships. Royal Naval support was provided in commissioning, storing, manning and working up these vessels.

Leading Seaman Frederick Harvey joins the Colombian Naval Service

A recruitment campaign was undertaken in England to help man the two new destroyers. No mean perk for those in the know, with a two year contract being offer on very similar conditions to service to those afforded under Kings Regulations & Admiralty Instructions (KRAI) which included medical cover, insurance and death benefits. The real incentive, in these times of grave unemployment, was 33⅓% additional pay in £stg for an equivalent RN rank. While this was a single man’s posting, at the completion of the contract a fully paid return passage to England was provided, plus an additional two months pay in lieu of leave.

NRP Lima constructed by Yarrow & Co.,
Glasgow

On 23 February 1934 a formal ‘Contract for Ratings’ (written in English) was entered into between the Chargé d’Affaires of Colombia representing the Government of Colombia and Frederick Harold Harvey. This was witnessed by a Royal Naval officer. On New Year’s Day 1935 another bonus was received with Fred promoted to Petty Officer.

There is an interesting aside in the report of a football (soccer) match between the two ships when working up. This notes that Antioquia’s goalkeeper ‘Shorty Harvey’ accidentally collided with an opposing player with the result that Shorty lost most of his teeth but with true British grit he continued playing with his ship winning 5 – 1. Shorty was not carted off to hospital until the end of the game.

Eventually both new destroyers reached their home port of Cartagena in Colombia on 14 May 1934. They were more of an insurance policy as the dispute with Peru had been settled before their arrival. We are not aware of Fred’s service in country but it does not appear to have been arduous and, strictly in accordance with his contract, he returned home on 22 February 1936. Upon return, with tales to tell and employment gradually improving, Fred became a postman in his native Newcastle. He also joined the RNR.

Had Fred remained in Antioquia he might have seen some unusual action. On 21 January 1936 on the occasion of the death of King George V the Bermuda Militia Artillery were instructed to fire a ceremonial salute from their 4.7-inch gun battery. This salute consisted of 70 blank rounds – one for every year of the sovereign’s life. Because of damp storage conditions there were insufficient blanks so the shortfall was substituted with life rounds fired at maximum elevation. As they opened fire the gunners were unaware that Antioquia was making for the Royal Naval Dockyard, where she was scheduled for refit. Although straddled the ship was not damaged.

Once more with the outbreak of war in 1939 Fred volunteered for naval service but was knocked back. This did not stop him from joining the Army as a private. Now over forty years of age he remained in the United Kingdom, mainly employed as a Batman/Driver to a senior officer based in Scotland.

After the war Fred was welcomed back into the Post Office where he worked as a driver until the time of his death in 1963. He is buried in Newcastle. His widow Dorothy came to Australia and lived with her son Victor and his wife Connie until her death in 1986. The eldest son Frederick Harold (junior) with his wife Violet migrated to Canada where they made successful business careers and raised two children. Finally younger son Vic continued the family tradition, joined the Andrew and, with many years of distinguished service in the RAN … but that is another story.

Notes:

1. In terms of population, present day Colombia, with a population in excess of 49 million, is the second largest country in South America.

Shades of Grey

December 21, 2015

As Father Time catches up with us all strands of hair turn to lighter shades, perhaps not unlike warship livery which is again changing to a different shade of grey. Our small research team has compiled this article with information mainly taken from our archive and library.

Two years ago in December 2013 the then Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, announced that the RAN would progressively change the colour scheme of its surface fleet to meet modern war-fighting and regional environmental conditions. It was claimed that the new ‘Haze Grey’ paint scheme, using reflecting pigments, reduces the ship’s infrared signature and also the external shipboard temperatures by up to 20 degrees Celsius, compared to the current ‘Storm Grey’ colour. Research has also shown that the new polysiloxane paints provide improved durability and fire resistance over older polyurethane systems. The results are now being demonstrated as ships leave refits in their new livery.

So what is the history of paint colour adopted by warships? An analysis of paint samples taken from HMS Victory confirms that her now dramatic orange ochre scheme is unlikely to have formed part of her original hull colour. This was mostly black with varnished upper works, black pitch being used extensively as a hull covering on earlier ships owing to its preservative qualities. If we therefore had black ships when did they become grey? And has the shade of this colour changed over time?

Early Colour Schemes

Until the late 1800s the selection of colour schemes for warships was made without considering the need for concealment. British warships of those times had black hulls, white superstructures and buff (yellow) masts and funnels. Many contemporary German naval vessels were painted white overall, while the ships of other nations displayed varied colour schemes. In about 1895 when the first thoughts of war were looming and with considerable increases in the range of naval guns, the German High Seas Fleet was painted a uniform shade of warm grey. Their French counterparts were painted a dark grey.

During the Spanish-American War of 1898 the United States Navy turned to a neutral grey colour scheme for its ships and the Royal Navy followed suit in 1903. In 1912 Russian Fleet Instructions specified a two-tone scheme for both Baltic and Black Sea fleets, with a dark grey hull and light grey upper works.Subsequently all other major navies made similar changes, so that well before the outbreak of WWI grey was recognised as the appropriate colour for all types of warships excepting submarines, which were mostly black.

This simple form of aiding concealment helped reduce the range at which ships were visible in a wide range of sea and weather conditions, when applied generally to mid latitudes in the northern hemisphere. The risk of submarine attack led to the application of camouflage systems in an attempt to disguise and confuse attacking submarines, leading to the ‘Dazzle System’ which has been widely discussed elsewhere.

Colour Schemes from 1901

Early black and white photography tells us little about colour, so where better to start than artistic representation. Much valuable information can be found in ‘The Royal Tour 1901,’ based on the journal of the cruise of HMS Ophir by Petty Officer Harry Price, DSM. The author came from an artistic family and his brother was a Royal Academician. He possessed a copperplate hand of wondrous clarity and was an accomplished artist. At the time of his enlistment his trade was given as a painter and decorator. We must however be careful in observing colour from an artist’s palette, as this can vary with the composition, the amount of natural light and the need to provide contrast between sky and sea. There is also of course the desire of the artist to attract attention, which can lead to undue emphasis on certain features.

There are similarities between the circumstances of the 1901 Royal Tour and those of today. There was a new but now unglamorous elderly king, who had been too long in the royal waiting room. An appealing younger couple found favour on the celebrity stage – the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York (later King George V and Queen Mary). Their nine-month tour of an empire on which the sun never set was immensely popular way of saying thank you for supporting the mother country during the Boer War. It was also of great importance to the Commonwealth as Their Highnesses officiated at the opening of the first federation parliament of the Australian states which took place in Melbourne on 9 May 1901.

The Orient liner Ophir was chartered for this tour as no existing royal yacht could span the distances between coaling ports. From the coloured painted sketches in Price’s journal we are able to identify numerous ships involved in this tour. As a commissioned ship Ophirhad a white hull and upper works and buff funnels. She was escorted from home waters by the cruisers HM Ships Diadem and Niobe with black hulls, white upper works and buff masts and funnels. En route they met Portuguese and Spanish men of war with similar paintwork to those of the Royal Navy. In the Mediterranean and through Suez as far as Aden they were escorted by a number of HM Ships, all with similar paint schemes to Diadem and Niobe.

At Aden they were met by HMS Racoon. This ship had a white hull and white upper works with a buff masts and funnel. This livery was maintained by other escorting ships of the East Indies Squadron and China Squadron. At Singapore they were joined in the anchorage by other men of war, a Dutchman in similar livery to the Royal Navy, and an Italian with a white hull but brown masts and funnel. A picture of a Frenchman and Japanese warships is also shown. For the first time we see ships painted grey overall with the exception of funnel tops which have black bands.

Later the royal yacht is met by ships of the Australian Squadron, namely HM Ships Royal Arthur, Ringarooma, Wallaroo and Mildura.All had black hulls with white upper works and buff masts and funnels. On the Australian Station they meet a Russian cruiser with a white hull and buff funnels with a black band at the top, and an American cruiser also white hulled with brown upper works, masts and funnels. A German cruiser has a white hull with buff upper works and funnels. We also met His Majesty’s Colonial Ships Cerberus and Protector with a black hulls, white upper works and buff funnels.

On a voyage to New Zealand they encountered heavy seas before being met by a squadron comprising HM Ships Archer, Pylades, Sparrow and Torch, all in the traditional livery as per Royal Arthur etc. On the homeward voyage at Albany, accompanied by Royal Arthur, St George and Juno, they were saluted by Australian troops in a white hulled SS Britannic on their way home from the wars in South Africa.

On leaving Australia under varying escorts the Ophir made for Mauritius and then South Africa and Canada before proceeding home. On reaching home waters they were met by the Channel Squadron of six battleships and six cruisers.

The flag ship was HMS Magnificent and Petty Officer Price has a picture of her in what he terms ‘War Paint’. He says: ‘Magnificent in full war paint black and grey, and she looked much more formidable than if she was painted in the ordinary naval colours of black, white, yellow and red.’ From these comments it is assumed that this is the first occasion that Price, a seasoned petty officer, had seen a British warship sporting grey livery.

The Duke and Duchess were officially welcomed home by their Majesties in their Royal Yacht Victoria and Albert. She notably had a black hull, white upper works and buff masts and funnels. The author and artist also shows a sketch of HMS Victory, which was then afloat, with black hull highlighted with white gunports.

Colour Schemes from 1914

Mal Wright is another commentator who says at the commencement of WWI Royal Naval capital ships used a colour scheme officially termed ‘Battleship Grey’ which was very dark, almost charcoal grey. This was changed during the first year of the war to ‘Mid Grey,’ partly because of a shortage of dark pigments. However, the new shade proved popular and was retained. When camouflage was first introduced at the time of the Dardanelles campaign it was usually confined to vertical lines of pale grey over dark grey on the funnels and upper works.

Earlier classes of Torpedo Boat Destroyers were black, but dark grey for newer vessels. Eventually, by 1917 most were painted mid grey. HMA Ships Parramatta and Yarra originally had black hulls but after delivery to Australia these were soon changed to grey. Early submarines were black but during WW1other schemes were tried including dark grey, dark green, mid grey and pale grey.

The practice in many ‘Tiddly Ships’ of painting areas around anchor cables and turret tops Brunswick Green continued in many ships throughout the war years. In coal burning ships metal decks around the funnels were painted black, but this was discontinued on oil fuelled ships. Corticene was a mid-brown linoleum-type decking used in many RN ships as an alternative to wood. The Germans used a similar material but coloured pale tan.

Tales from HMS Caroline

The cruiser HMS Caroline is unique to the Royal Navy, remaining in commission from shortly after her launch in 1914 until 2011, and is now being retained as a museum ship. In May 2015 during her restoration it was revealed that during the past one hundred years she had received thirty-eight shades of grey paint, ranging in colour from beige-cream to a rather dark grey at the time of her launch in 1914. An example of these changes is shown on the colour chart on the inside of the back cover of this magazine. The above clearly demonstrates that the colour and consistency of grey paint applied to warships has varied over time.

During the inter-war period the ingredients and formula for mixing Pattern 507C Grey Paint was laid down in Admiralty Fleet Order 1658/27, with similar guidance contained in Commonwealth Navy Order 109/1934. Larger ships where a Painter rating was borne were expected to mix their own paint to the given formula, but smaller ships could draw quantities from Garden Island Dockyard which was mixed to the same formula.

Since WWII the British Standard for ships’ hulls was BS381C Light Grey and a similar Australian Standard was AS1700 42 Storm Grey. Decks are painted BS381C 632 Dark Admiralty Grey, also known as Australian Standard AS1700 N63 Pewter. The Royal Navy experimented with other shades from the mid 1950s with a blue grey tinge, but in 1968 they standardised on BS381C 676 Light Weatherworks Grey for their hulls.

In the 1950s the RAN adopted and retained ‘Storm Grey’ with its greenish tinge. ‘Storm Grey’, a British Navy colour suited to overcast skies of the North Atlantic rather than Australia’s tropical waters. During her conversion to the anti-submarine role at Cockatoo Island Dockyard in 1954 HMAS Queenborough was the first RAN vessel painted Storm Grey. For more than sixty years this colour has served us well and our ships have stood out when berthed with those from other navies. The new colour ‘Haze Grey’ refers to the contrast between the dark blue of the sea and the lighter blue of the sky, which on the horizon merges into a strip of grey. Ships painted this new colour will therefore blend better into the horizon.

The Seamanship Manual

Early editions of that masterpiece of information on ship’s husbandry, the Admiralty Seamanship Manual, are surprisingly reticent on this topic other than advising on the organisation required for painting ship. Gems from Volume II of a 1923 edition include:

The annual service allowance for a fully commissioned ship is eight coats of grey paint for outside and weather parts, two coats of white for inside parts, and one coat biennially of grey and white enamel for definite spaces. The shade of grey used for outside work is laid down.

While the supply of paint at these times appears copious the quality was possibly not of the highest standard. Usually two coats were required and then, when ships were measured by their appearance there was a continuous touch up process.

Summary

From Colonial times to the present day the colour schemes adopted by ships serving on the Australian Station has been one of constant modification and change. The new, lighter shade of ‘Haze Grey’ should be well suited to our environmental conditions.

Bibliography

Admiralty Seamanship Manual Volume II, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1923 Edition.

Gardiner, Richard & Brown, David K. (Editors),The Eclipse of the Big Gun: The Warship of 1906-1945, London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992.

Price, Harry, The Royal Tour 1901, Exeter: Webb & Bower, 1980.

Wright, Mal, Warship Colour Schemes of World War 1, accessed 1 October 2015, http://www.gwpda.org/naval/s1200000.htm

Winston Churchill and the Navy

June 23, 2015

As fifty years have now elapsed since his passing this article may serve as a small tribute to the memory of this great wartime leader.

A meteoritic rise upon the world stage

Winston Spencer Churchill was perhaps the foremost of all characters taking the world stage during the turbulent period between the decline of Victorian empires and the post world war rise of social democracies. His influence on world affairs was profound and this extended to both naval enterprises and Australian politics. He was a leading character worthy of Shakespearean tragedy, which Hamlet expresses as: He was a man, take him for all in all: I shall not look upon his like again.

Winston Churchill was born on 30 November 1874. He excelled as a junior army officer, journalist and politician. In 1908 when aged 34 he married Clementine Hozier, a granddaughter of the Earl of Airlie, who was ten years his junior. As Churchill was short of money and the Hoziers were in similar circumstances this was an unusual match, but Clementine was bright and attractive and, being largely educated at a state grammar school, was worldlier than many of her contemporaries. Clementine’s younger brother William joined the Royal Navy and served as a Lieutenant during WWI. He resigned after the war and later committed suicide.

Winston & Clementine shortly before their marr1age in 1908

In 1905 when only 30 Churchill had his first taste of political power when he was made Under-Secretary for the Colonies (as the Colonial Office was also responsible for the Dominions, here he would have become acquainted with Australian issues). This was followed by a succession of promotions: 1908 President of the Board of Trade, 1910 Home Secretary and in October 1911 the prestigious position of First Lord of the Admiralty.

The latter came with prerequisites including an imposing residence at Admiralty House and unlimited access to the Admiralty steam yacht HMS Enchantress.This grand 3,470 ton vessel with a complement of 200 officers and men was to become Winston’s home away from home. Here he could find reasons to visit ships and establishments around the British Isles and take Mediterranean cruises with family and political friends. He also busied himself with the formation of the Naval Air Service and took flying lessons.

First Sea Lord

Winston threw himself into the affairs of Admiralty with relish which far exceeded an expected administrative role. He became increasing involved in operational issues. The Navy had been nurtured for a number of years by Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher who retired on 25 January 1910. His replacement, the robust Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, VC soon clashed with the new First Lord resulting in the admiral’s premature retirement. He was replaced by someone Churchill thought trustworthy, Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman. When Bridgeman objected to Churchill’s meddling in operational issues he too was forced to resign. His replacement was Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, well known to Churchill who considered him malleable. This was an unfortunate appointment as, with anti-German sentiment, the Prince was forced from office shortly after the declaration of war.

In the new era of instant (radio) communications decisions were able to made rapidly, with a greater need for continuous consultation between military and naval forces. The Army was supported by its general staff but the navy was suspicious of allowing decision to be made by relatively junior staff officers who were far removed from seagoing professionals. Churchill became a champion for the creation of a naval staff over which he could exercise control. The influence of Churchill, with his fine use of language more attuned to journalism than naval operations, can be seen in messages sent from the Admiralty to the Fleet and may in part have led to confusion in operational matters. Unfortunately, within the new naval staff there was no one capable of guiding the now self proclaimed ruler of the king’s navy.

The style of the ever-combative First Lord in communicating to the First Sea Lord (Prince Louis) with his desire for operational control, over matters which he had little practical knowledge, is demonstrated in the following message:

The escape of Emden from the Bay of Bengal is most unsatisfactory, and I do not understand on what principle the operations of four cruisers Hampshire, Yarmouth, Dupleix and Chikuma have been concerted. From the chart, they appear to be working entirely disconnected and with total lack of direction. Who is the senior captain of these four ships? Is he a good man? If so, he should be told to hoist a commodore’s broad pennant and take command of the squadron which will be detached temporarily from the China Station and all other duties, and should devote itself exclusively to hunting Emden. She appears to be making for a coaling place in the Maldives; but anyhow orders should be drafted which will ensure these four ships hunting her in combination and continuously ….

These Whitehall musical chairs led to great instability, with Churchill in October 1914 being forced to seek the now 70-year-old Sir John Fisher to once again take the reins. Churchill persuaded Fisher to support his passionate advocacy of the Dardanelles campaign and when this unfolded into disaster Fisher resigned after only six months in office, saying he refused to work any longer with Churchill. Churchill, who had become supreme ruler at the Admiralty, was now seen as disaster prone.

It seems the Army were also not averse to courting the First Lord’s attention to champion a cause. General Sir Ian Hamilton’s diary entries concerning preparations for landings at Gallipoli mention the need for large self-propelled transport lighters with bullet-proof bulwarks, the prototypes then thought to be under construction.

If I can possibly get a petition for these through to Winston we would very likely be lent some and with their aid the landings under fire will be child’s play to what it will be otherwise. But the cable must get to Winston: if it falls into the hands of Fisher it fails, as the sailors tell me he is obsessed by the other old plan and grudges us every rope’s end and ha’porth of tar that finds its way out here.

While not directly related to naval issues, Charles Bean, author of the Australian Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, provides the following none too subtle and perhaps biased summary of the Gallipoli campaign: So through Churchill’s excess of imagination, a layman’s ignorance of artillery, and the fatal power of a young enthusiasm to convince older and slower brains, the tragedy of Gallipoli was born.Churchill later responds to the criticism in the following terms: It is my hope that the Australian people, towards whom I have always felt a solemn responsibility, will not rest content with so crude, so inaccurate, so incomplete and so prejudiced a judgement, but will study the facts.

Next was the tragedy and resultant great loss of life on 22 September of the three cruisers Aboukir, Cressy and Hogueto the single submarine U-9. Newspapers quickly pointed the finger of blame at Churchill and Battenberg. In The World Crisis which he wrote after the war Churchill defends himself, pointing out that on 18 September he had asked for the cruisers to be withdrawn because they were exposed, but Battenberg had let them stay until more appropriate ships could be found.

Winston’s impetuous nature and adventurous spirit can be seen in his rush to Antwerp when it was besieged by German forces. On 5 October he telegraphed the Prime Minister asking that he might be permitted to resign as First Lord and take charge of the British forces in Antwerp, of which the poorly trained Royal Naval Division formed a major part. The First Lord was sensibly told to return to his post and the Belgium city capitulated a few days later.

Churchill was instrumental with Fisher in promoting the talented John Jellicoe, above others, as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. However when Fisher resigned Jellicoe wrote to him: We owe you a debt of gratitude for having saved the Navy from a continuance in office of Churchill, and I hope that never again will any politician be allowed to usurp the functions that he took upon himself to exercise. Perhaps stung by this barb, Churchill writing many years afterwards in The World Crisis describes Jellicoe’s cautious approach at the Battle of Jutland as: the only man on either side who could lose a war in an afternoon.

Army service at the front

These events were to become a permanent blight on Churchill’s career and he was forced out of the Admiralty. As a face saving measure in early 1915 he was made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, a sinecure without executive power. On 15 November 1915 Churchill resigned his ‘ministry’ but remained a member of parliament and sought to regain prestige by rejoining the regular Army, using his position as a Major in the territorial regiment, the Oxfordshire Hussars. Just shy of his 41st birthday this middle aged man, used to good living, with limited military experience, went to France for familiarisation training with the Grenadier Guards.

Many years before, on leaving Sandhurst Churchill, who was below average height, was adjudged too short for the infantry, resulting in his commission with a mounted regiment (the 4th Queen’s Own Hussars). He must have looked somewhat out of place in a Guards regiment of six-footers. Using all his family contacts and political influence, in January 1916 Winston, now a Lieutenant Colonel, was appointed in command of the 6th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers, where to his credit he saw duty at the front.

After a few tours of duty Churchill and the Army agreed to part company and in March 1916 he resigned his commission to re-enter politics. It took some while to find him a position of responsibility, but in July 1917 he was appointed Minister of Munitions but kept well clear of Cabinet and this time began to demonstrate a greater level of political maturity.

Churchill’s War with the Bolsheviks

With the end of hostilities Churchill was made Secretary of State for War which also combined the new Air Ministry. Now largely forgotten, towards the end of WWI allied forces, prominently British, were supporting White Russian (Tsarist) forces involved in civil war against the Red (Bolshevik) Army. Churchill, who was enthusiastic, persuaded the government to commit 40,000 British troops and numerous warships to this cause, in his words: ‘to strangle at birth the Bolshevik State’.

An allied force also included 5,000 Canadians, but Prime Minister Billy Hughes refused Australian involvement. However, in 1918 a number of Australian troops serving in Europe resigned, re-enlisted in the British Army, and saw service in Russia (a possible comparison with contemporary issues of young Australians volunteering to serve in Middle East). What became known as “Churchill’s War” or the “Whitehall Foley” became increasing unpopular, resulting by 1920 in a withdrawal of allied support to White Russian forces.

Turbulent times

On 13 February 1921 Churchill was appointed Colonial Secretary, again with Australian responsibilities, and the following month he was part of the British delegation to a Middle Eastern Conference in Cairo. This led to a political settlement in Iraq and Transjordan and to a policy allowing the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine.

If only the consequences of these policies could have foreseen the world might have been spared its present unhappy state. In December of this year agreement was reached for the partition of Ireland with the southern portion being granted Dominion status, coming under the responsibility of the Colonial Secretary. However his days were numbered, as in a 1922 general election when Labour came to power, Winston lost his seat.

The Labour Government was short lived being brought down by perceived links with the Soviet Communist Party. At fresh elections in 1924 Churchill was returned to parliament where he served as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Following a period of industrial unrest with a national strike, Labour was again returned to office in 1929 and Churchill was obliged to support his meagre MP’s pay with writing and American lecture tours.

While on the sidelines in September 1931 the British Atlantic Fleet mutinied in what became known as the Invergordon Mutiny. As an economy measure a 10% pay cut was introduced across the public sector, but to many junior ratings the reduction was 25%. These sailors refused work and the fleet was forced to a standstill until the worst of these measures was undone.

In December 1934 in the midst of the Great Depression, Clementine Churchill left the family on a five month voyage to the Far East, Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands as a guest of Lord Moyne (Walter Guinness) aboard his motor yacht Rosaura is search of Komodo dragons for the London Zoo. In Singapore Clementine took the opportunity of touring the dockyard. She gave Winston a remarkably detailed account of its construction, and the reduction of its scope and facilities due to the Government’s paring of defence expenditure. In Sydney she met again with family friend Margery Street. Margery was Churchill’s long-term secretary who joined the household in 1921 but had returned to her homeland of Australia in 1933.

Churchill did not wear naval uniform – this is the uniform of the Royal Yacht Squadron

Returned to power

With Britain once more at war with Germany in September 1939, Churchill was again offered his old post of First Lord of the Admiralty, with a seat on the War Cabinet and Admiralty House again his home. In May 1940 with a war going badly and a lack of confidence in his Government, Neville Chamberlain resigned. The King sent for Churchill and asked him to form a government.

An early and contentious decision was to seek the surrender of French warships based in North Africa. The French Admiral Darcan proved an irritant to Churchill because of his lack of enthusiasm to back Britain. To prevent the French ships falling into enemy hands the seemingly unthinkable happened, with British and French warships opening fire on each other, resulting in the destruction of major French warships with the loss of 1,300 lives.

Fighting on the beaches

Churchill is best known for his classical use of rhetoric where he reminds the audience of the main points of the speech to influence their emotions. One of his finest oratical moments is his speech delivered to the House of Commons on 4 June 1940 widely known as ‘We Shall Fight on the Beaches’, of which but a small extract is quoted. Radio was one of Churchill’s greatest assets, as his invigorating speeches were broadcast to millions who greatly appreciated his warm-hearted vigour and contempt for the enemy.

We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender and if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island, or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until in God’s goodtime, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and liberation of the old.

In comparison to these stirring sentiments there is another human side which alludes to the pressure being exerted on the great man. During these demanding times Clementine and her husband saw little of each other and they had grown used to exchanging notes. Amongst those surviving is one dated 27 June 1940, which in part reads:

My darling

I hope you will forgive me if I tell you something I feel you ought to know. One of the men in your entourage (a devoted friend) has been to me and told me that there is a danger of your being generally disliked by your colleagues and subordinates because of your rough sarcastic and overbearing manner. It seems your Private Secretaries have agreed to behave like schoolboys and take what’s coming to them and then escape out of your presence shrugging their shoulders. Higher up, if an idea is suggested (say at a conference) you are supposed to be so contemptuous that presently no ideas, good or bad, will be forthcoming. …… My darling Winston I must confess that I have noticed a deterioration in your manner; and you are not as kind as you used to be. ….. I cannot bear those who serve the Country and yourself should not love you as well as admire and respect you. Besides you won’t get the best results by irascibility and rudeness. They will breed either dislike or a slave mentality (rebellion in war time being out of the question!).

Please forgive your loving devoted and watchful, Clemmie.

We surely have Clementine to thank for broaching a subject that few dared and hopefully bringing Winston back to reality. That such a document has survived is testament to the completeness and honesty of the Churchill family archive.

Another person who rates little more than an historical footnote who held considerable sway over Churchill was a junior but ‘old and bold’ naval officer, Lieutenant Commander Charles Ralphe (Tommy) Thompson, RN. Thompson, who had served as a submarine commander during WWI became known to Churchill when he served in HMS Enchantress. When Churchill returned to the Admiralty in 1939 Thompson was appointed his flag lieutenant and followed his leader to Downing Street when he became Prime Minister. Thompson, a confirmed bachelor, was never far from his master’s side and accompanied him on overseas missions until he retired as a Commander at the end of the war when aged 50.

Stephen Roskill in his prodigious History of the War at Sea commenting upon Churchill’s meddling in the appointment of senior officers, suggests Dudley Pound’s unhappy appointment as First Sea Lord was based on Churchill’s tendency to surround himself with the pliable or like-minded. Here the dedicated Pound was held responsible for some of his master’s more outrageous demands, proposals and comments. Roskill also records that Churchill was wary of advancing Cunningham to First Sea Lord as he was tough, assertive and not susceptible to Churchill’s powers of persuasion.

The darkest days

There were two voyages to America in 1941 to meet President Roosevelt, the first in August in HMS Prince of Wales and the second in December in HMS Duke of York. On 26 December Churchill suffered a slight heart attack necessitating recovery in Florida. He returned home again in a Boeing flying-boat after an absence of five weeks. In February 1942 came some of the darkest days with the surrender of Singapore, the largest capitulation in British history. This defeat also marked a position from which British prestige in the Far East would never recover and the loss of a mighty empire. Australian faith in British support was undermined and for the foreseeable future our destiny was then linked to that of the United States.

Perhaps the greatest and most sincere complements are those paid by foes. In this respect Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and, after Hitler’s death the Head of State, writing in his memoirs says: Churchill, who has an excellent grasp of the requirements of naval warfare such as is very seldom to be found in a statesman and politician, appreciated this point (cross training of submariners in surface warfare) during the Second World War. In 1942, he entrusted to Admiral Sir Max Horton, a most experienced submarine commander of the First World War and later captain of a battleship and admiral in command of cruisers, the task of organising and protecting the Atlantic convoys, which were of such vital importance to Britain – and by so doing made him my own personal adversary-in-chief.

The Big Three

With American aid in 1943 the fortunes of the Allies began to improve, with the Germans being pushed back in North Africa and by Russia on the Eastern front. This was also the year of great conferences with the meeting of the ‘Big Three’, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Tehran. It was here that Churchill first began to recognise the Sun was fast setting on his empire and that future world events were being largely decided by American and Russian interests. This may help explain Churchill’s continued support to obsessive bombing of German cities, at the expense of greater number of air assets being afforded to the fight against submarines. By bombing Germany he could demonstrate to Stalin that Britain was creating pressure against Axis forces on the Eastern front. In February 1945 the same leaders met at the Yalta Conference where Britain again found her bargaining power weak, with a green light given to Russian domination over Eastern Europe.

The Big 3 – Churchill, Roosevelt & Stalin at Yalta 1945

Following victory in Europe the Labour Party refused to continue to support the war-time coalition government, forcing new elections. Polling Day was fixed for 5 July 1945 where the old warrior, now 70 years old, who had led his nation to victory, was pitted against a younger and more dynamic adversary. Labour was able to exploit thinking that the Conservatives, and especially Churchill, was irresponsible and out of touch with ordinary people. The outcome was a landslide win for Labour. The great statesman painfully watched the unfolding of the empire he so dearly loved and the demise of the great navy that had protected it.

Out of office and back again

While out of office Churchill perhaps unwisely retained leadership of his party. His days were now filled with what he enjoyed most, writing and painting, with more time, especially during the winter months, spent taking agreeable holidays abroad in warmer climes. In late 1951 the Labour Government called an election which it lost and Winston, now 76 years of age and in failing health, was called upon once more to form a new government. It was unfortunately a time when the health of his wife and greatest supporting prop was also failing. In 1954 one of his greatest personal triumphs and accolades was the award of the Nobel Prize for Literature.

There was forever reluctance by the old war horse to relinquish power but without the strength and stamina to fight he eventually resigned at Easter 1955. An election was called, with Winston still retaining a seat in parliament but under Prime Minister Anthony Eden. The Churchills spent much of their remaining years together in the South of France, frequently accepting hospitality from the very rich including the Canadian newspaper magnate Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook) and the Greek shipowner Aristotle Onassis.

An end to a remarkable voyage

On a Sunday morning on 24 January 1965 Sir Winston Spencer Churchill died aged 90 at his London house. He was accorded the rare honour of Lying-in-State (the first commoner since the Duke of Wellington) and given a state funeral. The pall bearers were from the Grenadier Guards with which he had fought during WWI, and his coffin was placed on a gun carriage drawn by 120 naval ratings, passing slowly through the streets of the capital to St Paul’s Cathedral. Following the service the bier was then taken to Tower Pier for a final voyage upstream to Waterloo Station; here bands played ‘Rule Britannia’ accompanied by a 17-gun salute. Even the giant-giraffe like dockside cranes dipped their jibs to the cortege. The body was taken by train for its final resting place at Blandon near Blenheim Palace, where he had been born. After the funeral President Eisenhower and our Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies made impressive broadcasts to the American people and the peoples of the Commonwealth respectively. With his passing the Churchill country home at Chartwell in Kent, with many of its historic contents, was bequeathed to the National Trust.

Dr Charles McMoran Wilson (Lord Moran) was Winston’s physician from 1940 until his patient’s death in 1965. The following year he published Winston Churchill – The Struggle for Survival based on his diaries concerning his illustrious patient. The book was later serialised in The Times. Many, including the Churchill family, were highly critical of this breach of medical ethics. However Moran does provide a unique insight into a private life which we should not otherwise know. There is mention of Churchill’s depressive tendency, the ‘Black Dog’, and his upsetting mood swings. Moran admits he gave his patient drugs to help bolster his spirits. However Moran downplays the effects these episodes had on Churchill’s overall performance.

The first ship named after him was an ex United States Coast Guard cutter commissioned into the Royal Navy in 1940 as HMS Churchill. She was later transferred to the Soviet Navy and was sunk in action in 1945. In 1967 the first of a new class of nuclear submarine was laid down as HMS Churchill. HMS Conqueror, another of this class, is best known for sinking the Argentinean cruiser ARA General Belgrano in the 1982 Falklands War. HMCS Churchill was a Royal Canadian Navy shore establishment from 1950 to 1966.

Lady Churchill was to spend another 12 years widowed, comforted by her family. She died in her 92nd year in December 1977. Her funeral service was held at Westminster Abby, and was attended by members of Winston’s old regiment the Queen’s Royal Irish Hussars (4th Hussars) and officers and men from HMS Churchill.

Summary

In 1940 a short flabby man of 65, a difficult man, a solid smoker and drinker, who most considered past his prime, took on the world’s toughest job of beating a triumphant Hitler. His pugnacious features became known to millions and epitomised the fighting spirit of the British Bulldog. But for Churchill, with his acknowledged shortcomings, there may have been no Anzacs winning their spurs at the Dardanelles, a great graving dock may never have been built and Garden Island would still be totally surrounded by water. In the darkest days when Britain stood alone it would have been far easier to seek compromise with the enemy; if this had occurred the world would be a far different place from what we know today and Australian independence not guaranteed.

His magnificent mastery of prose produced so powerful a potion it became a tonic which fortified the national spirit, for with him there was no need for lesser mortals to spin tales. With Churchill at the helm his ship never wavered from what he considered the true course and his indomitable fighting spirit was a major factor in bringing about victory in hopefully our last world war.

We are grateful to Jim Craigie who provided research material for this article.

The British Navy Between the Wars

June 14, 2011

(A lecture delivered to the naval history course of the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy)

FAILURE

The popular picture of British strategy and the Royal Navy between the wars is of failure, failure to understand strategic reality in the form of the emergent challenges of the Japanese, the Germans and the Italians and failure to comprehend the implications of the rapid pace of technological development and the massive consequences for maritime operations of such innovations as aircraft and submarines. All of this failure, it can be argued, in the disaster of the destruction of Force Z in December 1941, when the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse were overwhelmed in the absence of their own air cover by repeated attacks by Japanese long range gravity and torpedo bombers.

COMPLACENCY

There is some truth in this picture. There were complacency, lack of imagination and arrogance within the British government, defence machinery and the Royal Navy of the 1920s and 1930s and these defects certainly contributed to some of the failures of the British when the Second World War started. But there were also many factors which were beyond the control of strategic policy makers, force structure planners and operational commanders and against which they struggled with considerable success.

THE WORLD EMPIRE

When one contemplates the British situation, it is essential to consider the world as a whole because the British Empire was, literally, a world wide one and had to assess its strategy and its policy in a world wide context. Thus, for example, the maintenance of balance of power in Europe was not for the British an end in itself, however desirable, but a means to a greater end – the preservation and well being of the British Empire and Britain’s commercial and financial position – two aspects of British policy that were not identical but were very closely linked. For example, although British possessions within South America were very limited, their commercial holdings and investments were not and the profits made from South American ventures and the trade links with that part of the world were as significant to British thinking as any other.

ANGLO-AMERICAN COMPETITION

This brings me to another point in considering the British position, particularly from the vantage point of the Second World War and the Cold War that followed. Ideology, with the exception of fears of Communism and the nascent but still weak Soviet Union, was not really a factor in international politics until well on into the 1930s. Despite the First World War and any shared linguistic and cultural heritage, the United Kingdom and the United States perceived each other as much as strategic competitors as partners. Commercial competition between British and American interests was a reality around the globe and it was coloured by the anti-colonialism of the Americans that was partly idealistic and partly engendered by a desire to improve America’s position in a highly competitive environment. Multinationals and globalisation have been with us for a long time.

This did not mean that the British and Americans were enemies – even if the American Naval War College did include in the 1920s games against the British in its curriculum for strategic planning under the designation of ‘War Plan RED’ as the alternative to those against the Japanese which were designated ‘Plan ORANGE’. But it did mean that the British and the Americans were not very good friends.

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE 1920s

The next point is that the balance of power in Europe in the 1920s was not that of a decade later, particularly in regard to Germany. While a German renaissance was feared, the fact was that German naval power had been so restricted under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that it could not be considered as being a serious issue for the Royal Navy. Northern European security had many more land implications than it did maritime until the advent of the Nazis in 1933 and the start of German rearmament. British maritime security was concerned more with problems of the Mediterranean and very much more with problems of the Far East – the threat posed by the Japanese and their powerful fleet.

FAILURE AND TECHNOLOGY

Another part of the image of British failure is that of an alleged failure to exploit technological opportunities. Here, too, there are real difficulties in sustaining a thesis of systematic British failure and certainly challenges in according particular culpability to naval planners. The first point is that in understanding the effects of technological change upon military forces one has to remember the delicate balance between present capability and potential for the future and the relationship of both to strategic warning. What do I mean by this? As a military force, if you sacrifice your capacity to operate effectively in the short term in favour of spending your money on capabilities which will only give you a return a decade ahead – and which you cannot be 100% sure will be effective – you are going to look pretty silly if a contingency arises in the meantime.

REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

And here is another point about technological change. A revolution in military affairs is NOT about a particular innovation such as an aircraft or radar making a difference to the way that war is fought. It is the way in which such innovations are utilised that determines whether a revolution occurs. In the case of the Emperor Napoleon, for example, the revolution which he engendered in terms of improving the mobility of land forces and utilising in combination the arms of infantry, cavalry and artillery did not depend upon any significant new technology – it was the way that he used existing technology that counted.

THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Let’s look at the aircraft carrier. Please do not have the picture of the American super carriers in your mind when you think about the aircraft carrier – do not even have the picture of the attack on Pearl Harbor, of the Coral Sea or of Midway in your mind when you think of the 1920s and even most of the 1930s. Why? Because it took the best part of twenty years after World War I for the combination of new technological systems AND procedures and proven in-service capabilities to come together to make effective weapon systems. It really only happened from about 1937 onwards with the advent of metal skinned monoplanes with more powerful engines. The British were, for many reasons, three or four years behind in this development, a few years which in strategic terms were to prove critical.

Let me give you an example of the problems which British aircraft carriers had around 1930. First, carrier aircraft could not easily fly at night – that means that the aircraft carrier was ineffective up to 50% of the time. Second, carrier aircraft and carrier operations were weather limited (as were shore bases, a point sometimes neglected by advocates of shore based air power). If the wind was above about Force 6 with an accompanying high sea state, they couldn’t fly and they couldn’t fly in low visibility. In northern European waters, the combination of these two factors probably accounted for another 15% (by the most favourable estimate). Thus, you have a powerful and very expensive weapon system (and aircraft carriers with their air groups cost a lot more than battleships) which is ineffective for up to 65% of the time. This perhaps explains why aircraft carriers of the 1920s were armed with the same sort of guns as a cruiser. As exercises showed, they often had to defend themselves. It also partly explains why carrier borne air flourished in the clearer air of the Pacific where in any case the distances were much greater and the potential land air bases much more widely distributed.

THE BRITISH AND THE RAF

The problem gets worse. If we look at the aircraft which were available in the 1920s and early 1930s, single engine, cloth skinned biplanes, they suffered from limited speed and minimal range. Furthermore, the British had a problem which was a direct result of the creation of the Royal Air Force which had removed a substantial proportion of the aviation expertise from the Royal Navy on its formation in 1918. Because the British had so few aviation experienced senior officers, admirals and captains had to depend very much upon the advice of their juniors who were actually flying the aircraft. In the United States and Japan, by comparison, many of the aviation ship commanders were themselves aviators. What happened was that the British suffered from conservatism from the bottom. Because the British admirals were not themselves experts, they were much less willing than the Americans or Japanese to take risks and push their subordinates into extending the operational envelope and accepting greater risks. Thus, the British were much more cautious in the way they operated. For example, British carriers would not recover an aircraft while there was another one still on deck – each aircraft had to be struck down into the hangar before the next was landed on. This meant that the British took up to four times longer than the Americans did to get their air groups back on board. This of course meant that the effective operational range of the aircraft was reduced, particularly when operating in large numbers, because they had to keep a reserve of fuel to wait for recovery. The risk of one aircraft running into another if it did a bad landing on deck was something which the USN and the IJN would accept.

There were other, similar problems. But the consequence of them all was that British operational ranges were about one third lower than for the Americans or the Japanese. And when this meant a reduction from 180 miles to 120 miles, the consequences were profound.

AN EXERCISE IN THE ATLANTIC

Let us look at a theoretical exercise in 1932, in which a carrier is pitted against a cruiser force in the Atlantic. It is one hour before dawn and, at 0500, each side detects radio transmissions from the other and thus knows the bearing but not the range of the opposition. Although each has to assume that the opposition is in the vicinity, they are in fact 100 miles apart. Each determines to launch a scouting aircraft at dawn since their aircraft cannot operate at night. In each case, the scout is a Fairey IIIF biplane; the cruisers’ machine is a float plane, the carrier’s a land plane. The weather is clear and the sea slight, apparently ideal conditions for air operations at sea.

But note the first problem for the carrier – the wind is from the west, which means that the ship must steam towards the cruisers when launching or recovering aircraft. If she is operating any kind of air patrols this means, at best, that she cannot make ground to keep her distance from the cruisers. In reality, she could well end up making ground to the west, despite her best intentions.

If all the equipment works and accepting favourable times for the carrier to recover the scout and organise an eighteen aircraft strike (which against a three cruiser force is a threat but not necessarily a decisive one), we get the result that the carrier’s aircraft would be able to achieve a strike when the cruisers are still out of range at 32 miles.

But, if a radio fails in the scout (and the airborne radios often did – even in 1942 the course of the Battle of Midway was arguably determined by the failure of a single Japanese radio), the equation becomes very different. The cruisers are approaching gun range at fourteen miles from the carrier before her aircraft are in position to strike. See the problem?

THE RN AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Let me look at another aspect. The Royal Navy chose in the late 1930s to reduce the number of fighter aircraft in its carriers, concentrate on strike and reconnaissance aircraft and protect its carriers with a heavy armoured deck and an increased anti-aircraft gun armament – accepting that the armoured deck and gun armament meant that there was less capacity for aircraft, thereby apparently exacerbating the lack of fighters.

This seems, on the face of it, to be a pretty stupid approach. But was it, when the decision was taken in 1935? In the first place, one of the driving reasons was warning time. In the 1920s, fleets at sea gained the warning time necessary to launch fighters and get them high enough to be of use by deploying cruisers and destroyers on the horizon – in touch with the main force but maintaining radio silence. There they kept a lookout for approaching aircraft, breaking silence to report when they made a sighting. This worked with biplanes which were advancing at about 100 or so knots. But it did not work with monoplanes which were 50 knots faster because there was simply not enough time to get the aircraft up once the warning signal from a ship 20 miles away had been received of a force 10 or so miles further out. The difference here between 20 or so minutes and 12 or so minutes was vital. What changed the equation? Radar, something barely dreamed about as a possibility for seagoing ships as late as 1935 but which was providing effective early warning to the British fleet in the Mediterranean in 1940.

Before the advent of radar, only the very biggest carriers could have enough fighters to maintain a permanent airborne patrol throughout daylight hours – and, although the British possessed some big carriers, they never really had enough aircraft because they didn’t have enough money. And single seater fighters were not particularly useful – they had a limited role, limited range and not much of an ability to navigate over long distances over the sea.

CARRIERS AND BOMBERS

Another point is that in 1935 it did not appear as though long range aircraft would have the capacity to carry bombs greater than about 500 pounds (approximately 250 kilograms).[1] In these circumstances, it was possible to design ships which carried sufficient armour that the bombs could not penetrate. This is what the British did accepting the reduced aircraft carrying capacity which was part of the final armoured carrier design. By 1940, the operational carrying capacity of the new aircraft entering service in the world’s air fleets was about 1,000 pounds, as the British discovered to their cost – too much to armour effectively against in any reasonably sized ship. Nevertheless, despite the disadvantages of the armoured deck, it was true that British ships survived attacks by aircraft that would have sunk the aircraft carriers of other nations. This was well demonstrated during the kamikaze attacks in the Pacific in 1945 when British carriers literally brushed the debris of crashed aircraft off their decks while some American carriers were so badly damaged that they never again saw operational service.

THE BALANCED FLEET

Contrary to the received wisdom, the picture of the Royal Navy’s investment programmes between 1919 and 1939 is not one in which all the available money was poured into renovation of the battleship force. In fact, during the years between the wars it is now clear that in real terms the United States Navy spent more than half as much again as the British on the renewal of a battleship force which was the same size as that of the British.

The Royal Navy’s picture is on fact one of careful balance between all arms of the fleet. Cruiser construction was only interrupted by the Depression. Destroyer building programmes were begun at the end of the 1920s and also interrupted only by the Great Depression. The submarine building programme was also substantial and was marked by many efforts to experiment and innovate with new designs – such as a cruiser submarine with 130mm (5.2″) guns – not as silly as it sounds – and large minelaying submarines.

The fact that the British did not see the battleship as the sole arbiter of naval power is indicated by the resources which went into aircraft carriers – there were three major conversions in the 1920s which became the large carriers FURIOUS, COURAGEOUS and GLORIOUS, the ARK ROYAL was laid down in the early 1930s and the rearmament programme of the late 1930s included six large aircraft carriers by comparison with five battleships. Aircraft carriers and their air groups, it should be noted again, cost much more than battleships.

Indeed, as I look at the tactical school of the Royal Navy between the wars and the way in which they intended to fight, I am struck by the extent to which the British were seeking to overcome what they perceived as inherent technological disadvantages – and disadvantages in numbers – by innovative tactical thought and the combination of all arms of maritime warfare. For this reason, we see the Royal Navy working hard on night fighting, something about which it had been less than enthusiastic before Jutland. We do see a lot of work on surprise attacks, on seeking out the enemy where he would be most vulnerable.

This manifested itself in all sorts of ways. In the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935-36, the British Mediterranean Fleet had worked out a comprehensive plan for an air attack on the Italian Fleet in its bases, a plan that was to be revived and brought to a triumphant conclusion at Taranto in November 1940. The China Fleet of the 1930s, which did not have battleships and possessed only one aircraft carrier, nevertheless had no less than 15 submarines on strength, the most modern that the British possessed and more than the operational submarine forces of the Home and Mediterranean Fleets combined. Why should this be so? Because, until reinforcements could be brought out to the Far East, the submarines would be by far the most effective means for the weaker naval power – in this case the British – could slow down the onslaught of the stronger, the Japanese if the latter embarked upon an attack of British territories.[2]

These are not the dispositions of a Navy totally fixated on battleships.

THE GREATEST NAVAL DISASTER

I think that there are several factors that have caused us to be unduly critical of the British. The first, I believe, is that the alliance with the French was a fundamental construct of British strategy throughout the 1920s and 1930s and that it was the fall of France and the opening of the French ports to the German submarine and air campaigns that was in fact the greatest naval disaster that the British have ever suffered. It is a matter of looking at maps. If the Germans did not have the direct access to the Atlantic that they enjoyed from 1940 to 1945, then the ‘Battle of the Atlantic’ would have been as much a battle of Northern European waters and much of the British anti-submarine effort could have been conducted much closer to home. When we look at the FLOWER class corvettes of ‘the Cruel Sea’ and the fact that they were much too small for the Atlantic in 1941, we should remember that they had been developed with a different strategic construct in mind. It is worth noting, for example, that although the Germans enjoyed some spectacular successes in 1939 with their U-Boats, notably in sinking the carrier COURAGEOUS at sea and the battleship ROYAL OAK at anchor in Scapa Flow, they also suffered greater proportional losses in the same period than they did until 1943 when the tide turned in the Atlantic. Furthermore, the French possessed their own substantial Navy, one that could help on the trade routes around the world and, equally to the point, neutralise the Italian Fleet of equivalent size and capability.

THE LIMITS OF BRITISH TECHNOLOGY

The second point is that British technology on a national basis itself had considerable limitations. The British failed profoundly in their attempts to produce adequate anti-aircraft weapons and a systematic underestimation of the threat was at least partially responsible for this. This underestimation, to be fair, was partly caused by an intelligence failure in imagination which has in recent times been termed ‘projection’. Because the British were so limited in many of their achievements with aviation over the sea, they could not believe that others were much further advanced. When the Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk in 1941, this was the first inkling that the British had received that the Japanese aircraft could operate at such ranges from their bases.

THE LACK OF MONEY

But much of the failure was caused by the inability of the British to produce all the equipment that they needed. One fundamental cause, which I have already suggested by implication, was the lack of money. Look again at the map of the world. Fundamentally, the British had more calls on their day to day resources and more requirements to sustain operational readiness than did either the Americans or the Japanese or any of the Europeans. They had to maintain a chain of naval bases and repair and support facilities throughout the world, both more distributed and more numerous than any other naval power. Thus, although they apparently had parity with the USN and superiority over the IJN, they had consistently to devote more of their money to operations and less to modernisation and innovation than did any of the others. This is one way in which the Americans were able to spend so much more on modernising their battle fleet than the British, even when it appeared that the British had a larger budget.

NATIONAL CAPABILITY

The next problem was national capability. The anti-aircraft fire control system with which the British entered the Second World War was what is called a goniographic system which basically predicted the fire control solution based on the target aircraft continuing on a steady course, speed and height from its previously measured position – consistent movement from one point to another. Aircraft that are attacking you, just as ships that are in the same situation, rarely approach their targets on a steady course, speed and height. This goniographic system was just good enough against slow moving biplanes, it was effectively useless against monoplanes. What was needed was the type of tachymetric system which the United States and the Netherlands succeeding in developing, a system which computed the future position of the target by calculating the curves of movement –an integrating calculator in other words. The British eventually adopted the American system in default of their own – but a number of experts have admitted that they would probably not have been capable of developing and manufacturing such a system even if they were aware of what was really needed.

British marine engineering had been overtaken by the Americans and many of the Europeans and the Japanese in a number of areas, such that the much greater American reliability and range came as a real shock to the Royal Navy (and to the RAN) during the Pacific War. This overtaking was as much the case for the British merchant fleet – possibly much more – as it was for the Royal Navy and it was another indication of a national malaise in terms of investment in emergent technology in modern industry, a malaise that was itself the result of a host of social, economic and political issues.

CONCLUSION

I am not trying here to be an apologist for the British and for the Royal Navy. But I am trying to make the point that there is a great deal of difference between stupid people wilfully doing stupid things and intelligent people hard pressed by circumstance who were seeking to act in the best interests of an over extended Empire. They had to act on the information available, they had to act within time constraints and they had to live – and die – by the consequences of their decisions. Let me conclude by quoting Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, who as First Sea Lord from 1932 to 1938 was responsible for so much of the Royal Navy’s effort to prepare for the coming war. When the question of future battleship construction was being examined in 1935, he was asked by Lord Halifax to put to him succintly the case for such ships. Chatfield replied:

‘If we rebuild the battlefleet and spend many millions in doing so, and then war comes and the airmen are right, and all our battleships are rapidly destroyed by air attack, our money will have been largely thrown away. But if we do not rebuild it and war comes, and the airman is wrong and our airmen cannot destroy the enemy’s capital ships, and they are left to range with impunity on the world oceans and destroy our convoys, then we shall lose the British Empire.’

Footnotes:

[1] Let’s look at some statistics of speed and range over the period:

Fairey IIIF: 120 knots

1927 2 x 250lb bombs

Blackburn Baffin 118 knots

1934 4.5 hrs/87 knots

1 torpedo (18”)

6 x 230 lb bombs

Fairey Swordfish 114 knots

1937 322/86 knots

1 torpedo (18”)

2 x 500 lb bombs

Fairey Barracuda 205 knots

1943 725 nm

1 torpedo (21”)

3 x 500 lb bombs

Grumman Avenger 223 knots

1943 811 nm

1 torpedo (21”)

2000 lbs bombs

[2] UK Submarine Programs 1926-36:

1926 3 O Class (including 2 RAN)

1928 5 O Class

1929 7 O/P Class

1930 4 R Class ( + 2 cancelled)

1931 1 S Class

1932 1 THAMES Class

2 S Class

1 PORPOISE Class

1933 1 S Class

1934 2 THAMES Class

4 S Class

1935 1 PORPOISE Class

1 S Class

1936 2 PORPOISE Class

2 S Class

Book Review: A Hard Fought Ship

September 21, 2010

A Hard Fought Ship, The Story of HMS Venomous.
By Robert J Moore and John A Rodgaard.
ISBN 978-0-9559382-0-7.
Published by Holywell House Publishing, Portsmouth, UK. RRP is UK£18.99.
It can be bought online post free from the Book Depository for UK£13.72

HMS Venomous was a destroyer in the V & W Class, the most advanced of its kind in the world when built, and arguably the most successful ever. Sixty-nine were built at the end of the Great War. By the end of WW II they had all been sunk or scrapped, but during those thirty years, thousands of men served in them. This book tells their story from ‘the forgotten war’ in the Baltic in 1919 to scrapping in 1948.

The book begins with a comparative survey of the world’s destroyers in 1919 and ends with a list of all the V & Ws, giving date built and ultimate fate.

The Royal Navy relied heavily on the ‘old warriors’ of the V & W Class in WW II. In 1940, Venomous and her sister ships rescued thousands of troops from Boulogne and Dunkirk, and guarded England against invasion. Convoy duty in the Atlantic kept Britain from starvation and Arctic convoys to north Russia supplied Russian forces fighting on the Eastern Front.

Deployment to relieve the besieged island of Malta (Operation Pedestal) was followed by ‘a night to remember’ when Venomous fought the U-boat which sank HMS Hecla, rescued its survivors, and then escorted the invasion force to Sicily in 1943. After limping home to Britain, her engine ‘shot’, she was converted to a FAA target for air-launched torpedoes, survived a hurricane and was sent to Norway to accept the surrender of German naval forces.

The story of HMS Venomous is told by its officers and crew and illustrated with 170 of their photographs taken at ‘action stations’, plus paintings, drawings and maps; it is set in context by the authors.

About the authors: Robert J Moore is the former CO of the Sea Cadet Unit which keeps the name of Venomous alive in the UK, and Captain John A Rodgaard, USN was Naval History ‘Author of the Year’, 2000, He took over the writing of this book when Bob Moore died.

Royal Navy

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